G-2 Report

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SITUATION REPORT

March 6 - April 6,1939

RECEIVED G.S. W. D. MAY 4- 1939

1. The Siang (Han) River Front in Hupeh
2. The Capture of Nanchang
3. Minor Sectors
4. Air Activity
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6. The Lung-Hai Railway
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1. The Siang (Han) River Front in Hupeh:

On the date of our last report (March 6th) the Japanese column moving northwest from Yingcheng had reached a point four kilometers east of Anlu (Chunghsiang) on the Han River. Anlu was reported to be in Japanese hands on the 11th but to date no further westward advance has been made from there. Chinese claim Japanese at Anlu used gas both in shells and canisters. A Japanese column moving to the southwest from Yingcheng had taken Chiukou and Yochiakou by March 1st but by March 18th only small units from the Japanese 16th Division had crossed the Han at Chiukou and at nearby Shayang. These units, the Chinese knew, were too weak to proceed against either Ichang or Shasi without reinforcements and the bulk of the Japanese 13th Division, which was acting as reserve for the western push from Hankow, was still on the Ping-Han north of Hankow with a part south of Tienmen, Hupeh.

Between Chunghsiang and Ichang there is a good road but between Yokou and Shasi there is no road and the terrain is rough. From Hsiangyang to the north there is access to Shensi by river and road and to Honan by road. From Hsiangyang the Japanese might threaten Sian and the western Lung-Hai. Which way would they move? Some said the Japanese force at Chiukou was a mere covering force for the Japanese main body at Chunghsiang from which point the Japanese would drive to the northwest. On March 11th the Japanese were reported repairing the Hankow-Ichang highway. On the 24th Japanese in the Yingshan area of northern Hupeh were moving toward the Honan border. On the 31st Japanese in the Chunghsiang area were reported showing signs of moving toward Hsiangyang and Tsaoyang.

Based on Nanyang in western Honan the Chinese had ten divisions to block an advance north from the Han river. Chinese forces from the Hengyang area in Hunan had been transferred to the Chingmen area in western Hupeh. In command on the Han River front is Li Tsung-jen of Kwangsi (Kwangsi men are very proud of their Li and Po,

as they call Pai Chung-hsi) in whom the Chinese, with reason have great confidence. His job is to prevent a Japanese attack on either Ichang, Sian, or the Lung-Hai from the Han River region, and it looks as if he has the right solution for on April 2nd Chinese forces were reported to have crossed the Han River in a general offensive against Japanese positions on the east bank between Yokou and Hsiangyang. However this attack will probably fail to secure decisive results due to the chronic reluctance of the Chinese to risk sufficient troops.

2. The Capture of Nanchang:

The principal event of military importance during the period of this report was the capture by the Japanese of the Kiangsi provincial capital with the consequent severance of the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad. This railroad starts at Siaoshan in Chekiang at a point opposite Hangchow and connects with the Yueh-Han Railroad at Changsha via Nanchang. Junks from Siaoshan carried cargo to and from ocean steamers so that the Che-Kan Railroad has been an important artery for the export of Chinese products and for the import of arms and ammunition from abroad.

Early in March the Japanese began to reinforce their troops in northern Kiangsi. A total strength of a little over three divisions or 60,000 men was drawn from parts of five divisions, viz., the 6th, 16th, 101st, 106th, and one unidentified formerly in Hupeh. Chinese troops involved in the Japanese drive on Nanchang were an estimated twenty divisions or 100,000 men controlled by Hsueh Yueh, commanding general of the Ninth War Zone with headquarters at Changsha. Lo Cho-ying had half of these at Wuning. The Nanchang garrison commander was Sung Ken-tang, concurrently commanding general of the 32nd Army.

The curtain went up on this show on March 13th when troops from the 16th and 106th Japanese divisions launched an attack on Tuchang east of the entrance to Poyang Lake. Covered by airplanes and gunfire from war ships on the lake, troops were landed three kilometers west of Tuchang on March 14th. Tuchang was taken and retaken four times and on the 17th the Japanese shifted their operations to Wucheng on the west shore of Poyang Lake where for three days they attempted to land troops without success. Wucheng fell on the 24th. On the 25th, the Japanese had collected one hundred and fifteen large motor boats together with some small aircraft carriers on Poyang Lake off Wucheng where is the confluence of the Kan and Siu Rivers at their entrance into the Lake. Military and naval units effected a junction at Wucheng and a naval force which sailed up the Kan River. This river after opening several booms arrived in Nanchang on April 3rd.

On March 21st an advance was begun by part of the Japanese 6th Division (Takagi, Iwasaki, Inouye, Shirahama, Fujimura, Tomita and Harada Detachments) westward along the motor road from Jochi towards Wuning. Reuters reports eleven Chinese divisions were guarding the Wuning area. Heavy rains had made the roads almost impossible and Wuning did not fall until ten days later and then in the midst of a thunderstorm at five a.m.

On March 21st, simultaneously with the launching of the drive on Wuning, the Japanese started a southward push west of the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railroad. The Siu (Hsiu) River was crossed southeast of Chiuchin, which is northwest of Yungsiu on the railroad. On March 22nd another crossing was made over the Siu by pontoon bridge near Chiuchin. From here the Japanese troops assisted by tanks advanced southwards down the motor road encountering some resistance at Hanchi west of Yungsiu. Hanchi was taken March 23d and the Japanese then divided their forces, one column following the motor road toward Anyi, one following the old cart road toward Chienchou and Fengsin while a third column attacked Chingan to secure the right flank. Anyi, Chingan, Chienchou and Fengsin were all taken March 24th which was the date on which Wucheng also fell.

The Japanese now moved from Anyi east toward Lohua on the railroad north of Nanchang. From Fengsin they moved to the southwest toward Kaoan. Japanese troops from Kaoan cut the railroad at Shanchienchieh to the south and another detachment from Kaoan crossed the Kan River at Shengmi, 13 miles southwest of Nanchang on March 26th.

Nanchang fell on the evening of the 26th and the bulk of the defending Chinese retreated to the southwest along the Che-Kan R.R. where they were subjected to severe bombing by enemy planes. On April 3d the Japanese left wing from Nanchang was pushing southeastwards along the Chekiang highway and railroad headed for Chinhsien to cut off a Chinese retreat toward the east, and the main body was reported engaged in a westward advance from Kaoan, 50 kilometers southwest of Nanchang where Chinese resistance was being met on the north bank of the Chin River. Chinese troops were reported entrenched in the hills west of Chingan, Fengsin and Anyi.

Kaoan is an important traffic center on the way from Nanchang to Changsha along the military highway linking these two cities. The Chinese general staff expects the attack on Changsha to come from Wuning with a holding attack at Yochow. The Japanese Ninth Division reinforced is in the Tungcheng area where the Hunan-Hupeh-Kiangsi borders meet 50 kilometers northwest of the Changsha-Wuning motor road. The Chinese press expects the Japanese to continue the advance on Changsha in order to clear the Yueh-Han Railroad and make contact with the Japanese troops in Kwangtung. It does not seem to this office that

clearing of the Yueh-Han Railroad by the Japanese would be worth the effort at this time but it is quite possible that the Japanese may drive to Changsha to strengthen their position in Hankow, seize commercial advantages of that shipping center and deal a blow to Chinese morale by capturing yet another provincial capital. The fall of Changsha would weaken the Chinese position at Yochou at the entrance of Tungting Lake and make possible an attack on Ichang simultaneously from south and north. Possession of Ichang would secure Hankow from the west and furnish the Japanese with a convenient air base against Chengtu and Chungking.

To the Chinese the loss of Nanchang was a serious blow to morale in that it shattered the illusion that the Japanese military effort had spent itself. Loss of the Chekiang railroad, however, will not prevent supplies from filtering inland from that province. Coolies and carts will still be able to carry these supplies over secondary roads. Liaison between Chungking and the 4th Route Army in Chekiang will continue, as in the past, to be principally by radio.

3. Minor Sectors:

A. South China:

Much space was given by the press at the end of March to the Japanese capture of Kongmoon a city in the Pearl River delta southwest of Canton.

On March 29th the attack on Kongmoon was heralded in the usual manner by an air raid on the city. On the following day Japanese effected a landing at Paichai (Pakkai). The Chinese withdrew inland to Kongmoon where they fired the city and the Japanese succeeded in entering Kongmoong the same day. Chinese in Chungshan and Shunteh (Shuntak) anticipate a Japanese advance to the south of those cities with the object of isolating Macao from Canton. Chinese forces on April 2d were reported to be holding position east of Sinhui(Sunwui).

On the West River (Sanshui) sector the Japanese were on the defensive due to recent transfers of troops to North China and Hainan Island.

B. Shansi:

There was no activity in the Tungkuan sector during the period.

The Japanese attempted more "mopping up" along the Honan-Shansi border. Chinese troops which the Japanese claimed on March 28th to have mopped up were the 31st Army, 17th and 104th Divisions and the 46th Independent Brigade. The spokesman in Chungking claims the Chinese cut off the Japanese rear when the Japanese moved southward from

Ningwu in northern Shansi to Chinglo but that has frequently happened before with impunity to the Japanese. However, the taking by the Chinese of small towns such as Tawu northwest of Taiyuan on March 7th indicates that the time has not yet come when the Japanese can retain control of conquered territory without garrisons. (On March 10th eighteen of their thirty divisions in China were required for mopping up operations.)

C. Hainan:

The Japanese are employing German military and technical help to plan harbor and defensive works for the permanent occupation of Hainan Island, says the Takungpao on March 11th. Japanese strength in Hainan Island is reported to be about one brigade.

D. Yochou:

The Chinese in the Yochou area launched a "counter" offensive on March 24th which netted them a few miles. Their line now runs from a point 18 miles east of Yochou to a point seven miles south thereof. Japanese hold Yochou and dominate Tungting Lake.

4. Air Activity:

Japanese air activity showed a slight increase, as might be expected with the spring weather bringing more favorable flying conditions. Ichang, Chengchow, Sian and the Red Route in Kansu were the localities most frequently visited. Accuracy of Japanese bombing at Sian is shown by the killing or wounding of General Ch'eng Ch'ien while in his dugout. Ch'eng Ch'ien was in command of the Generalissimo's Northwest headquarters.

The Chinese Air Force still remains in the background. Should the Japanese again bomb Chungking, as is generally expected, then, in the opinion of the writer, it will become known whether or not the Chinese Air Force is to be a factor in this war. When Chungking was last bombed in January, the raiders escaped without a serious fight and it is understood from a reliable source that the Generalissimo told his aviators that when the capital was next raided they would repeat "would" fight.

The advantage to the Japanese in having an air base at Ichang would be not only that pursuits could accompany bombers from there to Chungking but that the same flying conditions prevail in Ichang as in the Yangtze Gorges, which is the best air route to Chungking.

The Japanese Army Air Force alleges that up to March 18th the total number of Chinese planes destroyed in this war was 456. However, training keeps up unabated at the Chinese Air Force Schools - Basic at Kunming and Advanced

at Chengtu. Curtis P'36 pursuits and Curtis-Wright 21 Interceptors were being demonstrated for sale at Chungking last month.

A report from Chungking says that Chinese planes from Chengtu raid in Shansi but not elsewhere. The Russian pilots are still staying close to their Lanchou base.

Follows a table of Japanese air raids reported in the press during March:

Ichang, March 7th, 8th and 14th
Sian, March 7th, 8th, 15th
"Red Route" in Kansu, March 8th,
Yungchang near the Great Wall, 1,600 air miles from Shanghai, March 8th,
Yenan, Shensi, March 6th,
Ninghsia City, March 6th,
Shensi Province, March 9th,
Loyang, March 12th,
Chengchou, March 17th, 19th, 21st, 22nd,
Tungkwan, March 12th,
Pingliang Airfield on Lanchou-Sian highway in western Kansu, March 15th,
Kuling, March 16,
Haimen on Chekiang coast, April 3rd,
Foochow, Fukien, March 21st
S.E. Shansi, March 25th, 28th
Chinghai on Chekiang coast, April 3rd.

5. Guerrilla Activity:

"The Japanese troops in Hopei have been very busy during the last few days" stated the spokesman of the Japanese Army Headquarters in Peking on March 24th while commenting upon current activity of Chinese guerrillas in Hopei, Honan, Shantung and Shansi. Principal clashes between Japanese and Chinese mobile units had occurred near Paoting, Chengting, Shihchiachuang and Nankung, all in Hopei Province. At the latter place Japanese were unsuccessfully chasing General Shih Yu-san, deputy commander of the Hopei guerrillas. Press statistics as to numbers engaged and losses sustained in these skirmishes are deemed unreliable - both sides invariably claiming the victory. But that the guerrillas are seriously hampering train service on either the Tsin-Pu or Ping-Han is not born out by the fact that last week the Japanese erected a pailou in Peking to commemorate the first through train from Peking to Nanking over the Tsin-Pu since their occupation of North China. Last Sunday at Paomachang, a village 3 miles southwest of Peking and now frequented by foreigners as usual, the writer observed a passenger train of twelve coaches in good condition approaching Peking from the south over the Ping-Han. The Peking station master says these trains run daily between Peking and Shihchiachuang.

Both the 8th Route Army and the Japanese troops plan to use the Chinese farmer as an ally. At Mengcheng, west of Paoting, the troops of the 8th Route Army have reportedly ordered all cereals in the hands of farmers to be turned over for storage to Communist collectors to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Japanese.

The Japanese plan is expressed in the following order from "The East Hopei Circuit District Government". Each hsien is directed to organize a summer defense committee under the local police bureau to combat guerrilla activities during the summer when the tall growing kaoliang will furnish the guerrillas with cover. House to house searches are to be made daily and stations, bridges, highways, etc. to be patrolled. Committees are to keep in constant touch with each other. Hsiens are to provide mutual assistance and to maintain liaison with the nearest Japanese garrison.

Neither side offers a very bright prospect to the Chinese farmer and the more frequently the control of an area changes hands the more that farmer will lose.

Cooperation between Central Government and Reds in Shensi is reported "bad with Reds getting worst". Such a situation patently will not help the guerrillas.

6. <u>The Lung-Hai Railway:</u>

The capture on March 4th of Haichou at the eastern terminus of the Lung-Hai Railroad was mentioned in our last report. On March 12th the 57th Chinese Army was reported in northern Kiangsu after having been routed from Haichow. On March 9th the Japanese announced the formation of a special mission to mobilize the villagers for the repair of the eastern end of the Lung-Hai where track and bridges had been almost completely destroyed between Hsuhhow and Hsinpu near Haichow.

A Canadian doctor with the 8th Route Army stated in Chungking last month that the Japanese had rail connection between the Ping-Han Railroad and that part of the Lung-Hai under Japanese control. This connection was obtained by the construction of a detour from a point north of Chengchow to a point west of Kaifeng using for this purpose rails and sleepers moved from the western half of the Tao-Ching Railroad in northern Honan. On March 24th the Japanese took Kingshui only ten miles north of Chengchow.

Commenting on the large scale air attacks on Sian and the Kansu supply route to Russia, the semiofficial "Japan Times", on March 9th, opines that "these air attacks will be followed by big scale military operations with the object of obtaining control over the whole of Northwest China which would become possible with the domination of the entire Lung-Hai Railroad." The Chinese are

expecting air attacks in force on Chengchou from Kaifeng, says a report from Chungking on April 3rd. A foreigner from Yulin, north Shensi, says Central Government units in Shensi have no intention to fight and are preparing for flight into Kansu.

7. General:

In the area south of the Lung-Hai and west of the Ping-Han there are, according to the Japanese spokesman in Shanghai on March 7th, seventy Chinese divisions or roughly 300,000 men (Estimate of 5,000 effectives per Chinese division is believed correct). These are chiefly in the Han River region in Hupeh and in the Kweilin area in Kwangsi where Pai Chung-hsi is hibernating. The Takungpao as of April 6th editorializes that the time has come for China to discard her slogan of "exchange space for time". According to one report, General Van Falkenheysen has written to Chiang Kai-shek urging that the Chinese Army assume the offensive on all fronts where possible. A good source says supplies are adequate for from six to nine months. Will the Generalissimo discard the Chinese policy of declining to risk his army to defend territory? In the opinion of this office the answer is "No." If the Chinese are to win this war they will win it in their own way which is to sit tight and hope that sometime, somewhere, the Japanese will become so involved outside of China that they will be forced to withdraw from the greater part of the present occupied territory. Then will the Kuomintang be able to put into effect all the carefully prepared plans it now has for the "Reconstruction of China."

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SITUATION REPORT

August 12 - September 4, 1939

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1. Shansi
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4. Hunan and Hupeh
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1. Shansi

During the period of this report the major Japanese military operations were, as during the period of our last report, in the Taihangshan area of southeastern Shansi. Again it appears to this observer that they have not only not succeeded in achieving any success but are definitely worse off than before they started in spite of their employment of three full strength provisional divisions drawn from the following units stationed in southeastern Shansi: 20th, 37th, 108th, 109th, 207th and 403rd Divisions.

Based on Luan (captured on July 14th) the Japanese were, in the middle of August, trying to establish a line of communications along the Paitsin highway in an endeavor to control the territory between the Tungpu railway and this highway (see map attached) and at the same time to drive a wedge between Chinese forces east and west of the highway. All that the Japanese succeeded in doing was to get themselves in a dangerous position from several points of which they were able to extricate themselves only with the greatest difficulty and, no doubt, with substantial losses. Opposed to them were, as reported last month, Central Government troops, 8th Routers and Shansi provincials in all about 100,000 men (See below for unit identifications).

On the 16th of August Chinese forces holding Tsinshui, Tungfengchen and Yangcheng had severed communication between the Japanese forces in Tsincheng (Tzechow) and Yicheng to the west thereof, while, on the Tunliu-Antseh highway, east to west communication for the Japanese was prevented by the Chinese 42nd division based in the mountains near Fuchengchen to the south of that highway. On August 14th, the Kimira detachment claimed to have routed part of the 42nd Division, twelve kilometers west of Kuhsienchen. On August 17th Reuters reported that the Japanese were attempting to construct a narrow gauge military railroad from Tsincheng north along the Paitsin highway.

North of Tunliu, the Chinese were holding Yushe, Wusiang and Siangyuan east of the Paitsin highway.

East of the Taihangshan, the Chinese on August 4th took Linhsien, Honan, near the Shansi-Honan border. This town had previously been captured by a Japanese thrust from Anyang on the Pinghan Railway.

On August 8th a Japanese column driving west from Hantan on the Pinghan, to relieve the pressure on Japanese troops in the Tunliu-Changtze-Kaoping area was stopped at Tungyangkuan east of Licheng. (An attempt to take Licheng from Lucheng to the southwest had been successfully blocked by the Chinese on July 14th.) The Chinese on August 16th were expecting a resumption of the Japanese attempt to reach Tunliu from the east.

On August 16th Chinese attacked Yicheng where they claimed 1,000 Japanese casualties.

On the northern end of the Paitsin highway the Chinese after several days of fighting occupied Tsinyuan (west of that highway) on August 11th. The Japanese garrison there fell back on Tsinhsien and on the 16th a Japanese attack west from Tsinhsien was blocked by strong Chinese resistance twenty kilometers from that city. As a result of the capture of Tsinyuan the Chinese claimed to have the upper hand in Shansi because they considered it necessary for the Japanese to have held that city in order to dominate the area north of the Hungtung-T'unliu highway.

On August 16th the Chinese had partially surrounded from east and west the important Japanese base at Tsincheng at the southern end of the Paitsin highway where were stationed two Japanese divisions. The Chinese at this time were expecting an attack on Pang Ping-hsun's mountain base at Lingchuan that would threaten the rear of the Chinese east of Tsincheng but that attack never materialized for by the 16th the Japanese in the Tsincheng-Poai area had started to withdraw on Sinsiang. On August 11th the Chinese eastward advance had reached to within 10 kilometers of Tsincheng but stiff Japanese resistance held out until the 21st when a Chinese column advancing from southwest of Yangcheng succeeded in capturing Tsincheng. One of the Japanese divisions in Tsincheng then withdrew northward on Kaoping. The other (believed to be the 207th) marched south to Poai. To prevent this division from reaching Sinsiang the Chinese were on August 29th attacking the Taoching Railroad between Poai and Sinsiang. The Chinese press heralded the fall of Tsincheng as marking the complete collapse of the much vaunted Japanese offensive in the Taihangshan. (The Japanese spokesman in Peking had at the outset of this offensive stated that it was to be the most important military operation launched by the Japanese army since the occupation of North China.)

On August 24th the Chinese retook Kaoping. The Japanese continued their retreat northward to Changchih (Luan) where according to the Chungking spokesman the pressure of Chinese troops from Linhsien forced the Japanese to withdraw northwest to T'unliu. On August 29th the Chinese stated that T'unliu was being attacked from east and south but on September 2d they admitted that they were still pressing on Changchih. If Luan again falls to the Chinese it will be for the third time and Japanese arms will have thrice suffered heavy losses in Shansi with nothing gained but further devastation of that province.

From August 21-29 some 3 to 4,000 troops from the Japanese 20th and 108th Divisions on the Tungpu Railroad attempted to advance east between Lingshih and Hungtung but were checked after seven days of fighting.

The Japanese spokesman in Peking stated that pitted against their 3 to 5 Japanese divisions in the Taihangshan campaign were approximately twenty Chinese divisions or 130,000 men, including the following units:

Chu Teh's 8th Route Army (119th and 115th Divisions); 27th Chun (45th and 46th Divisions); Wei Li-huang's 1st War Zone troops consisting of Chen Tieh's 14th Chun (14th, 83rd and 98th Divisions) and the 5th Chi T'uan (15th Chun commanded by Liu Mao-en and the 17th Chun commanded by Kao Kwei-tze); Pang Ping-hsun's Special North Honan "Yü Pei Corps" consisting of the 40th Chun (106th Division, 39th Division and 14th Cavalry Brigade); Chu Huai-ping's 97th Chun (24th and 94th Divisions) and Sun Tien-ying's 5th Chun of Shansi Provincials, Kuo Chi-chiao's 9th Chun (47th and 54th Divisions) was reported by the same source to have not been committed to the fighting, this unit having been engaged in guarding the highway west from Tsincheng.

Some fighting occurred in west and north Shansi during the period of this report. In the Fenyang area west of the Tungpu Railroad Chinese mobile units claimed to have inflicted heavy losses on August 13th on Japanese troops that were attempting to advance north from Lishih. In north Shansi Japanese were reported by the Chinese on August 29th to be launching an attack west from Chinglo toward Lanhsien east of which were Chinese troops in position to block them.

2. Manchukuo-Mongolian Border

As has been the case since the inception of this incident, Domei has continued to make fantastic claims for the Japanese air force at Nomonhan. Although hostilities have periodically recurred, the field of operations has not yet shifted beyond the original Balshagar-Noro heights area.

On August 16th Domei disposed of the commanders of the only Soviet units yet identified in the fighting by reporting them both killed in action - General Yakolev of the Soviet mechanized brigade and General Shalev of the 6th Division Siberian Sharpshooters.

On August 17th Transocean reported that military transport on the Trans-Siberian had caused temporary suspension of passenger traffic.

On August 28th the Japanese spokesman in Peking summed up the situation on the Khalha River since August 20th as follows:

> On August 20th, 8 - 9,000 Soviet Mongol infantry and cavalry with 100 tanks tried to outflank the Japanese positions on the Balshagar and Noro Heights by attacking north from the confluence of the Khalha and Holsten Rivers. (See map with Situation Report, July 14, 1939). The Japanese counter-attacked down the southern slopes of these hills and Soviet tanks attempted to encircle Japanese

troops that had advanced to the Khalha's east bank. This tank attack was broken up by Japanese bombers but the spokesman admitted that effective artillery fire was received on Balshagar Heights from Soviet long range artillery on the west bank of the Khalha. (Nine batteries had previously been reported there.)

On August 30th Domei reported that Japanese artillery was gradually getting the best of the Soviet-Mongol forces attacking Balshagar and Noro Heights. A Soviet Mongol force of 7,000 artillery and mechanized troops was reported to have crossed the border at another but undesignated point.

Apparently the Soviets are, at the time of writing this report, still on the east bank of the Khalha for on September 1st Domei reports that the Japanese-Manchukuo forces were steadily pressing the Soviet Manchukuo forces to the bank of the Khalha River. Hand to hand fighting had occurred on the river bank. This report placed the number of Soviet troops at 10,000 the majority of which were from mechanized units.

The following Japanese news reports of aerial combats in this area are considered of value only as indicating places and dates of probable air activity:

August 11 .....71 Soviet planes, including two out of nine S.B. bombers shot down by anti-aircraft batteries at Balshagar Heights.

August 20 .....34 S.B. bombers out of 90 shot down by Japanese aircraft and six out of 30 Soviet planes shot down by anti-aircraft batteries at the Halunarshan railhead southeast of the Nomonhan area. One Soviet bomber "32E-16" downed over Nomonhan.

August 22 .....27 Soviet bombers destroyed on ground in raid on air base in Soviet territory in which Japanese lost three pursuits and one bomber.

August 28 .....19 out of 40 E-16 pursuits shot down in air battle over Nomonhan with loss of one Japanese plane. A further bag of 14 out of 30 was claimed at the same place next day.

August 30 .....Twenty-three out of forty Soviet planes shot down over Nomonhan and sixteen more on the 31st.

September 1.....32 out of 60 Soviet planes shot down in aerial combat over Balshagar Heights.

As against the above total of 321 Soviet planes shot down with neglible losses to the Japanese, United

Press in Chungking reports on September 4th (apparently from Soviet sources) a total of 400 Japanese planes destroyed in the many recent clashes on the Outer-Mongol border. This report claims a major defeat to the Japanese with the capture by the Soviets of 144 field guns and 9,000 rifles. Russian troops entrenched in the Nomonhan area were said to number 20,000 (twice the estimate by the Japanese) and a large Japanese border drive was expected by the same source to start soon.

That war on a larger scale on the Manchukuo border was planned by Japan before the German-Soviet non-aggression pact is believed to be the case. Reports of Japanese troop withdrawals from Tsingtao toward the north early in August as well as withdrawal of Japanese divisions from Central China indicated this. On August 17th the Tokyo head offices of two German and one Italian newspaper correspondents who were then in Peking reputedly ordered them to proceed at once to Manchukuo to cover the impending war. It is the opinion of the writer, as stated in the last section of this report, that due to the German-Soviet non-aggression pact and to the breaking out of war in Europe that the time is not yet ripe for Japan to wage an extensive war with Russia but it is quite probable that she will again try, as on July 8th and July 29th, to push the Russians back across the Khalha.

3. Honan and the Lunghai

Chengchow, North Honan, was badly flooded by ten days of steady rain on August 16th, thereby removing any present threat of a Japanese advance in that sector.

4. Hunan-Hupeh

On August 8th the Chinese forces from North and Central Hupeh were converging, from the direction of Tsaoyang, on Suihsien in the eastern foothills of the Tahungshan (See map of Han River area accompanying Situation Report June 16, 1939). Their objective was small Japanese covering forces at Lishan (30 kilometers northwest of Suihsien) and at Kaocheng that had been sent out from the Japanese right flank in the Sinyang area on the Pinghan Railroad. The Chinese took Kaocheng and Lishan on August 8th by an attack in two columns one south from T'ungpeh (T'ungpo) and one southeast from Tsaoyang. On August 16th they were attacking Suihsien and as far as is known that town on the Anlu-Fancheng highway still constitutes Hankow's farthest north-western outpost.

West of the Tahungshan and east of the Han River, Chinese troops, astride the Hankow-Ichang highway, were attacking Chungsiang from the north on August 13th. On the

same date Chungking reported heavy fighting at Chienkiang, 100 kilometers down the Han River from Chungsiang. Here (Chienkiang) Chinese artillery fire had reportedly necessitated the Japanese rushing reinforcements from Yingcheng and Kingshan. Chienkiang and Yuehkow as this report is written remain in Japanese hands.

On August 17th Transocean reported a Japanese drive west from Anlu to be converging on the Chinese stronghold at Changshoutien north of Chungsiang.

On August 8th Japanese naval vessels, taking advantage of the high water level, proceeded south of Yochow, North Hunan, and reached the southern shore of Tungting Lake twenty miles northwest of Siangyin. Here, after an unsuccessful attempt to make a landing, they shelled Chinese positions and withdrew on Yochow.

A Japanese drive on Ichang along the north bank of the Yangtze, predicted by Chungking on August 19th, has not yet materialized.

5. Kiangsu and Kiangsi

The Assistant American Naval Attache in Shanghai reported on August 13th that Tseng Tsu-ming, Provincial governor of Kiangsu, had been notified to be prepared within two weeks from that date to assume military responsibility for his province, using his own local troops. According to the same source the Japanese had withdrawn "considerable" troops from the Yangtze valley. According to missionary reports the Japanese garrison in Soochow had been reduced from 5 to 1,000 and other posts in that area similarly cut.

In northwest Kiangsi Chinese claimed on August 15th to be launching attacks from the west against the Japanese positions running north from Kaoan thru Fengsin to Chingan (Tsingan). A thrust from the north was also being made to cut the Chingan-Anyi highway. On August 16th Central News reported another Chinese attack from the south against the Japanese positions along the north bank of the Chin River east of Kaoan. (See map with Situation Report May 5, 1939.)

6. South China

An abortive attempt on the part of the Japanese to isolate Hongkong occurred during August. On the night of August 15-16 about 1,000 Japanese troops landed at Namtau near Poan (see attached sketch) in the Pearl River delta area and advanced east along the northern border of Kowloon Leased Territory. On the morning of the 16th these troops after a preparatory aerial bombardment entered Shamchun on

the Kowloon-Canton Railway just inside the border of Kwangtung and dispatched a detachment to Shatoukok. This move blocked traffic from British leased territory into the hinterland and caused Hongkong to fear for her food supply and China's Commercial Air Lines, C.N.A.C. and Eurasia, to be concerned over the safety of their flights in and out of Hongkong.

On August 15th Domei reported that Satsoo Island, fifty miles southwest of Hongkong, which had been occupied by the Japanese since December of 1937, had been converted into a naval plane base "providing a threat to Hongkong."

The Manchurian Daily News stated that the border region stretching for thirty five kilometers from Poan to Shatoukok had long been a hot bed for anti-Japanese activity including the relaying of radios from Chungking by land line to Hongkong but the consensus of foreign opinion is that this move was aimed primarily at Britain.

On August 27th, four days after Germany's announcement of her non-aggression pact with Russia, Japanese troops concentrated at Namtou were loaded on eight transports and the Japanese garrisons at Shumchun and Shatoukok were considerably reduced.

7. Air Activity

(1) Japanese

Japanese aircraft continued, during the period of this report, to repeatedly bomb Chungking and the principal Kwangsi cities along the main motor roads to Indo-China, On August 22nd Chiating, a waterway junction on the Min River between Chengtu and Suifu, and reportedly being used as a provincial capital by rear echelons in the Central Government, was severely damaged by incendiary bombs from thirty-six naval planes. Chiating, Szechuan, is 270 kilometers west of Chungking. (See C.N.A.C. Airways chart attached hereto.)

Japanese air raids on the following places were reported in the press:

August 12 .....Changchow, 24 miles west of Amoy, Fukien, was bombed by eight planes. Talmadge College, an American mission school, was damaged.

August 13 .....Chinese troops were bombed at Lishan east of Tungliu (opposite Anking), Anhwei.

August 15 .....Hsintu, Ninming, Kweiping, Liuchow, Nanning and Wuchow - all in Kwangsi on the motor road to Indo-China - were raided. Nanning was again bombed on August 25th and Nanning and Lungchow (railhead near Kwangsi-Indo-China border) were bombed on August 27th.)

August 17 .... Japanese naval aircraft were reported active over Kiangsi, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Hainan Island.

August 21 .... Yuanling (Shenchow) on the Changsha - Kweiyang motor road in northwest Hunan bombed.

August 23 .... Kienli, Hunan and Kwangsin, Kiangsi raided. Kienli is on the north bank of the Yangtze, west of Yochow, and Kwangsin is 200 kilometers east of Nanchang on the Chekiang Railroad.

August 23 & 24 .... Chungking was raided at night. The Japanese planes flew at 12,000 feet in one eight-plane line formation followed in thirty minutes by a loose eight-plane line formation. Searchlights picked up the raiders but anti-aircraft guns did not fire. Major Mayer reported Chinese air action in this raid as "not too effective" - one Chinese pursuit having opened fire at a five mile range. Firing when the target was still out of range may have been intended to impair the bombing accuracy of the Japanese for all bombs dropped in this raid were reported to have landed in an open field west of the city.

August 25 ..... Fifteen Japanese bombers dropped fifty-five incendiary bombs on Lishui (Chuchow) in south central Chekiang.

August 28 ..... Chungking was again raided after dark by twenty-two (Chinese press reported fifty-four) naval bombers in three flights all in tight diamond formation at about 12,000 feet. The first flight had five planes, the second nine and third eight. The raiders approached the city from the north in bright moonlight and were promptly picked up by searchlights. Anti-aircraft fired heavily on the second flight but only a few rounds were fired on the first and third flights. The bombs landed southwest of the city. The second flight was engaged in a determined manner by what were believed by Major Mayer to be improved E-15 pursuits with Russian pilots. One pursuit dived from above and one attacked almost head on. Heavy machine gun fire was exchanged on both sides at effective ranges but no casualties were observed. The bombers made an excellent target but the anti-aircraft fire was ineffective - although Central News claimed one Japanese bomber shot down. There appeared to be no coordination between pursuit and anti-aircraft action.

During the early morning of August 31st Japanese naval aircraft conducted a moonlight raid at 8,000 feet on the Chinese airfield, 30 miles up river from Chungking and on the night of September 1-2d bombed the military airfield at Kwang(Wang) Yang Pa, ten miles down river from Chungking. On both occasions Chinese pursuits were reported to have "gone up" but no air action was reported.

On September 4th the western suburbs of Chungking were bombed by five planes in two echeloned V's followed by two more formations each of nine planes, the first in a tight V and the second in line. At least six Chinese pursuits engaged the raiders with unknown results. Anti-aircraft batteries fired on the Japanese planes outlined by searchlights. Again there appeared to be no coordination between pursuit and anti-aircraft action.

Attached hereto is an aerial photograph (only one copy) of the Ichang bombing raid of August 6th, referred to in our last report.

(2) Chinese

According to the Shanghai correspondent of the Japan Times, 150 Soviet airplanes had arrived during August 1939 at Lanchow, capital of Kansu, in accordance with the Sino-Soviet trade agreement of June 16, 1939. On August 10th Major Barrett reported that 14 Soviet planes with Soviet pilots had arrived in Chungking from Russia and on August 13th the same source stated that 225 Russian planes had arrived in China but not that many pilots. 60 Russian pursuits were said to have been allotted for the defense of Chungking. A new Chinese military airfield was reported constructed thirty miles upriver from Chungking. The Assistant American Naval Attache reported on August 15th that there were said to be 150 ships of all types in Lanchow whence oxygen tanks had been shipped from Chungking indicating that future altitude bombing operations were contemplated. An increase of Soviet fliers at Chengtu had also been reported.

On August 26th Chinese planes claimed to have raided Hangchow.

8. Guerrilla Activity

Guerrilla activity during the period of this report was mostly in the Shanghai-Hangchow-Soochow triangle. Rail service on the Shanghai-Hangchow Railroad was interrupted when Chinese troops advancing northeastward from the neighborhood of Kashing on August 17th reached the outskirts of Sunkiang on August 25th. Fourth Routers near Kunshan were making it difficult for the Japanese to operate trains on the Shanghai-Nanking railroad. The Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai, when claiming on August 12th that the guerrilla "menace" then had been "crushed", admitted that 4th Routers were better equipped than ordinary guerrillas and that they had frequently succeeded in filtering through the Japanese lines.

In Anhwei, Chinese shore batteries on August 10th sank one Japanese transport and badly damaged another at Tikangchen, up river from Wuhu.

South of Kaifeng and east of the new Yellow River guerrillas were "active" on August 16th.

On August 23rd Central News, Chengchow, claimed heavy losses inflicted upon Japanese forces near Luanchow on the Peining Railroad but the undersigned who passed through Luanhsien on the 21st saw only the usual Japanese garrison of about two squads there and no signs of guerrilla activity. About the same time, however, a foreigner did see several Japanese wounded being put on the train at Langfang half way point between Peking and Tientsin, in the neighborhood of which guerrillas have periodically been in evidence.

9. General

(A) China

a. Supply

On August 5th the harbor-master at Haiphong estimated that if no additional cargo were discharged at that port, it would require from six months to one year to clear the stocks now landed there and awaiting transportation inland. Most of this cargo was consigned to the Chinese government and fear was expressed in Chungking on September 4th that the outbreak of the European war might cause some of these supplies to be confiscated by the French authorities.

In order to meet the above congestion, the Ministry of Communications of the Chungking government stated that it was rushing construction on new highways and railroads in Free China as shown on the attached road and rail map of southwest China. To meet the twin difficulties of truck and gasoline shortage, cart caravans had been organized to supplement motor transport. On August 31st 900 new trucks from the United States arrived in the interior. An American transport expert was reported to be the new head of T.L. Soong's Southwest Transportation Company and three American highway experts (M. E. Sheahan, A. B. Bassi and C. W. Van Patter) are reported due in China in September to make a study of China's road conditions. On August 27th the last lap in the Kunming-Suifu-Chungking highway, Suifu to Luhsien (both on the Yangtze River), was nearly completed. Here five hundred trucks, recently purchased from France, were reported waiting to start operations.

New railroads reported under construction on August 20th were the Kweiyang-Liuchow Railroad (to connect eastward with the Kwangsi-Hunan Railroad at Kweilin) and the Kunming-Suifu Railroad with its connecting branch from Suanwei to Kweiyang. Suifu is at the head of navigation for small steamers on the Yangtze.

The first consignment of rails for the Kunming-Chungking (or Kunming-Suifu) Railroad was due from England about October 1st but an optimistic estimate placed its completion at least twelve months hence. The completion of the

railroad paralleling the Burma Road, referred to in our last report, is not expected for at least two and one half years.

Domei, Shanghai, reported that 45,000 tons of cargo monthly goes from Haiphong to Yunnan of which only about 10,000 are transported by railroad. The railroad was seeking to increase the monthly freightage to 30,000 tons. A total of Yuan 73,165,025 worth of goods went through the Mengtze (Yunnan) customs in 1938 increasing the customs revenue from Yuan 155,765 in 1937 to Yuan 4,424,197. Tin and marble were the principal exports; arms, munitions and raw cotton the principal imports.

Japan's recent customs ruling in Shanghai to make the "puppet dollar" the customs unit, thereby eliminating the need of importers to secure foreign exchange, resulted in Chungking's reduction of the customs tariff to one third of the previous rate. This will reduce the Japanese share of the customs revenue and may cause her to take over the administration of the Customs Service which, together with the Postal Service, still operates under the Chungking Government.

b. Morale and The United Front

The Berlin-Moscow Agreement gave a fillip to Chinese morale but the war breaking out in Europe is turning out contrary to Marshal Chiang's expectation. Instead of getting Japan embroiled with the democracies it appears that she will have a freer hand in Asia and the Kuomintang now faces the prospect of English aid falling off with the resultant necessity of greater dependence upon Soviet Russia.

As to China's united front, Domei continues to harp upon dissension between Central Government and Communist troops. Hsueh Yueh, 9th War Zone Commander (who is reputedly unpopular even with his own troops), was, according to Domei, having trouble with New Fourth Routers in his area. On the Hopei-Shansi border, Kuomintang troops were reported by the local Hsin Min Pao to have had armed clashes with 8th Routers on August 30th. There has been no confirmation from Chungking of these reports but that Chiang Kai-shek was having trouble with anti Central Government Szechuan warlords in Chengtu was reported by Major Mayer on August 17th. This feud has been referred to in previous reports from this office and dates back to the moving of the national capital to Chungking with resultant local hostility toward the influx of "outsiders".

The Japanese press continues to insist that T. V. Soong has returned to Chungking from Hongkong where he has been in semi-retirement for the past year, but when Major Mayer saw him in Hongkong on August 13th T. V. Soong said that he was "staying out of the picture". That the T. V. Soong-H. H. Kung feud will ever be patched up is doubted by the writer.

c. French Military Advisers

According to Chinese G-2 the present French military advisers are not as efficient as the Von Falkenheysen group, the former too frequently preferring pleasure to business.

(B) Japan

a. Economic Developments in North China

During the month of August, inauguration of the following economic projects in North China were announced in the local press:

1. North China Salt Company, Tientsin. Capitalized at Yuan 24,000,000 jointly subscribed by Provisional Government and Japanese authorities.

2. The Central Experimental Farm near Peking for improvement of farming methods in North China. Two and one half million dollar subsidy subscribed by the Provisional Government.

3. The North China Cement Company in Peking. $50,000,000 to be raised by Japanese and Manchukuo cement interests under the supervision of The Asia Development Board.

4. The Greater Peking Reconstruction Project calls for the construction of two new highways in November - one south from the Summer Palace and one west from the center of the city at the intersection of which 2,000 houses are to be constructed for Japanese families before the end of the current year.

5. A five year plan worked out by the North China Transport Company calls for the following five new trunk highways:

   a. Peking-Shanhaikuan (old Mandarin Highway)
   b. Shihchiachuang-Tsangchow
   c. Peking-Shihchiachuang
   d. Peking-Tangku
   e. Tsinan-Chefoo

6. The Chungfu coal mine in Tsiaotso, Honan province, was taken over by the Honan Provincial government from the former Sino-British owners.

7. The Paoshan coal mines on the Chiaotsi Railroad in Shantung have resumed operation.

8. The Chinese government gold mines at Chaoyuan on the Shantung promontory are being operated by the Japanese.

9. The Mengchiang or Mengkukuo (Inner Mongolia, South Chahar and North Shansi) Government is building a new railroad out of Paotou for hauling coal from Suiyuan mines.

10. Five Condor airliners were reported on August 13th to have been purchased by Japan from Germany. These ships are presumably intended for the Japan-China run. (See enclosed chart of Japanese air lines in China).

Domei August 22d reported the Japanese population in Taiyuan increasing at monthly rate of 6,000. Latest figures show total population of that city to be 90,000 of which 8,500 are Japanese and 1,500 Koreans. (The Japanese Army "Comfort Corps" could no doubt account for many of the latter.)

Japanese and Korean residents in Peking at the end of July numbered 37,430, an increase in one month of 1,116.

Japanese as well as foreign business in Tientsin has been paralyzed by the flood. Flood conditions are worst in the Japanese Concession.

b. Rail Service Interruptions in North China

What the guerrillas have long failed to do the greatest flood in the Tientsin area since 1917 has accomplished. Flood washouts have resulted in severance of rail communication between Tientsin and Tangku since August 25th. Limited deck passage is available to passengers on river tugs between Tientsin and Tangku. Washouts south of Tientsin have also interrupted service on the Tsinpu Railroad so that, at present, rail passengers bound for Shanghai from Peking are proceeding to Hsuchow via the Kinhan and Lunghai loop. Traffic on the Kinhan was resumed August 14th.

c. Japanese Casualties

Chungking on August 19th placed Japanese casualties in China from August 1-19th at 9,672. From August 23 - August 29 the count of Japanese sick and wounded embarking at Chinwangtao from the direction of Tientsin was 700.

d. Japanese Division Identifications

Attached hereto is a map showing locations of Japanese divisions compiled from reports from Major Barrett in Chungking dated August 10th and 15th and from the Military Attache in Tokyo dated August 1st.

e. Estimate of Japan's Present Policy

According to reliable information the Japanese Army, Navy and Consular officials were on August 23d in

possession of detailed plans to blockade the International Settlement in Shanghai and stop river traffic at Woosung. 2,000 Japanese troops had been dispatched to Shanghai within the preceding forty eight hours. According to French reports 8,000 more were due within the next few days. On the night of August 24th, orders were received at Japanese headquarters in Shanghai to cancel the plan to blockade the Settlement, and, on the following day, 6,000 Japanese troops left Shanghai for Hangchow and Chekiang Province. On August 15th the Japanese had moved troops up to the northern border of the British leased territory in order to isolate Hongkong but on August 28th these troops were also withdrawn.

The above measures had been designed, in the opinion of the undersigned, to force Japan's terms for an Anglo-Japanese bargain upon England. With a war breaking out in Europe it may appear to Japan that she can now get those terms without resort to the above blockades. The fruit may fall into her lap without shaking the tree. As this is being written she has asked England and France to withdraw their troops from China. The Japanese-owned "Peking Chronicle" on September 3d suggests the possibility of freedom for Japanese shipping in British -controlled waters in return for freedom for British vessels in Pacific waters. Foreign business men in Shanghai said on September 3d that the new Japanese customs rulings promulgated at that port (referred to above) left no doubt but what the ultimate objective of the Japanese was the complete expulsion of foreign business interests from China.

Germany's "betrayal" of Japan in signing of the Moscow-Berlin Non-Aggression Pact averted for the present at least Japan's embarking upon a war with Russia but that Russia will take advantage of this pact to launch a major offensive against Japan is considered highly improbable by the undersigned.

Japan's present policy is believed to be one similar to her role in 1915-18 - stay out of a world war and use that opportunity to recuperate financially at the expense of the belligerents. The writer does not subscribe to the view that, in order to remain in China, the Japanese will be compelled to crush the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Further military offensives such as the one recently engaged in in Shansi will net them nothing but no insurmountable difficulties are seen in the way of the Army "digging in" where they are. Japanese officers in Peking have said that they would be very happy to settle down in China and many of the soldiers would probably prefer farming in China to farming in Japan. Chief impediments to central control of an area so governed would be the tendency, already strongly in evidence, for authority, such as that of the Kwantung Army in Mengchiang and Manchukuo, to be completely independent of that exercised by the North China Commander. The North China Command in turn is separate from the Central and South China Commands. Each of these areas has separate currencies and military passes in one area are not necessarily recognized in another. In fact, the subordination

of General Homa at Tientsin to General Sugiyama in Peking (80 miles away) is largely nominal. The result may become (nothing new to China) a group of feudal warlords, each supreme within his own walls and owing allegiance in common only to The Emperor of Japan. The Provisional and Reformed Governments will probably be continued in order to give a semblance of self government as with the P'u Yi regime in Manchukuo.

Such a policy might not be to the liking of Japan's big business but the writer does not believe that any Japanese-dominated government can succeed in China without the presence of the Japanese Army and, if the Japanese Army is present, they will dominate the civil government as has been the case in Manchukuo.

The Japanese Navy may also not favor such a policy but is believed that the China war must be liquidated before the Navy could hope to successfully seize and operate oil holdings in the Dutch East Indies. Before such a southward expansion could be made, it is believed that the Kwantung Army will have insisted upon its war with Russia which war will be opposed by Japanese business interests in Manchukuo. Premier General Abe has been reported as famous for his "negative" qualities and well informed local opinion believes that he may serve as a figurehead for Kwantung Army control in the Tokyo Government.

For the present, however, Japan is expected to play a waiting game while freezing out foreign business in China and using every opportunity to recoup her finances. Supplies from America can continue to be carried in Japanese bottoms whereas the Chinese will probably suffer from the curtailment, due to the war in Europe, of non-Japanese shipping in the Far East.

E M Sutherland
E. M. Sutherland
Captain, Infantry, D.O.L.

Enclosures:
1. Military operations in South Shansi.
2. Japanese military operations on the northern border of Kowloon Leased Territory
3. Locations of Japanese divisions.
4. Communications in Southwest China, road and rail net.
5. Air routes of China Aviation Company.
6. Traffic guide, C.N.A.C.
7. Aerial photograph of Ichang bombing (1 copy)

Distribution:
6-MID; 2-Embassy; 1-Tokyo; 1-Manila;
1-Guard; 1-N/A; 1-File

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peking, China, September 8, 1939. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. Munson
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures: No change



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

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

To accompany Report No. 9799.

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

Military Operations in the Khalha River Area on the Mongol-Manchukuo Border September 1 - 16, 1939

NOTES:

1. Balshagal and Noro Heights occupied by Soviets June 22d - July 2d. Retaken by Japanese July 2d - 12th. Noro Heights reoccupied by Soviets Sept. 1st-8th.

2. Drives on Kanjurmiao, Chiangchunmiao and Halunarshan made by tanks and motorized-mechanized infantry.

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

NOMONHAN–KHALHA RIVER AREA

RCE: KWANTUNG ARMY

Scale

0 5 10 15 30 km.

——— Japanese position as of Sept. 10, 1939.

——— Soviet Position as of Sept. 16, 1939.

MILITARY ATTACHE, PEKING, CHINA.

NOTE:
At Changsha is "Yale in China". British gunboat "Sandpiper" has been stationed at Changsha since befor the fall of Hankow



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

To accompany Report No. 9799.

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE PEIPING, CHINA.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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G-2 Report 6130

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SITUATION REPORT

September 4 - September 28, 1939

1. Central China - Hupeh and Hunan - The Drive on Changsha
2. Kiangsi
3. The Manchukuo - Mongolian Border
4. Shansi
5. South China
6. Guerrilla Activity
7. The Lunghai Line
8. Air Activity
9. General

1. Central China - Hupeh and Hunan - The Drive on Changsha.

At the close of last report, September 4th, the Chinese were attacking Suihsien, Hankow's then farthest northwestern outpost. Fighting was also in progress along the Han River at Chungsiang and Chienkiang both of which places were held by the Japanese.

On September 12th the Chungking military spokesman stated that although 20,000 Japanese troops had arrived in Hankow between August 20th and September 10th, during the same period ten thousand had been withdrawn down river from Hupeh. The difference of 10,000 had been largely used to strengthen Japanese garrisons in Yingshan, Suihsien, Chingshan and Tienmen. At Chienkiang, across the Han River west of Yokow, he said that the Japanese had less than one regiment.

North of Chungsiang, the Japanese occupied Fengloho on the east bank of the Han River and the opposite city of Chuantowan on September 19th. The Chinese troops in that area fell back (north) on Siangyang.

On September 20th the Chungking military spokesman announced "all quiet" in west and northwest Hupeh.

In the Yochow, Hunan, area the Chinese took the Yanglossu railway station on September 15th but were unable to hold it. On the 12th of September the Japanese attempted a landing on the north bank of the Yangtze at Hsinti but this and a similar attempt at Chenglingchi were repulsed. On September 22d a report from Chungking that the Japanese were concentrating one brigade of heavy artillery in Yochow resurrected the prediction of a drive on Changsha and the important railway junction south thereof at Chuchow. The apparent object of such a drive would be to establish rail

communication from Hankow to Nanchang, Kiangsi, and possibly seize the rail and highway junction at Hengyang, eastern terminus of the railroad to Kweilin where is the principal concentration of Chinese Central Government troops. Source of the following is a communique issued by the Hankow headquarters of the Japanese Army in Central China on September 24th.

> From the Yueh-han Railroad for fifty kilometers east to T'ungch'eng, in the tri-provincial border region, the Japanese on September 23d launched an attack southwards against the Chinese 15th Army, bulk of 9th War Zone defenders. (Major Barrett reported from Chungking September 28th that the Chinese 31st and 33d Group Armies that had helped defeat the Japanese in Hupeh in August were now in Hunan.) Simultaneously Japanese naval units passed through mine fields and effected a landing at Yingtien south of the Ku (Kushui) River estuary on the east bank of Tungt'ing Lake. The main attack crossed the Hsinch'iang River (held by the Chinese 2d and 95th Divisions) on September 24th where Chinese had claimed successes September 20th-22d and Japanese reconnaissance planes reported Chinese artillery and infantry units stampeding southwestward across the mountainous region between the Hsinch'iang and Ku Rivers. This central column was aided in crossing the Hsinch'iang River by the attack of a naval landing party from north of Luch'iao against the Chinese west flank. On the Japanese east flank, the advance broke through Chinese positions on the Shenchow River and reached a point thirty kilometers south of Tungch'eng and twenty kilometers north of the Kushui River where five Chinese divisions of the 30th Army Corps were reported engaged on the evening of the 23rd. The Japanese forces that landed at Yingtien on the east shore of Tungt'ing Lake broke through lakeshore defenses manned by 3,000 troops and succeeded in intercepting the nearby Yueh-Han Railroad on the evening of the 24th and outflanking retreating troops of the Chinese 95th, 25th and 199th Divisions.

P

> On September 25th the Japanese force from Yingtien (the Kanai, Ishibashi and Yoshikawa units) claimed to have captured the ferry site at Kweiyi on the Yochow-Changsha highway but on the same date the Chinese claimed that this Japanese column from Yingtien was then north of Siangyin where it was being blocked from making contact with the Japanese forces north of Paishui. (See below). Japanese planes raided the Chinese base at Siangyin September 25th.

> The main body of the Japanese central advance east of and following the railroad from Yochow was reported on September 25th to have routed 30,000 Central

Government troops including the 2d, 25th, 60th and 195th Divisions and to have reached a point midway between the Hsinch'iang and Mishui (Kushui) River. Meanwhile the left wing of the Japanese forces - the column from T'ungch'eng was reported on the same date to have reached a point between the Hsinch'iang and Mishui Rivers about seventy kilometers northeast of Changsha.

Generals Lo Ch'i and Kuan Lin-cheng, former commanders of the Chinese 95th and 25th Divisions respectively, are mentioned in the Japanese reports as commanding the Chinese troops retreating on Changsha. On September 26th Domei enthusiastically placed the number of Chinese divisions "facing serious debacle in northeastern Hunan" at sixty numbering 500,000 troops.

The Central News version of the above operations under date of September 25th is as follows:

> On September 23d the Japanese launched a drive against Changsha using sixty thousand troops in three coordinated attacks. One column moved via the Yochow-Hsinch'iang highway on Hsinch'iang while another moved on Yanglin, 15 kilometers east of Hsinch'iang. Simultaneously, troops were landed from thirty ships and over 200 motor boats at Luch'iao and near Yingt'ien north of Siangyin. The Chinese admit some Japanese units crossed the Hsinch'iang River and also reached Yingtien but claimed the recapture of Yingtien on the 24th and claim that the Japanese, having lost 3,000 casualties (Reuters Chungking says 10,000 September 18-25), were being held at all points. (No mention is made in the Chinese report of the Japanese left wing advance from T'ungch'eng the recapture of which was claimed by the Chinese on September 22d.)

Central News, Kweilin reported that on September 25th the fighting had reached a point south of the Mi (Ku) River. Chinese and Japanese were fighting on a thirty-kilometer front astride the railway at a point ten kilometers north of Paishui. Chinese claimed to be still holding Changlochieh and Sinshih both on the Mi River east of Milo. The Japanese column from Yingtien had been stopped north of Siangyin thereby preventing its junction with the Japanese forces north of Paishui. In the drive on Changsha the Japanese are using five divisions (two originally in northern Hunan and three newly arrived) plus a naval landing force. (Japanese front line divisions were reported by Major Barrett on September 28th to be as follows: - 33d on Japanese left and east of the railroad, 13th in the center and 6th operating from the shore of Tungt'ing Lake.) Chinese top-flight Generals Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi were reported en route to the Changsha front.

On September 28th each side was claiming 10,000 casualties inflicted upon the other since the start of the Changsha drive.

By September 28th the Japanese central advance, in two columns along and east of the railroad, had penetrated south of the Mi River and the Chinese were attempting to hold the line Siangyin to Paihsien (Paishui). The Japanese mobile column from T'ungch'eng occupied Pingkiang on the morning of the 28th. (Pingchiang is the site of one of Chiang Kai-shek's principal victories over Chinese Communists in 1936.) The Japanese west flank column from Yingtien effected contact with troops of the central columns on the railroad south of the Mishui River on September 27th.

The rumored impending Japanese offensive on Ichang noted in our last Situation Report has again been given prominence by Reuters and United Press in Chungking. On September 13th the American Consul-General in Hankow reported that "an increase in the number of supply ships and transports arriving in Hankow, the augmentation of Japanese naval craft and the pronounced aerial activity originating from Hankow lent color to prediction of a late September offensive against Shasi and possibly Ichang and Changteh (Hunan)." The same source stated that the Japanese 32d and 34th divisions had recently arrived from Japan for what was said to be a joint land and water operation. (Major Barrett's radio from Chungking August 10, 1939 reported the 34th Division at Hankow and the 32d Division on the Tsinpu from Tsinan to Hsuchow.) The Chungking military spokesman stated on September 20th that he considered a Japanese advance from Chienkiang on Ichang to be unlikely due to the terrain difficulties of marshes and canals. As to the other approaches to Ichang he said the Yangtze was well boomed, that hills formed an effective barrier between Shasi and Ichang and that the most feasible route - the Hankow Ichang Highway - was heavily blocked by Chinese troops. United Press, Chungking, however, reported on September 19th that the Chinese were destroying highways and communication lines between Fancheng and Ichang. The advantages of taking Ichang would be threefold (1) command of Yangtze shipping, (2) interrupt the north-south Changteh (Hunan) - Siangyang (Hupeh) land freight route, (3) render Chungking and Chengtu vulnerable to continual air attacks. Combined land and water operations have invariably in the past been to the advantage of the Japanese in that such operations permit the use of their gun boats and provide them with an easily maintained supply route.

Reuters in Chungking surmised on September 13th that in addition to the drive on Ichang, the Japanese might drive on Sian, Shensi, via Laohokou at the head of navigation on the Han River and thence west following the motor road along the Han River to Hanchung, southwestern

Shensi from where they could turn northward on Sian and at the same time cut the Chengtu-Sian motor road. The Kwangsi troops that smashed the Japanese attack in April in Hupeh are still there. The writer does not believe that the Japanese have available enough troops to guard their line of communications for such a drive. To date, the only military activity in the Sian area has been an aerial raid on that city on September 21st.

2. Kiangsi.

In our last Situation Report the Chinese were reported to be advancing from the west against Japanese positions in the Kaoan-Fengsin-Tsingan area and from the south against Japanese positions on the north bank of the Chin River east of Kaoan. Kaoan and Fengsin were in Chinese hands but the Japanese held Tsingan and Anyi.

In the middle of September the offensive in the Nanchang sector changed into Japanese hands. On the 15th the Japanese had advanced south along the Kan River for a distance of thirty kilometers from Nanchang and established a base on the east (right) bank of that river. A Japanese column drove through the newly organized Chinese 17th Division in the mountains nine kilometers southeast of Fengsin and reached a ferry point on the Chin River from which they were bombarding Feng Sheng-fa's 51st Division across the river on September 16th. On the 19th a Japanese division (Takeuchi, Otino, Ichikawa and Terao detachments from Anyi and Tsingan) that had taken Fengsin advanced from the latter place through mountain passes that had been cleared of defenders by naval planes, broke through strong Chinese positions in the hills commanding the Fengsin-Kaoan highway eight kilometers northeast of Kaoan and occupied Kaoan.

On September 19th, Domei claimed that 40,000 Central Government troops from six divisions were stampeding west from north of Kaoan leaving 3,000 dead and that the highway from Kaoan to Ifeng had been cut by the Ikeda and Kijima detachments thereby blocking the Chinese retreat.

On September 20th the Chungking spokesman stated that the Chinese were on the offensive northeast of Wuning where they had taken several small towns but it is doubtful if the Japanese had much strength there. The same source stated that a Chinese counter-attack had checked at Lientang a southward Japanese advance from Nanchang along the Chekiang Railroad.

On September 22d Major Barrett reported from a Chinese official source that the present objective of the Japanese in Kiangsi may be to clear the Nanchang-Changsha highway for a move on the Hunan capital from north and east

although the Chungking spokesman belittled these operations as merely an attempt of the opposing forces to test each other's strength and stated that he did not anticipate a Japanese drive. On September 28th the Japanese Navy spokesman in Tokyo said that the Japanese operations against Kaoan had been merely to lure Chinese troops from Hunan.

United Press, Chungking, reported that the Chinese claimed the recapture of Kaoan on the afternoon of September 22d. One thousand Japanese, supported by heavy artillery and planes, had been driven out of the city and four thousand more had been repulsed along the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway. Since then little action of any importance has taken place in the Kaoan sector.

A Japanese column that had swung around from near Kaoan to west of Fengsin was reported in contact with the Chinese at Shangfuchen on September 25th. Japanese naval units were reported active on Poyang Lake on September 29th.

3. <u>The Manchukuo - Mongolian Border.</u>

At the close of our last Situation Report (Sept. 4th), Japanese troops in the Nomonhan area had failed in their attempt to drive the Soviets from the east bank of the Khalha. The Japanese had lost heavily and were awaiting reinforcements. The Peking spokesman stated at this time that the Japanese claimed the Khalha River to be the boundary line between Manchuria and Outer-Mongolia whereas the Russian contention was that the boundary was east of the Balshagal and Noro Heights. (See "Map of New Barga" attached hereto.)

To obtain reinforcements at Nomonhan, heavy Japanese troop withdrawals were made from the Tungpu Railway in Shansi and from the Hantan-Shehsien area in southern Hopei. During the first week in September empty trains were observed leaving the Fengtai railroad junction south of Peking, southbound over the Pinghan. From September 13th-15th inclusive twenty military trains (estimated 15 cars to train) containing personnel, trucks, tanks and artillery passed northward through Chinwangtao. On the 16th, twenty seven cars filled with troops and ten cars filled with light artillery passed the same way. (A local informant from the 8th Route Army stated on September 16th that the Japanese troops recently withdrawn from Shansi were being replaced along the Shansi railroads by inferior units from Manchukuo containing a large mixture of Manchukuo troops but this report has not been confirmed.) On September 8th, 9th and 10th, approximately twenty five Japanese planes a day were observed flying north over Peitaiho. On September 13th 100 Japanese bombers were re-

ported passed over Chinwangtao toward Shanhaikuan.

A White Russian who arrived in Peking from Harbin September 13th stated that between Hsinking and Mukden he had observed troop trains passing northward, one every fifteen minutes for a period of about five hours. He saw, in addition to personnel and horses, field artillery, mountain artillery and tanks. The Harbin railroad station, he said, was filled with Japanese wounded soldiers. This observer believed these troop trains were being routed to the Nomonhan front via the branch railroad from Szepingkai (on the main line of the South Manchuria Railway) west to Halunarshan. The same informant stated that there were "hundreds" of White Russian volunteers in the Kwantung Army including former Russian railway guards but knew of no all-Russian units fighting for the Japanese. (He also stated that, under the auspices of the Russian "White House" about one hundred Russian male civilians in Peking and about four hundred in Tientsin were being required to undergo military training. Their uniforms and rifles are furnished by the Japanese Army.)

On September 8th Domei, Tokyo, reported rumors of an agreement for a truce at Nomonhan having been effected at Moscow. On September 16th this truce was announced simultaneously at Moscow and Tokyo and, on September 18th, Major-General Fujimoto met Major General Potapov between the Japanese and Soviet front lines near Noro Heights to arrange for the exchange of the killed and captured. A border demarkation commission was expected to be formed in Moscow and meanwhile each side was holding their lines as of September 16th.

Wishful thinking at Chungking and at London predicted this truce to be of short duration. Even the Tokyo vernacular "Kokumin" opined "It is with mixed feelings that this paper greets the truce" and adds that "it has no courage to predict any improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations merely because a truce was concluded." However, the mere fact that the Japanese wanted this truce and that the Soviets were willing to grant it, is sufficient to convince the undersigned that outside factors preclude the probability of the recurrence of hostilities at Nomonhan in the <u>immediate</u> future.

What happened at Nomonhan during the first ten days in September was reported by A. T. Steele, of the Chicago Daily News, in Mukden September 9th upon his arrival from Hsinking. Wide flanking attacks by new type Soviet tanks, supplemented by highly mechanized and motorized infantry, had "probably" succeeded in taking Kanjurmiao and Chiangchunmiao and even threatened Halunarshan. (For nature of terrain see photographs attached hereto.) These flanking operations had penetrated the Japanese lines in some places for twenty miles and had partially surrounded

the positions held by the Japanese 7th and 23d Divisions. A thrust through the Japanese center had succeeded in isolating Japanese front line defense units on the Khalha's east bank and in either capturing or wiping them out. A Kwantung Army representative admitted to Steele the loss of Noro Heights but claimed that the Japanese still retained Balshagal Heights (See attached map on which the Holsten River is shown to be between the Balshagal and Noro Heights and the town of Nomonhan to be southeast of Balshagal Heights in conformity with information recently received by this office from two eye-witnesses.) One Japanese described the Nomonhan situation to Steele as "terrible" and a Japanese embassy official in Hsinking stated that although preliminary steps had been taken for the settlement of the "border controversy" he feared chances for success of these steps were slim.

Foreign news correspondents were ordered out of Hailar to Hsinking September 11th. The explanation given was that the Nomonhan situation during the preceding ten days was "a military secret". That the "secret" was not favorable to the Japanese is borne out by the following reports from Mukden and Harbin. An American Consular report from Mukden September 8th reported an estimate of 25,000 Japanese casualties (a schedule of seven trains bearing ash urns en route to Japan had been announced) during the recent fighting at Nomonhan. Morin of the Associated Press on the same date estimated Japanese casualties in the Nomonhan area had been averaging three to four hundred per day. Japanese sources in Harbin had estimated their earlier losses at Nomonhan to be 7,000 up to August 14th.

Morin of Associated Press after a visit to the Nomonhan front stated in Harbin on August 26th that all the fighting on the part of the Japanese had been defensive, that no Mongols had been seen on the battlefield for a number of weeks and that Soviet troops had not up until then constructed permanent trenches on the right (east) bank of the Khalha except in the Holsten River salient. The Soviet infantry, he said, fords the river at various points bringing their tanks across on pontoon bridges which are regularly destroyed by the Japanese artillery by day and as regularly repaired by the Soviet Engineers at night. An American consular report from Mukden based upon information received from Japanese sources and foreign news correspondents dated August 23, 1939 contained the following data believed to be interesting and illuminating concerning the operations at Nomonhan.

> The elevations at Nomonhan of Balshagal and Noro on the eastern bank of the Khalha were occupied by the Soviets June 22d - July 2d and retaken by the Japanese July 2d - 12th. The right bank of the Khalha was commanded by these heights but a salient between the Khalha and the Holsten Rivers was clung to by the Soviets in spite of

repeated attempts to dislodge them. These attempts were invariably stopped by the admittedly superb Soviet artillery on the left bank of Halha and at the confluence of the Halha (Khalha) and Holsten (Horston) rivers. The Japanese are definitely superior in the air. Their machines are newer and faster. Their best pilots are serving on this front and they have the advantage of numbers. From Hailar to Nomonhan four air bases were counted by a foreign newspaper correspondent and another four bases lie between Nomonhan and the railhead at Halunarshan. With 100 to 120 machines at each base there must be 1,000 planes engaged on this front. Soviet planes are repelled by sheer weight of numbers. Despite its alleged losses - 1,100 planes - the Russian air force still maintains an offensive policy and constantly harasses the Japanese ground forces and lines of supply. Many coolies impressed by the Japanese into service digging trenches on the Nomonhan front have been mowed down by machine gun fire from Soviet planes. August 20th the Soviet Air Force staged a second big raid on Hulunarshan. Soviet Mongol forces occupy the western side of Lake Buir and a road junction northwest of the lake (which may explain why Japanese have not attempted to send a column west of the lake to cut the Soviet communication in the rear.) "The Three Rivers Brigade" of the "Manchukuo" Army consisting of Cossack refugees in the Hailar area is said to be operating against the Soviets in the Lake Buir region. Ataman Semenov is now in Hsinking reportedly organizing a force of White Russians for service with the Japanese. (Semenov it will be recalled was the last White Russian leader in Eastern Siberia during the inter-allied intervention.)

4. Shansi

On September 2d the Chinese claimed that their troops were pressing on Luan but to date, September 25th, the Japanese, although completely hemmed in by Chinese troops, continue to hold the Luan-Changtze-Hukuan triangle on the western slopes of the Taihangshan where they have consolidated their main forces remaining in East Shansi.

On September 5th the Chinese claimed to have "partially" reoccupied Changtze. On September 11th the Fujimuto unit was reported by Domei to be engaged with 5,000 Chinese troops from the 39th Division (one of Pang Ping-hsun's) southeast of Hukuan.

During the week ending September 13th there were heavy withdrawals of Japanese troops from the Tungpu Railway and from the Hantan-Shehsien area on the Hopei-Honan border. These troops were reported moving toward Paoting and Peking

and are referred to in the section of this report on the Mongolia-Manchukuo border operations.

Reference the Poai-Sinsiang sector, the Chungking spokesman reported on September 13th as he had on August 29th that the Japanese were withdrawing from Poai toward Sinsiang while the Chinese were "pressing" on the Poai-Sinsiang section of the Taoching Railroad.

South of Poai, Wenhsien, near the north bank of the Yellow River, was retaken by the Chinese on September 13th thus giving them control of all river crossings in the Wenhsien-Menghsien area. (Wenhsien had been taken by the Japanese last February.)

On September 5th, 5,000 Japanese troops from the strong Japanese bases at Lishih and Fenyang advanced west and took Chuntu (the Yellow River crossing from which the Japanese have been repeatedly forced to retire) and some units crossed the river. The next day Chinese troops from Shensi retook Chuntu and forced the Japanese to retire to Liulin which the Chinese were attacking on September 12th.

5. South China

During the period of our last report the principal military activity in south China was the isolation by the Japanese of British leased territory on the Kwangtung border. On September 15th the American Consul General in Hongkong reported conditions on the Hongkong-Kwangtung border back to normalcy. During the month of September the principal activity has been a Japanese advance on Shekki from the Wangmoon district in the Chungshan area of the Pearl River delta.

On September 13th the Japanese advance on Chungshan (Hsiangshan) from Wangmoon (Hengmenkou) was being opposed at Cheungkaipin (Changkiapien) the village near which the C.N.A.C. plane was shot down about a year ago. The Chinese defense forces in that area were reported led by General Cheung Wa-chung who claimed heavy losses inflicted upon the Japanese. A cessation of food supplies into Macao was reported as a result of the closing of the water route from Shekki during the Japanese advance. During the week ending September 15th Shekki was heavily bombed. On the 20th Japanese forces were increased in the Wangmoon area with the apparent object of isolating that district from Macao. Roads leading to Macao were being subjected to attacks from Japanese planes.

Northeast of Canton, Hwahsien was retaken by the Chinese on September 10th, lost to Japanese next day and retaken by the Chinese on the 13th. Tsunghua was retaken

by the Chinese on the 9th, the Japanese withdrawing to Shenkang. The total Japanese strength on the Tsunghua-Hwahsien line was estimated on September 20th to be one division.

In the Swatow sector, where the Japanese were reported on September 4th to have left only bluejackets, the Chinese took Chaochow on September 4th and Anpu, first station on the railroad north from Swatow to Chaochow, on September 8th. Following the arrival of reinforcements at Swatow September 13th the Japanese have reoccupied Chaochow.

At Wenchow, southern Chekiang, the Japanese were reported to be strengthening their blockade on September 16th.

Reuters, Chungking, September 13th reported that the Chinese were still expecting a Japanese landing at Pakhoi aimed at severance of the Chinese munitions route in the southwest.

6. Guerrilla Activity

After the reoccupation of Tsingfeng and Puyang (kaichow) in the southern tip of Hopei Province during late August the Chinese, according to Central News September 14th, had reoccupied Taming. On the 20th the same source stated that, following the Chinese occupation of Nanlo, Hopei September 7th, the Japanese were withdrawing on Taming.

Mowping (Muping) on the Shantung premontory was occupied by the Chinese on August 29th.

An 8th Route Army contact in Peking claimed that Chinese guerrillas on August 29th had captured a train on the Tsinpu Railroad at the first station north of Hsuchow.

Guerrillas at Kashing on September 11th burned a paper mill owned and operated by the Nanking Reformed Government resulting in a reported loss of $7,000,000.

Li Tsung-jen stated in Chungking September 24th that thirty hsien in Anhwei had been reoccupied by the Chinese.

7. The Lunghai Line

On September 13th Central News, Chungking, reported the despatch of Japanese reinforcements from Sinsiang and Hsuchow into the area east of the new Yellow River (see sketch attached hereto) where Chinese troops had been active for several weeks.

On September 18th, Lanfeng, on the Lunghai east of Kaifeng in eastern Honan, was reported captured by the Chinese as a result of defection among the Chinese troops in Japanese employ. This report was denied by the Japanese spokesman in Peking.

8. Air Activity

The following is a summary of the principal raids made by the Japanese air force during the period of this report:

Sept. 9 Wanhsien (shipping center on Yangtze below Chungking) raided by 27 bombers. Bombed again on the 12th.

Sept. 10 Kian (seat of Kiangsi Provincial Government) bombed.

Sept. 11 Luchow (Luhsien), Szechuan, fifty miles up river from Chungking, was bombed by 30 Nippon planes - 400 casualties resulting. Luchow is the northern terminus of the Yunnan-Szechuan highway reported due to be completed in October, 1939.

Laifeng, southwest Hupeh, and Kiating, western Szechuan, bombed.

Sept. 15 34 Japanese planes bombed all important cities along "The Munitions Route" from Indo-China to Kwangsi. Lungchow and Pingkiang just north of the frontier mountain pass of Chonnankwan were heavily bombed.

Sept. 16 28 bombers raided Ninghsia, capital of Ninghsia Province.

Sept. 18 Shekki in Chungshan district near Macao bombed. Japanese aircraft were active in the Pearl River delta region south of Canton during week ending September 18th.

Sept. 21 Sian, Shensi, and Yuanling, northwestern Hunan, raided.

Sept. 22 Loyang on the Lunghai Railroad bombed.

Sept. 28 Chungking raided by twelve Japanese planes.

The American Consul General in Harbin estimated on August 26, 1939, from information received from Japanese and other local sources, that during the two years of the China War the Japanese had lost 2,200 planes, three to eight

hundred of which had been lost on the Manchukuo-Mongolian border.

Activity on the part of the Chinese Air Force continues to be negligible. An air raid on the Tungpu Railway in southern Shansi was noted in the Chinese press on September 3th.

9. General

A. CHINA.

a. Supply. The Standard Oil representative in Hongkong told the Military Attache on August 13, 1939 that the Chinese Government had contracted for and set aside funds for enough gas and oil to last them one year.

b. Communications. The Ministry of Communications announced that the Szechuan-Yunnan highway referred to in our last report will be opened for motor taffic in October. This road runs for 714 kilometers from Kunming to Luchow (Luhsien) on the upper Yangtze between Suifu and Chungking.

Major Mayer reported a new railway under construction from the Langson railhead on the Indo-China border to Nanning. (See Road and Rail Net Map accompanying Report No. 9793, September 8, 1939). The bed is constructed, though few rails laid and bridge construction was expected to slow up the completion of the project.

c. Government. To make "face" for his subordinates Chiang Kai-shek is reported to have assumed the governorship of Szechuan province on September 21st although that province was reported by United Press, Chungking, on September 25th to have been divided into three separate provinces.

B. JAPAN.

a. Communications. Domei, Tokyo, reported September 8th the cancellation of Japan Airway's order for five 40-passenger Condor planes contracted for through Focks Wulf Aircraft Company of New York. On September 14th a 42-passenger DC-4 was reported delivered to Japan Airways at Yokohama.

Rail service on the Tsinpu road that has been suspended since September 14th on account of floods is reported due to be resumed October 1st.

b. Government. The three leader conference (Wang Ching-wei, Liang Hung-chih head of the Reformed Government

and Wang Ke-min head of the Provisional Government) recently held in Nanking to pave the way for the establishment of a new national government is reported to have been fruitless due to Wang Ching-wei's insistence on too many key positions for his followers.

The appointment of General Nishio as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in China is taken to be merely an administrative move to iron out the lack of coordination in Japanese military command in China referred to in our last report.

c. Third Party Interests. Major Barrett was of the opinion that the Soviet Government had not approached the Chinese Government on the subject of making peace with Japan although he admitted that there were persistent rumors in Chungking that the Soviet Ambassador had proceeded to Shanghai to act as peace mediator.

Japan's recent request for the removal of all third party troops from China indicates to the undersigned that she has not departed from her anti-foreign policy although the American Consul General in Shanghai believes that the establishment of the Wang Ching-wei government may provide "a breathing space from which Japan, the foreign business interests and China herself might well benefit."

E. M. Sutherland
E. M. Sutherland
Captain, Infantry, D.O.L.

Enclosures:
1. Military operations in Hupeh.
2. ,, ,, in Hunan & Kiangsi.
3. ,, ,, in the Khalha River area on the Mongol-Manchukuo Border.
4. ~~Map of New Barga (1 copy)~~
5. ~~Manchurian Daily News photographs of Japanese activity at Nomonhan, Sept. 1939.~~
6. Military operations in Shansi.
7. ,, ,, in the Chungshan district of Kwangtung.
8. The Lunghai Sector.

Distribution:
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1-Guard; 1-N/A; 1-File

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peking, China, September 30, 1939. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures: No change

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SITUATION REPORT

September 29 - October 25, 1939

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 30 1939

1. Hunan-Kiangsi (Drive on Changsha)
2. Shansi
3. South China
4. Other Fronts
5. Air Activity
6. Friction between Communist and Nationalist Chinese Troops
7. General

1. Hunan-Kiangsi (Drive on Changsha)

At the close of ~~our~~ last report the Japanese drive on Changsha was in full swing, and reports of phenomenal Japanese successes appeared in the press until Oct. 3d when a considerably different tune began to be sung. On that date a Domei official military dispatch from Hankow stated that the Changsha campaign had actually ended with the battle on the Pingkiang-Changsha highway the day before, and that Changsha had been practically abandoned by the Chinese whose military and provincial leaders had fled to Hengyang. On October 4th the Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai admitted that the operations had reached a "delicate stage" and that it could not be disclosed whether or not the Japanese had decided to take Changsha. Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo issued a communique on October 9th to the effect that Changsha was not the objective of the drive which was merely to deal a crushing blow to the Chinese forces which had been disturbing peace and order in the area, and on the 10th the Shanghai spokesman repeated this and affirmed that: "having achieved their purpose the Japanese forces withdrew to the positions originally held on September 15th."

Official Chinese sources, on the other hand, claimed that the action resulted in terrific losses to the Japanese and a complete withdrawal of their forces, and hailed the operation as another "Taierchwang". The sudden change in the tenor of Japanese reports plus the communications from Chungking lend credence to the belief that the Japanese forces encountered a serious setback. The official Chinese version of the entire action (see map No. 1 attached) is as follows:

1. Operations against Changsha began in middle of September when Japanese 101st and 106th Divisions from Nanchang area moved west and took Kaoan on September 19th. Meeting Chinese resistance at Kaoan which was retaken by the Chinese on the 22d of September, Japanese turned northwest toward Hsiushui.

2. The Japanese attack south from the Yochow area got under way September 23d with the 33d Division based on Chungyang on the left, and the 6th Division and one brigade of the 13th Division constituting the main force in the center on the railway. The 5th and 6th Heavy Artillery Brigades and numerous tanks were concentrated in Yochow but were not used. Some Japanese units fought their way across the Hsinchiang River between the railway and lake on September 23d and landing of naval forces on east bank of lake at Luchiaoshih on same date forced complete withdrawal of Chinese from south bank of the Hsinchiang River. Heavy fighting took place on September 24th and 25th between the Hsinchiang and Mi Rivers and Japanese radio broadcast admitted Chinese resistance in this area most stubborn yet encountered. On September 25th 9th Brig. Japanese 3d Division landed north of Yingtien and forced the Chinese north of the Mi River to withdraw to the south carrying with them units which had been on the south bank. After the Chinese fell back across Mi River their left flank was exposed to attack by units which could be landed from Japanese gunboats in the Hsiang River, so the Chinese in Changsha and to the north thereof were ordered to withdraw to the east. (The Japanese moved into the evacuated area and on September 29th reached Chiaotouyi to north of and Yunganshih to east of Changsha while advance elements were practically in the outskirts of the city.

3. The Japanese 33d Division from Tungcheng took Taoshukang on September 26th and reached Changshouchieh on the 29th. Parts of the 6th and 13th Divisions took Pingkiang on the 28th. As the 101st and 106th Divisions were moving very slowly toward Hsiushui, the Japanese sent a column from Pingkiang toward the east to effect a junction with forces moving on Hsiushui so that all Japanese units could move south in a coordinated drive. At this point the Chinese made the first move in a counter-attack and took back Taoshukang on September 30th after wiping out all the 3,000 Japanese who had reached there and driving a wedge between the Japanese in Hsiushui and Pingkiang areas.

4. On September 29th Chinese forces which had withdrawn to east and northeast from Changsha and the area to the north thereof attacked east and west striking Japanese in the Pingkiang area in the right flank and those near Changsha in the left flank. Chiaotouyi and Yunganshih were retaken on September 29th. On October 5th the Japanese withdrew to a line Chinching - Fulingpu - Paishui where there was very heavy fighting and the Japanese lost 20,000 casualties. On October 6th the Japanese withdrew to the north of Mi River and next day fell back 50 kilometers to the north bank of Hsinchiang River south of which there are now no Japanese troops. The 10th Brigade of the 3d Division and naval landing forces were withdrawn

to Yochow on October 6th. While Chinese were pushing north of Changsha parts of the Japanese 33d and 106th Divisions took Hsiushui on October 5th but Chinese retook it October 9th and the Japanese withdrew toward Wuning.

5. Reasons for the Japanese defeat were the following: destruction of railways and highways and mountainous terrain south of Mi River made impossible use of heavy artillery, tanks and poison gas and placed Chinese and Japanese troops on equal footing, brilliant strategy of the Chinese in withdrawing eastward and then striking Japanese in flank and at same time driving a wedge between Japanese forces in Hsiushui and Pingkiang areas, excellent cooperation of civil population who frequently attacked the Japanese, and the heroic fighting qualities of the Chinese troops engaged. The Japanese broadcasted claim that the objective in the North Hunan campaign was not the capture of Changsha but merely to crush Chinese forces south of Yochow is refuted by the fact that the Japanese concentrated over one hundred thousand troops for operations. Total Japanese losses are over 30,000 while Chinese were 20,000. General Hsueh Yueh, acting commander of the 9th War Zone who commanded victorious Chinese troops, has been made actual commander vice General Chen Cheng, who has been in nominal command.

For more detailed information concerning the operations in Kiangsi (see map No. 2 attached) the following report is quoted from the Sao Tang Pao (October 12th), a Chungking military paper, and from the Central News:

> The Chinese attacked Hsiushui from southeast via the Hsiushui - Fengsin highway, from southwest via Hsiushui - Pingkiang highway, and from the west by troops following the Hsiushui River. In the Kaoan area in Kiangsi fighting is now going on near Chiuhsientang and the Chinese have taken Lofang. The Japanese division defending Huifu, 20 kilometers west of Fengsin, has suffered 2,000 casualties. Completing the mopping up of the south bank of Hsinchiang River south of Yochow Chinese took Hsinchiangchen and Yanglinchieh on October 8th and Jungchiawan (first station north of Hsinchiang) on October 9th. The Chinese continue to cross Hsinchiang River and are moving on Tungcheng, Linhsiang, and Yochow in three columns. South of Tungcheng the Chinese have passed Chiuling. The Chinese are now within artillery range of Yochow which they are shelling and from which Japanese are preparing to evacuate.

2. Shansi.

During the period under review the Japanese continued in their endeavor to crush the very active guerrillas and other Chinese troops in southern Shansi. On October 8th a report from Taiyuan claimed Japanese forces had occupied Yincheng in an effort to rout 50,000 Chinese of the 50th Army, three independent brigades and a cavalry division. On the day before the same source stated that Puhsien (west of Hungtung on the Tungpu Railroad) had been occupied in an attempt to defeat 30,000 troops of the Shansi 61st Army. The Chinese effort to recapture Luan (Changchih) was admitted by the local Japanese spokesman but a Japanese report on the 13th stated that the attempt had been completely frustrated. Artillery duels across the elbow in the Yellow River were reported on the 21st.

The Chinese claimed successes in this area and the official spokesman stated there was heavy fighting on October 12th in the Hukuan-Changchih -Changtze sector (see map No. 3 attached) where Japanese forces were making an attempt to break through encircling Chinese troops and establish contact with Japanese on the east bank of the Tsin River (which flows generally south through Tsinyuan west of Changtze). Japanese from Changtze are reported to be attacking in two columns to the northwest and two to the southwest which have reached points in a radius of fifteen miles from Changtze, and another Japanese column from Fuchengchen south of Tsinyuan is reported moving south on the east bank of the Tsin River to support the troops in the Changtze area. On October 12th the Chinese reported Japanese from Changchih attacking Yincheng to the south, which place the Japanese claimed to have captured on October 8th.

3. South China

Little military activity occurred in this area with the exception of that along the Kowloon border, the occupation of Chungshan (Shekki) and the naval blockade of Pakhoi. On September 30th Domei reported that a Japanese force had made a landing on the west coast of the peninsula and were moving eastward along the British leased Kowloon border. Meeting some resistance, they eventually cleared the area of Chinese troops reported to be remnants of the 4th Route Army. By October 3d the operation was reported to have been completed. The long expected attack against Chungshan (Shekki) actually got under way on October 6th when Japanese forces landed south of the city under cover of the navy and marched northward. By the next day the Japanese had forced the defenders to evacuate and entered the walled city to be followed shortly by naval units which had sailed up the Chungshan river. A Japanese military spokesman in Canton stated that "because the sacred city was the birthplace of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the occupation had been postponed in the hope that the populace would realize the folly of further resistance and dis-

associate themselves from the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The authorities, however, had failed to come up to Japanese expectation and had continued to disseminate anti-Japanese propaganda, whereupon it was decided to occupy the city to restore peace and order." The day following the occupation witnessed the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and the same spokesman revealed that at last the populace had embraced a pro-Japanese attitude hence the birthplace of the immortal Dr. Sun Yat-sen could remain unmolested in Chinese hands. He added, however, that any further signs of anti-Japanese action on the part of the local citizenry of Chungshan would result in immediate bombing of government buildings.

Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondoh, former commander of the South China Fleet, stated on his return to Tokyo on October 13th that Pakhoi, the last seaport open to the Central Government, had been bombed every day (weather permitting) and was "virtually occupied" by the Japanese since it was being strictly blockaded by the navy. (Actual military occupation, however, has not taken place.)

4. Other Fronts

In Kiangsu province Japanese units are reported to have landed on the eastern shore of Kaoyu Lake, captured Kaoyu and Paoying and marched north to clear the Grand Canal. This operation began on October 2d and was in conjunction with another campaign along the Hwaiho (River) in Anhwei Province. Japanese forces from Hwaian (Kiangsu) marched east on October 9th and captured Yencheng on the 18th.

On October 3d the Japanese naval commander in Shanghai notified foreign diplomatic representatives that a naval action would begin on October 6th against Kupiehkow (thirty miles south of Wenchow, Chekiang province) after booms had been erected which would render general shipping impossible.

During the period under review reports from Harbin and Mukden indicate a peaceful state along the Nomonhan front since the declaration of the truce, but both the Japanese and Soviets appear to be keeping considerable numbers of troops in the area.

5. Air Activity

The following is a summary of the principal raids made by the Japanese air force during the period under report:

Sept. 29 - Chungking and Suining (70 northwest of Chungking) bombed.

Oct. 1 - Sian (Shensi) and Chengtu (Szechwan) bombed.

,, 2 - Chengtu bombed.

,, 3 - Ipin (upstream from Chungking), Chungking, and cities in western Hunan bombed.

,, 5 - Chungking, bombed.

,, 8 - Kweilin (Kwangsi) bombed.

,, 10 - Kulichen (south Shansi), Sian and Chengtu bombed.

,,
,, 11 - Sian raided.

,, 12 - Kweilin bombed.

,, 13 - Nanchwan (southeast of Chungking) and Chinese bases on the western end of the Lunghai R.R. bombed.

,, 14 - Chinese bases in Hupeh and Hunan bombed by Japanese naval planes.

,, 15 - Yenan and other cities in Shensi bombed.

On the afternoon of October 3d nine Chinese planes flying at 6,000 meters appeared over Hankow and released nine bombs, after which they flew off in the direction of the Han River. This was the first attempt on the part of the Chinese to bomb Hankow since its fall last year.

Again on October 14th some twenty Chinese planes appeared over Hankow and bombed it. The Chinese claimed huge fires were started as a result but the Japanese maintained only a few coolies were killed and that the damage was negligible. It was also claimed by the Japanese that two of the attacking planes were shot down and that the crews were Russian.

6. <u>Friction between Communist and Nationalist Chinese Troops</u>

Major Barrett reported from Chungking that ill feeling had existed between Red and Central Government troops in Shensi during June, July and August and that in June a pitched battle was fought in which both sides had hundreds of casualties. The fighting resulted from a question of jurisdiction over a town in the southern edge of the Red area and General Tung Chao, commanding the 28th Army of the 8th Route Army garrisons at Shenyi and Chengning in west Shensi, is reported to have begun the attack which lasted about two weeks, the Reds

finally evacuating these districts. The American Consul at Tsinan reported a Japanese claim that Yu Hsueh-chung's troops clashed with troops of the 8th Route Army near Mengyin in south central Shantung in the latter part of September. It was later reported that 2,000 8th Routers had been transferred from the west to reinforce those in Mengyin. The Japanese also reported a clash which lasted forty eight hours near Tsingping (west Shantung) between 8th Routers and Chinese irregulars under Admiral Shen Hung-lieh, in which 1,600 were killed with losses about equal. The dissension was said to have been due to the efforts of the 8th Route Army to extend its sphere of influence.

7. General

Toward the end of the period under review Chungking reported a lull in military activity on all fronts, including a noticeable slackening off of Japanese air raids. Chinese sources believe this to be the lull before the storm and state they expect further operations against Changsha. The same sources report 60,000 Japanese reinforcements in the Wuhan area up to October 20th. Since no towns of importance have been occupied by the Japanese since the fall of Hankow, it is conceivable that another thrust will be made at Changsha both to wipe the stigma of any reverses which may have occurred and for propaganda for home consumption. The newly established Central Military Headquarters in Nanking has as yet made no concerted effort to consolidate operations in China, and as a summary it may be said that in spite of friction between Red and Nationalist troops, the still unsettled conditions in south Shansi and the apparent reverse near Changsha leave much to be desired from the Japanese military point of view.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures:
1. Military operations in Hunan and Kiangsi, (Sept.23 - Oct.9, 1939)
2. Same map (Oct. 5 - 12, 1939)
3. Military operations in Shansi

Distribution:
6 MID; 2 Embassy; 1 Tokyo,
1 Manila; 1 N/A; 1 Guard; 2 File

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, October 31, 1939. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

William Mayer
Major, F.A.
Military Attache

Encls. No change


MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN SHANSI
OCT. 12, 1939.
0 10 20 30 40 50 Km.
NO. 3
N.
To Taiyuan
HUNGTUNG
LINFEN
SHANSI
YICHENG
KUWO
WENSI
To Lanchow
TSINYUAN
TSIN RIVER
TSINHSIEN
TUNGYANGKUAN
CHANGTZE
CHANGCHIH (LUAN)
HUKUAN
YINCHENG
KAOPING
TSINCHENG
POAI
HONAN
ANYANG
SINSIANG
Japanese Forces
Chinese Forces
To accompany Report No. 9808.
M. A. PEKING, CHINA.


MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN HUNAN & KIANGSI
Oct. 5 - 12, 1939
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Kilometers
NO. 2
YANG TZE RIVER
CANTON-HANKOW R. R.
LINSIANG
TSUNGYANG (CHUNGYANG)
TUNGTING LAKE
10/9
JUNGCHIAWAN
10/7
LUCHIAO
HSINCHIANG R.
HSINCHIANGCHEN
10/8
10/8
YANGLINCHIEH
TUNGCHENG
CHIULING
TAOSHUKANG
YINGTIEN
10/6
CHANGLOCHIEH
MILO
HSINSHIN
KU RIVER
PINGKIANG
SIANG RIVER
SIANGYIN
PAISHUI
CHANGSHOUCHIEH
CHINCHING
FULINPU
10/5
CHIAOTOUYI
CHANGSHA
YUNGANSHIH
LILIYANG
Chinese Forces
Japanese Forces



To accompany Report No. 9808.

PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE, PEKING.


MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN HUNAN & KIANGSI
SEPT. 23 - OCT. 9, 1939.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Kilometers
NO. 1
YANG TZE RIVER
CANTON-HANKOW R. R.
LINSIANG
TSUNGYANG (CHUNGYANG)
YOCHOW
5
6
33
TUNGTING LAKE
NAVAL FORCES
9/23
6
(13TH DIV.)
9/23
TUNGCHENG
JUNGCHIAWAN
10/7
LUCHIAO
HSINCHIANG R.
CHIULING
9/26
TAOSHUKANG
Retaken 9/30
HSINCHIANGCHEN
YANGLINCHIEH
Landed 9/25
3
10
9/24-25
CHATSIN
Landed from gunboats
YINGTIEN
10/6
CHANGLOCHIEH
MILO
9/29
HSIASHIN
KU RIVER
PINGKIANG
9/29
CHANGSHOUCHIEH
PAISHUI
SIANGYIN
Retaken 9/29
RIVER
CHINCHING
10/5
FULINPU
10/5
9/29
CHIAOTOUYI
Retaken 9/29
SIANG
Retaken 9/29
9/29
CHANGSHA
YUHGANSHIH
LIUYANG
Japanese Forces
Chinese Forces



PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE, PEKING.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

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

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OCT 1940

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


CHANGTAIKUAN
SINYANG
TUNG PEH SHAN
TSAOYANG
FANCHENG
SIANGYANG
N
TA HUNG SHAN
SUIHSIEN
YINGSHAN
KWANGSHUI
HAN RIVER
CHANGSHOUTIEN
ANLU
HUAYUAN
CHUNGSIANG
KINGMEN
KINGSHAN
YINGCHENG
SIAOKAN
TANGYANG
YUKIHO
KIUKOW
TSAOSHIH



To accompany Report No. 9829.

No. 1



PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.

To accompany Report No.



To accompany Report No. 9829.

G-2 Report

6180

G-1

JAN 18 1940
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

4 bms
2657-J-276
J-46

SITUATION REPORT

October 26, 1939 - November 27, 1939

1. Kwangtung (landing at Pakhoi)
2. Hupeh
3. Shansi
4. Hopei
5. Minor Fronts
6. Air Activity
7. Guerrillas
8. General

1. Kwangtung (landing at Pakhoi).

The Japanese landing near Pakhoi (Kwangtung Province) and subsequent operations inland which have been expected by both Chinese and foreign observers for many months finally got under way November 15th. An indication of the imminence of operations in this sector reached this office on November 9th in the form of a message from Hongkong which stated that most of the Japanese Third Fleet was in Tongking Gulf plus the aircraft carrier Akagi and transports with landing boats.

On November 15th Domei reported that a landing was made west of Pakhoi early that morning, and that after cleaning up local Chinese resistance the Japanese were driving inward. The navy was reported to have established a seaplane base at the point where the landing was made. Major Barrett reported from Chungking that two Japanese contingents landed at Lungmen island (in Chinchow Bay) on the 15th, and another message from the same source stated that, according to the Chinese press, three landings were made - one southeast of Pakhoi (consisting of 3,000 Marines), one at Lungmen (consisting of the 5th Division from Shantung), and one at a point on the east shore of Chinchow Bay. This report stated that the first landing attempts made in boats carrying 100 men each were repulsed in spite of heavy protecting fire from the Japanese navy, but that later landings were effected under cover of darkness. Domei reported another unit sailed up the Yukong River and landed within striking distance of Yamchow. The Chinese admitted the loss of Fancheng on November 15th and Yamchow (Chinchow) on Nov. 17th, but stated that the entire Japanese force was not more than a brigade, hence they did not expect large scale operations inland.

According to Domei the Chinese forces in the vicinity consisted of three divisions of regular troops and about 100,000 militiamen. The Chinese 175th Division was said to be at Pakhoi, the newly organized 19th at Fancheng and Yamchow and the 188th Division at points further south. Another Domei

dispatch stated that the Chinese defenders were completely taken by surprise since the landing was effected during very adverse weather conditions and with a wind of 40 miles per hour (?). It also reported General Chiang was greatly alarmed and had ordered General Chang Fa-kwei (Commander-in-Chief of the 4th War Zone) and General Tsai Ting-kai (commanding general of the 16th Army Group) to rush reinforcements to the vicinity to check the Japanese advance. On November 18th General Pai Chung-hsi, Assistant Chief of the General Staff, and concurrently Director of Chiang Kai-shek's Southwestern Headquarters, declared: "Our only fear is that the Japanese will not invade Kwangsi. If they do , it will give the Chinese another chance to tie up a further large enemy force." General Pai added that the Chinese would probably adopt the same tactics used in Shansi and north Hunan where the civil population, in cooperation with the Army, destroyed all means of transportation thus depriving the Japanese of supply routes and of the use of heavy artillery.

The Sao Tang Pao, a Chungking military organ, reported that the Japanese were advancing northwest from Chinhsien (Yamchow) in two columns and that heavy fighting was taking place November 18th at Tasze. As this report goes to press the Japanese have advanced, according to Domei, more than twenty kilometers into Kwangsi Province, apparently along the Yamchow-Nanning highway.

Comment (See Map No. 1 attached)

Due to the conflicting Japanese and Chinese reports, and also to the Japanese practice of giving locations of operations by merely stating "at a certain place", it is difficult to plot accurately this landing operation but all available information to date has been recorded on the attached map. A glance will show that if, as reported, a landing was made on the coast southeast of Pakhoi, it was probably with the intention of cutting off the city from communication to the north, and to start operations along the Hoppo-Yamchow highway.

The operation naturally points to a drive on Nanning and whether or not it can be taken easily, or with difficulty, or not at all, depends largely on General Pai Chung-hsi. This officer is considered by foreign observers to be one of, if not the most able Chinese general, and it is well known that he holds the full confidence of the Generalissimo.

In January 1938 Captain Mattice, language officer on temporary duty in Chungking, learned from a German advisor that at that time the Chinese plan of action in case a landing was made in the vicinity of Pakhoi, was to offer only nominal resistance along the coast where the Japanese would have the advantage and protection of naval armament, and withdraw to the north where the main defense would be made in the mountainous country between Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces. This seems to be in line with the above remarks by General Pai Chung-hsi and is probably the plan to be adopted.

A Domei dispatch from a spokesman with the Tongking Bay Expeditionary Force stated on November 16th that "the operations just started in the vicinity of Pakhoi aim at the destruction of Chinese forces in Kwangsi and Yunnan Provinces as well as the interception of a communication line by which the Chiang regime has maintained contact with the outside world in an attempt to continue resistance against Japan." Even if this report is correct, it is inconceivable to the undersigned that the Japanese will, in the near future, undertake operations to the west toward Yunnan, unless possibly - just possibly - as a desperate attempt to cut one of China's last remaining lifelines. The distances involved would render communications and supply most difficult, and the number of troops required would be enormous. If, however, Yunnanfu (Kunming) could be taken, the Indo-China and Burma roads would be cut and the sole remaining supply route would be that into Kansu Province from Soviet Russia.

It is the opinion of the undersigned that if Nanning is taken, the Japanese will thoroughly consolidate their position before moving northeast toward Kweilin or northwest into Yunnan Province.

2. Hupeh.

During the first half of the period under review there was considerable military activity in eastern Hupeh, and it was believed that the Japanese had begun another drive westward toward Shasi and Ichang on the Yangtze River. On October 30th the 26th Brigade of the 13th Division moved westward from Hanyang (see Map No. 2) and occupied Chujushan, pushing on the next day to Hsientaochen on the Han River. Chinese sources believed this move resulted from losses sustained by Japanese shipping on the Han River from Chinese artillery near Hsientaochen, and also to improve the radio net so no more Chinese planes could approach the Wuhan area through this territory without being detected.

On November 1st the Japanese moved southwest in two columns and took Mienyang and Fengkow, while another unit of the 13th at Yokow moved south on Tunghaikou in support of the eastern column. Chinese sources stated a counter attack was launched on November 3d from Chienli which was successful in retaking Fengkow, Tunghaikou and Changchiakou but that Mienyang remained in Japanese hands although it was surrounded. Reports from this theatre have been very obscure lately and it is believed that while there is still fighting going on, the Japanese are not attempting a major push toward Shasi at present.

Early in November a Japanese column was reported moving north from Sinyang in southern Honan, and Chinese sources stated that this force was meeting considerable opposition at Changtaikwan on the Pinghan Railroad. Japanese concentrations were also reported in the triangle: Yingshan-

Anlu-and Suihsien. From Suihsien a Japanese force moved westward and encountered resistance along the eastern foothills of the Ta Hung mountains. The Chinese believed that the Japanese intentions in this area were to wipe out any Chinese forces in the Ta Hung and Tung Peh mountains and thus facilitate a drive northwest from Suihsien to Fancheng and Siangyang. In southern Hupeh artillery activity was reported around Tungcheng, while to the west Japanese and Chinese faced each other across the Hsinchiang River in northern Hunan. The Chinese are still expecting another Japanese drive on Changsha (especially after reported reinforcements had arrived in the Wuhan area) but as we go to press this has not begun.

3. Shansi.

During the period under review operations in South Shansi consisted, for the most part, of a Japanese attempt to wipe out troops of the 61st Shansi Army who have been operating effectively between the Tungpu Railroad and the Yellow River. Operations began on October 23d and 24th when four Japanese columns each estimated to be an infantry regiment supported by a battalion of artillery moved west from bases along the Tungpu at Lingshih, Hwohsien, Linfen and Fengcheng. (See Map No. 3). According to the Japanese press and the Chinese spokesman Shihlou, Shihhsien, and Puhsien were taken on October 25th, Hsiangning and Kihsien on the 26th and Taning on the 27th. After some days of comparative quiet in this sector the Chinese began a counter offensive in which they claimed to have retaken Kihsien on November 10th, Taning and Puhsien on the 16th and Hsiangning on the 14th after several days of bitter fighting. Shihhsien is reported to be still in Japanese hands although attacked by Chinese vigorously.

Down in the elbow of the Yellow River the Japanese have been heavily shelling Tungkwan, and a detachment from Fenglintu marched east to participate in a minor action against guerrillas. The Changtze-Luan sector has been comparatively quiet except for occasional guerrilla raids in the vicinity of Luan. Japanese sources claimed that during the month of October the operations in Shansi Province resulted in 18,000 Chinese killed and 2,200 taken prisoner, while they stated their own losses amounted to 306 killed and 831 wounded.

4. Hopei.

This province has been comparatively quiet from a military point of view for many months, but like all the occupied areas guerrilla activities (very annoying to the

Japanese) are continually taking place. In order to clean up certain mobile Chinese units operating in the general area Yihsien-Paoting-Tanghsien and Laiyuan (see Map No. 4), a Japanese force reported to be about three thousand men was sent south from Laiyuan to Yinfang. Meeting with serious resistance, the Third Mixed Brigade (from Laiyuan ?) was sent to relieve the first column and this unit also suffered a large number of casualties, including the commander Lieut. General Abe, who, with several members of his staff, was killed by a trench mortar shell which reportedly fell right at his feet. General Abe is the senior Japanese officer to be killed in action since the incident began.

According to the Chinese military spokesman the Japanese then dispatched the 110th and 139th infantry regiments from Tanghsien and Yuanhsien to relieve the Third Mixed Brigade, and these units too were stopped before reaching Yinfang. A cavalry unit from Yihsien is reported to have failed in an attempt to reach the same place.

Japanese reports claim that in spite of severe weather they are having their usual successes in this area.

5. Minor Fronts.

During the period under report military activity of a minor nature occurred in Shantung, Anhwei, Chekiang Provinces and in Inner Mongolia. On November 8th Japanese marines, supported by naval aircraft, attacked Laishan south of Chefoo on the north coast of Shantung, and according to Domei routed 500 enemy troops. On the 6th Showhsien on the Hwai River in northern Anhwei was reported to have been occupied by the Japanese after considerable resistance. In Chekiang Province the Japanese began on November 8th a drive from Hangchow against Chinese troops in the area: Hangchow-Huchow-Kashing. These troops were reported to be from the Chinese 62d, 192d, 63d and 18th Divisions under General Liu Hsien-chu, and have been harrassing the Japanese along the Shanghai-Hangchow and Shanghai-Nanking railroads. A Chinese dispatch from Chungking reported that fighting for several days took place in Suiyuan Province north and west of Paotou.

6. Air Activity.

The following is a summary of air raids made by Japanese army and naval aircraft during the period under report:

October

25....Naval planes bombed Suining field (between Chungking and Chengtu)
,,....Naval planes bombed Nanyang field, S.W. Honan.
,,....Military planes bombed Yinchih on Lunghai R.R.,N. Honan.
,,....Military planes bombed Nancheng, Shensi.
,, ...Military planes bombed Wushan, Szechwan.
28 ...Military planes bombed Loyang, Honan.
30 ...Naval planes bombed Hofei, Anhwei and Paoying, Kiangsu.
,, ...Naval planes bombed Kwangteh, Anhwei.
,, ...Military planes bombed Sian, Shensi, Pingliang, Kansu, and Loyang, North Honan.
31 ...Military planes bombed Loyang (three times). Loyang is on the western section of Lunghai R.R.

November

1 ...Japanese planes bombed Nanning, Kwangsi.
3 ...Japanese planes bombed towns in Honan and northern Hunan.
4 ...Naval planes bombed Chengtu, Szechwan.
,,...Naval planes bombed Nanyang, Honan and Yiyang, Hunan.
,, ...Military planes bombed towns in eastern Kiangsi.
5 ...Japanese planes bombed airfields near Chengtu, Szechwan.
,, ...Japanese planes bombed cities in Hunan and Kwangsi.
6 ...Naval planes bombed cities in Kwangsi.
7 ...Japanese planes bombed Changsha, Hunan and Chienli,Hupeh.
,, ...Japanese planes bombed Lungchow, Kwangsi.
10 ...Military planes bombed Chinese troops near Hangchow, Chekiang.
11 ...Naval planes bombed northern Kiangsu and central and western Kwangsi.
15 ...Military planes bombed Waichow, Kwangtung.
16 ...Military planes bombed Waichow, Kwangtung.
18 ...Military planes bombed Hingning, northwest of Swatow, Kwangtung.
,, ...Japanese planes bombed Chungking.
19 ...Japanese planes bombed Nanning, Kwangsi.
20 ...Japanese planes bombed Nanning and other towns in Kwangsi.
23 ...Japanese planes bombed strategic towns in Kwangtung.
25 ...Japanese planes bombed Sian, Shensi.

During the engagement which took place when the Japanese raided Chengtu on November 4th, the Chinese claimed one Japanese plane was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and two by Chinese pursuits. The Japanese admitted one naval plane was lost. Chinese sources also claimed the death of Kiku Okuda whom they refer to as the Japanese "king of bombing". Okuda was reported to have been a naval aviator who was well versed in Chinese topography and who frequently led bombing raids into Szechwan Province. He was said to have been forty-four years old and formerly a member of the Aviation Advisory Committee of the Naval Operations Board. A Chinese dispatch stated that Okuda was leading a squadron over Chengtu when his plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire which caused it to crash, and papers identifying Okuda were found on his body.

A Shanghai report stated that Chinese aircraft raided Nanking early in November, and that Chinese aerial reconnaissance had taken place over Kaifeng. The Japanese reported that on October 16th Lieutenant Colonel Keizaburo Hara with two officers and six enlisted men lost their lives when the bombing plane in which they were flying was shot down by anti-aircraft fire at an undisclosed place.

The highlight of air operations during the period under report was the Japanese military dispatch which claimed that Chinese planes, while flying over Kaifeng on or about October 31st, dropped "cobweb" like packages containing anthrax germs. The Peking military spokesman reaffirmed this as an official dispatch, but he was caused considerable embarrassment by the caustic questions from the members of the fourth estate present at the conference. This was denied by the Chinese who claimed it Japanese propaganda.

Reuter reported on November 16th that China had placed a one-million dollar order with an American aviation concern for an attack bomber assembly plant and material for 25 planes.

7. Guerrilla Activities

While guerrilla troops may never actually win a war, the Chinese troops operating in the occupied areas and behind the front lines are certainly a thorn in the side of the Japanese military machine. During the period under report they were active around Shanghai and Hangchow, Kaifeng and Lanfeng south of the Yellow River in North Honan, in Shantung and also in Hopei and Shansi. They claim to have killed and wounded almost 5,000 Japanese during the month of September alone. In Shantung the notorious bandit chieftan Liu Kwei-tang, who has been "cooperating" with the Japanese, is reliably reported to have suddenly deserted to the Chinese side taking with him 5,000 men and all their Japanese arms and equipment.

A glance at the present general distribution of Japanese troops in China and their lengthy lines of communication and supply, will cause one to realize the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare if only for the number of Japanese troops they cause to be kept back from the front lines to guard supply routes.

8. General.

The last month has been a critical one for the Generalissimo, but from all reports he is as firm as ever in

his intentions to continue armed resistance to the bitter end. The clashes between Kuomintang and Communist troops which resulted in a gradual withdrawing of the latter into Shensi Province and consequently strengthened the Communist demands on the Central Government, have given him much to think about. In order to keep Soviet penetration out of the northwest and at the same time to keep on receiving supplies from them, he will probably lend an ear to the Communist demands, at least temporarily. Although a recent report stated that the amount of supplies coming over the northwest route is not nearly as much as has been reported, it still remains one of the two remaining lifelines.

There was also reported some friction between the Generalissimo and the military governor of Yunnan Province, and the Japanese enlarged on this and stated that the Yunnan troops were to be ordered to the front while Hunan troops were to be transferred to Kunming. This was denied by the Chinese but may have been another problem for Chiang to worry about. As we go to press the Japanese claim to have entered Nanning and are now cleaning up in the vicinity. If this is true, the undersigned is at a loss to know how the Generalissimo could have permitted General Pai Chung-hsi to allow this to happen. It may be possible that the Chinese have an ace up their sleeve, but if so it is not understandable why they reportedly tore up the roads for miles around Nanning thus hampering any counter attack on their part.

From the Japanese point of view, while they gained an apparently easy victory at Nanning, they have also been extremely busy for there was fighting in all of twelve different provinces. When the smoke cleared away they were checked in Hupeh, they failed to wipe up the troops in western Shansi, they suffered losses even in supposedly quiet Hopei, and in spite of the terrific air bombardments the Chinese are still able to put up plenty of resistance. With winter already here, and using the figures for this last month as a coefficient for computing monthly casualties and expenditure, it is no wonder that the Japanese military leaders are sincere when they urge an early termination of the China incident.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON,
Capt., F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures:
1. Map of military operations in western Kwangtung,
2. Map of mil. operations in Hupeh,
3. Map of mil. operations in Shansi,
4. Map of mil. operations in Hopei.

Distribution:
6 MID; 2 Embassy; 1 Tokyo;
1 Guard; 1 N/A; 1 Manila; 2 File

JAN 12 1940
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

Morris
2657-0-276

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 11 1940

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peking, China, November 29, 1939. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

William Mayer
Major, Field Artillery
Military Attache

Enclosures: no change

6-1
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2657-J-276
WAR DEPARTMENT

PROPOSED JAPANESE MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR 1940 (AS SEEN BY CHINESE OBSERVERS)



No.4

PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.

No.3


MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN KWANGTUNG
AS OF JAN. 5, 1940.
LINHSIEN
SHIUCHOW
LUNGNAN
TAKUNKOW
YUNGYUN Jan. 1
KUANTU
Dec. 31
LINPING
HAMKWONG
Jan. 1
YINGTAK
HSINFENG
MEIKENG
Dec. 25
Jan. 2
LUTIEN
Dec. 26
NIUPEICHI
LIANGKOW
PAKONGHOW
TSINGYUN
LUNGMOON
Dec. 25
HOYUN
FAHSIEN
TSUNGFA
YINCHANNAO
SZEWUI
TSENGCHENG
RIGHT
GD
CENTER
SANSHUI
LEFT
CANTON



To accompany Report No. 9842.


Dec.17
PINYANG
KUNLUNKUAN
Dec.17
Dec.29
CHIUTANG
PATANG
Dec.17
CHITANG
LIUTANG
WUTANG
SZETANG
Dec.29
RIVER
YU
KWEINSIEN
NAMHEUNG
WATLAM
LINGSHAN
HSIAO
HSIATUNG
LUKUK
POKPAK
LUWUYU
TASZE
YAMHSIEN (YAMCHOW) (CHINCHOW)
LUNGMEN IS.
CHIN CHOW BAY
SHEKKONG
HOPPO
ANPU
PAKHOI
GULF OF TONGKING
FT. BAYARD
HOIHONG

No. 2



PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA

To accompany Report No. 9842.

No. 1



To accompany Report No. 9842.

PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.


PANGKIANG
CHAHAR
TEHWANGFU
PAILINGMIAO
SUIYUAN
WUCHUAN
TSINING
CHOTZESHAN
KWEISUI (HOUHO)
Dec. 19
SANATSI
FENGSCHEN
LIANGCHENG
HOLIN
To Kalgan
TOKOTO
TATUNG
TSINGSHUIHO
SHANSI
7th CAV. DIV.
MEN PING-YUEH
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN SUIYUAN
AS OF JAN. 5, 1940.
0 10 20 30 40 50 km.

G-2 Report

6-1

6910

OFFICE CHIEF OF ENGR.
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
FEB 2 1940
WAR DEPARTMENT

RESTRICTED

SITUATION REPORT

November 28, 1939 - January 5, 1940

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 7 1940

1. North China
   a. Suiyuan
   b. Shansi
   c. Hopei
   d. Shantung
2. Central China
3. South China
   a. Kwangsi
   b. Kwangtung
4. Air Activities
5. General

1. North China:

a. Suiyuan.

This sector, which has been devoid of major military activity for over a year, was the locale of the northernmost thrust of the Chinese "winter offensive". The object was to retake Paotow, Saratsi and neighboring towns from the Japanese. On December 15th the Chinese 35th Army Corps under General Fu Tso-yi and consisting of some 6,000 men of the 31st, 32nd, 101st divisions and the 6th Brigade moved southeast from their base at Wuyuan and marched rather confidently on Paotow. At the same time the Chinese 7th Cavalry Division under General Men Ping-yueh marched north from Shansi (see map No. I), crossed the Yellow River and attacked Saratsi on December 19th. The Japanese estimated this force to number about three thousand. The cavalry force actually succeeded in cutting the railroad west of Saratsi, evidently with the intention of surrounding and defeating the Japanese in the Paotow area before help could arrive from Kweisui.

The cavalry division attempted to enter Saratsi on the 19th, but they were held off by the Japanese garrison which forced them to retreat south across the river, where they were attacked again by the Japanese trained Mongol cavalry. General Fu Tso-yi's vanguards reached Paotow and on December 20th actually penetrated the city's walls, but the attack was not pushed with much vigor and on the 22d, after the arrival of Japanese relief columns from Anpei and Kuyang, the Chinese retreated to the northward. The Japanese admitted their casualties were over three hundred, of which more than one half were killed, including Colonel Kazuo Kobayashi, and also claimed the Chinese losses totaled around 5,000 killed. By December 26th the railroad had been repaired and comparative quiet reigned in the entire area.

Comment: From information received from an American pressman who flew to Paotow and was allowed to view

the battlefield before the Chinese bodies had been removed, it was evident that General Fu Tso-yi was over confident. That he was prepared to attack in force may be gathered by the photographs of captured materiel enclosed with the original copy of this report, which were taken by the American mentioned above. They include light artillery, mountain guns, light and heavy machine guns, entrenching tools, gas masks etc. Not wishing to antagonize the inhabitants of Paotow, he did not even shell the town before attempting to take it. Japanese sources reported on January 7th that General Fu Tso-yi had punished several of his commanders for military blunders, including the commander of the 101st Division, General Tung Chi-wu, who was imprisoned. Eight others were reported to have been executed. Of interest is the fact that the Mongol cavalry gave much assistance to the Japanese in dispersing the 7th cavalry division after its retreat south of the Yellow River. This may be understood, however, by the fact that General Fu Tso-yi has long enjoyed a reputation of not being kindly disposed toward the Mongols.

b. Shansi.

During the period under review there was no pronounced Chinese "winter offensive" in Shansi Province, other than increased guerrilla activity and an attempt to enter the capital, Taiyuan, which was repulsed. The Japanese, on the other hand, were busy throughout the entire period with their mopping up operations which, according to the Japanese press, were successfully carried out at various points along the Tungpu Railway. The largest operation took place in southern Shansi when on December 2d a reinforced division concentrated at Wensi (on the Tungpu) and Hsiahsien (25 kilometers south of Wensi) moved east to dislodge Chinese troops from the Chungtiao mountain range. The Japanese claimed the Chinese were defeated and retreated to the southeast, while the Chungking official spokesman declared that, after several days of severe fighting, the Chinese counter-attacked which caused the Japanese to withdraw to Wensi and Hsiahsien. That the Chinese troops are still in the vicinity is evident from a Domei dispatch on December 31st which stated that a Japanese unit had routed Chinese troops eleven kilometers northeast of Hsiahsien. During the month there were also several clashes in the troublesome Changtze-Luan sector in southeast Shansi, in which the Japanese claimed to have repulsed guerrilla attacks.

c. Hopei.

Japanese headquarters at Taiyuan reported three successful mopping up operations in Hopei during the period under review. On November 25th (but not recorded in our last report) they claimed to have taken the town of Fuping in northwestern Hopei, west of Paoting and near the Shansi

border. This, they stated, had been a vital Communist center-the capture of which will do much to restore order in North China. On the 29th they reported routing five hundred Chinese remnant troops near Chohsien (between Paoting and Peking on the Pinghan Railroad). In this skirmish the Japanese reported stubborn Chinese resistance from prepared positions, so that the attacking (Tomioka) detachment had to be assisted by the Fukumi unit, and the Japanese losses included two lieutenants killed in action. After a period of quiet the Japanese again took the field on December 24th, and marched against Chinese troops in the Hsincheng-Kuan-Yungtsin area (northeast of Paoting and 35 miles south of Peking). Here, on December 27th, they reported dispersing the Chinese who had been making attacks on local Japanese garrisons in what was termed the "winter offensive". This is interesting in that it shows the Chinese are active right in the center of the relatively strong Japanese garrisons between Paoting, Tientsin and Peking.

The military headquarters at Paoting announced that, during the month of October 1939, they had engaged a total of 3,700 Chinese in 33 skirmishes and that the Chinese had suffered 570 killed and 150 prisoners - rather a modest statement of Japanese accomplishments.

d. Shantung.

As evidence of the limited area under Japanese control in this province, a report from Tsingtao on Dec. 7th stated that a communication line running south from Chefoo and connecting Tsisia, Laiyang and Tsimo with Tsingtao would shortly be completely under Japanese control since troops and planes were steadily making gains against bandits in this sector. Laiyang and Tsisia were reported already taken.

A naval communique reported 800 bandits were routed by Japanese Marines from the suburbs of Chefoo on December 25th.

On December 16th the headquarters at Tsinan published the results of operations in Shantung Province for the month of November, 1939. According to the figures a total of 7,800 Chinese troops were engaged in 489 skirmishes which resulted in Chinese losses of 4,250 killed and 520 taken prisoner. The Japanese losses were 40 killed and 89 wounded during the same period. This can hardly compare with the statement issued above from neighboring Hopei Province.

A reliable source from Tsinan reported on Dec. 19th that the Japanese were in action since December 1st in the region north of Chowtsun (fifty miles east of Tsinan on the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad), against the 8th Route Army and probably Chang Pu-yun's men. The same source also reported (December 19th) that Central Government troops

under General Li Pin-hsien had arrived in the Poping-Tsingping area (fifty miles west of Tsinan). It was also reported that guerrilla activity along the Tsinpu Railroad was not diminishing, that trains had been delayed and that there had been three attacks between Tsinan and Tawenkow (65 miles south) in one of which the Japanese lost 40 men at night. Tracks in bad sections are reported to be illuminated by electric lights and dogs are staked at intervals of about 100 yards on each side of the line to give warning of the approach of marauders. The Tsinan-Tsingtao line is reported to be running without trouble at present.

2. Central China.

(a) While there was considerable military activity in the Provinces of Honan, Hupeh and Kiangsi during the period covered by this report, the results claimed by both sides are so conflicting that it is impossible to portray an accurate picture of the actual situation at present. The Chinese claimed to have entered Kaifeng (north Honan) on December 17th, but it has been confirmed that they did little more than fire a few grenades at the walls and retired without causing any damage. In the south the Chinese report large forces marching on Sinyang on the Pinghan Railroad, while the Japanese claim their troops are successfully routing enemy forces north of that city.

In Central Hupeh the Chinese claim to have retaken Hsintaochen (on the Han River) on December 14th, and that their troops were (December 20th) marching west against the Japanese at Chienchiang. Both the Japanese and Chinese report victories in southeastern Hupeh in the Tungcheng-Puchi-Tungshan area.

(b) Hunan has been relatively quiet but in Kiangsi fighting took place around Nanchang, Fengsin and Kaoan. It is not believed that the Chinese were able to retake and hold any important town, but that their operations were rather designed to prevent Japanese withdrawals of troops for rest and reorganization.

(c) In Chekiang Province the Japanese reported a successful landing (December 2-3d) on Tayang Island - one of the Chowshun Islands in the southern entrance of Hangchow Bay. This may forecast an attempt to land at Ningpo. On the north coast of Hangchow Bay the town of Haiyen was reported to have been occupied on December 7th.

3. South China.

(a) Kwangsi.

In continuation of our last report the Japanese columns moved north from Fangcheng and Yamchow (see map

No. 2) and after severe fighting at Taze and Tatang, reached the outskirts of Nanning on the 23d of November. The city was entered the next day under cover of heavy aerial bombardment and the Chinese forces withdrew on the 26th to positions at Takaofeng and Szetang. Chinese sources claimed the loss of the city was due to Japanese superiority in numbers and to the use of three Japanese air squadrons.

Continuing their drive the Japanese pushed north and northeast, and by December 5th had reached Liutang on the Pinyang highway and were pursuing the Chinese force which had withdrawn north from Takaofeng, reaching a point just south of Wuming on the 5th. This column began a withdrawal the same day however, and by December 14th it was back just south of Takaofeng. The northeast column was reported to be digging in at Kunlunkuan - a mountain pass. In the meanwhile a Japanese column from Yamchow moved southeast along the Yamchow-Hoppo Road and the Chinese claimed it was stopped before it reached the latter city. The Chinese also attacked Japanese communications at Tatang and other points between Nanning and Yamchow, but apparently not in sufficient force to cut the Nanning operation from its bases.

On December 17th the Chinese made a counter-attack from Pinyang and claimed to have penetrated as far southwest as Patang the same day. By January 5th they reported the Japanese had withdrawn to Szetang, but admitted the Japanese still held Chiutang and that one Japanese regiment had filtered through the Chinese lines and was attempting to retake Kunlunkuan. In the severe fighting at this place the Chinese claim to have badly beaten the 21st and 42d Regiments of the Japanese 5th Division.

On December 23d the Japanese spokesman at Canton announced that a Japanese mobile column had proceeded southwest from Nanning and had entered both Chennankuan and Lungchow on the 21st. After destroying huge quantities of Chinese military stores these forces are reported to have withdrawn east after seizing 5,000,000 gallons of gasoline and 750,000 gallons of oil. Japanese also admitted that much of the stores had been removed by the Chinese. (Note: since this is quite an item, it is probable that the spokesman meant to include this in the stores destroyed.) The Chinese reported, however, that although Japanese troops had entered these places, they had been forced to retreat and that by January 5th there were no Japanese near the Indo-China border.

(b) Kwangtung.

The Japanese attempt to take Shuichow (north of Canton on the Yuehhan Railroad) took the form of three distinct columns (see Map No. 3). To prepare for this drive, a division formed from the Imperial Guards which had recently arrived from Japan was sent north of Canton to Fahsien and thence east to Tsungfa to form the center. The east column was approximately a division formed from the Tsengcheng garrison plus troops from Paoan, Sumchun and the

Kowloon border, and its jump off point was Tsengcheng. In this connection it is interesting to note that the Japanese Consul General in Canton notified his British colleague that the troops were being removed from the Kowloon border "out of friendliness to Great Britain."

The left column, also a division, was based on Yinchannao and was composed of troops from the Fatshan and Samshui garrisons plus some from the Swatow-Cahoan front. This left unit was again divided and moved north in two columns, one along the railroad and one west of the river. All three divisions moved out around the 20th of December. The left column worked its way almost to Yingtak, where, on January 1st, the Chinese counter-attacked and began to drive it south. The center column took Liangkow on the 26th and, after heavy fighting, reached Lutien on Jan. 2d, whereupon a strong Chinese counter-attack forced it southward.

The right column fought its way into Lungmoon on the 25th, and finally took Meikeng the same day. In spite of heavy losses it proceeded northwest and reached Kuantu on the 31st. A Chinese attack the next day drove it south. A Domei report from Canton stated that the Japanese force captured Yungyun and then turned south to pursue Chinese remnant troops. A flank detachment from the left column turned northwest from Lungmoon to outflank the Chinese who were holding up the progress of the center column near Lutien, but they were driven south according to the Chungking military spokesman.

Although the reports from both sides are in conflict, it is believed that the drive has been at least temporarily blocked, and the Chinese hail the move as the greatest victory since the defense of Changsha. By Jan. 4th the Japanese were back to their original positions occupied before the drive started.

4. <u>Air Activity.</u>

The following is a summary of air raids made by Japanese army and naval aircraft during the period under review:

Nov. 25th--Naval planes bombed enemy troops on shore of Laichow Bay, Shantung.
,, ,, --Naval "Shimada" unit bombed Sian, Shensi.
,, 28th--Naval planes bombed Lanchow three times.
,, 29th--Naval planes bombed Nanyang, Honan, and Lingshan, Kwangsi.
Dec. 1st--Naval planes bombed Lanchow, Kansu.
,, ,, --Army planes bombed Sian, Shensi.
,, ,, --Naval planes bombed Pinyang, Wuming, Lingshan and Kweilin, Kwangsi.
,, 3rd--Japanese planes bombed Kweilin, Kwangsi.

Dec. 4th -- Army planes bombed Liuchiatai ,N.W. of Wanhsien, Shansi.
,, 5th -- Army planes bombed enemy troops southeast of Anking, Anhwei.
,, 6th -- Naval planes bombed troops south of Changsha, Hunan.
,, 7th -- Naval planes bombed towns in Chekiang & Kwangsi.
,, 9th -- ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Hunan ,, ,,
,, 12th -- Japanese planes bombed southeast of Hangchow, Chekiang.
,, 13th -- Army planes bombed northwest of Hangchow, Chekiang.
,, 15th -- ,, ,, ,, enemy troops in Honan & Anhwei.
,, 16th -- ,, ,, ,, Hoku, N.W. Shansi.
,, 18th -- ,, ,, ,, airfield at Liangshan, Szechwan.
,, 17th -- Naval planes bombed Yanlo, Kwangsi.
,, 19th -- Army planes bombed troops N.E. of Anking, Anhwei
,, ,, -- Navy ,, ,, Liangshan, Szechwan.
,, 20th -- Japanese planes bombed Sian, Shensi, and Lanchow, Kansu.
,, 22d -- Navy planes bombed Hengyang, Hunan.
,, 21st -- Navy planes bombed bandits near Laiyang, Shantung.
,, 23d -- Army planes bombed Shiuchow, Kwangtung.
,, 26th -- Army and Navy planes bombed Lanchow, Kansu.
,, 27th -- Army planes bombed Hengyang, Hunan.
,, ,, -- Army and Navy planes bombed Lanchow, Kansu.
,, 28th -- ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 29th -- Army planes bombed southern Hunan.
,, 30th -- Japanese planes bombed Ichang, Hupeh.

Jan. 1st)-- Japanese planes bombed Indo-China-Yunnan Railway.
,, 2d)
Jan. 3d -- Naval planes bombed Paoking, Hunan.
,, 4th -- Naval planes bombed Mengtze, Yunnan.
,, ,, -- Naval planes bombed towns in Shantung and Anhwei.
,, 5th -- Naval planes bombed installations on Indo-China-Yunnan Railway.

The Japanese claim 99 planes participated in the joint raids on Lanchow December 26-28th, and that 13 Chinese planes were shot down while 22 were destroyed on the ground. They admit one naval plane crashed. The Chinese claim at least three Japanese bombers were brought down during the engagement. The Japanese also claim to have brought down three Chinese planes of the E-16 type in an engagement on December 27th in Kwangsi Province, and stated that this was the first aerial combat the Japanese had engaged in during the past two years. Chinese sources asserted that one group of Japanese planes which invaded Szechwan on December 19th dropped only handbills. During this same raid Chungking sources stated Chinese pursuits took to the air to engage the raiders, but no losses were claimed by either side. The Japanese reported their naval air unit which bombed Liangshan on December 18th was engaged by five Chinese aircraft but that all the Japanese ships returned safely. They also stated that during the raid on Lanchow on December 1st they were engaged by 20 Chinese planes, of which they shot down nine.

Comment: During the period under review the number of raids participated in by the Japanese Army and Navy aircraft was about equal, signifying a gradual increase in Army air activity - due perhaps to the relief of air units from Manchukuo after the Nomonhan truce. The consecutive bombings of Lanchow was evidently a well co-ordinated and well executed movement. In this connection the Japanese were probably aware of the rumor that the Soviet air forces had been withdrawn from that place. Also of interest is the fact that the Chinese air force, although insignificant in numbers, is actually in the air again - for the first time in many months.

5. General.

From a standpoint of military objectives gained, it must be admitted that the Chinese "winter offensive" came to no more than the April offensive of 1939. The Chinese Army is not yet in a position to deal a really crushing blow to the Japanese. Including the half-hearted attack on Paotow, not one of the many engagements which occurred during the period under review tended to weaken the Japanese military position. It is not possible at this time to calculate the results of the operations in Kwangtung north of Canton, but in all probability if the Japanese were turned back from their drive on Shiuchow they will be permitted to fall back on Canton without much pressure from the Chinese.

Although fighting is in progress in the Nanning area the Japanese are gradually consolidating their position, and once consolidated they are unlikely to remain quietly in that area. Chinese sources in Chungking (according to Reuter) feel that the Japanese will make a final attempt in 1940 to crush the resistance of the Central Government. They expect any or all of the following military operations (see Map No. 4):

1. A joint drive north from Canton and south from Hankow along the railroad to effect a junction at Hengyang, Hunan.
2. A drive from north Hunan westward toward Changteh.
3. A drive from Nanning northeast to Liuchow and Kweilin.
4. One from Nanning west into Yunnan.
5. A drive from Hankow west toward Shasi and Ichang.
6. A drive from Sinyang (South Honan) west to Siangyang and Fancheng.
7. A drive from Shansi west to Sian, Shensi.

None of these would be an easy task but they are likely possibilities and may be undertaken by a desperate Japan. From the Japanese military point of view the period under review has not been an easy one, for with the guerrillas behind the lines as active as ever, and the Central Government forces determined to continue armed resistance, their h

hope of a speedy curtailment of hostilities is as remote as ever. If the Japanese, however, can effectively destroy the Indo-China road, they will have taken away from China a lifeline the loss of which she will very quickly begin to feel.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Capt., F.A.,
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures: Maps
No.1-Mil.Operations in Suiyuan,
No.2-,, ,, in Western Kwangtung and Kwangsi,
No.3-Mil. Operations in Kwangtung
No.4-Proposed Japanese Operations for 1940

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1ST. IND.

THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY, PEKING, CHINA.

TO: A. C. OF S., G-2

1. APPROVED.

WILLIAM MAYER,
MAJOR, FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

No.3

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KWANGTUNG

February 3, 1940





To accompany Report No. 9849.

No. 4



PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA

To accompany Report No. 9849.


CHIENKIANG
Chinese forces withdrew FEB. 2
PINYANG
FEB. 21
Japanese claim to have encircled large Chinese force here
KWEINSIEN
KUNLUNKUAN
Dec. 31
CHUTANG
Jan. 4
PATANG
CHITANG
LIUTANG
WUTANG
SZETANG
Japanese Jan. 28
Japanese Offensive beginning Jan. 28
RIVER
NAMHEUNG
WATLAM
LINGSHAN
(Repeated attacks on L of
Japanese column sent to protect flank here driven back
HSIATUNG
LUKUK
POKPAK
LUWUYU
TASZE
GUARD
YAMHSIEN (YAMCHOW) (CHINCHOW)
LUNGMEN IS.
CHIN CHOW BAY
SHEKKONG
HOPPO
ANPU
PAKHOI
GULF OF TONGKING
FT. BAYARD
HOIHONG
CHINESE

No. 2



February 3, 1940

PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.



To accompany Report No. 9849

No. 1


TUNGPEH
Chinese Threat early Jan.
CHANGTAIKUAN
10 11 93 122
123 124 125 7
Tang En-po
TSAOYANG
YINCHIATIEN
Counter attack Jan. 19
Retaken Jan. 22
Taken Jan. 18
SINYANG
FANCHENG
SIANGYANG
Counter attack Jan. 19
Advance on Suihsien Jan. 29
Retaken Jan. 22
Taken Jan. 18
KAOCHENG
Taken Jan. 16
WANCHIATIEN
Japanese to here Jan. 24
SUIHSIEN
3 13 39
Drive Started Jan. 14. with Parts of these Divs.
YINGSHAN
WUSHENGKWAN
KWANGSHUI
HAN RIVER
Changshoutien
Chang Ling
Tsunchiatien
Japanese claim advanced to here Jan. 15
Yangtzechen
Chinese claim Jan. 29
ANLU
HWAYUAN
CHUNGSIANG
KINGMEN
KINGSHAN
YINGCHENG
SIAOKAN
TANGYANG
YUKIHO
KIUKOW
TSAOSHIH



PREPARED IN THE OFFICE OF AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHE, PEKING, CHINA. To accompany Report No. 9849.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 11 1940
WAR DEPARTMENT
6910

G-2 Report

RESTRICTED

SITUATION REPORT

January 6 - February 3, 1940

I. General
II. North China
a. Suiyuan
b. Shansi-Shensi-Kansu
c. Hopei-Northern Honan
d. Shantung
III. Central China
a. Hupei-Southern Honan
b. Lower Yangtze Region
c. Chekiang
IV. South China
a. Kwangtung
b. Kwangsi
V. Miscellaneous
a. Air Activities
b. Casualties

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 11 1940

I. General.

During the period covered by this report, military activities in China, although continuing in some nine separate theatres, have shown a tendency to slow down rather than to intensify. The Chinese have proceeded with their "winter offensive"; but, as on previous occasions, their inherent inaptitude for the offensive has resulted in restricting their success to, at best, the mediocre. The Japanese, on their part, have confined themselves to defending or securing their holdings and have shown no disposition to undertake new large-scale operations. In the meantime, although aggregate totals of casualties on both sides must have been large, the military situation in general shows little evidence that it is approaching substantially nearer a decisive finality than heretofore.

II. North China.

a. Suiyuan.

A Chinese account of the December attack on Paotow has been recently received. It runs, in condensed form, as follows: "General Fu Tso-yi personally commanded the Chinese forces. The first Chinese column began to move eastwards from western Suiyuan toward Paotow on December 12th. The second column attacked from southern Suiyuan. A third column cut the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway northwest of Tatung. Chinese troops on the Chahar border also approached the railway near Kalgan. Moslem cavalry, operating in the Mongolian grasslands north of Paotow, protected the Chinese north flank. Guerrilla units harassed the Japanese from the rear. A squadron of Chinese aircraft prepared for the attack by bombing the railway

and the Japanese barracks to the east of Paotow. (Subsequent support by this unit is not mentioned.)

"Communication facilities in the area were greatly deficient. Chinese Headquarters in western Suiyuan learned that Chinese troops were attacking Paotow through the interception of a Japanese military wireless message sent on the morning of December 18th, and requesting reinforcements.

"In order to ensure secrecy, the Chinese troops made a detour of 300 kilometers through Mongolian territory, marching only at night. During the forced march across the Mongolian grasslands, the troops were entirely without shelter, even that of tents. As the force had no field kitchens, soldiers had to subsist on hard pancakes which they carried on their persons. Water was scarce; and the troops, marching in an average temperature of 30° below zero, were able to obtain only one drink of water in twenty-four hours."

The Japanese report that Fu Tso-yi was relieved of his command by the Central Government, as punishment for his failure to take Paotow, and sent to Lanchow for trial by court martial. If this report is true (and it is doubted) this action is another instance of the very sporadic severity of the Central Government on commanders who fail in action.

After the defeat of the Chinese at Paotow in December, a part of their forces withdrew westward into the Wulashan region, a part southward to the Ordos Plateau, and a part to the area south of Kweisui. The Japanese did not immediately undertake a large-scale pursuit, but, for the time being , contented themselves with striking units of Ma Chan-shan (who cooperated with Fu Tso-yi in the Paotow attack) at Liangcheng and Tsingshuiho and driving them, respectively, south of the Great Wall and into the Ordos. On January 20th, however, three Japanese columns crossed the Yellow River on the ice opposite Paotow, Saratsi, and Tokoto and, driving to the southwest, plunged deep into the Ordos. By January 30th, these columns, having reached the Shensi border, had directed their advance southward on Shenmu and Yülin in northern Shensi. In the meantime, on January 29th, three other Japanese columns began an advance from Paotow and Anpeh westward against Wuyüan. One of these columns proceeded westward along the south bank of the Yellow River and, on February 2nd, was attacking the Chinese in the Yellow River salient southeast of Wuyuan. The second column marched west along the Paotow-Suiyuan highway and, on February 2nd, was attacking Chinese positions on the eastern edge of the Wulashan. The third column advanced west from Anpeh with a view to encircling Wuyuan and attacking it from the rear. In all of these operations, the Japanese have made liberal use of bombing planes.

The Chinese in the Ordos appear to have put up little resistance against the Japanese advance. However, as the

terrain in this area affords few good defensive positions for the Chinese, but, at this season, favors the Japanese employment of motor vehicles, this fact is not surprising. The Wulashan terrain, on the other hand, should enable the Chinese there to cause the Japanese much trouble. In fact, it is to be noted that this is the first serious attempt to capture Wuyuan that the Japanese have made since the fall of 1937.

The Japanese have announced that their objective in this campaign is to wipe out Chinese troops and bases in the Wulashan and Ordos regions. That at this late date they have decided that such a step is necessary is probably to be explained by saying that they were convinced by the December attack on Paotow that their previous measures for securing the P'ing-Sui Railroad were inadequate. It appears, however, that, to accomplish and maintain these objectives, it will not be enough to drive off and scatter the Chinese forces and then withdraw. Rather will it be necessary to take and permanently hold a number of widely scattered points, establish a complicated system of patrolling, and maintain further ramifications of an already complex system of communications. Even then, the fluid characteristics of Chinese troop units will make the setting up of a stable situation extremely difficult. In a word, if the Japanese truly succeed in these tasks, it will be the first time they have done so in this type of country during the present war. If they do not succeed, they will undoubtedly have the same campaign to undertake again in the not too distant future.

Some observers believe that these operations are the beginning of the long-looked-for Japanese drive to Lanchow and Sian. It is certain that, if the Japanese take and consolidate the areas they are now attacking, they will be in a much better position to execute this drive than they have been heretofore. However, it is felt that Japanese forces available are too weak (believed not to total more than two and one-half divisions at the most) and the distances to be covered too great to warrant a continuation at this time beyond the present objectives.

b. Shansi-Shensi-Kansu.

Internal dissension (which will be subsequently discussed) among the Chinese forces in Shansi has so dissipated their combat efficiency that the "winter offensive" scheduled for that province has been cancelled and the Japanese have been enabled to transfer one division from southern Shansi to northern Hupeh. Some desultory fighting has, however, occurred. In northern Shansi, the Japanese, apparently with a view to rendering impossible an attack on Tatung similar to the December attack on Paotow, launched an offensive on January 7th against Chinese concentrations at Hwaijen, Hunyüan, and Lingchiu. They claim to have dispersed these concentrations after four days' operations. However, the Japanese military authorities in Peking refused

on January 29th to allow the Assistant Military Attache, Captain Munson, to go from Tatung to Taiyuan for the reason that military operations were in progress south of Tatung. On January 18th, a Japanese unit struck Chinese troops of the 71st Division and the 202d Independent Brigade as they were moving southward from Lishih (western Shansi). The Japanese claim that these troops were moving down from Linhsien after a brush with the Eighth Route Army. The Japanese were satisfied with speeding them on their way south, after inflicting some casualties on them. In southern Shansi, the Chinese attempted to cut the lower T'ung-P'u Railroad by attacking Hsiahsien on January 8th, but the Japanese held on and relieved pressure at this point by attacking Chinese troops at Yicheng, to the northeast. What was perhaps the most important of these minor operations occurred in the perennially troublesome T'aihangshan region, (southeastern part of the province). Here P'ang Ping-hsun's Fortieth Army (39th and 106th Divisions and 14th Independent Cavalry Brigade), after taking Shehsien, Linhsien, and Lucheng, and thus cutting Japanese communications between Luan and Hantan (on P'ing-Han Railroad), attempted to regain control of the Luan (Changchih) area by attacking Hukwan on January 6th, This movement was supported by the Twenty-seventh Army (45th, 46th and 8th Divisions under Fan Han-chieh) from the vicinity of Changtze and by another body of troops from the vicinity of Kaoping. The Chinese were unable to push their attack home in Hukwan area. The Japanese held on there until January 11th and then started a counter-offensive which drove the Chinese to the southwest. Simultaneously they drove off the Twenty-seventh Army from the Changtze area. The Chinese put up a stiff resistance along a line thirty kilometers south of Luan and were not driven back until January 22d. They then withdrew to Kaoping, which the Japanese claim to have entered, after considerable fighting, on January 24th. Thus, once again, Chinese inability to cooperate allowed the Japanese to turn a bad situation into a victory.

Since early this month reports have been reaching here of widespread fighting in Shansi between the Central Government and Communist elements of the Chinese forces there. One report of January 18th (from a neutral source) stated that warfare involving 260,000 men was in progress but admitted that this warfare was confined to isolated clashes. The Chungking Government vigorously denied this report, stating that, although there had been some fighting involving not more than 3,000 men, all fighting had ceased. The Chungking spokesman also pointed out that "with several million men at the front, and an equal number under training, isolated cases of insubordination cannot be entirely avoided."

The following comments attempt to set forth the facts of the situation.

Yen Hsi-shan's Shansi troops are divided between his so-called "old" and "new" armies. The old army is composed principally of Yen's old provincial troops and may be considered, at least partially, as his own instrument for maintaining his personal position in the province. The new army is composed of former Shansi militia, many of whom, while not, strictly speaking, communists, nevertheless have distinctly radical tendencies. Since the formation of this new army, about two years ago, Yen has made it bear the brunt of the fighting, while he has conserved his old army.

Yen, when about to undertake his assignments in the Shansi winter offensive last month, again allotted to the new army all of the arduous tasks. At this time, the army demanded independence from him; and, when he used force to suppress this move, one brigade in northwest Shansi (the Linhsien district) went over to the Reds in that area. Although some fighting then occurred, there were no general engagements.

At this juncture the issue became one of Yen versus the Reds. Yen accused the Reds of stirring up trouble, the Reds denied the accusation, and both sides appealed to the Central Government for settlement. In the meantime 3,000 Reds, at the increasing of friction between Reds and Central Government in Kansu in December, had left the Shansi front and crossed the Yellow River into Shensi.

The Central Government now presented the Reds with the following four demands: (1) that the truant Reds return to the Shansi front; (2) that they give up the rebel brigade of Yen Hsi-shan's new army; (3) that they cooperate with the Central Government in guerrilla operations in Japanese occupied areas; and (4) that they cease printing paper money in Red controlled territory. These demands were accompanied by the threat that the Reds, unless they promptly acceded, would be suppressed by armed force.

Here the matter stands. The Reds have promised to give up the rebel brigade, but they have not yet done so. They also have offered to cease printing paper money if the Central Government will be more liberal in supplying them with funds. Their reaction to the other two demands noted above is not yet known.

While this trouble was brewing in Shansi, sharp friction arose in Kansu between the Central Government and the Reds in that province. It appears that this friction sprang from Red dissatisfaction with the ungenerous, and otherwise irritating attitude of the Central Government towards them. As the friction increased, Central Government troops occupied five of the twenty-three hsien in the special Red area of the province, are still in occupation, and are desirous of occupying two additional hsien. Major Barrett reports from Chungking that Red representatives there are urging the Central Government to increase the monthly allotment of funds to the Reds (now enough for three divisions) to a sum

sufficient for the maintenance of nine divisions. He also reports that Ho Ying-ch'in has agreed to recommend funds for six divisions, and believes that a compromise settlement allotting funds for between six and nine divisions is probable.

It must be pointed out that, although this complicated situation cannot yet by any means be considered out of hand, it is nevertheless serious, and that, if not speedily and satisfactorily settled, it may well grow to such a status as to cripple China's entire war effort. Of course, this is not the first instance of Central Government - Red friction since the outbreak of the war. Ever since attack by a common foe made unwilling allies of these two factions, a mutual policy of forbearance and compromise has resulted in the settlement of many disputes. In the past also, the felicitous combination of tact and firmness on the part of Chiang Kai-shek has enabled him to handle successfully many an untoward situation occasioned by factional strife. Old observers expect him to do so again. In any event, the sooner the matter is settled, the better for all concerned.

c. Hopei-Northern Honan.

Operations in Hopei were confined to the usual guerrilla activities along communication lines and Japanese action to secure these lines. Early this month a force of guerrillas (said to be the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army) appeared along the P'ing-Han Railroad in the area south of Yüanshih, and on January 14th a Japanese expedition set out against them. After a week of severe fighting, the Japanese drove the guerrillas over the Shansi border some forty kilometers west of Yüanshih. On January 22d, the Japanese drove off the Chinese 120th Division from Ankuo district (east of the P'ing-Han Railroad). In eastern Hopei, the Japanese claim to have taken advantage of an armed conflict going on between Communist and Kuomintang troops in the vicinity of Tsaokiang on January 17th and defeated them at Tsaokiang and Kuch'eng (on Shantung border). A dispersal of a guerrilla force in the Pingku district (in the P'anshan area northeast of Peking) by Japanese troops and Chinese police on January 24th appears to have concluded the operations in Hopei during the period.

On January 18th, a part of the Chinese 6th Division attempted a night attack on Kweiteh (Lung-Hai Railroad) which was successfully resisted by Japanese troops and members of the Chinese Peace and National Salvation Army. The Japanese regard as mere propaganda reports that General Sun Tung-hsüan's troops are being prepared to take the offensive soon with a view to recapturing Kaifeng.

d. Shantung.

Reports from Shantung state that there, as in Shansi, considerable friction exists between the Central Govern-

ment and Communist elements of the Chinese forces. Early this month, in the vicinity of Tsisia (forty kilometers southwest of Chefoo), occurred a clash arising from the reputed anti-Red activities of Kuomintang political agents. Japanese reports state that, following the clash, Kuomintang Headquarters presented the Reds with the following demands: (1) immediate withdrawal of the 5th Division, Eighth Route Army, from the Tsisia area; (2) suspension of people's mobilization in eastern Shantung; (3) prompt punishment of the Red assailants of the Kuomintang political agents; (4) formal apology by high Red political officials and assurances that such incidents will not be repeated. The Japanese further state that the Reds not only ignored these demands but also precipitated further clashes.

Paradoxically, however, this internal dissension among the Chinese does not appear to have curtailed greatly their prosecution of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. Early in the month, renewed guerrilla activity occurred in eastern Shantung, particularly in the Laiyang, Tsisia (north of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway) and Chucheng (south of the railway) areas. For two successive days, the railway remained cut at Kaomi (west of Tsingtao). In conjunction with intense aerial bombing operations, the Japanese land forces advanced southward toward the trouble spot in two columns, one from Chefoo and one from Hwanghsien (fifty kilometers northwest of Chefoo). In addition, a naval expedition bombarded Chinese fortifications east of Haiyang. The Japanese claim that these operations were successful. In southern Shantung the Japanese had to drive the guerrillas off from Yenchow and Tenghsien (points on the Tsin-P'u Railroad). In western Shantung battles between Japanese and guerrillas occurred at some seven different points between Lintsing and Chengwu. That the Japanese now have the Shantung situation in hand again, however, is indicated by the fact that their military authorities here recently granted Captain Munson permission to travel by rail from Hsuchow to Tientsin and from Tsinan to Tsingtao.

III. Central China.

a. Hupei-Southern Honan.

This area was the scene of considerable fighting throughout the month. The Chinese attempted to regain control of those portions of the communications net to the north, west, and south of Wuhan which are now held by the Japanese and thus to confine the Japanese to the area of Wuhan proper. The theatres of action, named in order of the relative severity of the fighting which occurred in them, were as follows: (1) the Sinyang-Suihsien area; (2) the Tsungyang-Tungcheng area; and (3) the Han River area.

Early in January sizable bodies of Chinese troops under T'ang En-po advanced from western and northwestern Honan to attack the Changtaikuan-Sinyang-Wushengkuan area (Map No. 1).

Here the Japanese forces, with some difficulty, held their own; but they quickly realized that the threat was a serious one. Accordingly, they reinforced their troops in the Suihsien-Yingshan area; and, on January 14th, using parts of three divisions, they began a two-column advance northward from Suihsien against the Chinese south flank. The left column advanced north and took Kaochong on January 18th. The right column advanced northeast and captured Wanchiatien on January 16th and Yinchiatien on January 18th. On January 19th, the Chinese started off simultaneously two counterattacks: one from Tsaoyang against Kaochong, and another from Tungpei against Yinchiatien. After severe fighting, they retook both places on January 22d. They then drove the Japanese back on their starting point, Suihsien, and are now converging on this point from the north and northwest.

The Chinese claim to have inflicted 13,000 casualties on the Japanese during the engagements above described. Inasmuch as the Japanese forces engaged probably did not exceed 25,000-35,000 men, it is thought that 13,000 represents too high a figure for casualties.

Early in December, 1939, Chinese forces from the vicinity of Pingkiang began an offensive on the Tsungyang-Tungcheng area (Map No.2). One column (part of which attacked Puchi on January 12th) approached Tsungyang from the west and another from the southwest. They seem not to have pushed home the attack with vigor, for the Japanese held them off until January 13th and then began a counterattack. Operating in several columns to the west, southwest, and south along a front of over thirty kilometers they pushed the Chinese back to the line shown on Map No. 2. To date, however, they have shown no disposition to press their attack with a view to reducing the Pingkiang area.

In an operation which appears to have been independent of those set forth in the paragraph above, the Chinese claim to have taken Tayeh on January 15th.

The Japanese have long held, as far west as the line of the Han River, the road net which extends from Hankow to Ichang (see Map No. 1). In mid-January, the Chinese began an attack on the Japanese outpost line, which is located on the east bank of the Han River. The Chinese do not appear to have used large bodies of troops in this attack, nor do they deserve favorable comment on their execution of it with regard to points other than their coordination in time and the fact that they selected for their main effort a locality not necessitating passage of a river line. They directed this main effort against Chungsiang from the northeast on January 13th. The Japanese stopped the attacking force at Yangtzechen, and, counterattacking immediately, claim to have driven the attacking force north to the line Changling-Tsunchiatien. The Chinese now insist that they are back on a line just north of Yangtzechen, where the situation is a deadlock. Simultaneously with their attack on Chungsiang,

they attacked Tsienkiang, but, not succeeding in capturing this point, they finally contained the Japanese troops there and sidled across the river to Yangchia, which they held until January 20th, when a Japanese counterattack drove them back across the river. On the night of January 14th, another Chinese force crossed the river from Sientaochen and succeeded in reaching Mayangtan, from where a Japanese counterattack quickly drove it to the south bank. Thus, this Chinese effort seems to have accomplished little, if anything, worthwhile.

b. The Lower Yangtze Region.

Miscellaneous small operations occurred in this area during the period. Their general nature was that of efforts on the part of the Japanese to forestall any attempt the Chinese might make to institute a winter offensive. For instance, on the night of January 9th the Chinese attacked several points on the Kiukiang-Nanchang Railroad north of Tehan. They claim to have captured Mahuiling on January 11th and then, after destroying a section of the Railroad, to have separated into two columns - one pushing east and north in the direction of Sintze and Kiukiang, the other pushing southward against Tehan. The Japanese appear to have stopped this drive. Also, in December, 1939, and early January, 1940, the Japanese dispersed Chinese concentrations in the Tsingyang (seventy kilometers east of Anking) area. In addition, the Japanese have been engaged since December, 1939, in clearing northern Kiangsu and adjacent region of Chinese troops and guerrillas.

c. Chekiang.

Early in January, the Japanese initiated a drive into northern Chekiang with the dual purpose of clearing northern Chekiang of Chinese troops which have long been threatening Shanghai and harassing Hangchow and of cutting rail communication leading inland from Ningpo. They began by driving the Chinese out of the triangular Huchow-Hangchow-Kashing district and clearing them away from the Hangchow-Shanghai Railway. This task they had completed by January 10th.

At 6:00 a.m., January 21st, they began a drive south from Hangchow across the Chientang River. By 8:00 a.m. a force adequate to begin the attack had crossed the river, and by noon this force had occupied Siaoshan, strategic point on the Ningpo-Kiangsi Railroad. They immediately pushed south along the railroad to the line Linpu-Ichiao (eight kilometers south of Siaoshan), where they stopped, and eastward toward Shaoshing. Here the Chinese claim to have counterattacked them and stopped their advance. An unconfirmed report, however, states that the Japanese occupied Ningpo on January 30th, after the Chinese had burned and evacuated it. The Japanese announced on January 24th that they considered the action completed and would not make further advances for the time being.

The Japanese report that Chiang Kai-shek has wired Ku Chu-tung, commander of the Third War Zone, demanding an explanation of the Chinese defeat in Chekiang and directing him to take precautions to stop any further Japanese advance southward. Whether or not this report is true, it appears to be a logical one, and what excuses those Chinese responsible can give for their poor showing are hard to imagine. Although the Ningpo-Kiangsi Railroad cannot by any means be said to be a main Chinese supply line, yet it was the only railway in China still principally under Chinese control, and a Japanese attack at some time was extremely logical. It would appear that for reasons of morale, if nothing else, a defense of some kind was indicated. The Chinese, however, during their long tenure, seem to have made absolutely no adequate preparations to meet this attack. Now that they have been easily pushed out of their holdings, they will probably, as at Canton and Nanning, spend much time, effort, and blood in unsuccessful attempts to recapture what they might not have lost if they had put up a determined defense in the first place.

IV. South China.

a. Kwangtung (Map No. 3).

The Japanese announced that the purpose of their December offensive northward along the Yüeh-Han Railroad was to disperse large Chinese troop concentrations in the area Yingtak-Shiuchow (Shaokuan) - Yungyun, and that, having accomplished this purpose, they had withdrawn to their original line. They do not, however, explain why the troops they went north and dispersed are now pressing them in their home territory.

After having reached a line as far north as Yungyun-Yingtak on January 1st, they relinquished their offensive and began withdrawing southward, closely followed by the Chinese. By January 10th, the Japanese were back on the line Lungmoon - Liangkow-Tsingyun. However, they withdrew from Lungmoon on January 10th and Chengkuohsu on January 14th. The Chinese attacked them at Tsengcheng on January 19th and broke into the town, but had to abandon it on the same day. On the Canton-Shaokwan highway, the Chinese entered Tsungfa on January 10th and immediately pushed south against Shenkang, which they have been unable to enter. Heavy fighting there on January 19th and 20th was reported. To the west of this highway, Chinese column took Fahsien on January 12th and advanced to Kaotsenghsu, where the Japanese stopped it. Along the railroad, a Chinese column took Yuantan on January 12th, Yinchannao on January 16th, and Chuntien on January 17th, but as yet, this column has been unable to reach Hsinkai. Still another Chinese column, advancing southward along the North River, captured Tsingyun on January 10th and advanced to Kuanyao, where the Japanese are still holding it in check. Thus, the opposing front lines run at present as follows:

north of Tsengcheng - north of Shenkang - north of Kaotsenghsu - south of Chuntien - north of Kuanyao.

In speaking of the above operations, the Chinese naturally claim a brilliant victory, while the Japanese say that everything went as planned. The substance of the matter appears to be, however, that the Japanese, in their December offensive, used an inadequate force, ran into resistance which they could not overcome and had to withdraw, and that the Chinese pressed them so hard that they could not stop until they reached their present line. That they are well established on this line is indicated by the fact that the Chinese have been unable to make further gains for the past two weeks. The net results are that the situation is now a deadlock, with a Chinese recapture of Canton most doubtful and the gains achieved by the Japanese offensive adding up to zero.

b. Kwangsi (Map No. 4).

Late in December, 1939, the Chinese began counteroffensive operations with a view to recapturing Nanning. Their forces, reported by the Japanese to number over 200,000 (thought to be an exaggeration) and to include mechanized units, were grouped in the Pinyang-Tamingshan area (north and northeast of Nanning), and to the east and west of the Nanning-Yamhsien-Fancheng communications route. The forces to the northeast of Nanning retook and lost Kunlunkwan three times (December 17th, 20th and 26th) before they retook and held it on December 31st. They then advanced and retook Chiutang on January 4th but were unable to go further. In the meantime, the forces to the east and west of the Nanning-Yamhsien-Fancheng route repeatedly attacked the Japanese troops holding this line of communications and, while unable to cut the line, resisted all Japanese attempts to push out from the communications zone. For instance, late in January, the Japanese tried to push a column with a security mission to the northeast of Hsiatung, but the Chinese fell upon this column and cut it to pieces.

The Japanese task of holding Nanning and keeping open their communications with the sea has been difficult because of these Chinese attacks and because of the paucity of their own troops. Shortly after the capture of Nanning, they realized their deficiency in strength, and, by December 26th, had brought a Formosan brigade to the Nanning area. Also, beginning January 5th, they began landing an entire new division, said to be from the Canton front. At this time, their strength, as estimated by the Chinese, was nominally three and a half divisions plus some naval landing parties. However, as all these units must have been depleted by casualties and must have had no opportunity to secure replacements, it is believed that the total Japanese forces in the area do not exceed 50,000 men.

After the Chinese counteroffensive slowed down, about the middle of January, there was a lull in this theatre extending over a period of a week or ten days. Then, on January 28th, the Japanese began a counteroffensive from the Nanning area in the direction of Pinyang. On this date, one Japanese column advanced up the highway and attacked Chiutang, while another, crossing the Yu River, began a movement to encircle Pinyang from the southeast. At present the extent of progress of the Chiutang column is not clear; but the eastern column claims to have entered Pinyang on February 2d, after having trapped and encircled a large body of Chinese troops some kilometers to the east thereof. In the meantime, the Chinese claim to be withdrawing their forces slowly toward Chienkiang, from where they will later make a new counteroffensive consisting of a frontal attack in conjunction with encirclement of the Japanese flanks.

It appears that, in the Nanning campaign, adverse criticism of both sides is in order. For over a year before the Japanese attack on Pakhoi and Nanning came, the Chinese had been expecting it. A year ago, their plans and preparations to meet it seemed fairly comprehensive. At that time, their plan was to sacrifice Pakhoi, but to put up maximum resistance in defense of Nanning. It is not believed that they subsequently changed this plan; yet they permitted the Japanese to take Nanning with ridiculous ease. Now, with great preponderance of manpower (but deficiency in airplanes and mechanized forces) they have clumsily failed to push their counteroffensive home at the most favorable moment; viz., while Japanese strength was at low ebb. In view of these performances, unless some miraculous advantage falls to their favor, their success in future attempts to retake Nanning is doubted. The Japanese, too, have not made a perfect record of sagacity. They obviously underestimated their problem and sent too small a force to accomplish the task in hand. Although the first wave of success carried them to their objective, they have until recently been fighting desperately, and to no small cost, in defense of their gains, especially their communications to the sea. At the moment, the situation appears again to have turned to their favor; but it seems reasonable to predict that the end of their trouble is not yet. They may well have to undertake a series of piecemeal offensives before they attain that security which might have been theirs had they sent an adequate force originally.

V. Miscellaneous.

a. Air Activity

The following is a summary of air raids made by Japanese military and naval aircraft during the period of this report:

December 30 - Japanese planes bombed Liuchow, Kwangsi Province.
Jan. 4,5, 7 - Japanese planes bombed Hokow and other points near border on Indo-China R.R.
January 8 - Military planes bombed Wuyuan, Suiyuan Province.
,, 9 - Naval airplanes bombed Kiutang and Pinyang, Kwangsi Province.
,, 10 - Naval planes bombed Chinese military establishments in southern Kwangsi.
,, 10 - Military planes bombed Chinese bases in Shantung.
,, 10 - Naval planes bombed Kweilin, Kwangsi Province.
,, 18 - Naval planes bombed Ankiu, Shantung Province.
,, 23 - Military planes bombed Changsha.
,, 23 - Military planes bombed Chinese troops south of the Chientang River.
,, 24 - Military planes bombed Suiyang, Kweichow Province.
,, 25 - Naval planes bombed Kian, Kiangsi Province.
,, 25 - Military planes bombed Wuyuan.
,, 26 - Naval planes bombed Chinese positions south of Yochow and above Anking.
,, 28 - Military planes bombed Liuho (Outer-Mongolia-Ninghsia border).
February 1 - Japanese planes bombed points near the border on the Indo-China R.R.
,, 3 - ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,

The most important of the bombings listed above are those of the Yunnanfu-Haiphong Railroad. The Japanese, in January, announced their intention of bombing this railroad out of existence, and claim to have already crippled it severely.

b. Casualties.

The American Consul-General in Hankow reports the following numbers of Japanese casualties passing through the Wuhan area during the period October 1 - November 25, 1939:

Source	Wounded	Dead (cremation ashes)
Han River Sector	6,810	850
Canton-Hankow R.R. & Poyang Lake	22,160	15,600
North Hupeh	4,800	
Totals	33,770	16,450

He admits that the above figures may include exaggerations due to duplication or inaccuracy in counting, but points out that they manifestly do not include casualties abandoned by the Japanese in retreat or those which may have passed through Wuhan unnoticed.

Earl Mattice
EARL MATTICE
Captain, Infantry (DOL)

Enclosures: 4 maps

Distribution:
6 MID
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1 Tokyo
1 Guard
1 N/A
1 Manila
1 File

MAP No. 2



To accompany Reports No. 9856

PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.


TA MING SHAN
CHIENKIANG
SHANGLIN
Feb. 4
Feb. 13
Feb. 2
PINYANG
Feb. 8
TACHIAO
Feb. 8
KLITANG
Feb. 8
Feb. 6
Feb. 8
Feb. 10
Feb. 8
Feb. 8
Feb. 8
Feb. 10
Feb. 15
Feb. 3
KUNLUNKWAN
SZELUNG
WULINGHSU
CHUTANG
Feb. 6?
PATANG
Jan. 28
KUCHENG
Jan 31-Feb. 3
Jan. 31-Feb. 3
KANTANG
LIUTANG
CHITANG
SZETANG
Jan. 26
Jan. 26
Feb. 4
YUNGSHUN
Jan. 29
YU RIVER
Jan. 26
NAMHEUNG
LINGSHAN
HSIAOTUNG
1½ Japanese
Divs Withdrawn
Feb. 15- Mar. 5
YAMHSIEN
SHEKKONG
HOPPO
PAKHOI
KWEINSIEN
WATLAM
ANPU
GULF OF TONGKING

MAP No. 1



M. A. OFFICE CHINA.



To accompany Report No. 9856.

6-1

APR 10 1940 WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-J-276

G-2 Report

RESTRICTED

SITUATION REPORT

February 4 - March 6, 1940

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 9 1940

I. Manchukuo
II. North China
  a. Suiyuan
  b. Shansi-Shensi-Kansu
  c. Hopei-Northern Honan
  d. Shantung
III. Central China
  a. Hupei-Southern Honan
  b. Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei Border Region
  c. Eastern Chekiang
IV. South China
  a. Kwangtung
  b. Kwangsi
  c. Fukien
V. Air Activities

Since our last report, no startling events have occurred which have changed the general picture of the military situation. While it is true that military operations have taken place in nearly all parts of China, yet these operations, for the most part minor, have almost without exception arisen from Japanese efforts to mop up or secure important localities. By all odds the most spectacular events of the period were the Japanese "lightning war" campaigns in west Suiyuan and southern Kwangsi. In these campaigns, the Japanese, probably actuated by a desire to show the world that they are not to be outdone by the Germans, adopted a new form of tactics by which they lashed out suddenly at superior Chinese concentrations, threw them into confusion, and then returned to the starting point. Yet even these displays of fireworks left the situation substantially unchanged.

I. Manchukuo.

The Manchukuo Government has recently evidenced increased interest in the efficiency and size of the Manchukuo army. On February 16, the Department of Public Safety announced that compulsory military training would be introduced this year in 188 schools of grade higher than middle school, and that army officers would be attached to these schools for the purpose of supervising the training. In addition, conscription will be enforced from June 1st of this year. On February 19th, the cabinet announced that, as the term "conscription", is "unsuitable for Manchukuo", the conscription law will be known as the National Army Law.

In order to insure as much public acquiescence in the conscription law as possible, measures will be

promulgated prior to June 1st, it was announced, for the "state protection of Manchukuo soldiers". The purpose of this "protection" is stated to be "to provide for the well-being of families of soldiers, to replenish the morale of the national army, and to eliminate anxiety at home". The methods of protection are outlined as follows: "(1) aid in livelihood, (2) medical aid, (3) aid in conducting enterprises, (4) assistance in the expenses of child-birth, (5) temporary relief (livelihood), (6) free burial, (7) educational assistance, (8) aid in bringing up orphans, (9) assistance in getting employment". Those who will receive the benefits of protection are as follows: (1) enlisted men and their families, (2) discharged soldiers and their families, (3) wounded or invalid soldiers and their families, (4) dependents of soldiers and officers who have been killed in action or who have died of disease, (5) dependents of persons who have been requisitioned by the army and have died in service. This program seems almost too good to be true. If fully and efficiently carried out, however, it should do much to improve the efficiency of the Manchukuo troops, who, in this war to date, have still to achieve name and fame.

II. North China.

a. Suiyuan.

Early in the month of February the Japanese completed their west Suiyuan campaign, the beginning of which is mentioned in our last report. It was expected that the mountainous terrain around the Wuyuan delta and the fact that considerable time had been available for completing defensive preparations might enable the Chinese to offer a stiff resistance. In fact, it appears that the supreme Chinese commander, General Fu Tso-yi (apparently not, after all, relieved from command for his December failure at Paotou) did make defensive preparations, but that the time of starting and the speed of delivery of the Japanese attack completely surprised him. Exploitation of the surprise element, plus the fact that the Chinese had as supporting artillery only some twelve or fourteen mountain guns, and that they had inadequate motor transport and communication facilities and no airplanes, enabled the Japanese to accomplish a limited form of blitz krieg.

According to Japanese reports, which appear reasonable, the numerical strength of the Chinese forces involved outnumbered those of the Japanese in approximately the proportion of three to one. The Chinese forces numbered between 30,000 and 35,000 men and comprised Fu Tso-yi's Thirty-fifth Army of the 31st, 32d, and 101st Divisions; Men Ping-yueh's 4th, 6th, and 7th Cavalry Divisions; and Ma Hung-ping's 1st and 2d Brigades of the 35th Division of the 81st (Mohammedan) Army. The Chinese report that the Japanese forces consisted one brigade of the 26th Division from the Kalgan area, one

brigade of an unidentified division in the Suhsien (north Shansi) area, and a reinforced cavalry brigade from the Paotou area. This cavalry brigade appears to have been mechanized. The Japanese claim, however, that they used a total of 10,000 troops, all of whom were mechanized or motorized.

The Japanese began the campaign by sending westward from Paotou, on January 28th, a mechanized unit in two columns. One of these columns, proceeding on the north bank of the Yellow River between the river and the southern edge of the Wulashan, made first contact with a Chinese force at Shihshantzueh (Map No. 1) on January 31st, encircled it, and drove it across the river to the southwest. This column then crossed the river and effected a junction with the other mechanized column, which had moved southward to Aowangfu and then westward toward Kweisu. The Chinese assert that this second column left Paotou on January 22d and occupied Aowangfu and Tsaitengchiao on January 23d. It is believed, however, that they have confused it with another Japanese column which, at about the date in question, went south from Paotou towards Tungsheng in the Ordos. In any event, the reunited Japanese mechanized unit recrossed the Yellow River at Kweisu on February 2d and, after little fighting, entered Wuyuan via Tucheng on February 3d. A part of this unit then set out towards Linho, reached the vicinity of the place on February 4th, captured it on February 6th, and continued on towards the Ninghsia border. The Japanese claim that this force took Hwangyangmutou on February 8th: the Chinese insist that, although the Japanese appeared before that town, they did not enter it.

On January 31st, three days after the start of the mechanized unit whose movements are described above, the main Japanese force began moving westward in two columns simultaneously, one from Paotou and the other from Anpei. The column from Paotou took Wucheng on February 2d and sent a part of the force to effect a junction with the mechanized unit already in Wuyuan. The column from Anpei passed north of Wucheng to Wanhochang. From this point part of the force proceeded to Wuyuan and part continued to the southwest towards Shanpa where it arrived on February 6th. The main concentration of Japanese troops was now in Wuyuan. From this concentration the main body of the Shanpa expedition was sent westward along the Wuyuan-Shanpa road. This body, uniting with the Wanhochang force, entered Shanpa on February 6th.

The Japanese scheme of maneuver in this operation was to begin their movement to the south and thereby draw the main Chinese forces out of their prepared positions in the mountainous terrain around the Wuyuan delta and then, by a lightning thrust, drive with their main force through this mountainous terrain into the Wuyuan delta. According to Japanese reports, this scheme succeeded <u>in toto</u>. Fu

Tso-yi first moved the bulk of his forces, including his Thirty-fifth Army, southward to meet the mechanized threat above described and left only the Mohammedan troops to guard the northern defenses. Then, when he found that the Mohammedans were retreating before the main Japanese drive, he attempted to shift back again. The only results of this maneuver, however, were hopeless entanglement and confusion of Chinese units, which made them an easy prey for the Japanese, and a precipitate flight of all Chinese troops who were not casualties to the west and southwest.

The total number of casualties sustained by both sides in this campaign is believed to be small. The Japanese claim that the Chinese lost 6,500 killed and twice that number wounded. These figures are believed to be greatly exaggerated, as the Chinese did not fight long enough to suffer that severely. The Japanese admit that they themselves lost 123 killed, 250 wounded, and suffered "about" 120 cases of severe frost-bite. The last-mentioned type of casualty indicates that the Japanese have not, since the Tsitsihar days of 1931, devised a means of protecting their particularly susceptible troops against the cold of winter operations.

The Japanese announced that their objective in this campaign was to crush the Chinese concentration in the Wuyuan area and thereby teach the Chinese the folly of thinking that they can accomplish anything by such efforts as the December attack on Paotou. They then stated that they had attained this objective, took a number of foreign correspondents to inspect Wuyuan, and, beginning February 15th, started withdrawing the bulk of their troops from Wuyuan area to Paotou. They are very proud of their blitz krieg. It is certainly true that their operation swept the Chinese out of the Wuyuan area in record time and disorganized them to no small extent. The Japanese, however, did not achieve a Cannae, as the Chinese would not remain fixed long enough to be annihilated. And even now, as the Japanese are withdrawing from the Wuyuan area, the fluid Chinese are commencing to infiltrate back into it and to harass those Japanese troops still in Wuyuan. How long it will be before they are sufficiently reorganized and restored in spirit to recommence serious pestering of the Japanese is unpredictable. But it is safe to say that the Japanese blitz krieg did not dispose of them once and for all.

On January 20th, well before the beginning of the west Suiyuan campaign, the Japanese initiated operations, supposedly with a view to disposing of Ma Chan-shan's troops in the Ordos region and along the Shansi-Shensi border. According to Chinese reports, one column moved due south from Paotou (Map No. 1) on Tungsheng. It is believed that this column was the

unit located by the Chinese at Aowangfu, and possibly at Tsaitengchiao, on February 23d. The Chinese also say that a second column moved southwest from Saratsi on the seat of the First Left Banner, and that third and fourth columns moved on both sides of the Yellow River from Tokoto on Fuku and Shenmu (Shensi) and Hochu and Paoteh (Shansi), respectively. The first column was reported engaged with the Chinese north of Tungsheng on January 28th, and what is believed to have been the second was reported engaged northwest of Halachai on the same date. It now appears that no Japanese troops actually crossed the Suiyuan-Shensi border, as previously reported by the Japanese and stated in our last situation report. Subsequently, the movements of the above-mentioned columns and of the third and fourth columns could not be ascertained. The Japanese military spokesman in Peking now states, however, that the first and second columns, after maneuvering in the Ordos for several days, joined the southern column of the advance on Wuyuan, and that the Tokoto columns did not start out at all. The whole operation, therefore, appears to have been merely a flank guard action to secure the main advance on Wuyuan.

b. Shansi-Shensi-Kansu.

Exclusive of the continued friction between Chinese Communist and non-Communist elements, only a few miscellaneous events of interest have occurred in this area during the period. On February 11th, a new "strategic" railway in Shansi, connecting Tungkwanchen (on the Tung-Pu Railroad twelve kilometers south of Taiku) with Tsinhsien (eighty kilometers northwest of Luan) was formally opened. This new railway extends ninety-seven kilometers through mountainous terrain and took some eight months to construct. On February 16th, General Wu Hua-ying (said to be a friend of Fu Tso-yi) announced in Taiyuan, the organization of the "New Asia Yellow Army", which, under Japanese auspices, will fight the Communists. Sino-Japanese military conflicts in the area have been negligible, only a few minor clashes south of Yutze and in southern Shansi having been reported.

Friction between Central Government and Communist elements in the area has continued. First-hand information about the present status of affairs from competent neutral sources is unobtainable here. The following miscellaneous details are taken from Japanese reports on the subject:

1. On January 25th, Yen Hsi-shan convened a military conference in southern Shansi. At this conference it was decided to suppress Communist activities and purge all Communist elements in Shansi. It was also decided to reject the mediation of Feng Yu-hsiang, sent by the Chungking Government to the trouble area. Arrest of Communists had begun by the end of January.

2. A Communist news organ announced on January 26th that, since the autumn of 1939, 1,470 Communist troops had been killed in Communist-Kuomintang clashes.

3. By the end of January, General Chiang Ting-wen, commanding the Tenth (Shensi) War Zone, had begun to arrest Communists and had issued secret orders with a view to blocking Communist communications between Sianfu and Yenan.

4. During early February, the Eighth Route Army killed the Political Director of Yen Hsi-shan's Army and fourteen others because of their anti-Communist activities. In retaliation, Yen strengthened his anti-Communist policy with a view to clearing Shansi of Communists.

5. A conference scheduled to take place in mid-February at Chilan (northwest Shansi) to effect a compromise between the Shansi Army and the Eighth Route Army was called off because of Yen Hsi-shan's refusal to attend. At the time, two Central Government divisions started to march northward from the Taming area, and Shansi provincial troops prepared to cooperate with them in a drive against the Communists. Late in January, Yen Hsi-shan ordered the First Cavalry Army and the Ninth Army to cross the Yellow River into Shensi, in order to cut the Communists' line of retreat. The Eighth Route Army countered by concentrating troops at Chuntu (on east bank of Yellow River in northwest Shansi) with a view to blocking the advance of the force mentioned above.

6. In mid-February, Chu Teh, Mao Tse-tung, and Chou En-lai, the three principal Communist leaders, presented the Chungking Government with the following demands:

a. Formal recognition of the existence of the Chinese Communist Party.

b. Formal recognition of the expanded influence of the Eighth Route Army in North China and of the independent judicial power of the new Fourth Route Army.

c. Dispatch of an order to all military commanders in the country to delete such slogans as, "Down with the Eighth Route Army".

d. Acknowledgment of the Communist Party's right to carry on special undertakings with various military organs.

7. It is reported that 200,000 Communist troops stationed in southeast Shansi and 100,000 more on the west bank of the Yellow River are making preparations to drive into the interior of Shansi and that Yen Hsi-shan has already commenced to attack the Communists in South Shansi with an army of 150,000 men.

Two main immediate questions outstanding between the Communists and the Central Government are (1) the number of Communist divisions to be maintained by the Central Government and (2) the extent of the territory in Shensi and Kansu to come exclusively under Communist administration. It is reported with regard to the first question, that the Central Government has agreed to increase the number of Communist divisions which it maintains from three to six, provided that the Communists observe the rules and regulations of the Central Government relative to organization, discipline, and other matters. It is further reported that the Central Government has undertaken to maintain three additional Communist reserve divisions but not to arm, equip, and supply them. Regarding the territorial question, it is understood that, at the time of the Sian incident, the Communists actually controlled only three hsien in Northern Shensi. After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, the Communist controlled area was extended to eighteen hsien for the purpose of facilitating military operations. The Communists, however, now claim control over twenty-three hsien. To-date, jurisdiction over the disputed five hsien has not been determined.

The importance of this friction relative to the effect on the Chinese war effort as a whole should not be underestimated. It is true, as some observers have pointed out, that, among China's 440,000,000 people, the Communists constitute a distinct minority. This minority, however, is highly cohesive, idealistic, and determined. In what began as a local fracas between Yen Hsi-shan's Old and New Armies in Shansi, the Chinese Communist Party early espoused the cause of the radical New Army and added it to the already considerable number of questions outstanding between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Regardless of the exact magnitude of the internecine hostilities in Shansi, the facts remain that such hostilities have already brought activities against the Japanese in that province practically to a standstill, and that the sympathetic tension between Central Government and Communist forces in other parts of China is rapidly approaching the breaking point. The Chinese methods of political adjustment are devious and slow; and, therefore, it is much too early to be pessimistic regarding a satisfactory settlement. In the meantime, however, if factional clashes between Chinese troops in the field continue to spread at their present rate, the dissipative effect on the efficacy of Chinese opposition to the Japanese is obvious.

c. Hopei-Northern Honan.

The only events of interest which occurred in this area during the period of this report were continued guerrilla activities and reported increase of friction between Central Government and Communist elements of the Chinese forces.

The guerrilla activities and Japanese countermeasures were all scattered, minor operations. In what appears to have been an action related to the Japanese Yuanshih drive, mentioned in our last report, the Japanese took the offensive on January 27th against the Chinese Communist troops in the mountainous Tsaowang (near the Shansi border, seventy kilometers southwest of Shihchiachwang) region and advanced thirty kilometers to the west of Tsaowang. On February 4th, a small body of Chinese guerrillas appeared south of Kihsien, only to be driven off by a Japanese detachment on February 5th. Reports that guerrillas had interrupted the Ping-Han Railway so that, between February 6th and 12th, trains from Peking could operate only as far south as Paotingfu were proved incorrect by Captain Munson who travelled to Shihchiachwang on February 6th without any delay except a brief one at Tinghsien, where a bridge was damaged through structural failure. Between January 10th and 16th, the Japanese dispersed guerrillas north and east of Kuan. A report that Chinese troops had reoccupied the town of Mentoukou in the Peking district on February 19th proved to be false. On February 22d, the Japanese took the offensive against elements of the Eighth Route Army which had appeared in the vicinity of Nankung (105 kilometers southeast of Shihchiachuang) and, by February 26th, had driven them away.

Both Japanese and Communist Chinese sources allege that serious fighting has recently occurred between Reds and Central Government troops in the Red dominated area of southern Hopei. Major Barrett reports that this fighting took place in the Chengan-Tzehsien-Wuan area (first two places mentioned are in southern Hopei, and the third is in northern Honan). The most serious clash occurred on January 28th, when the troops of Shih Yu-shan (a former puppet of the Japanese who went over to the Chinese in 1938), said to have been supported by five Japanese planes, attacked Reds who were engaging the Japanese. In this action the Red casualties numbered several hundred. Although no further clashes have been reported, and Shih has received orders not to bother the Reds, this trouble is not yet settled.

Across the Yellow River in northern Honan, the situation remained generally quiet. On February 10th and 11th, the Japanese attacked and drove off guerrillas who had been harassing the Lung-Hai Railroad at Lanfeng, Minchuan (thirty-five kilometers east of Lanfeng) and Yuchang (125 kilometers east of Lanfeng). The only other military activity reported was a mutiny of some 500 puppet troops under one Liu Ching-lin at Lanfeng on the night of February 6th. The mutineers are said to have killed several Japanese officers and advisers, set fire to their barracks and supplies, and engaged the

Japanese troops sent to suppress them. Commander Liu was killed in the course of this fighting. Part of his men escaped and joined Chinese forces in the vicinity, and part were rounded up by the Japanese.

d. Shantung.

The Japanese continued mopping up operations in this province. Minor activities took place in southern Shantung on February 1st and 2d, when Japanese troops cleaned out the guerrillas from the Ishui-Mengyin area. In northern Shantung, other Japanese units, in mid-February, drove other guerrillas from the Tsiyang (forty kilometers northeast of Tsinan) area. But the most important campaign was that in which the Japanese Army and Navy cooperated to mop up the eastern peninsula - the "dark corner" - of Shantung. The mountainous terrain of this peninsula had long been infested with the troops of the "Eastern Shantung Anti-Japanese Federated Army," under General Chao Pao-yuan, and the Shantung Corps of the Eighth Route Army, under General Kao Chin-shun. These two elements of the Chinese forces had frequently clashed, but they united in cooperation when the Japanese attack became imminent. The Japanese estimate (believed to be too high) of the total numerical strength of these forces at the beginning of the campaign was 20,000. The Japanese Army (total force employed believed not to have exceeded one division) moved eastward on February 7th from the line Lungkou-Chaoyuan-Jihchuang-Aoshanwei. Simultaneously, the Navy threw a blockade around the coast of the peninsula in order to cut off the escape of the Chinese by sea. By February 13th, the Army had reached a line extending across the peninsula from Chefoo to Haiyang. From this line, four Japanese columns coverged on Wenteng and entered the town on February 19th. Another Japanese column, moving through Weihaiwei, entered Jungcheng (on the northeastern tip of the peninsula, thirty miles southeast of Weihaiwei) on February 21st. In the meantime, naval landing units, on February 18th, had landed at Shihtao (on the southeastern tip of the peninsula, fifty miles southeast of Weihaiwei) and had advanced inland to Shangchuangtsi (fifteen kilometers northeast of Shihtao). This naval force then, in conjunction with an Army unit from Wenteng, mopped up the area northwest of Shihtao. Other naval activities, besides maintaining the blockade, consisted of bombarding several points on the northern coast between Chefoo and Weihaiwei.

On February 22d, the Japanese announced that they had successfully concluded the peninsular campaign. They stated that the Chinese forces had been dispersed and that outstanding remnants who would surrender and promise to sin no more would "be forgiven". The real object of the Japanese in undertaking this operation seems to have been (1) to speed up the building of the "new order" in this region by making it possible for local

officials appointed by the Provisional Government in Peking to take up their posts there (something which they have, up to the time, been unable to do), and (2) to tap the rich resources of eastern Shantung, including gold deposits in the Chaoyuan area. Whether their campaign was "successful" enough to accomplish the realization of those aims, only time, of course, will tell.

III. Central China.

a. Hupei-Southern Honan.

The lively activity in this theatre during the months of December and January appears to have died down during February and early March. The Japanese claim to have driven the Chinese away from the Sinyang area between January 27th and February 1st. The Chinese state that they reentered Sinyang from the south on February 22d, but that,after doing some damage, they withdrew on the same day. They also state that the Japanese attacked Loyang on February 25th, but had to fall back the next day. It appears, therefore, that the situation in this sector is substantially as it was at the close of our last report. Nothing happened in the Han River sector except a Japanese dispersal of Chinese troops in the Kingshan area on February 5th, after several days of fighting. In the Tungcheng sector, the Japanese were still, on February 12th, conducting mopping up operations. Thus it seems that the Chinese "winter offensive" in this area is at an end.

b. Kiangsu-Chekiang-Anhwei Border Region.

With a view to clearing Chinese mobile units out of this difficult terrain, and, possibly, to cooperating with the new east Chekiang offensive, the Japanese sent a column of about 1,000 men to the southeast towards Langki on February 19th. This column took Langki on February 21st; but the Chinese claim to have retaken it the next day, cut the Japanese communications with Wuhu, and forced them to withdraw to Tungpa (twenty kilometers north of Langki). On February 29th, the Chinese claimed to be still beleaguering this Japanese force in the lake area there. On February 22d, the Japanese sent another column to Fanchang, southwest of Wuhu, entered the town, and then, on February 24th, withdrew to Wuhu. A third Japanese column, also on February 22d, took Wanchih, south of Wuhu; but the Chinese claim to have recaptured this point on February 25th. Presumably with a mission of relieving the force beleaguered at Tungpa, a fourth Japanese column left Tienwanszo (sixty kilometers southeast of Nanking), entered Liyang on February 24th, and turned northwest towards Lishui, the Chinese reentering Liyang as soon as the Japanese had evacuated it. On February 29th

this Japanese column was still engaged with the Chinese between Liyang and Lishui.

The Japanese claim to have successfully concluded this operation, after having slaughtered thousands of Chinese. The Chinese, on the other hand, insist that the Japanese campaign has failed without having inflicted much damage on the Chinese. Actually, however, the fighting appears to be continuing, with "no decision" as a most probable verdict.

c. Eastern Chekiang.

The Japanese announced on January 24th, after their occupation of Hsiaoshan, that they considered the campaign closed. Since that time, however, their life in this area has not been all beer and skittles. Between January 22d and 31st they had to undertake additional mopping up operations of Chinese remnants in the Hangchow-Kashing-Huchow area. In the meantime, the Chinese had massed some eight divisions in the vicinity of Hsiaoshan and begun to counterattack that place, which was said to be held by only 2,000 Japanese troops. By February 14th, the Japanese had to send out a relief expedition. They accordingly, on that date, sent units across the Chientang and Fuchun Rivers, east and west of Hsiaoshan, and had the troops in that town counterattack to cover the crossings. The column which crossed east of Hsiaoshan had, by February 17th, reached Kanshan (seven miles east of Hsiaoshan) and was pushing towards Anchang (twelve miles east of Hsiaoshan). The column which crossed the Fuchun River encircled Hsiaoshan to the south. A Chinese report that a Chinese counterattack on February 20th had completely dispersed both of these columns is not believed. On February 21st, the Japanese Central China Headquarters announced that the Japanese were "gaining steadily". Since that date no information relative to the situation on this front has been received. Because of the mutual silence of Chinese and Japanese on the subject, however, it is believed that the fighting has died down.

The Chinese claim that much cargo is still coming inland over the Ningpo route, although the transportation involves five transfers. The Japanese, therefore, appear to have failed, at least partially, in their major objective in occupying Hsiaoshan. They now say with regard to their operation here, however, that their "true aims are nothing but to make a paradise of peace and security of the region and to help in the consolidation of Sino-Japanese cooperation."

IV. South China.

a. Kwangtung.

No activity on the Canton front has been reported during the past month. The fact that the Japanese transferred at least one, and probably two, divisions from this front to Nanning in January would indicate that they anticipate no major activity in the Canton area in the near future.

For some time prior to February 11th, some 2,500 Chinese troops, puppets of the Japanese and commanded by Huang Ta-wei, had been in training at Chinghai (ten miles northeast of Swatow). On February 11th, these troops were withdrawn and sent on an expedition to Fukien, which will be hereinafter described. Only 300 Chinese mercenaries were left to guard Chinghai. On February 27th, the Chinese guerrillas drove out this force and occupied the town. By the end of February, however, Japanese troops from Swatow had reoccupied it. In the meantime, Chinese regulars and guerrillas had concentrated on both sides of the Swatow-Chaochow Railroad. On February 29th, they succeeded in cutting this line. At this juncture (March 1st and 2d), 3,000 Japanese reinforcements landed at Swatow and advanced against the Chinese. As no further reports have been received from this area, it is believed that, by this time, the Japanese have restored the status quo ante.

As this report goes to press, the Japanese are beginning another operation in the vicinity of Macao. Their aim in undertaking this operation, they state, is to reassert their authority over Chinese guerrillas in the district, who have got out of hand since last October. On the night of March 5th, two Japanese columns landed in the vicinity of Chungshan. On March 6th, they were advancing inland toward the Macao-Shekki highway. This office is inclined to accept the Japanese statement of their aims in this campaign, and does not read into these aims an immediate threat to the Portuguese in Macao.

b. Kwangsi.

Foreign sources attribute the original loss of Nanning to the following factors:

1. In view of the fact that Nanning is not directly accessible by sea, river, or railway, the Chinese command did not believe that the Japanese would attempt to attack it. They had not previously attacked a major point thus inaccessible. The Chinese command, therefore, discounted persistently reported Japanese preparations to invade Kwangsi and considered such preparations in the nature of a feint to cover a second big Japanese attack on Changsha.

2. Kwangsi leaders have always been reluctant to admit Central Government troops into their province. The Central Government, while grudgingly respecting this attitude, has always used as many Kwangsi troops as possible in other parts of the country. In fact, a number of Kwangsi divisions were despatched from Kwangsi to the Changsha front at the very time when Japanese preparations to attack Nanning were being reported. Consequently, at the time of the Japanese attack, there were very few Chinese troops in Kwangsi.

3. The Chinese had taken precautions to defend the main Yamhsien-Nanning road, but had left undefended the devious mountain paths on both sides of this road. The Japanese, using these paths for encircling moves, were thus enabled to reach Nanning without encountering much resistance.

4. Some of the commanders of the troops still in Kwangsi were absent from their units when the Japanese attacked.

5. Deficiency in communications prevented a sufficiently rapid advance of Central Government mechanized troops sent to recapture Nanning.

6. The Japanese December offensive in Kwangtung influenced the Chinese command to make a temporary diversion of effort from Kwangsi to Kwangtung.

In any event, the poor showing of the defending troops jolted Chiang Kai-shek into despatching his good man Friday, Chen Cheng, to Kweilin to keep an eye on Pai Chung-hsi, whom events had caused to lose prestige, and into flying there himself about February 1st.

As in west Suiyuan, the Japanese counter-offensive from Nanning (Map No. 2) beginning about February 26th, attempted the form of a blitz krieg. The Japanese did not, in the beginning, announce the objective of their attack. Some observers believed that these objectives were Poseh and Liuchow with a view to cutting the Caobang-Kweiyang and Kweilin-Kweiyang routes, respectively. In view of the relative paucity of Japanese troops employed and the unavoidable dispersion and communications difficulties resulting from such a maneuver, however, other observers doubted that these were the objectives. The Japanese scheme of maneuver was as follows: (1) the main effort a wide envelopment to the east, northeast, and northwest, with Pinyang as prime objective; (2) holding attacks to the northeast against Ssulung and Chiutang and to the north against Wuming.

The numbers of the opposing forces in this campaign were considerable. The Japanese claim that the Chinese forces totalled over 200,000 and comprised thirty

to thirty-five divisions. Japanese identifications of some of these divisions are as follows:

Locality	Designation by numeral
Pinyang area	75, 78, 92, 156
Shanglin area	145, 301, 302, 303,
Wuming area	2, 13, 17, 45, 84, 93, 103, 135
Litang area	110, 115, 155, 156, 175

Chinese identification of Japanese divisions in the Nanning area are as follows: 5th, 18th, Guards, and 28th (part), the last-named having been originally designated as a Formosan brigade. Foreign observers, however, believe that the above mentioned units were greatly depleted and that the total of Japanese in the area did not exceed 50,000.

The Japanese started their operation on February 26th by sending parts of the Guards and 18th Divisions (totalling about one division in strength) to cross the Yu River, south of Nanning, and then to proceed eastward along the highway to Yungshun. This force took Yungshun on January 29th, crossed the river, and, encountering little opposition, entered Pinyang on February 2d. The bulk of the Chinese forces in the Pinyang area, claimed by Chinese authorities to have totalled twelve divisions of about 8,000 men each, got away to the north and east, after suffering heavy losses. Immediately after occupying Pinyang, the Japanese pushed part of their force towards Shanglin, to the northwest, and Tachiao to the east. The Chinese claim that the Shanglin force reached a point eight kilometers southeast of the town on February 4th and attacked it on February 4th and 5th, but did not enter it. The Japanese claim that they entered Shanglin on February 4th. The Tachiao force appears to have occupied its objective without difficulty. The Chinese claim, however, to have recaptured Tachiao almost immediately. If they did, the Japanese subsequently counterattacked and drove east as far as Litang.

In the meantime, Chinese forces in the vicinity of Lingshan counterattacked Yungshun and retook it on February 4th. Other Chinese forces recaptured Kantang and Kucheng on the Yungshun-Pinyang highway, between January 31st and February 3d. Thus, by February 4th, the Japanese Pinyang force had lost the use of the Pinyang-Yungshun-Nanning communications route.

On January 26th, also, another Japanese column of unknown strength advanced northeast along the Nanning-Pinyang highway. After making contact with the Chinese south of Chiutang, this column captured Chiutang on February 6th (it is believed) and proceeded to Ssulung. Meanwhile, a third column, also of unknown strength, had left the main highway at Ssutang on January 28th and,

advancing over the Tamingshan mountain roads, had entered Ssulung on February 3d. When the column from Chiutang arrived in Ssulung, the united columns, in conjunction with a force sent down from Pinyang, converged on Kunlunkwan, where a Chinese force was still holding out. After severe fighting, the Japanese succeeded in wiping out this entire force of a division and a half. This action completed the opening of the highway from Nanning to Pinyang.

A fourth Japanese column, consisting of a reinforced brigade, moved out from Nanning simultaneously with the other columns and advanced directly north against Wuming. The Chinese state that this column entered Wuming on January 28th. The Japanese, however, do not claim that this force took the city. They report that their force which took Wuming started from Ssulung on February 6th and, advancing westward, entered Wuming on February 8th. It is, of course, possible that the Chinese statement is correct and that the Japanese force from Ssulung was merely a reinforcing column.

The vigor of the Japanese drive seems, at this point, to have spent itself, and the Chinese seem to have come to their senses. On February 8th the Chinese forces east of Pinyang counterattacked and recaptured Litang and Tachiao, the Japanese troops at these points withdrawing to Wulinghsu. On the same date, other Chinese forces from the Shanglin area began counterattacking the Japanese flank at Ssulung and claim to have reoccupied that point on February 11th and cut the Japanese Pinyang-Nanning communications. Also on the same date (which is the very day on which the Japanese claim to have entered Wuming), the Chinese forces in the Wuming area claim to have driven the Japanese out of that city, to have retaken Shuangchiao on February 10th, and to have begun attacking the Japanese at Takaofeng on February 15th. In the meantime, the Japanese in the Pinyang area, allowing discretion to prevail over valor, began withdrawing down the highway toward Nanning on February 11th. During their retrograde movement they had to cut their way, at no small cost, through Chinese forces attempting to block them at Ssulung and other points in the Tamingshan terrain. Immediately on the Japanese withdrawal, the Chinese forces from the Chienkiang area resurged toward Pinyang, which they claim to have reoccupied on February 12th. From this time onward, they followed on the heels of the receding Japanese until the latter came to rest at Szetang. To date, the Chinese have shown no disposition to attempt a retaking of Nanning by storm.

From mid-February until recently, the Nanning front has been relatively quiet. On February 15th, the Japanese began withdrawing troops from Nanning to Yamhsien and embarking them from the latter point for an unknown destination (conjectured by some observers to be Foochow).

The Chinese estimate that, by March 5th, the Japanese had thus withdrawn one and a half divisions. In the meantime, about February 20th, some minor activities again sprang up. One Japanese column (about a regiment in strength) pushed southward from Lungtao against a Chinese force in that vicinity, took Funan on February 21st, attacked Chuli on February 23d, and then withdrew to Suwei and prepared to meet a Chinese counterattack from Suilu. Another Japanese force, about February 23d, left the Nanning-Yamhsien highway between Tangpao and Tatang and moved against a Chinese force (said to include the 131st and 188th Kwangsi Divisions) which was attempting to cut the Nanning-Yamchow road between Tatang and Hsiaotung. Operating in several columns, the Japanese drove this force back and claim to have entered Shangsze (denied by the Chinese) on February 25th. This column then withdrew to the Nanning-Yamhsien highway. To the northeast of Nanning, the Chinese 33d, 49th, and 53d Divisions (all newly organized Szechwan divisions) began pressing the Japanese a little too closely. Thereupon a Japanese force of approximately a reinforced regiment counterattacked on February 24th and drove the Chinese to the north of Chitang on February 25th.

When the Japanese began withdrawing from Pinyang, they proclaimed that they had accomplished the purpose of their campaign; viz., the "destruction" of Chinese forces which had dared to attack Nanning. They further announced that they were "voluntarily returning such small towns as Pinyang and Chiutang" to the Chinese, but that they stood ready "to repeat the lesson", should the Chinese again dare to attack Nanning. For previously mentioned reasons, this office doubts that the original Japanese intention was to drive to Posch and Liuchow, and therefore places some credence in the Japanese statement that their objective was to "destroy" the threat to Nanning. The question is whether or not they really accomplished this objective. It is certain that they inflicted upon the Chinese severe losses of both personnel and materiel - and, incidentally, lost heavily themselves - and that they disrupted to no small extent Chinese plans and organization. It is believed that, in general, Chinese "recaptures by counterattack" were really re-occupations after the Japanese had, for one reason or another, withdrawn. On the other hand, the fact remains that, as in the Wuyuan area, the Japanese achieved no Cannae. When, in the nick of time, they began withdrawing, the supposedly "destroyed" Chinese forces resurged like a flood tide after them. Now, the Japanese are back at their starting point with the Chinese facing them - somewhat chastened, it is true, but facing them, none the less.

c. Fukien.

Huang Ta-wei's puppet troops who left the Swatow area on February 11th boarded Japanese transports and sailed for Fukien. The bulk of these troops, supported by Japanese naval landing forces, landed, on February 12th, at Chenhaicheng (twenty-two kilometers south of Amoy).

From here they advanced inland fifteen kilometers and took Chingwei on February 18th. Their objective appears to have been Lungki (Changchow), an important salt producing city west of Amoy. The Chinese assert that the Japanese preferred not to advance directly from Amoy on this point because of the strong Chinese defenses intervening. However, the expedition, after February 18th, appears to have disintegrated. After the fall of Chingwei, the bulk of those puppet troops who were not casualties went over to the Chinese troops and salt guards who opposed them (reported figures: 1900 went over, 800 casualties). On February 29th, Huang Ta-wei himself was reported under surveillance aboard a Japanese warship.

In the meantime, on February 14th, a part of Huang's forces not included in the main expedition took, with Japanese assistance, the city of Tungshan, on the northeast tip of Tungshan Island (one hundred kilometers southwest of Amoy). On February 16th, however, the Chinese defenders retook Tungshan and cleared the island of the puppet troops, remnants of whom took refuge on the Japanese warships and transports off the coast.

It is believed that the Japanese aims in engineering this expedition were mainly political. The objectives, they apparently believed, were "set-ups", but of sufficient importance to attract attention. If, therefore, their puppet Chinese troops could, with some Japanese assistance, achieve success, the psychological effect on Chinese in general might be considerable. Of course, the Japanese may well have considered that the time was ripe for getting practical returns from their investment in the puppet troops by having them perform a task from which Japanese troops were not available. In any event, the results must have been very disappointing.

V. Air Activities.

The following is a partial list of air raids made by Japanese military and naval aircraft during the period of this report:

February 3 - Japanese Naval planes bombed points (including Mengtze) on the Haiphong-Kunming Railway. Japanese planes in this operation were engaged by Chinese pursuits.

February 3 - Thirty Japanese planes (believed naval) bombed Luaiping (west of Nanning). Two Japanese planes said brought down by anti-aircraft gun fire.

February 4 - Japanese military planes bombed Chinese barracks west of Wuyuan.

February 8 - Japanese naval planes bombed Yushan (eastern Kiangsi), Chuhsien (western Chekiang), and Lishui (western Kiangsu).

February 9 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese military establishments at Kian (central Kiangsi) and Kanchow (southern Kiangsi).

February 9 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chikow (southwest of Ningpo).

February 13 - Sixty Japanese naval planes bombed the Haiphong-Kunming Railway. Five Chinese pursuits (E-16's) said to have attacked Japanese bombers.

February 13-19 - Japanese planes (believed naval) carried out nineteen air raids over northern Fukien, paying particular attention to the mouth of the Min River.

February 16 - Japanese naval planes bombed the Haiphong-Kunming Railway southeast of Mengtze.

February 17 - Japanese naval planes bombed the Haiphong-Kunming Railroad.

February 18 - Japanese naval planes bombed the Haiphong-Kunming Railroad near Mengtze.

February 22 - Japanese planes (believed naval) bombed Liuchow, Kwangsi.

February 25 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kweiki and Yingtan (Kiangsi), on the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad

March 2 - Japanese military planes bombed Kweihsien (two hundred kilometers east of Nanning.)

The following is a list of miscellaneous comments based on reports from various sources which are considered dependable:

1. In the bombings of the Haiphong-Yunnanfu Railroad, particular damage was done to tunnels and bridges. Chinese repair work has been going on continuously, and limited traffic has been sporadically maintained.

2. The following comments are taken from reports of the American Consul in Hanoi:

a. Russian aviators, using Russian planes, took part in the air operations over Liuchow, Kwangsi. The aviators are distinctly inferior in ability to those formerly employed in China.

b. In the bombing of the Haiphong-Yunnanfu Railroad by naval and military planes, on January 7th, the Japanese used two types of planes: the Standard Mitsubishi Bomber, and the Mitsubishi Bomber, Model 97. The latter is a new type and has the following characteristics: twin motors; maximum speed, 467 kilometers per hour; carries 1,200 kilograms of bombs; has a cruising range of 2,800 kilometers.

c. The main Japanese naval air base is off the coast of Kwangtung (exact location unknown - this office believes probably in the vicinity of Pakhoi).

d. By January 15th, the Japanese had restored the flying field at Nanning. At least fifty planes, mostly pursuits, were, on that date, stationed there.

e. Japanese bombs used in raids on the Haiphong-Yunnanfu Railroad showed extremely poor fragmentation.

Earl Mattice
EARL MATTICE
Captain, Infantry (DOL).

Enclosures: Two maps

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, March 7, 1940. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson
F. P. MUNSON
Capt., F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

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

To accompany Reports No. 9862.

PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.


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6-1
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G-2 Report

RESTRICTED

SITUATION REPORT

March 7 to April 3, 1940

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 7 1940

I. North China
A. Suiyuan
B. Shansi
C. Hopei
D. Shantung
II. Central China
III. South China
A. Kwangtung
B. Kwangsi and Western Kwangtung
C. Hainan Island
IV. Air Activities

During the past month, the country-wide military situation has been tranquil - probably more so than during any similar period since the war began. The Japanese have carried out only scattered mopping-up and defensive operations and have intensified their campaign of propaganda calculated to convert Chinese to their cause. Their reasons for this policy are probably as follows: (1) they desire to have the birth of the Wang Ching-wei regime take place in an atmosphere generally as peaceful as possible; (2) having concluded that there is no point in undertaking further big offensives, they wish to conserve their manpower and resources. The Chinese, also, except in a few minor instances, have remained quiet. Despite the fact that now, of all times, would be the psychologically propitious moment for them to open a general counteroffensive,- the more general the better, - they show no indications of being about to do so. The reason undoubtedly is that the aftermath of their abortive "winter offensive" has left them in a condition which, as concerns assuming a general counteroffensive, is little short of incapable.

I. North China.

A. Suiyuan.

After the conclusion of the west Suiyuan campaign, the Japanese held all points occupied until about February 15 and then began returning their troops to Paotou. They evacuated all points except the city of Wuyuan and its immediate vicinity, where they retained a sizable garrison of Japanese and Mongolian troops until February 20. On this date, they began returning most of the Japanese troops to Paotou and left Wuyuan to be held by a Mongolian garrison, reinforced by a small Japanese detachment.

From: M/A China Report No. 8962 April 3, 1940

9862

As the Japanese evacuated outlying points, the Chinese reoccupied them and gradually closed in on Wuyuan itself. On March 20, they attacked the city and the next day they entered it. By March 23, after several days of street fighting, they had cleared the garrison out of the town. Subsequently, according to their claim, they reoccupied Hsishantsueh (on the north bank of the Yellow River and sixty kilometers southeast of Wuyuan), a pass which is considered one of the keys to west Suiyuan. In the meantime (March 22), the Japanese had rushed up reinforcements from Paotou via Anpei, and attempted an encirclement of Paotou from the north. The Chinese held them for several days at the line of the Wuchiaho in the vicinity of Wanhochang (twenty kilometers northwest of Wuyuan). The Japanese claim, however, that they finally broke through, reoccupied Wuyuan on March 26, and drove off the Chinese to the west and south. Fighting in the area continued for several days; and then, on March 30, the Japanese announced that, having "repeated the lesson" to the Chinese, they had again withdrawn to Paotou.

In the meantime, the Chinese claim repeatedly that their main body is advancing eastward towards Paotou, along Wuyuan-Paotou highway. The Japanese make no mention of such a movement. If the Chinese reports be true, however, it is doubted that they intend to attack Paotou. What appears more likely is that they have withdrawn southeastward from Wuyuan into the Wulashan area, and intend to slip back into Wuyuan at a safe interval after the Japanese evacuation of that point.

Thus, the Japanese have had to do over again a large part of what they did in their lightning campaign of late January - early February. This time, they may have left in Wuyuan enough Japanese troops to hold it. Otherwise, there is no telling how many times in the future they may have to repeat the operation just completed.

B. Shansi.

Sino-Japanese fighting in Shansi during the month of March has been minor. The only engagements reported were as follows: skirmishing along both sides of the Tungpu Railroad; a Japanese attack on part of the Chinese 120th Division near Chuntu (on the east bank of the Yellow River in northwest Shansi; and a Japanese mopping up of Chinese bases in the Linhsien area, beginning March 28.

According to reports from Chinese sources, the Japanese, in late February and early March, withdrew their 108th and 109th Divisions from Shansi and returned them to Japan. Nothing has been reported relative to the replacement of these divisions. It was concluded, therefore, that the Japanese had no further major offensive operations scheduled and felt that, by reason of the current Chinese factional strife, they could employ reduced garrions to maintain

their holdings in the province. The Chinese now report, however, that, because of "heavy" Japanese troop movements into south Shansi, they believe a large-scale offensive in that area imminent. This office believes that the Japanese troop movements can not have been truly "heavy", and that, if a Japanese offensive materializes, it will be merely another mopping-up operation of larger or smaller scale.

The friction between Kuomintang and Communist elements of the Chinese forces has continued, but no reliable information concerning it from neutral or Chinese sources has been available here. According to Japanese reports, on the accuracy of which entire credence is not placed, a number of armed clashes have occurred. For example, the Japanese report a severe clash between elements of the Eighth Route Army and Yen Hsi-shan's troops near Hoku, on February 13, in which the Yen Hsi-shan troops were beaten. They also report clashes near Lingchuan (fifty kilometers southeast of Luan) and west of Shunteh (southern Hopei) in late February. They have even gone so far as to issue a statement (not believed) that Chiang Kai-shek has appealed to the Communists to wipe out Yen Hsi-shan's Army, as this army has lost its taste for fighting the Japanese.

C. Hopei.

The Japanese perennial mopping up of guerrillas here continued during the period. On March 10, the Japanese started a campaign to dispose of some 3,000 guerrillas under General Hsia Ko, who, based on Tungchaitang (forty-five miles west of Peking) in the mountainous area near the Hopei-Chahar border, had long been demonstrating their nuisance value. Four Japanese columns, with ample air support, moved simultaneously as follows, all converging on Tungchaitang: one from Liangsiang, westward and then northwestward; one from Mentoukou (fifteen miles west of Peking), westward; one from the vicinity of Nankow, westward and then southwestward; one from Fanshanpu (twenty-two miles southwest of Hwailai), southward and then southeastward. The Japanese claim that the column from Fanshanpu entered Tungchaitang on March 14. The other columns continued their advance, dispersing Chinese troops in front of them. By March 22d, the bulk of the Chinese having withdrawn to the southwest, the Japanese considered the campaign successfully concluded. However, fighting with Chinese remnants, and probably with returning elements of the troops who withdrew to the southwest, still continues in the area.

In the meantime, the Japanese had undertaken another mopping-up campaign in central Hopei. This time, their objective was a body of Communist troops, some 3,000 strong, who after driving a detachment of Shih Yu-san's Kuomintang troops to the south, had attempted to settle down in the Funing-Jaoyang area (sixty kilometers southeast of Paotingfu). The Japanese surrounded this area, and, on March 16, converged on it from the following points: Shenhsien, Anping, Poyeh, Jenkiu, Hochien, and

Hsienchow. By March 24, they reported, they were "crushing enemy resistance at every point, and gradually encircling the Chinese."

The Japanese, with much publicity, claim that the following bodies of Chinese guerrilla troops voluntarily surrendered to them:

March 11, at Ihsien	4,000
March 11, near Shunteh	162
March 17, near Paotingfu	1,300
March 17, near Anyang	5,000
Total	10,462

According to the Japanese, the reason for these surrenders was dissatisfaction with the treatment accorded the guerrillas by the Communist authorities. There is no way of verifying the above reports. Whether true or not, however, they illustrate one form of Japanese propaganda in support of the new regime.

D. Shantung.

No reports of Sino-Japanese fighting in this province have been received during the period. The Japanese claim, however, that there has been considerable fighting between Shih Yu-san's Kuomintang troops and the Communists. These Japanese reports state that on March 19, 8,000 Communist troops from the Sintichen area (one hundred and fifteen kilometers west of Tsinan) attacked the Kuomintang troops in the Popinghsien (eighty kilometers west of Tsinan) area - results unknown; and that, on March 21, 2,000 troops of the Eighth Route Army attacked a similar number of Kuomintang troops at Puhsien (one hundred and twenty kilometers west of Yenchow), with the result that the Communists were put to rout. The Japanese also report that Shih Yu-san, having been defeated by the Communists on March 10, withdrew to the area west of Tsowhsien, where he found himself threatened by the Communists on one side and the Japanese on the other. He then, according to the Japanese, requested them not to attack him pending his preparations for a counterattack against the Communists.

It is difficult to determine what amount of credence to put on the above mentioned Japanese reports. Although they have undoubtedly been disseminated for propaganda purposes, it is not believed that they have been fabricated out of whole cloth. That the Chinese have not recently attacked the Japanese in Shantung is an established fact. One of the principal reasons for this may well be some such internal friction as the Japanese describe.

II. Central China.

Little of note occurred in Central China during the period of this report. Chinese shore batteries were active against Japanese shipping on the Yangtze, especially near Kiukiang and Wuhu. The Chinese claim to have sunk some ten Japanese naval vessels and transports within a

few days. Between March 4 and March 9, the Japanese attacked Chinese positions west and south of Suihsien (northern Hupei); but, at the end of that period, the status quo ante remained. Beginning March 24, the Japanese pushed south and southeast from Tungliu and Hsiangkow (thirty-five and fifty-five kilometers, respectively, southwest of Anking), but have been unable to advance far against the stiff Chinese resistance they have encountered. The Chinese claim that they attacked the Japanese at Taipu (south of Liyang in southern Kiangsu) and drove them northward towards Chuyung. The Japanese report that mopping-up operations are still going on in eastern Chekiang and west of Lake Tai, but make no statement as to the progress of these operations.

III. South China.

A. Kwangtung.

In Kwangtung, the principal activity of the period occurred in the extreme western part of the province, along the Kwangsi border. This activity is hereinafter described. Except for local skirmishes, Canton and the immediate vicinity have been quiet. Small mopping up operations took place in the Shekki and Swatow areas. It has been said that the center of military activity in South China has shifted to the lower valley of the West River; but, as this report is submitted, no important moves in this area or from it have taken place.

In order to mop up guerrillas who had become obstreperous in the Shekki area since the Japanese withdrawal last October, the Japanese suddenly landed at three points on the Chungshan peninsula on March 5. The landing points were Tsinshanchai (just northwest of Macao), Tongka (on the east coast of the peninsula and twenty kilometers northeast of Macao), and Titshek (Chauchik), on the east bank of the West River, fourteen kilometers west of Shekki. The advance of these units proceeded rapidly; and, on the morning of March 8, elements of all three entered Shekki (Chungshanhsien). Leaving a a small garrison in the city, the Japanese main body continued to mop up Chinese remnants. On March 21, a Japanese force landed on the northern part of Lappa Island (just west of Macao). The purpose of this landing may be to lend support to certain demands (see Comments on Current Events, April 4, 1940) which the Japanese are reported to have made recently on the government of Macao.

The Japanese excuse for remaining in occupation of the Chungshan peninsula is that they cannot, for the time being, rely upon puppet administrations to maintain order there. Considering the fact that the Japanese have had to undertake the present "punitive expedition" as a sequel to their withdrawal last October, this excuse is supported by some elements of logic. In view of their reported demands on the Macao government and their actual occupation of a portion of Lappa Island, - an area not heretofore connected with anti-Japanese activities, - however, it must now be admitted that an additional, if not the main, reason for the present campaign is probably to intimidate the Portuguese into accepting Japanese de facto domination of the Macao area.

After the operations of late February, some 20,000 Chinese troops (including the 6th Reserve Division and the 9th Independent Brigade) in the area west of Swatow

remained a threat to the Japanese. According to Chinese sources, the Japanese reinforced their troops in this area with the 106th Division. On March 7, the Japanese advanced westward in two columns, one from Anpu and one from Chaoan, both columns converging on Chiyang (Kityang). These columns were held up for some time by Chinese resistance east of Chiyang. The Chinese claim that at this juncture, they sent a "strong" column around one of the Japanese flanks and captured Tonghai on March 9 - a maneuver which compelled the Japanese to withdraw in the direction of Swatow. Whether the fall of Tonghai, the dispersal of the Chinese in their front, or a combination of both was the real reason for the Japanese withdrawal is not known. In any event, the Chinese remained inactively in possession of Tonghai until March 18, when the Japanese returned and drove them out. According to Japanese reports, the "strong" column consisted of only 200-300 men. No reports of further action in this area have been received.

B. Kwangsi-Western Kwangtung.

The Japanese, anticipating a period of repose after their February campaign in the Nanning area, sent the 18th Division back to the Canton area and the brigade of Imperial Guards to Formosa. This exodus left the remains of the 5th Division holding the Nanning area and those of the 28th Division guarding the communications to the coast.

In the environs of Nanning itself, nothing noteworthy occurred except some slight changes in the Japanese defensive perimeter (see map). On March 9, the Japanese withdrew to Erhtang, on the Nanning-Pinyang highway, and, on March 14, to Wutsunhsu, on the Nanning-Pingsiang highway. At Takaofeng, Shihpu, and Lungtao they held fast. The Chinese, naturally, resurged after them when they withdrew to Erhtang and Wutsunhsu. The Japanese counterattacked, however, and retook Suwei and Funan on March 27. The Chinese claim that they retook Funan on March 28 and forced the Japanese to withdraw towards Nanning.

A more serious situation arose, however, along the Nanning-Yamhsien highway. Early in March a Chinese force (said by the Japanese to consist of four divisions) appeared to the east of the highway and threatened to cut the Japanese communications with the sea. This threat so concerned the Japanese that they decided to take the offensive and disperse it. Accordingly, on March 13, a column of 3,000 men moved out from Nanning eastward, along the Nanning-Yungshun highway; another main column of 2,000 men, moved northeast from Yamhsien on the same date; and small columns, also on the same date, moved eastward from Nahsiao and Hsiaotung. The Nanning column developed unexpected resistance at Pumiao and divided into two columns. One of these, outflanking the Chinese to the south, advanced on Namheung (Nansiang), as shown on the accompanying map, and arrived there on March 17. This flanking movement enabled the Japanese on the Nanning-Yungshun highway to advance to Yungshun. The Yamhsien column moved northeast through Niukiang, Pingchi, and Sanlung to

Luwu, where it met stiff resistance on March 14. After receiving 1,000 reinforcements, this column fought its way with some difficulty to Lingshan, which it entered on March 18.

At this juncture the strength of the Japanese offensive, as at Pinyang, seems to have spent itself. The column at Yungshun, its communications threatened (apparently by Chinese troops who had not joined the general withdrawal), began withdrawing along the highway towards Nanning on March 19. The Namheung force, being counterattacked from three sides by the Chinese on March 19-21, also withdrew westward towards Hsiaotung. On March 22, the force in Lingshan withdrew, closely followed by the Chinese, in two columns, one retreating westward towards Hsiaotung, the other southwestward towards Yamhsien via Wulicheng. The Chinese claim that they entrapped a flank guard sent eastward from the Wulicheng column and annihilated it. Although the Japanese still deny that the Chinese have reoccupied Lingshan, credence is not placed in the denial. The Chinese claim that, in the meantime, they have kept up their attacks on both sides of the Nanning-Yamhsien highway, and that, on March 25, they captured Nachen.

In the circumstances, the tactics used by the Japanese in the defense of Nanning are probably the most practical they can employ. The necessity for them to hold widely scattered localities against tremendous numerical odds naturally requires them to utilize to the utmost their great superiority in combat efficiency and equipment. There is no doubt, too, that their lightning thrusts against the slow-moving, poorly commanded Chinese - thrusts that they would never dare make against a more efficient enemy - temporarily regain for them the initiative and break up threats before they can gather momentum enough to become dangerous. However, such tactics are extremely enervating to combat strength and morale, and effectiveness is likely to fall off rapidly if tried too often with the same body of troops. Heretofore Chinese clumsiness in maneuver and inherent lack of the offensive spirit have operated greatly to the advantage of the Japanese. Still, it is difficult to see how the Japanese can continue indefinitely to employ the thrust - withdraw tactics without serious repercussions on themselves. In any event, with their present strength, they will be fortunate to retain what they now have in the Nanning area; and the undersigned does not look for them to undertake drives to Wuchow or any other distant points in the near future.

C. Hainan Island

After the Japanese seized Hainan Island in February, 1939, they took possession of the highway which runs around the perimeter of the island, and established an aerodrome for 200 planes at Hoihow; but they made no serious efforts to penetrate into the mountainous interior. The result has been, that, during the past year, some 15,000 Chinese guerrillas and regulars (including three regular brigades under Generals Wang I and Ou Tao-nan) have made this area their habitat. Furthermore, loose Japanese vigilance along the coast and in the Hainan-Kwangtung strait has made it possible for these Chinese troops to receive military supplies regularly by junk from the mainland.

As these "bandits" became more and more troublesome, the Japanese gradually became convinced that a general clean-up was indicated. They first took steps to build up their occupying force to adequate proportions (according to Chungking reports, the Japanese have recently transferred from other China fronts to Hainan 30,000 men, including part of the 18th Division from Canton). On March 4, they began a large-scale mopping-up campaign, starting from several points on the northern, northwestern, and southeastern coasts of the island, and converging on the mountainous interior. By the latter part of March, the various Japanese units had reached the triangular perimeter, Nata (thirty kilometers southeast of Tanhsien) - Tunchang (twenty kilometers southwest of Kiungshan) - Paoting (forty-five kilometers northeast of Lingshui). As this report is closed, the operations are continuing - it is not known with what net results. Chinese sources appear to be unable to furnish details, and Japanese accounts are very meagre and vague.

Because of the topography of interior Hainan, and of the perverseness of Chinese characteristics, it is doubted that the Japanese will soon, if ever, be able to bring the island one hundred per cent under their control. In the long run, it will probably not make much difference whether they do or not. If they can render conditions there analogous to those in Formosa, such a settlement will probably be satisfactory. It is believed that they are undertaking a large-scale mopping-up campaign at this time in order to pave the way for the establishment of permanent air and naval bases on the island before interested third powers can revert to a position to dispute them. Comments relative to the establishment of naval and air bases on Hainan Island are contained in Report Number 9744 (Situation Report, February 5 to March 6, 1939).

IV. Air Activities.

The following is a partial list of raids carried out by Japanese military and naval aircraft during the period of this report:

March 7 - Military planes bombed Hochiatien (forty-five kilometers west of Yingshan, eastern Hupei).

March 10 - Naval planes bombed Taiping (in southeastern Anhwei and 120 kilometers east of Anking).

March 12 - Naval planes bombed Shanjao (in eastern Kiangsi, fifty kilometers southwest of Yushan).

March 12 - Military planes bombed Szelung and Tapingkan (in southern Kwangsi and southwest of Pinyang).

March 14 - Naval planes bombed Kweiki (on Chekiang-Kiangsi Railway and 130 kilometers southeast of Nanchang).
March 15 - Naval planes bombed Chinese troops near Tsingtao.
March 25 - Planes (believed naval) bombed Lungchow (southwestern Kwangsi).
March 26 - Military planes bombed Paishui (in eastern Shensi and 110 kilometers northeast of Sian).
March 30 - Planes bombed Yushan (northeastern Kiangsi) and Kian (central Kiangsi).
March 30 - Military planes bombed Hsienyang (thirty kilometers northwest of Sian).

The Chinese claim to have bombed Nanking on March 26. They report that they carried out the operation with two heavy bombers and two pursuits and that they "dropped on the outskirts of Nanking one bomb which exploded with a deafening roar".

Earl Mattice
EARL MATTICE
Captain, Infantry, DOL.

Enclosure: Map

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peking, China, April 4, 1940. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F P Munson
F. P. MUNSON
Capt., F.A.,
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosure: no change

Distribution:
6 MID; 2 Embassy; 1 Tokyo;
2 Guard; 1 N/A ; 1 Manila;
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G-2 Report

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JUN 6 1940
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-2276

SITUATION REPORT

April 4 - May 1, 1940

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 6 1940

I. North China
A. Suiyuan
B. Shansi
C. Hopei
D. Honan
E. Shantung
II. Central China
A. Hupei-Northern Hunan
B. Kiangsi
C. Anhwei
D. Kiangsu
III. South China
A. Kwangtung
B. Kwangsi
IV. Air Activity

The period covered by this report has been characterized by a continuation - with slight intensification of effort - of Japanese mopping up campaigns in southern Shansi, in Hopei, and in the Yangtze valley. South China has been generally quiet. The present Japanese policy appears to be one of enhancing the security of the New Regime, and, otherwise, of readjusting their lines and settling down to a defensive attitude. From the Chinese side have emanated several reports of heavy counteroffensives to come presently. With the exception of some more or less half-hearted pushes in Shansi, Honan, Hupei, Hunan, and Kiangsi, however, no Chinese counteroffensives have yet materialized.

I. North China.

A. Suiyuan.

There is still some doubt as to the exact accomplishments of Japanese punitive expedition to Wuyuan in late March. They claim to have captured the town on March 27 and, after clearing the vicinity of Chinese troops, to have withdrawn voluntarily to Paotou. The Chinese, on the other hand, insist that, although the Japanese did enter Wuyuan on March 27, they retreated before Chinese pressure towards Paotou on March 29. The Chinese further claim that they reentered Wucheng on April 1 and that, by April 8, they were attacking the Japanese at Anpei, with a view of advancing on Paotou. Since that time, no reports of major fighting in Suiyuan have been received. It is possible that the Japanese have given up the idea of controlling west Suiyuan permanently and have decided to content themselves with maintaining their limit of western advance at Paotou and outposts thereof.

From: M/A China Report No. 9873 May 1, 1940

In south Chahar guerrillas based on the Yuhsien area have for some time been annoying the Japanese along the Pingsui Railroad. Accordingly, the Japanese, early in April, set out to mop up the district. They claimed to have successfully completed the task on April 14.

B. Shansi.

Chinese reports claim that Chinese troops, after capturing Linhsien (northwestern Shansi) in a counter-offensive, attacked Fangshan on the night of March 29. The Japanese, however, claim to have subsequently counter-attacked at Linhsien and Tsikowchen and regained control of the area.

In southwestern Shansi the Japanese "major offensive" which the Chinese predicted in March materialized in mid-April. The aims of this mopping up campaign were apparently as follows: (1) to annihilate or disperse Wei Li-huang's troops, massed in the Chungtiao and Taihang mountain areas; (2) to cut off the supplies which these troops had been receiving by ferry across the Yellow River from free Honan; and (3) to demonstrate that the Japanese Army is still able and willing to strike in behalf of the New Regime.

The operations began on April 17, when the Japanese moved out in several columns from the lower Tungpu area towards the Yellow River. One column captured Painanchen (see Map Number 1) on April 17, another Pinglu on April 19, and a third Maotsingtu on April 17. Leaving some troops for local mopping up and some artillery to shell Shenhsien, across the Yellow River, the main Japanese body then swung eastward into the Chungtiao mountains towards Yuanchu. At last reports this body of troops was approaching Yuanchu in the face of rather stiff Chinese resistance. The Japanese state that this maneuver was intended, in its early stages, as a feint to divert Chinese attention from the main blow to come further north by making them believe that, at last, a push to Sian was in progress.

During the period April 20-22, two other Japanese forces began advancing: one in three columns moving generally southward from Changtze, Changchih (Luan), and Hukwan; the other in two columns moving generally eastward from Fowshan and Yicheng. The columns from the Luan area took Kaoping on April 21 but encountered stiff resistance south thereof. While the main body of Japanese pressed southward towards Tsincheng (Tsechow), a force proceeded eastward, captured Lingchuan on April 22, and then swung southwest towards Tsincheng. To this column and the main body pressing southward from Kaoping Tsincheng fell on April 25. On April 26, the Japanese continued their advance southward towards Tienchingkuan. In the meantime, the Yicheng-Fowshan columns had converged upon and entered Tsinshui on April 21. They then continued southeastward through Yangcheng, and, by April 25, had crossed the Tsin River and were advancing on Tsincheng.

Another Japanese force, with a view to cutting off the Chinese retreat from Tsincheng southward, left

Poai on April 25 and proceeded against the important mountain pass, Tienchingkuan. They claim to have broken through the pass on the night of April 25-26.

At the present time, reports on the results of these operations are very conflicting and vague. The Japanese, as usual, claim outstanding success. The Chinese, on the other hand, proclaim that the Japanese offensive has collapsed because of the extremely heavy casualties inflicted by the Chinese. It is probable that, although the Japanese have taken terrain objectives as they claim, they have not yet disposed of the Chinese armed forces, and that fighting is still in progress.

The fighting described above appears to have either called a halt to the bickering between Kuomintang and Communist factions or, more probably, to have supplanted it as a news topic. Although no recent reports concerning this factional friction have been received, there is no reason to aver, therefore, that it no longer exists.

C. Hopei.

During the month of April, this province was the scene of slightly intensified Japanese mopping up operations, mainly along the Ping-Han Railroad. Early in the month the Japanese mopped up "Chinese remnants" in the Kucheng area. At the same time, they took the offensive against Chinese guerrillas in the southern hook of the province, capturing Tungming on April 2, and dispersing some 2,000 guerrillas in the Taming area between April 1 and 5. About April 8, some fifty guerrillas in plain clothes entered Wangtu, on the Ping-Han Railroad, in search of information, according to Japanese reports. The Japanese claim to have wiped them out almost immediately. On April 8, a combined force of Japanese troops and Chinese police dispersed some 5,000 guerrillas near Weihsien (fifty kilometers west of Taming). The Japanese claim that 1,000 guerrillas surrendered to them at Chuhsien on April 18. On April 26, the Japanese were engaged in a series of mopping up operations in the Sincheng, Poyeh, and Hantan areas - a strip of territory along the east side of the Ping-Han Railroad from north of Paoting to the Honan border.

D. Honan.

In middle and late April, the Chinese attempted, rather timidly and without much coordination, to start a counteroffensive in eastern Honan. According to Japanese reports, one Chinese force in the vicinity of Taikang was about to attack that city about April 16; but the forehanded Japanese took the offensive first and dispersed the threat before it could materialize. A more serious situation arose, however, when the Chinese attacked Kaifeng on April 23. The Japanese version of the attack is as follows: A Chinese force of some 2,000 men of the 22d Division and part of the 81st Division, all commanded by Sun Tung-hsuan, approaching Kaifeng from the north, west, and south, began to attack the city at

2:30 a.m., April 22. By 5:00 a.m., about 300 Chinese troops had forced their way into the city through the west gate. Street fighting then ensued until 3:00 p.m., when the Chinese withdrew, hotly pursued by the Japanese. The Chinese version differs, in some respects, from the above. They claim that only one division (probably the 22d) plus some detachments sent to destroy sections of the railroad between Kaifeng and Lanfeng were involved in the operation. They also claim to have completely cleared the city of Japanese troops by 6:00 p.m., April 22. They state, however, that, as Japanese reinforcements from Sinsiang, Lanfeng, Taikang, and other points began pouring in on April 23, the Chinese position in Kaifeng became precarious. They admit withdrawing from the city early on April 24.

The Kaifeng action is one more illustration of Chinese lack of coordination and determination. If they had committed an adequate force and coordinated their Taikang action with that at Kaifeng, they undoubtedly would have placed the Japanese in a very serious position, indeed. As it was, they manifestly took the Japanese in Kaifeng by surprise. According to estimates by foreign sources, the Japanese garrison in Kaifeng was only 300-500 men. Further, at the time of the attack, the garrison commander was absent from the city; and his second in command, a major, was killed during the action. Yet, by sending too small a force against Kaifeng and failing to contain the Japanese at Taikang and other points, the Chinese again missed a victory which was within their grasp.

E. Shantung.

This province has been generally quiet during the month of April. The Japanese report only one small mopping up operation in eastern Shantung and continued clashes between Kuomintang and Communist factions in various places.

The American Consul in Tsinan, however, makes some interesting reports on the Shantung situation. He states that six truckloads of Japanese troops were ambushed near Tsinan on April 7, five truckloads being killed or captured. He also reports that the Chinese appear to have taken effective measures to curtail the important salt trade between Yangkikow (on the coast) and Tsinan via the Siaotsing River, and that, according to Chinese sources, Yangkikow itself is now threatened by a combined force of Eighth Route Army troops and troops of Yu Hsueh-chung. He says, further, that American missionaries report a concentration of 50,000 Eighth Route Army troops in the Lintsing area and that people in the area believe a major Chinese offensive imminent.

II. Central China.

A. Hupei-Northern Hunan.

Although there is no doubt that considerable fighting has been going on in this area during the period,

reports thereon have been so fragmentary, contradictory, and vague that it is most difficult to comment intelligently on the situation there. In general, it appears that the Chinese, early in April, initiated a counter-offensive, of sorts, both in the area north, northeast, and southeast of Wuhan, and in the Tungting Lake region, and that the Japanese have been meeting this counter-offensive with countering moves of their own.

Northeast of Wuhan, the Chinese began attacking Macheng on April 7 and claim to have captured the town on April 9 and to have continued the attack in the direction of Sungfow (forty kilometers southwest of Macheng), forcing the Japanese to withdraw west and southwest. If this report be true, the Japanese must have subsequently regained Macheng; for the Chinese claim to have captured this point again on April 26 and to have forced the Japanese to retreat to a point east of Suihsien. In this same area, the Japanese also, on April 12, moved northeast from Hwangan against a Chinese force in the vicinity of Hsintsi. On April 18, fighting between Hwangan and Hsintsi was reported as still going on.

On the Yangtze River, southeast of Wuhan, the Chinese, on April 14, began an advance from Hwangmei against the Wuhsueh-Tienchiachen-Lungping area. The Japanese thus threatened in this area received reinforcements. So far as is known, the fighting here is still in progress.

North of Wuhan, fighting is now reported along the Ping-Han Railroad, particularly at Kwangshui and Hwayuan. The Japanese in this area are said to be hard pressed.

West of Wuhan, between Chunghsiang and the Tahung mountains, minor operations have been in progress since April 10. Although the Chinese claim to have staged several successful raids here, the localities raided and the results of the raids are unknown.

In the Tungting Lake region, the Chinese, early in April, started a push which apparently worried the Japanese considerably. The latter report starting a counteroffensive in this area on April 22 and gaining some successes by April 25. Naval units, cooperating with the land forces in this operation, patrolled Tungting Lake and sent ashore at Luchiao landing parties which proceeded northward in the direction of Yochow.

The American Consul General in Hankow reports that for the several days preceding April 22 there was heavy movement of Japanese troops and materiel both up and down river from Hankow - the down-river traffic being approximately equal in volume to that up river. He believes that possibly the down-river traffic consists of troops and materiel being shifted to the southeast Hupei and Nanchang sectors from Yochow, an area from which they can ill be spared. He also reported that during the week preceding April 16, 1,000 Japanese wounded arrived in

Hankow from southeast Hupei, and that military police in Hankow are now taking over the duties of the regular garrison troops, most of whom have been withdrawn for service at the front. These reports appear to indicate that the Japanese are quite concerned and that there is a long chance that the Chinese counteroffensive in this area may yet develop into something important.

B. Kiangsi.

On April 7, the Chinese launched a "surprise offensive" on Nanchang. Moving from the west and southwest in several columns, they captured Tsingan, Fengsin, and Kaoyushih (all west of Nanchang) on April 9. The Japanese, however, although probably numerically weak, put up determined resistance, cut the dykes along the Kiu Kiang on April 12, and stopped the Chinese eastward advance. In the meantime, another Chinese force, approaching from the south or southeast, had reached Lientang (twenty kilometers southeast of Nanchang). The Japanese from Nanchang counterattacked and drove the Chinese from this point on April 14; but the Chinese retook it on April 16. By this time the Japanese had received reinforcements enough to bring their strength in the Nanchang-Anyi area up to a division and a half.

From this point onward, because of the scarcity and fragmentary nature of reports, the situation in this area is difficult to follow. The maximum Chinese advance eastwards towards Nanchang appears to have been the line Anyi-Wanshoukung (twenty-five kilometers southwest of Nanchang). During the period April 20-24, the Japanese counterattacked in the direction of Anyi; and on April 27 they counterattacked in the direction of Fengsin. Neither of these counterattacks appears to have achieved decisive results. Meanwhile, the Chinese force south and southeast of Nanchang continued to press the Japanese. Chungking claims that units of this force were engaged in street fighting in Nanchang suburbs on April 24. The validity of this claim is doubted, unless Lientang be considered a suburb of Nanchang. In general, the situation in the Nanchang area appears at this time to be a deadlock, after severe fighting in which both sides have suffered many casualties. If the Chinese act according to precedent, they will now relax their efforts, draw off, and leave the Japanese in undisputed possession of Nanchang.

Apparently with the intention of creating a diversion of Japanese strength from the Nanchang area, a Chinese force, probably from the Wuning area, began advancing eastward towards Mahuiling and Tehan about April 18. Nothing further has been heard of this force.

C. Anhwei:

The Japanese have done a considerable amount of mopping up in this province during the month of April.

Between April 4 and April 22, they were engaged in scattering troops of the Fourth Route Army who had been infesting the Suhsien, Chaohsien, and Anking areas. More serious operations began, however, about April 21, when the Japanese proceeded against Ku Chu-tung's Central Government troops in the area south of Wuhu. The Japanese advanced from Wuhu in two columns; one southwestward towards Fanchang, the other southward towards Nanling. The first column took Fanchang and then circled to the southeast to assist the column advancing on Nanling. At this point, the Chinese apparently resisted strongly; for it took an all-day fight and a night of street fighting on April 24-25 for the Japanese to clear them out. The Japanese then continued their advance southwestward and, in conjunction with other Japanese units from Tatung, were attacking Tsingyang on April 27.

D. Kiangsu.

The Shanghai area, which has long been relatively quiet, was the scene of some Sino-Japanese fighting during the period, late March-early and middle April. From March 27 to April 14, the Japanese were engaged in ejecting the Chinese 117th Army (Japanese identification) and some paoantui from the Chapei-Kaoyu sector. On April 16, severe fighting took place near Chaohang (thirty kilometers southwest of Shanghai on the Shanghai-Tsingpu highway) between Japanese troops and 1,500 guerrillas. It is reported that both sides suffered severe losses, and that the fighting was the most severe that has occurred in the vicinity of Shanghai since the 1937 campaign. No recent reports of fighting in this area have been received.

III. South China.

A. Kwangtung.

No news of fighting on the Canton and Swatow fronts has been received. The Japanese report, instead, bickering among the Chinese military heads in the Canton area. These reports state that one of the main reasons for promoting Yu Han-mou to Commander of the Fourth War Zone and removing Chang Fa-kuei from the Canton area was the friction between these two. Li Han-hun, of the Chang Fa-kuei faction, however, still remained as Chairman of the Provincial Government of Canton; and the friction continued with the effect of disuniting Chinese troops in the Canton area. With a view to eliminating this friction, therefore, the Chinese Central Government has recently appointed Lo Cho-ying as Chairman of the Provincial Government of Canton and shifted Li Han-hun to command the Thirty-fifth Route (?) Army. For the purpose of checking Yu Han-mou, the Central Government has appointed Wu Chi-wei as Deputy Commander of the Fourth War Zone.

B. Kwangsi.

Nothing startling has occurred in Kwangsi during the period of this report, but the Nanning area continued to be the scene of interesting maneuvers. A Chinese threat having developed to the west of Nanning in late March, the Japanese decided to break it up. Accordingly, on April 1, two Japanese columns, total strength reported to be 5,400, moved westward from Nanning along the north and south banks of the Yu River (see Map Number 2). Both columns crossed the Tso River on April 5, one taking Tungcheng on April 6, and the other taking Tsohsien on April 7. The Chinese, apparently at the start of the Japanese maneuver, began moving troops westward from the area east of the Nanning-Yamhsien highway. This force crossed the highway south of Nanning on April 5 and the Tso River on April 6. They then, according to Chungking reports, attacked Tsohsien and Tungcheng in conjunction with other Chinese forces from the Leiping area, the latter attacking from the southwest, west, and northeast. The Japanese then withdrew from Tungcheng and Tsohsien to Nanning on April 9. Chinese estimates that Japanese casualties in this action were 2,400 appear manifestly too high.

It is not clear why the Chinese from east of the highway did not, on reaching the highway, swing northward on Nanning itself, instead of continuing on across the Tso River. Obviously, if this maneuver had been successful, they would have recaptured Nanning and left the Japanese west of the River without a base. The Chinese command, however, probably had no confidence in Chinese ability to force the Japanese defense works around Nanning and, consequently, adopted the less decisive but more easily to be accomplished objective of cornering the Japanese who had crossed the Tso River.

The only other maneuver in this area reported was the Japanese capture of Kanyu (northwest of Nanning on April 8. The Chinese, however, claim to have recaptured this point on April 10.

The Japanese, with an estimated actual strength of one and one-half divisions, are now confined to Nanning and immediate vicinity and the Nanning-Yamhsien highway. The Chinese report that, in the Nanning area, there are no Japanese west of the line, Shihpu-Suwei, and that, east of the Nanning-Yamhsien highway, only a few scattered Japanese detachments remain. The writer is not, however, one of those observers who believe that Japanese evacuation of Nanning at this time is either logical or necessary. They have demonstrated their ability to hold, up to now, not only Nanning but also their communications to the sea, in spite of all the Chinese could do to prevent them; and they will probably continue to do so for some time to come.

IV. Air Activity.

A. Japanese

During the period under review there was a slight

increase over the previous month in Japanese military and naval air activity. The principal operations reported by the press were the following:

April 2 - Army planes bombed Yenan and Lochwan in Shensi Province.
April 3 - Army planes bombed Sian, capital of Shensi Province.
April 4 - Planes bombed Kwangsin in Kwangsi Province, and Kinhua, Chekiang.
April 5 - Army planes bombed Yingtan in Northeastern Kiangsi.
April 6 - Army planes bombed Hengsien in Chekiang Province.
April 8 - Army planes bombed Hengsien in Chekiang Province
April 9 - Army planes bombed Chengchow in northern Honan.
April 10 - Planes bombed Kweilin, Kwangsi Province.
April 11 - Army planes bombed Wuming, Kwangsi Province.
April 12 - Army planes bombed Pingma, northwest of Nanning, Kwangsi Province.
April 13 - Naval planes bombed Fuchow in central Kiangsi.
April 16 - Naval planes bombed points in Chekiang and Kiangsi Provinces.
April 18 - Army planes bombed Chinese troops south of the Yellow River in Northern Honan.
April 20 - Naval planes bombed Iping, near Chungking.
April 22 - Planes bombed towns in Szechwan Province.
April 24 - Planes bombed Suifu, Szechwan.
April 25 - Naval planes bombed Chungking, Szechwan.
April 25 - Army planes bombed points in southern Shansi.
April 26 - Naval planes bombed Chinese troops in the Nanchang-Nanling sector of Kiangsi Province.
April 26 - Naval planes bombed Indo-China Yunnan Railroad, damaging at least one bridge.
April 27 - Planes bombed Yunnan Railroad between Mengtze and Kaiyuan.
April 27 - Army planes bombed Tsiyuan in Northern Honan Province.

B. Chinese.

April 3 - Chinese planes bombed Yuncheng, south Shansi, and Yochow in north Hunan.
April 12 - Sixteen Chinese planes bombed Yochow, north Hunan.

COMMENT:

While it undoubtedly aids the Chinese morale to have their planes in the air again, the damage resulting from the three raids mentioned above was practically negligible. Apparently the Chinese air force is still too prone to drop their loads near the outskirts of their

objectives and hurry away before pursuit follows. Until a vital Japanese military center is damaged or destroyed it is probable that the Japanese will continue to rely on a few bursts of anti-aircraft shells to warn away the aerial enemy.

Earl Mattice
EARL MATTICE
Captain, Infantry (DOL)

Enclosures: 2 maps

Distribution:
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1ST. IND.

THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PEKING, CHINA.

TO: A. C. OF S., G-2

1. APPROVED.

WILLIAM MAYER,
MAJOR, FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE.


LINGSHIH
YUNGNO
SHWINSIEN
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ANTSE
HUNGTUNG
YELLOW RIVER
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LINFEN
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Apr. 20
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YISHIN
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YUNCHENG
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46A
Apr. 17
YUNGTSI
YUSIANG
Apr. 17
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Apr. 18
JUICHANG
SHENHSIEN
LINGRAO
FENGLINGTU
Chinese
Japanese
PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE, CHINA.



To accompany Report No. 9873.


MILITARY OPERATIONS
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AS OF MAY. 1, 1940
No. 2
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NANNING
Apr.5
LIPING
Apr.6
TSOHSIEN
Apr.9
TSO
RIVER
Apr.6
Apr.6
LI
RIVER
TATANG
LUNGCHOW
SUILU
PINGSIANG
SHANGSZE
CHENNANKUAN
LANGSON
FANGCHENG
MUNGKAI
TUNGHING
To accompany Reports No. 9873.
PREPARED IN M. A. OFFICE PEKING, CHINA.


CHIENKIANG
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SZELUNG
PATANG
Apr.10
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SZETANG
YUNGSHUN
NAMHEUNG
WATLAM
Apr.5
NACHEN
LINGSHAN
HSIAOTUNG
WULICHENG
YAMHSIEN
HOPPO
PAKHOI
GULF OF TONGKING
Japanese advance
Japanese withdrawal
Chinese concentrations at beginning of operation
Chinese Counter attack

G-2 Report

6-1 6910, Enc

Morris

OFFICE OF ASSIST. CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

2657-D-276
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SITUATION REPORT

May 2 - June 8, 1940

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 24 1940

1. Summary
2. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
   d. Honan
3. Central China
   a. Hupeh
   b. Hunan
   c. Kiangsi
   d. Anhwei
4. South China
   a. Kwangtung
   b. Kwangsi
   c. Hainan
5. Air Activities

1. Summary.

During the period covered by this report the principal military activity occurred in the Provinces of Hupeh and Shansi. In the former the operations conducted by the Japanese took place in two phases; an attack against the twin cities of Fancheng and Siangyang which was indecisive, and a crossing of the Han River and subsequent march toward Shasi and Ichang on the Yangtze River. The Chinese themselves admitted that torrential rains in Central Hupeh were largely responsible for the bogging down of the Japanese drive on Siangyang and Fancheng, but as this report goes to press the second phase has carried the Japanese to the neighborhood of Shasi, and it is the opinion of the undersigned that this city and Ichang also will fall into Japanese hands.

Southern Shansi continued in its role of "stormy petrel". It may be recalled that while the northern and central sections of this Province (including the area around Taiyuan) have been comparatively quiet for some time, fighting in the southern part has been practically continuous ever since the Japanese occupation.

In south China principal operations consisted of a Japanese drive north from Canton to Liangkou, and continued "mopping up" operations on Hainan Island. The Nanning sector was comparatively quiet. French and Chinese sources reported the Japanese were constructing a railroad from Yamchow to Nanning, and the Chinese stated it was completed as far as Hsiaotung. The French in Indo-China are naturally watching Japanese operations in this area with the greatest of interest. Large naval concentrations were reported off Hainan and speculation was rife as to whether this foreshadowed a threat to Indo-China or a visit to the Netherlands East Indies.

From: M/A China Report No. 9901 June 10, 1940

Military activity of lesser importance occurred in north and south Honan, southwest Shantung, the Yangtze River area in Anhwei, north Hunan (Tungting Lake area) and in the Nanchang-Kaoan area in north Kiangsi. There was no lessening of air activity on the part of the Japanese army and navy, and Chungking in particular was the locale of several intensive bombing raids.

2. North China.

a. Shansi.

The difficulty in obtaining accurate information regarding operations in southern Shansi makes it impossible to tabulate the net results. On May 2d the Japanese claimed to have wiped out the remnants of the Chinese 93d Army in engagements west of Kaoping (see Map. No. 1, Report No. 9873). With this victory they proclaimed the mopping up operations in the Luan area practically completed. Chinese dispatches at this time had little to say other than that the Japanese operations were being carried out on a scale not previously witnessed.

Taking advantage of the temporary absence of large numbers of Japanese troops from their bases on the Tungpu Railroad during the latter part of April, the Chinese were able to concentrate troops north of the Fen River in southwest Shansi, and on May 1st attacked the Japanese garrison at Hotsin. The Chinese claimed to have encircled numbers of Japanese troops by May 4th, but other unconfirmed reports stated they themselves were cut off by the Japanese. By May 8th the Japanese claimed Chinese dead numbered 14,000 out of 150,000 troops from the 3d, 9th, 14th, 15th, 37th, 38th, 47th, 71st, 93d and 96th Army Corps. On the 28th the Japanese claimed to have administered a crushing defeat to some 50,000 Chinese in the Hsiangning area (northwest of Fancheng), while Chinese sources stated Japanese attacks were being successfully repulsed. On June 4th the Chinese claimed General Wei Li-huang's troops were besieging Tsechow (southeast Shansi near Honan border which fell to the Japanese on April 26th) and that they expected to retake the town in spite of possible heavy losses. The Japanese refuted this in a statement that the attempt to retake the town had been frustrated and that General Wei had lost 10,000 men in engagements near Tsechow. Although this is probably one of the usual "generous" estimates used when referring to Chinese casualties, it is almost too much to expect that General Wei will take Tsechow "at all costs". Thus the period under review ends with the Japanese army still faced with active opposition in southern Shansi.

b. Hopei.

Relative quiet prevailed. The Japanese reported the following engagements: May 3d, 100 enemy troops defeated near Hsiaotien (Central Hopei); May 23d. defeated 6,000 troops under General Pang Ping-shun who were moving on Changte (on the Pinghan just over the border in north Honan); May 24th, Japanese army and air force routed 2,000 Chinese 12 miles south of Changte; May 25th, defeated and dispersed Communist troops southeast of Tinghsien (on the Pinghan south of Paoting).

c. Shantung.

The American Consul in Tsinan reported that, in spite of the Japanese guard detachment, the bridge across the Wen River near Tawenkow (south of Tsinan on the Tsinpu Railroad) was burned on the night of April 30th causing a rupture of through rail service. During the period under review the Japanese reported the following engagements: Between April 20th and May 3d more than 1,000 Communists were killed in mopping up operations in the mountains of southwest Shantung. May 2d, 1,500 troops of the Chinese 51st Division were "trapped" twelve miles south of Taling on the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railroad. The American Consul in Tsinan reported firing in the city on May 1st and 3d which was stated to have been Japanese and Chinese puppet troops dispersing bandits from the southern outskirts of the town.

d. Honan.

The Japanese reported that on May 1st a mobile unit moved west from Kaifeng (on the Lunghai in north Honan) and on the same day captured Chungmow (also on the Lunghai). This is the first attempt to move west from Kaifeng that the Japanese have made in many months, but it is not likely that this presages a move on Chengchow, across the new Yellow River. A lady missionary reported Chungmow was again in Chinese hands on May 24th. In the southern part of this Province there were engagements in the vicinity of Sinyang (on the Pinghan Railroad) and the Chinese claimed to have recaptured the city but admitted they were forced to withdraw almost immediately due to superior Japanese pressure from the south.

3. Central China.

a. Hupeh.

During the month of April the Japanese concentrated in eastern Hupeh four divisions plus parts of three others in anticipation of a drive to the west. These units were identified by the Chinese as the 3d, 13th, 33d, and 39th Divisions, parts of the 14th and 40th, one brigade of the 6th and the 20th Independent Brigade. The drive began on May 1st and consisted of four columns based respectively (see map) from Kioshan and Sinyang on the Pinghan, Suihsien and Chungsiang. The two northern units moved westward on schedule taking Miyang and Hsinhsichi on the 6th and converged on and took Tangho May 8th. The main striking force was the central column which was reported to consist of one and one half infantry divisions, two tank regiments, heavy artillery and attack aviation. This unit jumped off May 2d, and, dividing into two columns, proceeded northwest. In spite of stiff opposition, these two columns of the central unit converged on and took Tsaoyang on the 8th. The left flank column moved north from Chungsiang on the 1st, pushed along the mountain roads of the Tahung range and took Shuangkou on May 7th.

At this point nature took a hand for on the 9th torrential rains fell and the Japanese advance bogged down. The Chinese claim to have counterattacked from Sinyeh to the east and to have retaken Tangho on the 9th and Miyang on the 10th. In the center they attacked Tsaoyang from the mountains to the northeast and southwest and retook it on the 16th. In a counter-attack from Fancheng they retook Shuangkou on the 11th. They claim to have captured several hundred Japanese tanks, armored cars and trucks. The Japanese claim that the Chinese suffered 13,000 casualties by May 10th is rather offset by the foreign estimates from Hankow that by the end of May 30,000 Japanese dead and wounded were evacuated through that city. Lieutenant General Itagaki (Chief of Staff of the China Expeditionary Force) arrived in Hankow on the 15th and announced that he was taking personal command of the operation. Reinforcements were rushed from Hankow to Suihsien to support the central column but observers in Hankow doubted that there were more than 10,000 men. On the 19th the weather cleared and Tsaoyang and Shuangkou were retaken by the Japanese the same day. A mobile column from Tsaoyang pushed across the Tang and Pai Rivers and reached a point north of Fancheng on the 21st, but a Chinese counterattack from Fancheng drove them back on the 22d. From this point on the reports are conflicting and movements obscure, but it is believed that the northern and central columns retired to the vicinity of their bases at Kioshan, Sinyang and Suihsien respectively. During this operation Japanese naval units from Hankow were reported to have rendered active assistance by attacking Chinese positions along the Han River.

On May 31st the second phase of the Japanese advance began. Troops from Fangchiatsi crossed the Han River and entered Siangyang, Wuanyen and Yicheng on June 1st. They reported Siangyang burning when they entered and the Chinese claim it was retaken June 4th. The column from Yicheng turned south and reached Kingmen which the Japanese reported was taken on the 6th. In conjunction with this, three other crossings were made to the south on June 4th, and the military spokesman in Chungking announced that the long expected drive on Shasi and Ichang was under way. He estimated 45,000 Japanese would be used in this operation, one third of which he stated had crossed the Han River by June 4th. Further reports from Chungking inferred the Chinese would not make a stand along the Han River but would oppose the progress of the Japanese from prepared positions further west. The result of this operation is a matter of conjecture. Although the terrain is very mountainous, the Japanese have in the past used their reconnaissance aviation to excellent advantage in reconnoitering Chinese so-called prepared positions, thus preventing the ground troops from being too badly surprised. Another vital factor is whether the Chinese are determined to offer stubborn resistance at this point, or

whether they have already made up their minds to sacrifice Shasi and Ichang to the Japanese.

b. Hunan.

Only minor operations were carried out and these consisted mainly of Japanese naval units landing on the east shore of Tungting Lake south of Yochow.

c. Kiangsi.

During the period under review minor fighting occurred in the Kaoan sector west of Nanchang, and Japanese naval units landed on the west shore of Poyang Lake.

d. Anhwei.

The Japanese reported capturing Tsingyang (south of the Yangtze and east of Anking) on May 10th, and beginning a drive to the southeast.

4. South China.

a. Kwangtung.

A Japanese force estimated by the Chinese to be 7,000 moved north from Canton and took Tsunghua (Tsungfa ?) on May 18th. Proceeding to the northeast they took Liangkou on the 25th, but the Chinese counterattacked and by June 3d claimed to have recaptured the town. The Japanese reported it as a mopping up operation in which the Chinese lost 4,200 killed. It will be remembered that during December and January last the Japanese undertook an operation utilizing several divisions through this area, and that they were finally forced to withdraw to Canton. It is probable that the present blow was merely to disperse any Chinese forces in the vicinity which might, if allowed to concentrate, become a real threat to Canton.

b. Kwangsi.

During the period under review neither Japanese nor Chinese sources mentioned military operations in the Nanning area. It was reported that the Japanese are busy constructing a railroad ("light" according to the Chinese) from Yamchow to Nanning, and apparently the Chinese have not yet deemed the time ripe for their much heralded counterattack. A reported large Japanese concentration in Nanning was viewed with apprehension by the Chungking Government as a possible preparation for a demand from the French for free passage to Yunnan to cut the Burma and Indo-China routes.

c. Hainan Island.

Mopping up operations continued. A large Japanese naval concentration was reported off Hainan which the military spokesman in Tokyo declared was due "to military necessity". Chinese sources later reported this concentration not nearly as large as previously believed and attached no particular significance to it.

5. Air Activities.

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

April 28th -Japanese planes bombed Loyang, north Honan.
April 30th -Naval planes bombed Chungking.
May 1st -Japanese planes straffed ground troops near Loshan (southeast Honan).
1st -Naval planes bombed Kweiyang, Kweichow.
2nd -Japanese planes bombed Kaiyuan (on Yunnan Railroad in Yunnan).
2nd -Army planes raided Chinese positions on east bank of Han River, Hupeh,
4th -Army planes bombed Siangyang, Hupeh.
5th -Army planes bombed Chinese positions on the Han River.
5th -Army planes bombed Poseh and Pingma, Kwangsi.
6th -Japanese planes bombed Liuchow, Kwangsi.
6th -Japanese planes bombed Nanyang, Honan.
6th -Naval planes bombed Hwaiyuan, Kwangsi.
9th -Naval planes bombed Kunming, Yunnan.
14th -Naval planes bombed Kunming-Kweiyang highway.
15th -Army planes bombed Chinese troops in mountains along Suihsien-Tsaoyang highway, Hupeh.
17th -Army planes bombed Lungchow, Kwangsi.
18th -Naval planes bombed Chengtu, Szechuan.
20th -Naval planes bombed Chungking.
21st -Army planes raided Nanyang, Honan.
21st -Naval planes bombed Chungking.
22nd -Naval planes bombed Chungking.
26th -Japanese planes bombed Chungking.
27th -Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
28th - ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
29th - ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
29th - ,, ,, ,, Liuchow, Kwangsi.
30th -Naval planes bombed Chungking,
June 6th -Army planes bombed Chungking.

Chinese
April 29th -11 Chinese planes bombed Sinyang, Honan.
,, 28th -8 Chinese planes bombed Yuhsiang, south Shansi
May 2d -5 Chinese planes bombed Chungsiang, Hupeh.
,, 19th -8 ,, ,, ,, Chungsiang, Hupeh.
,, 20th - Chinese planes bombed Suihsien, Hupeh.
,, 28th -5 Chinese planes bombed Suihsien, Hupeh.

The Japanese also reported encountering Chinese planes in the air three times during their raids on Chungking and when they raided Chengtu.

F P Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, FA
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosures: Map

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, June 10, 1940. To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

The most important development during the period covered by this report is the Japanese drive on Ichang which late Japanese reports claim to have been entered on June 11. The loss of Ichang is a serious though not vital blow to the Chinese. Ichang was a principal point on the supply route to Chinese forces located in the Tungting lake and Central Yangtze area. Regular freight and passenger service had been maintained between Chungking and Ichang and freight service by means of small waterways between Ichang and Changsha.

Against any enemy but the Chinese the Japanese situation would be exceedingly vulnerable. Their rapid advance during the last 12 days of the drive has left large bodies of Chinese troops intact in their rear, flanks and in the mountains north of Ichang. The size of the Japanese force involved, 45,000 as esimtated by the Chinese military spokesman, will necessitate lines of communication as short as possible. They will probably use the Han River to Shayang then the road via Shihlipu to Ichang with Kingmen as a flank outpost. Immediate attempts will undoubtedly be made to open the Yangtze to Ichang. If the Chinese can prevent the Japanese from securing easy passage up the Yangtze, they should be able to so harass the Japanese communications as to make Ichang an extremely hazardous spot.

Japanese retention of Ichang will cut down the warning time Chungking has enjoyed against Japanese bombardment. Heretofore Chungking was informed of an impending raid almost immediately after the Japanese planes left Hankow, about three hours away. Now with a refueling stop possible at Ichang, Chungking and Chengtu will be considerably more vulnerable to air attack.

William Mayer
Major, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN SOUTH HONAN &
NORTH HUPEH
CHINESE FORCES
JAPANESE FORCES
NANYANG
TENGHSIEN
SINYEH
May 9
May 8
TANGHO
TAHOTUN
May 6
MIYANG
May 10
May 10
CHUKOU
May 1
KIOSHAN
MAOTSIO
May 6
HSINHSICHI
OMINGKANG
TUNGPEH
TANG RIVER
HUANGCHUPU
LACHOKOW
TAIPINGCHEN
YUHOTIEN
May 1
SINYANG
PAI RIVER
May 21
May 22
LUNGHSINGSZE
May 8
TSAOYANG
May 7
HSINGLUNGTSI
May 11
SHUANGKOU
May 7
Retaken
May 19
May 16
May 16
May 19
FANCHENG
June 1
SIANGYANG
May 11
May 6
FANGCHIATSI
May 31
WANGCHIATSI
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

To accompany Report No. 9901.

JUNE 8, 1940.

M. A. OFFICE, PEKING

RESTRICTED

Classification

1 Enclosures

2657-J-276
553

Record Section File No.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report, June 9 - July 23, 1940 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Press and M/A reports from Chungking
Reliability: Good

Summarization of Report

When Required

Completion of Japanese drive to Ichang (Hupeh). Continuation of mopping-up operations in Shansi, Hopei and Shantung. Drive to Indo-China border in Kwangsi. Occupation of Kowloon border in Kwangtung and operations against heretofore open coastal ports in Chekiang and Fukien Provinces. Air activities.

In Comments on Current Events Enter New Headings Here

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,

Copy No. 1, R/S; 2, L/C; 3, Section File

From M. A. Peiping Report No. 9919 Date July 30, 1940

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RESTRICTED 7520 1

Classification

1. Summary
2. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
3. Central China
   a. Honan
   b. Hupeh
   c. Anhwei
   d. Kiangsi
4. South China
   a. Kwangtung
   b. Kwangsi
5. Coastal blockade
6. Air Activities

I. Summary

During the period under review Japanese military operations - other than the continuation of the drive on Ichang and the usual mopping-up campaigns in Shansi, Hopei and Shantung - were influenced largely by the rapidly changing situation in Europe. The sudden capitulation of the French army was the signal for increased pressure on the Government of Indo-China, which resulted in the closing of the Yunnan Railroad as a means of munition supply to Chungking. The reported concentration of a Japanese fleet off Hainan Island and the capture of Chennankuan and Lungchow in Kwangsi may have served as an additional threat but there is little likelihood of a Japanese invasion of Indo-China in the near future. England's subsequent embarrassment was followed up by the Japanese in the form of insistent demands that the Burma road be closed, and to help the British along in their decision the Japanese occupied the Kowloon border and allowed rumors to be circulated that Hongkong might be invaded at any time. That the Hongkong authorities themselves believed an invasion was imminent can be seen by the hasty and not too efficient evacuation of non-combattants.

While the closing of these two supply routes was a crushing blow to Chungking, the Japanese continued to tighten the noose by blockading the three principal open ports, one in Chekiang and two in Fukien Provinces. In spite of this turn of events, however, the Generalissimo is as firm as ever in his determination to carry on the war to a successful conclusion, and hopes to do so with what supplies he can get from the Soviet and what munitions he can manufacture in the arsenals in free China. These latter will consist mostly of small arms and small arms ammunition. It is obvious, however, that in spite of this very creditable spirit the stoppage of large gas and oil supplies will have its effect on the operation of the few Chinese planes and on the transportation and supply of the Chinese armies.

2. North China

a. Shansi

Operations took place in southern and northwestern Shansi during the period under review but the exact results and final outcome remain obscure. The Japanese claimed that their campaign against General Wei Li-huang in the south continued successfully and that the Chinese left thousands of dead and much booty on the field. The Chinese reported on June 14th that Japanese reinforcements were being dispatched to Anyi and Chiehhsien but that the Chinese were still attacking Chincheng. On June 21st a report from Taiyuan claimed that Japanese forces had wiped out 20,000 Communist troops in western Shansi and that the towns of Paoshan, Lanhsien and Linhsien had been occupied. Several times during the month of June the Japanese reported that more and more Communist troops in Shansi were showing their disapproval of the Chungking regime by voluntarily surrendering to the Japanese. Those reported to have given themselves up included commissioned personnel from general officers to lieutenants, but this has not been confirmed by this office. It seems more than likely that - for publicity purposes - any prisoners taken are reported to have surrendered voluntarily.

On June 24th Chinese sources reported Japanese operations against Fengchiachuan and Niuchiachuan in northwest Shansi south of Paoteh on the Yellow River. The Japanese claimed to have completed this operation and to have entered Paoteh on the 25th. By July 1st they reported the capture of Hsinhsien (Shinghsien?) to the south of Paoteh, but Chinese sources maintained that the Japanese failed to take Paoteh and withdrew to Hsinhsien. Japanese claims for the month of June tabulated 6,000 Chinese dead out of a total of 60,000 engaged.

b. Hopei

In this province, which has been relatively quiet since the Japanese occupation, the Japanese reported the successful completion of several mopping-up campaigns. On June 10th they claimed to have encircled 15,000 Communist troops in the south Hopei sector near the Honan-Shantung border. By the next day it was reported that the Japanese had taken the town of Puyang in south Hopei - said to be the headquarters of that section of the Eighth Route Army operating in Hopei. Activity of Communist troops in this province was admitted by the Japanese in an article published in a Chinese puppet paper in Shihmen on June 18th. The article spoke of the cruelties inflicted on the peasants by the Communist troops and reported over 500 persons had been buried alive for failure to comply with the Communists' demands. While this method of execution and number of

victims has not been confirmed, it is a known fact that Chinese have - on numerous occasions - punished villagers for giving information to and otherwise aiding the Japanese. This is not a one-sided game, however, for the Japanese on their part inflict severe penalties on those Chinese accused of harboring guerrillas or other Chinese forces.

Japanese sources reported twenty one "battles" against 18,000 Chinese troops of various categories during the month of June in Hopei Province, while Chinese sources maintained that the Chinese were still active in the southern part of the Province and that the Japanese operations were all of a minor nature. In keeping with the Japanese Army policy of granting military decorations for almost any reason, a Domei dispatch from Tientsin on June 22nd reported the Commander of the Tientsin Garrison (presumably Lieutenant General Homma) had granted a letter of appreciation to the Hirota detachment which had been engaged in the task of examination and search at the Concession boundaries and medals to all members of the unit for their services in enforcing isolation of the British and French Concessions. It is wondered if special decorations were received by those soldiers responsible for the stripping of foreigners which occurred last summer.

c. Shantung

Both Japanese army and naval units were busy during the period under review in their cleaning up campaign in Shantung. On June 9th a Japanese report from Tsinan claimed that in May operations were carried out against 10,000 Chinese remaining in the Province and that 6,700 enemy were killed. This is believed to be a not unusual Japanese overestimate of enemy casualties. A dispatch from Tsingtao on the 10th reported that the Japanese had surrounded another 10,000 Chinese in the eastern part of the Province, but the figures differed from the above as to casualties - this time only 100 Chinese were reported dead. Other successful operations were reported by the Japanese on the 17th and 25th of June and 5th of July.

The American Consul at Tsinan reported the guerrillas active and that Japanese troops left Tsinan to combat them on July 1st and 3rd. He also reported units of the Eighth Route Army attacked a train near Tsaochuang in south Shantung on June 15th. This is on the Suichao Railroad, which is a branch line of the Tsinpu and connects with the Lunghai in northern Kiangsu. In this attack it was reported that all the railroad guards were killed and all 80 passengers kidnapped.

3. Central China

a. Honan

Another attempt on Kaifeng (north Honan) was made by units of the Chinese 20th and 23rd Divisions on June 30th.

The attack was made over the western end of the north wall of the city, where sand from the old bed of the Yellow River has gradually drifted up so it is possible to walk over the top of the wall. It was through here that General Doihara's division entered the city when it was first occupied by the Japanese. This latest attempt proved abortive as usual and the Japanese claimed to have annihilated a large part of the Chinese force. Chungking sources state that Chinese troops actually entered the town and caused much dissatisfaction among the local puppet troops, necessitating a relieving column of Japanese to come from Sinsiang. Foreign residents state there was practically no fighting in the city, and that it is now as secure as ever in Japanese hands. The several threats on this city may possibly cause the Japanese to increase their garrison in Kaifeng, since it has been only a few hundred men. Chungking sources also reported that early in July 20,000 puppet troops in eastern Honan and Hupeh turned over to the Chinese after a few days fighting. These comprised three divisions under Generals Sung Ke-ping, Li Shun-li and Chao Ta-chung. The latter was reported to have led an attack on Kweiteh after the turnover. They had no artillery but were reported to have been armed with rifles and machine guns. Chungking believes the defections in the Nanking Central Government to be responsible for the action on the part of the Chinese generals, and expects more to return to the Chungking banner.

COMMENT: While this turn over has not been confirmed by this office, it is the largest reported "double cross" of puppet troops to date. In the past the use of puppet troops in punitive campaigns have met with little success, and while the Japanese are diligently training them it is becoming more evident that they can be relied upon only for police and guard work.

b. Hupeh

In continuation of our last report (No. 9901) the Japanese columns which crossed the Han River south of the Ichang-Hankow highway (see map) took Shasi on June 8th, while that marching south from Yicheng entered Tangyang by the 10th. The southern units were reported by the Chinese to be the 13th and 6th Divisions, while the 39th and 3rd were reported to have taken Kingmen and Tangyang. A force of about 10,000 Japanese moved west from Kiangling along the north bank of the Yangtze River and took Kulaopei on June 11th, and entered Ichang on the 12th. The Chinese reported that the main body of their troops at Kulaopei had marched north to prevent the Japanese from moving southwest from Tangyang, but a glance at the map reveals that in all probability this force had no intention of getting itself cut off by the Japanese pincers and sought the safety of the mountains north of the Tangyang-Ichang highway. The Chungking spokesman stated that the capture of Ichang was of little importance to the Japanese and that they would

not be able to hold in their present positions since the Chinese had large forces near Tangyang and Kingmen which would shortly attack the Japanese lines of communication and force them to withdraw east of the Han River. An unconfirmed rumor from Chungking opined that the rapid advance of the Japanese along north bank of the Yangtze was permitted by the collapse or sellout of two Szechwan divisions. By June 17th the assurances from Chungking that the Japanese would be made to withdraw had dwindled to a mere hope that Ichang would be recaptured. Fighting had continued till that day and it was actually reported that Chinese troops entered the city, only to retire again the next day. Japanese sources claimed that they purposely withdrew to the east of Ichang on the 17th to lure the Chinese and on the 18th returned and administered another defeat which forced the Chinese to withdraw to the mountains northwest.

On June 17th the Generalissimo predicted that the Japanese drive west of the Han River was a last desperate effort to crush the Chinese army in the Fifth War Zone, and that it would fail because of the Chinese strategy which was to lure the Japanese into an unfavorable position and then destroy them by attacks on their flanks and rear. The Chungking military spokesman stated on the 21st that Chinese forces had surrounded Japanese garrisons at Tangyang, Kingmen, Shasi, Shihlipu and Shayang, and that Ichang was being hard pressed. By June 28th the Chinese counterattack had not materialized and the Japanese were holding their gains west of the Han River. Chinese intelligence sources identified units of the Japanese 34th and 40th Divisions as well as the 3rd, 6th and 13th. The 39th Division was lost track of and was believed to have moved east of the Han. Japanese naval units were reported active on the Han River and also on the Yangtze as far as Shasi. The Japanese dispatched a covering force across the river south of Ichang and, in spite of Chinese attempts to drive it out, it is still holding its position as this goes to press. In order to create a division of Japanese forces the Chinese attacked Hwangpi (northeast of Hankow) on June 27th, but this met with no success and the attacking force was dispersed by Japanese units from Hankow. To date (July 28th) the Chinese admit that Japanese positions west of the Han are still intact but state that there are no indications of a Japanese push west or south of Ichang or south of Shasi. Both sources report very little fighting in Hupeh this past week.

COMMENT: The primary objective of the drive west of the Han River is still obscure but the following are a few of the possibilities: 1. To erase the stigma of the reverses suffered east of the Han early in May, and to gain new victories with which to appease the growing restlessness of the population in Japan. 2. To cut the supply line from Ichang south into Hunan Province. 3. To utilize the airfield at Ichang as an advance base for more concentrated bombing before the poor flying weather sets in over Chungking. To use Shasi and Ichang as bases for future

operations to the west or south. 5. To defeat and disperse the armies of the Fifth War Zone. This last supposition seems the most unlikely since the Japanese force was too small to accomplish this and large units of Chinese troops are still active in the area, not only in the mountains north of the Kingmen-Ichang highway but actually behind the Japanese lines. It may be, however, that the Japanese, knowing their opponents, felt that they could make the drive and hold the positions without too much fear of the much heralded and never occurring Chinese super counter-offensive.

c. Anhwei

Chinese sources reported the recapture on June 17th of Kweichih (on the south bank of the Yangtze east of Anking). This town, they claimed, had been in Japanese hands for two years. The Japanese reported the same engagement as one in which their forces defeated a "flying column" of some 1,200 Chinese operating near Kweichih, and again on the 27th they claimed to have routed a larger force twenty five kilometers south of Kweichih. Since nothing further had been heard from the Chinese, it is very probable that the Japanese version is more nearly correct.

d. Kiangsi.

This province for the most part was free from any large scale operations. An attempt was made on Nanchang by Chinese troops from the Kaoan area, but on June 21st the Japanese reported that this plan had been completely frustrated.

4. South China

a. Kwangtung

On June 22nd the Japanese began operations along the border of Kowloon British leased territory. This was to close any possible munition route to the interior and also serve as a threat to the British in Hongkong until the closing of the Burma road was settled. A force of three thousand troops from Canton landed at Nantau (south of Paoan) and the same day pushed east and took Shatau on the Kowloon border and Shumchun further to the east. There was some fighting near Shumchun on the 22nd and 23rd. On the 24th they occupied Shatouchiao on the eastern edge of the Kowloon border and Hengkang to the north. Pingshan to the east of Hengkang was occupied on the 26th. Chinese sources claimed that the Japanese fell back on Shumchun on June 28th, which may be true since from that date there have been no reports from the Japanese side concerning the border operations. It is believed, however, that the Japanese are at present in virtual control of the entire border.

b. Kwangsi

Operations in Kwangsi began when Japanese troops from Nanning moved southwest and attacked Fuan, Shangsu

and Suilu (southwest of Nanning) on June 9th. They met with serious resistance at first but were reinforced and passed Suilu on the 22nd. Here they divided, one column proceeding southwest and occupying Chennankuan on the Indo-China border on June 29th and one striking west to take Lungchow on July 1st. Subsequent attempts on the part of the Chinese to retake Lungchow proved unsuccessful. The Japanese have made no further efforts to move westward toward Yunnan and are reported to be digging in around Lungchow. While this operation may have been partly in the nature of a threat to the French, the forces used were too small (not more than three thousand) to have been much use in an actual attack against Indo-China.

5. Coastal Blockade

As a sequel to the closing of the Indo-China Railroad and the Burma road Japanese marines, assisted by units of the fleet and naval air force, initiated operations against three of the few remaining open Chinese ports. In Fukien Province they landed on July 16th at Chungwu and Yunning near Chuanchow (north of Amoy) and also at Santuao Island (north of Foochow). The Japanese reported these operations to have been successful but the Chinese claimed that strong resistance forced the Japanese back to their ships from all three points.

In Chekiang Province warships heavily shelled Chenhai which commands the mouth of the river leading to Ningpo. The shelling took place on July 15th and 16th and a landing was made on the 17th. The Japanese forced their way into the city on the 18th and claimed to have the situation well in hand but Chungking sources maintained that it was retaken after heavy fighting by the Chinese on the 21st.

6. Air Activities

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

June 8 - Naval planes bombed Shasi and Ichang (Hupeh).
,, 9 - Japanese planes bombed Lingshan northeast of Chungking.
,, 10 - Japanese planes bombed Chungking.
,, 11 - ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 12 - ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 14 - Army planes bombed Lungchow (Kwangsi).
,, 16 - ,, ,, ,, Chungking.
,, 16 - ,, ,, ,, Waichow (Kwangtung).
,, 17 - Planes bombed Chungking.
,, 19 - Naval planes bombed Chinese troops west of Ichang (Hupeh).
,, 22 - Army planes bombed Shumchun (Kwangtung).
,, 24 - Planes bombed bases in Shensi Province.
,, 24 - ,, ,, Chungking.
,, 25 - Naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 27 - ,, ,, ,, ,,

June 28 - Naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 29 - ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 29 - Army ,, ,, ,,
,, 30 - Naval planes bombed enemy south of Nanchang (Kiangsi).
,, 29 - Army planes bombed Sian (Shensi).
,, 30 - Planes bombed Chungking.
July 4 - Naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 5 - ,, ,, ,, bases near Chungking.
,, 8 - Army planes bombed western Kwangsi.
,, 8 - Naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 9 - ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 9 - Army ,, ,, Western Kwangsi.
,, 11 - ,, ,, ,, ,, ,,
,, 12 - Naval planes bombed Kweiyang (Kweichow).
,, 14 - ,, ,, ,, western Kwangsi.
,, 14 - Army planes bombed bases in Yunnan Province.
,, 16 - Naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 17 - Planes bombed Kweilin (Kwangsi).
,, 17 - ,, ,, Chungking.
,, 18 - ,, ,, western Kwangsi.
,, 19 - ,, ,, Wulin (Suiyuan).
,, 18 - Naval planes bombed Chenhai (Chekiang).
,, 23 - Planes bombed Chungking.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

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
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
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June 7
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HAN RIVER
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YANG TZE
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Japanese Troops
To accompany Report No.9919.
JULY 30, 1940.
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

To accompany Report No.9919.

JULY 30, 1940.

M. A. OFFICE, CHINA

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Classification

Enclosures 2657-J-276 J-J-4

Record Section File No.

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[redacted] SEP 27 1940

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report, July 24-August 20, 1940 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Press and M/A reports from Chungking.
Reliability: good

Summarization of Report
When Required Little important Japanese military activity other than in Kwangsi. Operations against coastal ports. Reported evacuation of troops from North China and increasing guerrilla activity. Continuation of Japanese air activity especially over Chungking.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,
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From M. A. China Report No. 9924 Date August 21, 1940
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Classification

WAR DEPARTMENT
OCS Form 17

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

1. Summary
2. North China
3. Central China
4. South China
5. Guerrilla Activity
6. Air Activity

1. Summary.

During the period under review no large scale military operations were attempted by the Japanese and the whole area was relatively more quiet than for many months in the past. In North China the only activity reported by the Japanese consisted of "mopping up" operations against units of the Communist 120th Division in northwestern Shansi and operations against Chinese remnants in Shantung. In Central China skirmishes took place in Hupeh but the Japanese experienced no particular difficulty in holding their recent acquisitions in the Shasi-Ichang area. There were minor naval operations in the Anking area in Anhwei and the Tungting Lake area in north Hunan and against the coastal ports of Chekiang and Fukien Provinces. In South China the principal activity occurred in the Lungchow area of Kwangsi - near the Indo-China border. Japanese military and naval aerial activity continued as usual with particular emphasis on Chungking.

2. North China.

As mentioned above, fighting in North China was sporadic. The Japanese claimed that Communist 8th Route Army troops and Chinese bandits fought in Shantung from July 28th to August 2nd. On August 5th the spokesman for the Japanese fleet in North China issued a communique in Tsingtao showing the activity of naval landing parties during the period January-June, 1940. These results were surprisingly modest, stating that landing parties had 782 engagements against Chinese remnants in the coastal areas, in which the Chinese left 267 bodies on the field and 157 were captured. Another Japanese report from Taiyuan (Shansi) stated that between July 18th and August 1st a severe "blow" had been dealt the Communist 120th Division operating in northwest Shansi. 3,600 Chinese were reported engaged with Chinese losses of 500 killed and 28 taken prisoner.

The Chinese reported that they had taken Wuhsiang (east of the Taiku-Chincheng highway in southeastern Shansi) and that several points on the Taoching Railroad in northern Honan had been blown up. General Wei Li-huang, commander of the Chinese forces in southern Shansi and northern Honan, stated that the Japanese forces in North China were not sufficient to move up the Han River to southern Shensi or down the Yellow River into Kansu Province.

COMMENT. The cessation of military activity in North China is believed to have resulted from the withdrawal of certain Japanese units from this area. French sources reported the embarkation at Tangku and Shanhaikuan of 18,900 Japanese during July. These were believed to have come from Shansi, Hopei and Shantung, and to have been sent to Central or South China. (The French still maintain small garrisons at Tangku and Shanhaikuan.) They reported the arrival - during the same period - of 4,800 Japanese, 1,800 Manchukuo troops and 2,450 troops of the new Japanese sponsored Chinese army. These latter came from the Langfang area and the Manchukuo troops were said to have been dispatched toward Peking, perhaps for duty in Mongolia. Recent reports indicate that numbers of Japanese women and children have been returning to Peking and Tientsin from cities to the south on the Kinhan Railroad. These evacuations have not been confirmed by this office but it is believed that, if true, it represents an attempt to return to Japan the overflow of non-combattants plus the "undesirables" rather than evacuations for fear of Chinese reprisals. While the lack of military activity plus the French reports indicates troop movements from North China to the south, it is evident that the Japanese have no intention of weakening their garrisons to the extent that they will not be able to maintain control of the important towns and communication lines in this area.

3. Central China.

No major military operations occurred during the period under review. The Japanese navy continued mopping up operations on the Yangtze in the Anking area. Chinese sources reported that the Japanese took Wuwei (north of the Yangtze between Nanking and Anking) on July 17th and that it was retaken on the 22nd. The Japanese attack came from Chaohsien to the north. The same source reported that the Chinese took Chaohsien on the 23rd thus cutting the Hwainan Railroad and that Hofei (150 kilometers west of Nanking) was attacked necessitating the dispatch of a relief column from Pengpu (on the Tsinpu Railroad northwest of Nanking).

In Hupeh the Japanese unit on the south bank of the river at Ichang was reinforced on July 27th and moved west about 20 kilometers but this was only to secure its flank. The Chinese report the Japanese strength in this sector to be one division at Ichang and one and one half divisions from that point east to the Han River. The Japanese have removed booms in the Yangtze and are now operating ships between Shasi and Ichang. On August 3rd there was an artillery duel across the Yangtze at Kulaopei (southeast of Ichang) and also some fighting near Tangyang and Kingmen (north of Shasi). In north Hunan the Japanese attempted to gain a foothold on the shore of the entrance to Tungting Lake (northwest of Yochow) on July 27th but the Chinese claimed that this was unsuccessful.

In Chekiang Province the Japanese continued to bombard and blockade the ports of Chenhai (entrance to Ningpo) and Wenchow, but these are still believed to be in Chinese hands.

4. South China.

On August 9th the Japanese attacked the port of Haimen (twenty kilometers south of Swatow in Kwangtung), but the Chinese reported that they were forced to withdraw. Chinese sources reported that Japanese warships appeared off Makung (130 kilometers east of Hongkong) on July 27th but were unable to make a landing. The same source stated that puppet troops revolted against the Japanese in the Paoan-Sumchun area north of Kowloon on July 31st.

In Kwangsi a Japanese force from Suilu on July 24th attacked Chuli and Funan to the northeast but apparently underestimated the Chinese strength and were forced by a counterattack on the 26th to withdraw to Suilu. In the Lungchow area the Japanese on July 25th moved from Lungchow northwest through Hsiatung to Shuikoukuan of the Indo-China border but were reported to have been driven out by the Chinese on the 28th. On August 17th Chinese sources reported that there were no more Japanese troops west of Lungchow and that Shangchin on the Li River east of Lungchow had been taken by the Chinese on August 6th. They estimated the Japanese strength in this area to be two divisions between Nanning and Chennankuan and one between Nanning and Yamchow.

COMMENT. Just what the Japanese contemplate in this area is not clear. Chinese sources report that the Japanese troops in the Indo-China area are suffering from summer complaints such as dysentery, and other sources have reported seeing many ragged and poorly conditioned Japanese in this area. The Japanese so far have not been successful in forcing the French to allow them to send reinforcements as well as supplies through Indo-China. Domei reported that the Generalissimo had sent five divisions to the Yunnan-Kwangsi border of Indo-China to aid the French if attacked, and that these troops had attempted to cross the border and were repulsed by French troops. This latter statement has not been confirmed, and while five Chinese divisions may not be too effective, they will help to augment the French forces and cause the Japanese to bring sufficient reinforcements to Kwangsi to assure a quick victory in the event of a movement against Indo-China. They may be delaying in the hope for special concessions from the Germans when the French armistice settlement is made public, or they may be watching the trend of the European situation. If this situation resolves itself into a lengthy war of blockade it would seem natural for the Japanese to take matters into their own hands and demand a settlement with the French - by use of force if necessary, but they probably realize that if they take this course an ultimate British victory will undoubtedly mean a reckoning with Great Britain in the future.

5. Guerrilla Activity.

Guerrilla activity in general increased during the period under review. This was particularly noted in North China and was probably caused by the removal of some Japanese units. A foreign source reported that a goods train was derailed on the main line east of Tangku on August 10th. Four cars were completely looted by the guerrillas who escaped with their booty during the night. Another freight train was derailed on a branch line east of Tsinan on August 16th. In this accident twenty one persons were killed and twelve injured.

6. Air Activity.

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

A. Japanese.

July 24 -Army planes bombed Chengtu (Szechuan)
,, 25 -Navy planes bombed enemy around Chenhai (Chekiang)
,, 28 -Navy planes bombed Kweiyang (Kweichow)
,, 28 - ,, ,, ,, Wanhsien (Szechuan)
,, 28 - ,, ,, ,, area around Nanchang (Kiangsi)
,, 29 -Navy planes bombed Kweiyang
,, 30 -Planes bombed Loyang (north Honan)
,, 31 -Army and navy planes bombed Chungking
Aug. 2 -Naval planes bombed Chungking
,, 3 -Army planes bombed Tungliang (northwest of Chungking)
,, 3 -Naval planes bombed Kian,(Kiangsi)
,, 5 - ,, ,, ,, Chekiang Railway
,, 6 - ,, ,, ,, Tungpu (on Chekiang R.R.)
,, 7 - ,, ,, ,, Chinhua (Chekiang)
,, 9 -Planes bombed Chungking
,, 10 -Naval planes bombed Hengyang (Hunan)
,, 11 - ,, ,, ,, Chungking
,, 12 - ,, ,, ,, Tzeliutsing (Szechuan)
,, 13 -Army planes bombed Kweilin (Kwangsi)
,, 13 -Naval planes bombed towns in Chekiang
,, 15 -Naval planes bombed Hengyang (Hunan)
,, 16 -Naval planes bombed Chungking
,, 16 -Army planes bombed Laiping,(Kwangsi)
,, 18 -Naval planes bombed Chungking
,, 18 -Army planes bombed Paoki,(Shensi)
,, 18 -Naval planes bombed Changyang (Hupeh)
,, 17 -Naval planes bombed Fushun, (Szechuan)
,, 17 -Army planes bombed Liuchow (Kwangsi)
,, 19 -Planes bombed Chungking
,, 20 -Planes bombed Chungking

B. Chinese.

On August 18th nine Chinese bombers bombed Ichang. Japanese claimed that damage was negligible and that five were shot down.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

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Assistant Military Attache

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report Aug.21-Sept.30, 1940 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Press and M.A. reports from Chungking.
Reliability: good

Summarization of Report

Eighth Route Army cuts North China railroads. Japanese mopping up operations continue. In spite of Hanoi agreement Japanese invade Indo-China. Invasion resisted for four days till Japanese superiority in numbers caused French to lay down arms. Chungking bombings continue.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
   d. Other areas
3. Central China
4. South China
   a. Kwangtung
   b. Kwangsi—Indo-China
5. Air activity

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,

Copy No. 1, R/S; 2, L/C; 3, Section File

From M. A. China Report No. 9936 Date September 30, 1940

This line to appear on all succeeding pages

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Classification

WAR DEPARTMENT
OCS Form 17

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

1. Summary.

During the period covered by this report there was considerably more military activity than last month, although the only major operations occurred in Kwangsi and French Indo-China. In Shansi and Hopei the Japanese were kept busy repairing railroads and lines of communication destroyed by the Communist forces, and in these two provinces as well as Shantung, Anhwei and Kiangsu the usual mopping up operations took place. In Hupeh several skirmishes resulted in a draw, with the Japanese still in possession of all their former gains. The Chinese took the offensive north of Canton but achieved nothing outstanding. In Kwangsi they worried the Japanese as much as they could but were not able to become enough of a stumbling block to keep the Japanese from invading Tongking with not too much opposition. The Chinese blew up the Laokay bridge and others on the Yunnan railroad and have massed large forces on the border - but have made no effort to advance into Indo-China. General Ando will have to reorganize and increase his forces if he intends to move toward Kunming, and will probably have in any case to wait a month or so till the rainy season is over. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the Yunnanese troops will be directed to resist to the utmost, and that the Japanese (except for bombing raids) will have no easy time if they undertake the march on Kunming.

The Japanese continued their bombing raids and, as usual, paid particular attention to Chungking, which by now is being destroyed more quickly than it can be built up.

2. North China.

a. Shansi.

During the period since our last report the Japanese forces in Shansi Province were kept busier than they have been for several months. This was due to the coordinated attacks on communications lines by the Chinese (mainly 8th Route Army forces) which came soon after the withdrawal of several thousand Japanese troops from North China and their dispatch southward. On the night of the 20th of August, units of the 120th and 129th Divisions of the 8th Route Army cut the Tatung-Puchow Railroad north and south of Taiyuan and the Shihmen-Taiyuan Railroad in several places both in Hopei and Shansi. That the extent of the damage was considerable may be realized from a report issued by the Japanese military spokesman in Peking, who stated it was the most highly coordinated and well planned attack ever to be carried out on Japanese communications. He also admitted that the damage done to the Shihmen-Taiyuan line would take some time to repair, and stated that Japanese troops had immediately taken to the field to drive the Chinese out. Strangely enough the military spokesman in Chungking said very little about this raid, which lends weight to the belief that it was

planned and executed by the Communists, possibly to prevent the withdrawal of Japanese troops from North China in order to reinforce those in Hupeh for a push westward from Ichang. Another possibility, since the Peking spokesman admitted that the damage was large, was that the raid had the cognizance of the North China military authorities and was used to bring pressure on Tokyo to prevent the withdrawal of Japanese troops.

On September 21st, after one month's operations, the Japanese reported that they had cleared out all the Chinese troops and that the first through train to Taiyuan since the cutting of the lines would leave Peking that day. Whether the Japanese had cognizance of the raid or not, it is certain that they realized the gravity of the situation and spared no effort in restoring the railroad from Shihmen to Taiyuan which is so vital to the supply of the troops in northern, central and southern Shansi. On August 23rd the Japanese reported that they had killed over three thousand of the reported twelve thousand Communist troops which participated. Before the month's fighting was over the Japanese found it necessary to send a considerable force east from Taiyuan along the railroad to clear out the Communists' hilly strongholds in the Yutze, Shouyang, Yangchuan and Niangtzekuan areas. The Chinese claimed to have captured Niangtzekuan (on the railroad near the Hopei border) on August 23rd, and to have killed 1,000 Japanese and taken large quantities of military stores. The Japanese refuted this and reported that the town was never in danger. The difficulty of obtaining accurate information makes it impossible to determine the veracity of these conflicting claims, but from information which leaked into Peiping from Chinese and foreign missionaries it is believed by the undersigned that it is very possible that some or all of the above mentioned towns were threatened or actually occupied by the Communists for a few days, though now with the restoration of the railroad they are presumably back under the control of the Japanese. A reliable foreigner who is known to have received communications from important people in free China reported that in another month or two the Communists would again attempt to cut the railroads in Shansi as well as Hopei and Shantung. The Chungking military spokesman reported on August 24th that in southern Shansi the Chinese were contenting themselves with harrassing Japanese flanks but admitted that the Japanese held most of the important points. On September 2nd he insisted that the Chinese had entered Changhsien (southwest Shansi), but admitted they left the same day (August 12th). On September 21st he reported that the Chinese were attacking Chincheng and Yangcheng, Pinglu and Yuanchu, and that in the east they were harrassing Japanese posts along the Chengtai railroad between Chingching and Yangchuan. Domei from Taiyuan reported on September 17th that Chinese forces (6,000 strong under Fan Han-chieh) attempted to

enter Tsechow (south Shansi) on September 14th, but that Japanese units contacted them northeast of Tsechow and drove them off. On September 27th a report appearing in a local Chinese paper stated that due to incessant rainfall which had destroyed the tracks, the section of the Tatung-Puchow railroad between Ningwu and Yuanping (north Shansi) was temporarily out of commission. It is very possible that the Communist troops had more to do about this than the rainfall, (which has, however, been unusually heavy for September).

b. Hopei.

Hopei came in for its share of Communist activity when, on August 20th, the Peking-Hankow line was cut several places both north and south of Paoting. On the same night the Chengtai railroad was cut at several places to the west of Shihmen. In the Paoting area Japanese forces had small brushes with the Chinese who withdrew and the losses on both sides were negligible. Telephone lines were cut, however, and the rails in many places were removed. One British subject arriving in Peking a few days after the raid counted over one hundred and fifty consecutive poles which had been sawed off at the bottom, and all the wire had been cut off and taken away. Since it is logical to suppose that as soon as communication was out the Japanese would immediately sehd out their armored relief trains, and therefore the Chinese would have to work with the utmost rapidity, there must have been many thousand men taking part in the raid which was obviously very well planned. The Japanese forces from Shihmen pushed west along the Taiyuan railroad and several heavy engagements were reported until, a month later, the Japanese claimed to have restored communication with Taiyuan and to have cleared the railroad of Communist troops. In this their air force participated in almost daily raids on the almost inaccessible mountain positions of the Chinese. During the rest of the period under review the Province of Hopei was fairly quiet although about the middle of September many thousand men of the Eighth Route Army were reported to be in the Peiping-Tientsin area and the railroad near Langfang (east of Peiping) was cut for a few hours. The magistrate of Weihsien (south Hopei) issued a proclamation forbidding the farmers to accept Bank of Southern Hopei notes which were distributed by the Eighth Route Army in exchange for the purchase of supplies.

c. Shantung.

The Chungking spokesman reported that Chinese troops in Shantung attacked Chitung (northeast of Tsinan) on August 8th, and that Taierchwang has been under attack since the end of July. He also reported that the road to Linyi and the railroad to Lincheng have been cut and that the Japanese had to send reinforcements to Taierchwang.

The naval spokesman at Tsingtao reported on August 22nd that landing parties had continued mopping up operations against Chinese remnants north and west of Tsingtao. About the only other reported military activity stated that Chinese Communists in Shantung were realizing the futility of further resistance and were surrendering to the Japanese in large numbers, and that there was an engagement on Sept. 23rd between Japanese stationed at Putei (north Shantung) and Communist troops under Liu Ching-liang, in which the latter left many dead and wounded on the field.

d. Other areas.

On September 10th the Japanese reported from Kalgan that the Communist 358th Brigade had been attacked on September 4th by the Japanese Nukuda unit and that the former had suffered 300 killed while the Japanese lost one killed and fourteen wounded. From Hongkong on August 30th came a Domei report of a two-day battle in northern Shensi between Eighth Route Army units under Su Ching-kuang and Shensi provincial troops under Sung Ting-wen. Casualties for both sides were reported to have exceeded 1,500. On September 9th a report from Hsuchow stated that 2,500 members of the Chinese 57th Army engaged in guerrilla activities on the Shantung-Kiangsu border had pledged allegiance to the Japanese flag. They were then transformed into an "Asia Development and National Construction Army."

3. Central China.

Fighting in Central China consisted mainly in Japanese mopping up operations in Anhwei along the Yangtze valley, and some skirmishes in the Ichang-Han River area in Hupeh. The Japanese reported that their troops had captured Siangan (Anhwei) August 23rd and the Chungking spokesman admitted that it was being attacked. Chungking reported that the Japanese move on Chungmou from Kaifeng (north Honan) on August 24th had been stopped, and that between August 15th and 22nd there had been continued fighting in the Chunghsiang-Kingmen-Tangyang-Ichang area in Hupeh, with the Chinese generally on the offensive. There is still a Japanese force of about one and one-half infantry regiments across the river from Ichang, but it has not moved west. Chungking also claimed to have cut the Shasi-Tangyang road (Hupeh). On September 21st the Chungking spokesman asserted that only minor skirmishes had taken place in Central China for the past week, and as this goes to press there has been no change.

4. South China.

a. Kwangtung.

The Chinese military spokesman reported on Sept. 5th that the Japanese had attempted unsuccessfully to land troops at Chiehshih (twenty-five kilometers southeast of Lufeng on the Kwangtung coast). He also reported that the

Chinese had taken Fuho (twenty kilometers northwest of Tsengcheng) on August 11th, and that, as a result of the decrease of Japanese strength in the Canton area, the Chinese moved south from Hwahsien September 4th and attacked Hsienchieh and also Tapingchang south of Tsunghwa. No other operations were reported from this province.

b. Kwangsi — Indo-China.

On August 2nd the Chinese were reported by Chungking to have taken Naliao, thirty kilometers north of Hsulo in western Kwangsi, and on the 7th to have taken Nakhi (half way between Lungchow and Shangchin). On the 9th they attacked Japanese positions near Hsiaotung and Chienhsin. On the 10th a Japanese column moved south from Ningming but was stopped after advancing forty kilometers. From August 11th Japanese activity was reported south of Mingkiang and they worked on the construction of a road from Mingkiang toward the Indo-China border. On the 18th Japanese troops southwest of Nanning attacked northwest from Wutsun and northeast from Funan but were driven back. On the same day there were skirmishes east and west of Yamchow. At this time the Japanese strength in Kwangsi was reported to be little more than two divisions. By the 13th of September the Japanese forces in the Lungchow area had not been reinforced appreciably but they had pushed southwest and reached the Indo-China border at Yitien. On the 21st it was reported that the Japanese in the Lungchow area had been reinforced to some extent from the Canton area but not sufficiently to invade Yunnan. More reinforcements were reported to have reached Hainan (possibly from Taiwan) and transports appeared off Haiphong awaiting the decision to allow them to pass through Indo-China. Major General Nishihara, the Japanese officer in charge of the mission in Hanoi, was reported to have reached an agreement with General Martin, the French commander, which would allow the Japanese to land (by sea) 6,000 men and to occupy three northern Tongking airports. The agreement was to become effective at 12 p.m. on September 22nd but two hours before that time Japanese forces crossed the border near Dongdang (see map) and were fired upon by the French led Annamite forces. The Japanese withdrew but opened hostilities the next morning, and General Nishihara dispatched one or more officer messengers by plane to contact the Japanese commander at Lungchow and acquaint him with the fact that the agreement had been reached and signed. This had no effect, however, and on the 23rd, 24th and 25th fighting continued with the Japanese forcing the French back although both sides are reported to have suffered around 200 casualties. As this goes to press, the Japanese have taken Dongdang and Langson, and the French have surrendered with honor. The Chinese declared martial law in Yunnan province and have massed large numbers of troops on the Indo-China border, some of which have already harrassed the Japanese flanks and rear in Kwangsi. The Chungking spokesman reports that General Ando, Japanese commander-in-chief of South

China forces, intends to bring 80,000 men to Tongking through Kwangsi, no matter what the terms of the agreement are.

COMMENT: The fact that General Nishihara's agent failed in his mission is not surprising and shows all the more clearly the lack of unity in the present Japanese chain of command. That General Nishihara represented the Tokyo government made little or no difference to General Ando, who probably had his own plan to invade Yunnan via Tongking and thought by committing his forces to action he would force the Tokyo government to recognize his course. It is also possible that the news of the signing of the agreement had not reached the commander at Lungchow, but in that case it would seem the messenger would be authorized to explain this to the Japanese commander, and when the fighting continued it showed too clearly that General Ando either did not like the terms of the agreement or had made up his mind to ignore it anyway.

5. Air activity.

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

August 21 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chekiang Railway in Ningpo area.
,, 22 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chekiang Railway in Ningpo area.
,, 22 - Japanese naval planes bombed towns in Kwangsi Province.
,, 23 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 24 - Japanese army planes bombed Kweilin, Kwangsi.
,, 24 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese bases on the upper Han River.
,, 26 - Japanese army planes bombed towns in Kwangsi.
,, 27 - Japanese naval planes bombed bases in the Ningpo area, Chekiang.
,, 29 - Japanese army planes bombed towns in northern Kwangtung.
,, 30 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese bases in northern Kwangsi.
,, 30 - Japanese army planes bombed the Lunghai railroad.
Sept. 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kweiyang, Kweichow.
,, 3 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese bases on the upper Han River.
,, 3 - Japanese planes bombed towns in Szechuan Province.
,, 3 - Japanese naval planes bombed towns on the Yangtze upstream from Ichang.
,, 3 - Japanese naval planes bombed towns in Kweichow.
,, 4 - Japanese naval planes bombed points on the Chekiang Railway.
,, 7 - Japanese naval planes bombed Hengyang, Hunan.
,, 9 - Japanese naval planes bombed Ningpo, Chekiang.
,, 11 - Japanese army planes bombed Pingyang, Kwangsi.
,, 11 - Japanese naval planes bombed oil dumps in Hochieh, Kweichow.
,, 12 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.

September 13 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 14 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 15 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kweiyang, Kweichow.
,, 15 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 16 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 17 - Japanese planes bombed Chungking.
,, 18 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.,
Assistant Military Attache

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

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN INDO-CHINA
SEPT. 30, 1940

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To accompany Report No. 9936

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report - October 1 - 31, 1940 **I.G. No.** 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Press and M.A. reports from Chungking.
Reliability: good

Summarization of Report
When Required

Nothing but mopping up operations in North China. Activity in Central China near the borders of Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Chekiang Provinces. Japanese concentrate in Indo-China and evacuate Nanning area in Kwangsi. Bombings continue with special emphasis on Kunming and Burma Road.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
3. Central China
4. South China
   a. Kwangtung
   b. Kwangsi
5. Guerrilla Activities
6. Air Activity

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,
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From M. A. CHINA **Report No.** 9943 **Date** October 31, 1940
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Classification

WAR DEPARTMENT
OCS Form 17

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

1. Summary.

During the period under review there was very little decisive fighting between the Chinese and Japanese forces and the most important Japanese gain resulted from the capitulation of the French in Indo-China which allowed the Japanese to withdraw their troops from the Nanning-Lungchow area in southwest Kwangsi. In North China the usual mopping up operations were reported by the Japanese in Shansi, Hopei and Shantung Provinces, and the Chinese made no important forays on railroads or lines of communication. In Central China there was considerable activity in southeastern Anhwei south of the Yangtze and also in northern Kiangsi and western Chekiang. In Hupeh the Chinese harrassed Japanese lines of communication between the Han River and Ichang but the Japanese were able to hold their former gains. In South China Chinese forays were reported in the Canton area and also in the Nanning-Lungchow area in Kwangsi.

The Japanese were quick to take aerial advantage of the use of bases in Indo-China and have heavily bombed the Chinese side of the Burma road. They claim to have knocked out the very important Mekong River bridge but Chungking reports that, although the bridge was bombed, traffic is still crossing. If this bridge is completely destroyed the present value of the Burma road to Chungking will be negative. The signing of the tri-party agreement between Japan, Germany and Italy and its consequent reaction in the United States has naturally done much to bolster up the morale of the Chungking Government and the possibility of the latter government signing a peace with Japan is as distant as ever.

2. North China.

a. Shansi.

According to Japanese press reports the operations in this province consisted of successful mopping up campaigns against Communist and bandit troops, principally in the eastern and southeastern sections of the province. Seven reports emanated from Taiyuan between September 26th and October 22nd in which it was stated that a total of 61,000 Communist and bandit troops were engaged resulting in 6,700 Chinese casualties and 1,000 prisoners. One engagement occurred in eastern Shansi near the Shihmen-Taiyuan railroad. The Japanese claimed that they dealt a crushing blow to the enemy troops which endeavored to retake Tsechow in the southeastern part of the province, and that they were encircling Licheng- also in the southeast - which they stated was the last stronghold of General Chu Teh.

The military spokesman in Chungking had little to add to the meagre amount of information about operations in Shansi except to insist that Chinese troops were attacking

Tsechow (Chincheng) from three sides and that the Japanese had, as usual, failed to clear the Chinese out of the Taihang and Chungtiao mountain ranges. Considering the difficult nature of the terrain in this southeastern part of the province this is not surprising and it is evident that the Japanese, with what troops they now have, are content to hold the railroads and only venture out in short blitzkriegs when the Chinese from the mountains become too bold. Recent information from Chinese sources reveal that there are at present only three Japanese divisions and four or possibly five independent brigades in this province, which would indicate the inability of the Japanese to undertake any really large scale operations.

b. Hopei.

During the period under review the Chungking military spokesman made no mention of operations in Hopei, but the Japanese press reported mopping up successes in the southcentral and southwestern sections. Japanese figures claimed, for September, 2,300 Chinese killed out of 85,000 met in a total of over 400 engagements. On October 24th another report stated that a Japanese drive on Chinese in the Taihang range along the Hopei-Shansi border had begun on October 31th and was progressing smoothly. Rail communication between Peiping and Kaifeng (north Honan) was reported completely restored and the Peiping-Tientsin area has been generally quiet.

c. Shantung.

On October 5th and again on the 11th the Japanese press reported the results of more mopping up operations in southern Shantung province. These figures included the month of September and revealed that 116,000 Chinese had been met in a total of 700 engagements in which the latter suffered 5,000 killed and 750 prisoners. On October 7th a report from Tsinan stated that on the 2nd several hundred 8th Route Army men raided Peikiao in south Shantung, looted the village and resorted to acts of violence in which the headman and fifty other Chinese were slaughtered. The Japanese rushed to the scene, repulsed the 8th Route troops, and were reported to be preparing monetary offerings to console the survivors. This report has not been confirmed.

The Naval spokesman in Tsingtao revealed that the Navy in North China waters had not been idle but had examined 36,000 junks from January to September, and had had 865 landing party engagements with shore bandits. He further reported that 270 Chinese had been killed, which hardly made the landing operations worth while.

The Chungking spokesman had nothing to say about operations in Shantung during the period under review other than that Chinese troops had been active in the northern part of the penninsula.

3. Central China.

While both Japanese and Chinese sources admitted considerable activity in Central China during the period under review, the reports are so conflicting that it is impossible to ascertain what lasting results, if any, were attained. Chinese sources stated that their troops in Hupeh province attacked Japanese lines of communication in the Tangyang area, and that the Japanese were unsuccessful in an attempt to drive southeast from Hsientaochen on the Han River toward Minyang in southeast Hupeh. The Chinese admit that the Japanese are holding their positions in the Ichang area but state that there has been no evidence of a push westward. In Kiangsi the Japanese claim to have driven west from Nanchang to rout Chinese troops in the vicinity of Fengsin. Chinese sources state that they have been victorious in engagements around Nanchang. The Chungking spokesman reported that Chinese troops from northeast Kiangsi attacked and recaptured Matang, southwest of Anking on the Yangtze on October 11th, but the Japanese claim their Yangtze flotilla and landing parties successfully repelled this advance. It is believed that Matang is now in Japanese hands.

Both sides admitted intensive fighting in southeast Anhwei between the Yangtze River and the Chekiang border. The Chinese claim that a Japanese column of 15,000 pushing southeast from Wuhu was stopped at Linan (west of Hangchow), while the Japanese report the capture of Linan on October 7th. They also reported that a column moving south from Hangchow had taken Chuki (on the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad) on October 17th. Smaller operations occurred in the Poyang Lake (Kiangsi), Tai Lake (Chekiang) and Nanking areas. The Japanese reported that their Yangtze naval flotilla and landing parties continued to conduct mopping up operations between Wuhu and Anking in Anhwei province.

4. South China.

a. Kwangtung.

Very little activity was reported from this province. On October 7th the Chungking spokesman reported that there had been sporadic fighting north of Canton on September 13th, and that the Chinese, taking advantage of the transfer of Japanese troops from the Canton area to Indo-China, had attacked Japanese positions along the Kowloon border at Shatakou, Shumchun and Paoan on the 18th and 19th. He also reported that small Japanese columns north of Swatow and north of Chenghai were repulsed on October 10th. The Japanese press reported the landing of marines on the west and south shores of Luichow Penninsula on October 4th, and that successful mopping up operations took place. They also reported the continuation on October 16th of the campaign against bandits and irregular Chinese troops on Hainan Island.

b. Kwangsi.

When our last report went to press, the Japanese, after three or four days fighting, had occupied Caobang and Langson in Indo-China and the French had capitulated. On September 26th the Japanese press reported that Japanese troops had made a peaceful entry at Haiphong, that Franco-Japanese hostilities had ceased and that the French prisoners would shortly be returned to the French authorities with honor. The Tokyo authorities expressed themselves as pleased with the attitude of the French and stated that Japanese nationals who had evacuated Hanoi were returning to that city from Hainan. It was reported that Chinese troops from Yunnan had moved into Indo-China on September 28th, but this was denied by the Chungking spokesman and it has been ascertained that no Chinese troops crossed the border. Major General Sumita relieved Major General Nishihara as head of the Japanese inspection party and arrived in Hanoi on October 3rd. On the same day Japanese troops from Haiphong reached Hanoi, and Japanese army air units arrived on the 5th. On the 7th over 1,000 Indo-China troops who had surrendered were returned to the French authorities. Japanese units continued to arrive at Hanoi and by now it is probable that at least two divisions are concentrated in Indo-China. The Chungking spokesman stated that there had been minor actions in the Nanning area and that the Chinese had retaken Lungchow on October 16th.

On the 28th the Japanese press stated that Japanese forces would be withdrawn from Nanning as the necessity for keeping them there no longer existed, since the French had agreed to allow Japanese forces in Indo-China.

COMMENT: The withdrawal from Nanning was only to be expected. There is nothing to be gained by staying and the terrain between Nanning and Indo-China has been difficult to hold. By cutting lines of transportation from the Indo-China side there is no need for Japanese troops in the Lungchow-Chennankuan area and since the Japanese have control of the Kwangsi coast they will have no difficulty in holding the port of Yamchow. At last the much battered but very capable Japanese 5th Division may have a chance for a rest. This division came with the initial landing party at Yamchow about a year ago and has operated in the Nanning-Lungchow area ever since. It even gained the admiration of the Chinese.

5. Guerrilla activities.

A Japanese report from Kalgan stated that on September 30th four to five thousand Communist troops were wiped out in the Laiyuan area in South Chahar. Another report from Jehol (Chengte) claimed that the 8th Route bands operating in the Jehol-Hopei border area had been stopped with the death of their leader Wang Lin, who had organized a "soviet" in the districts of Fengning, Lanping and Miyun - the latter being south of the Great Wall. A local report on October 19th

stated that General Wang Tieh-hsiang, commander of the puppet Chinese troops in Peiping, left the city in September for Pingku (northeast of Tungchow)and successfully scattered 4,000 bandits who had been hindering the farmers in the vicinity from harvesting their crops. Another local report stated that there had been over 4,000 engagements from May to September in Jehol between the army and the bandits, but the following figures as published would hardly make the effort seem worth while:

Engagements	4,094
Bandits engaged	9,579
Bandits killed	564
Bandits wounded	323
Bandits captured ...	66

6. Air Activity.

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

Sept.30 - Japanese naval planes bombed Yunnanfu.
Oct. 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Ami (hsien) on the Yunnan Railroad, 150 miles south of Yunnanfu, Yunnan Province.
,, 1 - Japanese naval planes (27) bombed Yunnanfu - considerable damage, few casualties.
,, 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kiyang and Lingshuitan in Hunan Province.
,, 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Patung and Kweichow on the upper Yangtze.
,, 3 - Japanese naval planes bombed strategic points on the Canton-Hankow railway, including Hengyang and Liuchiang.
,, 4 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chuchow in Chekiang.
,, 4 - Japanese naval planes (27) bombed Chengtu in northern Szechwan, also Wanhsien and Patung.
,, 6 - Japanese naval planes (27) bombed Chungking and Liangshan in Szechwan.
,, 3-7- Japanese naval planes bombed Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad, near Iyang, Fenghua, Taichow, Kweichih, Haimen, Ninghai and Tientai.
,, 7 - Japanese naval planes (25) bombed Kunming in Yunnan Province.
,, 10 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.
,, 11 - Japanese naval planes bombed strategic points in Hunan Province, and Chinese batteries at Erhlangmiao, opposite Ichang
,,7,8,9,10-Japanese naval aircraft bombed the Chekiang-Kiangsi Railroad.
,, 12 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chengtu and Lukow in Hunan Province.
,, 13 - Japanese naval planes bombed Wanhsien and Ichang.
,, 13 - Japanese heavy bombers (27) bombed Kunming, doing great damage.

Oct. 13 - Japanese bombers (27) raided Chengtu.
,, 14 - Japanese naval planes bombed Wanhsien and Ichang.
15 - Japanese planes (18) bombed Chungking in moonlight raid.
16 - Japanese naval planes (9) bombed Chungking.
17 - Japanese naval planes (27) bombed Chungking.
18 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kunming.
18 - Japanese naval planes bombed motor road connecting with the Burma Road, in Yunnan Province. Also, bombed a tin-refining plant at Kochiu west of Mengze.
20 - Japanese naval aircraft (52) bombed Chinese portion of the Burma Road, including bridges, and straffed truck convoys; also bombed Kochiu.
21 - Japanese planes bombed Burma Road, destroying vital bridges.
25 - Japanese naval planes (45) bombed Chungking and Ichang.
25 - Japanese naval planes destroyed two bridges across Mekong River, on Burma Road, between Yungping and Paoshan.
26 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chengtu and Wanhsien.
26 - Japanese naval planes (27) bombed Chungking.
26 - Japanese naval planes bombed aircraft manufacturing plant, near Burma border in western Yunnan Province.

The Japanese press reported that on October 4th, during a raid on Chengtu airfield at Tapingssu, four Japanese naval planes landed and four non-commissioned officers left their planes and made a successful raid on the establishments of the airfield, in the face of heavy fire. They claim to have destroyed four airplanes, the airforce headquarters and fuel storage. This raid was reportedly made to avenge the death of Rear-Admiral Kikuji Okuda, who was killed at Tapingssu a year ago.

Japanese naval air force reported forty air raids on Chungking from May 18, 1940 to September 1, 1940, and, 25 raids in other towns in the interior. During this period they claim to have engaged 505 Chinese planes, brought down 93 in aerial combat, and destroyed 66 planes on the ground.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

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1ST. IND.

THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PEKING, CHINA.

TO: A. C. OF S., G-2

1. APPROVED.

WILLIAM MAYER,
Lt. Col. FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE

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Enclosures 2657-I-276

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report—Nov.1-Dec.4, 1940 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Press and M.A. reports from Chungking
Reliability: good

Summarization of Report
When Required

Japanese complete evacuation from Kwangsi. Japanese initiate drive in Hupeh which was indecisive. Mopping up operations continue in North China. Guerrillas active in wrecking trains. Puppet troops in North China mutiny. Japanese air bombings continue.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. Jehol
3. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
4. Central China
   a. Hupeh
   b. Minor actions
5. South China
   a. Kwangsi
6. Guerrillas
7. Disaffection of Puppet Troops
8. Air activity

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,
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From M. A. CHINA Report No. 9956 Date December 5, 1940
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WAR DEPARTMENT
OCS Form 17

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

1. Summary.

During the period under review there were no decisive military operations. In the south the Chinese gained a tactical victory by the Japanese evacuation of Kwangsi, in that they were able to reclaim the ports and routes of communication to the interior. A Japanese drive to the north took place in central Hupeh but it had no decisive effect on the military situation in that province, nor did the Chinese counterattacks affect the Japanese holds on their former gains. There were mopping up operations on the part of the Japanese in northern Anhwei, northern Shantung and eastern Shansi.

Japanese air activity continued but part of the air force stationed at Hankow was withdrawn, presumably to the south. The Chinese irregulars operating within the occupied zones were active in making depredations on the railroads and there were two cases of disaffection on the part of the puppet troops stationed near Peiping.

2. Jehol.

For the past two months the Japanese and Manchukuo troops stationed in and near Chengteh (capital of Jehol Province) have been busy mopping up Chinese reported to be Communists which were operating in the area southwest of Chengteh and near the Great Wall at Kupeikow. On November 5th an article in a Chinese puppet newspaper stated that an endless campaign of small engagements between Communist and Manchukuoan forces had taken place since May, 1940. By the end of October Japanese forces were reported to have captured the chief sources of the Chinese munition supply, which was described as a mountain arsenal containing melting stoves, iron ore, powder and machine tools.

On October 22nd it was reported that a Japanese major, one captain and twenty-two cavalrymen out on patrol were caught between their base and the "front lines" by several hundred Communists. After twenty-three hours of fighting the Japanese had expended all their ammunition and were finally all killed by the Chinese. Their bodies were brought to Hsinking and the Japanese and Manchukuo troops, which did not arrive in time to rescue them, swore to avenge this "defeat". On November 22nd a report from Jehol enumerated more engagements between Communists and both Japanese and Manchukuoan detachments.

COMMENT: In spite of the many successful mopping up campaigns reported by the Japanese there has been continual activity on the part of the Chinese in the Jehol area, and there seems to be no likelihood of immediate cessation.

3. North China.

a. Shansi.

During the period under review Chinese sources failed to reveal any military activity in Shansi Province. The Japanese reported on November 6th and 22nd that successful operations had been carried out against Communist troops infesting the Wutai and Taihang mountains (on the eastern border of Shansi). They claim to have destroyed arsenals, powder magazines, clothing depots and the printing machines for the Hsin Hua Jih Pao - official organ of the 8th Route Army.

COMMENT: For the first time in many months there was no mention of any military activity in southern and southeast Shansi. This may have been due to Chinese inactivity or because withdrawals of Japanese troops have required the remainder to refrain from venturing far from the walls of the occupied towns.

b. Hopei.

Except for guerrilla depredations along the Pinghan railroad (see paragraph 6) the only operations of importance in Hopei was the Japanese occupation of Fuping. This city has long been a Communist base and is situated northwest of Shihmen and due west of Paoting - near the Shansi border. The Japanese drive began on November 10th from bases along the Pinghan railroad and it was reported they entered Fuping on the 21st, finding the city practically deserted.

COMMENT: Whether or not the Japanese will attempt to hold Fuping is problematical but it is believed they will not make needless sacrifices and will withdraw to their bases on the Pinghan. Experience has shown in the past that when Japanese troops capture Chinese cities a large part of the civil population remain, and the fact that Fuping was practically deserted tends to show the strength of Communist influence. They were probably all ordered to evacuate and did so.

c. Shantung.

Another province in which general quiet prevailed. A report from Tsingtao stated that on October 31st a naval landing party attacked Chinese irregulars operating from a point 15 miles north of Tsingtao, and that "several" prisoners were taken. The same source on November 21st stated that the Japanese army had launched a campaign against 8,000 Communist troops in the northern sector of the Shantung Penninsula between the town of Pingtu, Laiyang, Chaoyuan and Laichow.

4. Central China.

a. Hupeh.

Except for minor skirmishes in the Ichang area there was no noteworthy activity in Hupeh until November 24th. On that day the Japanese began a drive northward from the four bases of Suihsien and Chungsiang (east of the Han River) and Tangyang and Kingmen (west of the river). (See map accompanying report No. 9901, June 8, 1940). The column from Suihsien took Lishan to the northwest on the 26th. Japanese sources stated that the Chinese retreated northwest to Tsaoyang but the Chungking spokesman claimed that the Chinese retook Lishan on the 27th and that this Japanese column made no further advance. The column from Chungsiang moved north and took Changshowtien on the 26th and was unable to move farther. On the west bank of the Han the two columns from Tangyang and Kingmen converged and moved toward Yicheng to the north but the Chinese maintain these troops were unable to advance beyond Lohsiangkuan (thirty miles south of Yicheng). Chungking reported the four Japanese columns consisted of not more than three divisions. By November 30th the Japanese claimed they had dealt a crushing blow to 300,000 Chinese troops and that the latter had lost over 5,000 in killed alone.

COMMENT: It will be recalled that in May, 1940 the Japanese attempted a clean up campaign in this area with undecisive results, and it is believed the present drive was one of the habitual blitzkriegs to clean out the encroaching Chinese forces rather than a feint to cover any appreciable withdrawals in the Hupeh area.

b. Minor actions.

It was reported from Chungking that on November 17th the Japanese attacked Mengcheng in northern Anhwei Province west of the Tsinpu railroad, and entered the town on the 18th. This force then pushed northwest toward Koyang but the Chinese claim a counterattack prevented them from taking the town. The size of the Japanese force is not known but they were probably based on Suchow and Pengpu on the Tsinpu railroad. A Japanese report stated that Koyang was taken on the 21st and that the Chinese forces involved consisted of 3,000 men of the Communist New Fourth Army which had been operating in Kiangsu Province.

5. South China.

a. Kwangsi.

The Japanese began their withdrawal from this Province on October 28th, and, in spite of Chinese claims to the contrary, appear to have experienced little or no harrassing from the Chinese troops. Lungchow was evacuated on the 28th and on the same day the Japanese moved south toward Yamchow from Nanning. By the 14th they

had evacuated Yamchow but still held Chennankuan on the Indo-China border. This town was undoubtedly evacuated shortly after and the troops in this area moved through Langson to Haiphong. The Chinese claimed to have "recaptured" Lungchow, Nanning and Yamchow and that they captured Japanese prisoners but these, if any, were negligible. As this is being written most of the Japanese troops from Kwangsi are believed to be in Hainan Island although units of the 28th Division were at Haiphong and some of the 5th Division were in the Langson area in Indo-China. French sources state that there are at present only a few thousand Japanese in Indo-China, mostly stationed at air fields and some at the port of Haiphong.

6. Guerrillas

The month under review witnessed considerable activity on the part of Chinese irregular units, either guerrillas or Communist troops operating within the occupied areas of north and central China. These activities consisted mainly of depredations along the Pinghan, Tsinpu and Nanking-Shanghai railroads. On the night of November 17th a Japanese hospital train was derailed north of Paoting in Hopei, and on the next night a supply train of forty-one coaches traveling on the same line was dynamited near Kaopeitien - half way from Peiping to Paoting. It was reported that three fourths of the cars were wrecked or destroyed by burning and that all livestock which were not killed by the wreck were driven off by the Chinese. It was further reported that the headmen of eighteen nearby villages were executed for not notifying the Japanese of impending disaster and the villages razed to the ground as an example. This has not been verified but such severe punishment has been meted out in the past in similar cases.

Early in November it was reported that two trains between Tsinan and Pukow had been wrecked, and on November 30th a train was blown up just east of Soochow on the Nanking-Shanghai line. Seventy three Chinese and Japanese were reported killed and over one hundred injured. It was later reported that the guerrillas had intended to destroy the train carrying the dignitaries from Shanghai who were coming to partake of the cermonies incident to the signing of the Tokyo-Wang Ching-wei agreement. This train, however, got through unscathed.

7. Disaffection of Puppet Troops.

On or about November 29th there were two instances of disaffection on the part of puppet troops stationed just outside of Peiping. In one encampment at Ta Chueh Ssu about 250 of these militia suddenly decamped to the mountains and joined the guerrillas near Miao Feng Shan. At another barrack in Peiyuan at least 250 of these men (who had been issued rifles for the first time that very day) mutinied and, after killing an unknown number of Japanese guards and instructors, left with their arms to join the guerrillas.

COMMENT: These are just further instances of the difficulty the Japanese are experiencing with their puppet troops. This has happened in other occupied provinces as well and naturally most of the cases occur after the "trained and trusted" puppet troops have been issued their arms. In spite of these reverses, however, the Japanese are going ahead steadily with the organization of Chinese puppet units.

8. Air Activity.

On November 13th a Chinese report stated that their artillery had bombarded the Japanese airfield at Ichang and had destroyed 13 planes. It was also reported on November 21st that in the preceding month the Chinese Government had received three hundred planes from the United States and Soviet Russia via the Burma Road.

Chungking sources reported on November 19th that there were no Japanese planes at Ichang on that date and that the 15th bombardment squadron of naval planes had been transferred from Hankow, leaving the 13th group. American consular sources in Hankow reported that the number of Japanese planes transferred from Hankow was 100.

The following air activity was reported by the press:

Oct. 27 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chengtu.
Oct. 28 - Japanese naval planes bombed bridges on the Burma Road.
Oct. 28 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kunming.
Oct. 31 - Japanese Army planes bombed Chinese in Nanning.
Nov. 3 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese troops in Kwangsi Province.
Nov. 5 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese troops in Nanning and Lungchow.
Nov. 13 - Japanese army planes bombed the Burma Road.
Nov. 14 - Japanese planes bombed Mengtze, Yunnan.
Nov. 15 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese troops in Yamchow, Kwangsi.
Nov. 15 - Japanese naval planes bombed Kunming.
Nov. 16 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese troops in Poyang Lake area, Kiangsi Province.
Nov. 26 - Japanese army planes bombed Chinese in the Han River area, Hupeh.
Nov. 27 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese in Tsaoyang, Hupeh.
Dec. 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese bases in Yunnan Province.
Dec. 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chungking.

F. P. Munson

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1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Peiping, China, December 5, 1940. To: The A.C.of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Approved.

2. The withdrawal of Japanese troops from Kwangsi and partial withdrawal from French Indo-China indicates that they have abandoned any intentions they may have had for a drive on Kunming. A force of from four to eight divisions with auxiliaries is being assembled in Hainan and Formosa. Just what Japan intends to do with this force is problematic. Rumors that it is to be used to attack the Saigon area, the Netherlands East Indies, Singapore and Hongkong are equally current. Some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf. It is probable that their first military action outside of China will be to wait for an embroilment between Thailand and French Indo-China and then swoop down on Saigon in order to preserve peace and order and to acquire the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in the process.

3. Chinese troops continue their indecisive harrassment of Japanese lines of communication in the occupied areas. No major action in China appears to be imminent. The Japanese continue to hold a spearhead at Ichang, while the Chinese seemingly apathetically look on. It would appear that the Japanese at Ichang with their long line of communication, are particularly vulnerable. The capture of Ichang by the Chinese would again open to them a valuable communication center for Central China. It is difficult to understand why a strong attack has not been launched there before.

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Military Attache

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2657-I-276

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 31 1941

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report -Dec.2-30, 1940 **I.G. No.** 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Principally press
Reliability: Good

Summarization of Report
When Required

No major military operations. Japanese continue mopping up operations in North and Central China. No activity in south except coastal blockade. Guerrillas continue railroad sabotage. Japanese air activity by naval planes only.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. North China
3. Central China
4. South China
5. Guerrillas
6. Air activity

1. Summary.

From the point of view of military operations the month of December has been the most quiet of any period since the beginning of hostilities in July, 1937. Although the Japanese evacuated Kwangsi in November, there have been no other withdrawals reported and in fact the North China forces were actually increased by Japanese troops which came west from Tangku and probably went to the south Hopei or Shansi fronts. The number of these has been estimated as high as 20,000. There were minor skirmishes or mopping up operations in Shansi, Hupeh, north Kiangsi and Chekiang but none of importance. The Chinese seemed content to rest on their laurels after stopping the Japanese drive in Hupeh, and the Japanese former gains were in no way endangered.

The Chinese unity was reported endangered by violent protests on the part of the Communist troops when they were ordered north of the Yangtze in Anhwei Province but the will to resist the Japanese seems as strong as ever on the part of both

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From M. A. CHINA **Report No.** 9962 **Date** December 30, 1940
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Communist and Central Government troops. There is little likelihood, however, of anything decisive coming from the reported giant Chinese counter offensive to take place in the near future.

2. North China.

While the Chungking spokesman was silent regarding military operations in North China, Japanese sources reported a few meager mopping up activities in Shansi and Hopei, but nothing from Shantung. A Kalgan report on December 3rd stated that late in November there had taken place in northwestern Shansi an armed clash between Communist and Kuomintang troops in which the former were routed. Further Japanese reports from Taiyuan revealed that successful actions had been carried out against Communist troops in the Luan area in southeastern Shansi, and in the Fenyang area in western Shansi. Figures showing results of mopping up operations continued to be preponderantly in favor of the Japanese, as for example the report from Tatung on December 14th which stated that during November in northeastern Shansi 1,500 Communist troops have been attacked nineteen times, resulting in 366 Chinese dead while the Japanese suffered three wounded.

In Hopei only one action was reported by the Japanese, and this consisted of 100 Chinese being dispersed in the Tsunhwa area (south of the Great Wall). A report from Shihmen on December 11th, however, stated that results of Japanese mopping up operations during November showed that a total of 64,000 Chinese had been engaged 423 times, resulting in 1,400 Chinese killed.

3. Central China.

On December 5th the Chungking military spokesman reiterated the fact that the Japanese drive in Hupeh during the latter part of November had been completely stopped and that they had been forced to withdraw to their original positions. He also reported the recapture of Nanlinchiao south of Sienning on the Yueh-han Railroad south of Hankow in Hupeh Province, and that the Chinese still held Loshan east of Sinyang on the Pinghan Railroad in south Honan. A report from Chungking on December 10th stated that feverish Japanese military preparations were being carried out on Formosa. Whether or not this means the "southward push" may take place in the near future cannot be verified but other reliable sources have given indications of Japanese military activity on Formosa and in some cases the units reported to be training there have been estimated as large as four divisions.

During the period under review the Japanese reported the usual mopping up operations in Central China, namely in the Hankow area, in northern Kiangsi, along the Yangtze and in the Taihu Lake area in Chekiang. Other than these no major operations were reported.

4. South China.

With the completion of the Japanese voluntary evacuation in November, all their troops have left Kwangsi Province. The Chinese have reoccupied Lungchow, Chennankuan, Nanning and Yamchow and the Japanese navy has established a coastal port blockade to prevent supplies from entering. During December there has been no military activity in South China but the Japanese were reported to have reinforced their garrison in Canton and to have moved military supplies north to Hsinchieh (twenty miles north of Canton). No drive to the north has taken place however.

5. Guerrillas.

Three train wrecks occurred in North China during December and these were attributed by the Japanese to Chinese guerrilla or Communist troops. On the 10th an army train was reported blown up in Shansi Province on Tungpu Railroad between Taiyuan and Yutze. On the night of the 12th another army train of 35 cars (mostly empty) was blown up just south of Paoting on the Pinghan line. The third attempt took place on the night of the 13th when a train was derailed south of Anting (between Peiping and Tientsin). Traffic on this line was delayed for twelve hours.

COMMENT: In the past few months the railroad sabotage has been fairly frequent but it has not seriously handicapped the Japanese in the transportation of troops and supplies. The guerrillas apparently have to work so fast between the arrival of Japanese armored patrol trains that they often merely loosen or remove a few rails and seldom damage the roadbed. A few bombs have been used but effective demolition has not been extensively carried out, probably because of the lack of materials and the difficulty of transporting them into the occupied zones.

6. Air Activity.

The following air activity was reported by the press during the period under review:

December 5 - Japanese planes raided Yunnan Railroad.
,, 9 - Army planes bombed Lungchow, Kwangsi.
,, 11 - Naval planes bombed Kunming, Yunnan.
,, 12 - Naval planes bombed Liangshan, Szechwan.
,, 13 - Naval planes bombed Ami and Kokiu, Yunnan.
,, 13 - Naval planes bombed Chingtechen, Kiangsi.
,, 14 - Naval planes bombed Hengyang, Hunan.
,, 14 - Naval planes bombed Burma road in Yunnan.
,, 15 - Naval planes bombed Burma road in Yunnan.
,, 15 - Naval planes bombed Hengyang, Hunan.
,, 16 - Japanese planes bombed Mekong River bridges, Yunnan.
,, 18 - Naval planes bombed Kunming, Yunnan.
,, 19 - Naval planes bombed points south of Changsha, Hunan.

December 21 - Naval planes bombed Chinese troops northeast of Anking, Anhwei.
,, 22 - Naval planes bombed Mengtze and Kokiu, Yunnan.
,, 26 - Naval planes bombed Chinese base east of Poyang Lake, Kiangsi.

A report from Chungking stated that on December 16th a squadron of Chinese planes based in Shensi Province dropped bombs on the Tungpu Railroad in Shansi and wrecked two Japanese military trains. This has not been confirmed. It is noticeable from the above list of raids that naval planes were used almost entirely. While at least twelve heavy bombers have returned to Peiping (probably from Central China) it is not known where the rest of the Japanese army aviation is being concentrated.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

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THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PEKING, CHINA.

TO: A. C. OF S., G-2

1. APPROVED.

WILLIAM MAYER,
Lieut-Col, FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

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Record Section File No.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report - Dec. 31 - Feb. 4, 1941 I. G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability: RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 5 1941

Source: Principally press

Reliability: Good

Summarization of Report

When Required

Mopping up operations in North China continue. Japanese make indecisive drives in south Honan and Hupeh. South China quiet. Air activities as usual. Fighting on Indo-China-Thai border ends with Japanese as mediators.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. General Summary
2. North China
3. South China
4. Central China
5. Friction with Communist Troops
6. Indo-China — Thai Border
7. Air Activity

1. General Summary.

During the past year a general glance at the military situation indicates that the Japanese still hold all their important former positions plus those gained in 1940. Their voluntary withdrawal from Kwangsi was more than compensated for by the agreement with the French which enabled them to land troops and utilize air fields in Indo-China. The American consul in Hanoi estimates there are at present 11,000 Japanese in the Haiphong-Hanoi area of Tongkin.

In North China military activity consisted of mopping up operations by the Japanese and of railroad sabotage by the Chinese. In Central China, after a setback in May in central Hupeh, the Japanese crossed the Han River and occupied Shasi and Ichang. In the south the principal Japanese activity con-

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From M. A. China Report No. 9972 Date February 4, 1941

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sisted of attempting to consolidate the Nanning-Lungchow area of Kwangsi which was finally evacuated in November. Chinese sources claim that the total Japanese casualties including killed, wounded, sick and captured since the beginning of the incident in July 1937 amount to 1,495,000 and the same for 1940 to be 380,000. This office estimates the total number of Japanese killed to date as approaching 500,000.

During the past year withdrawals of Japanese troops from north and central China to the South were reported several times, and it is believed that although they still control the principal railways and routes of communication, the areas are so thinly garrisoned that they are unable to prevent the infiltration of Communist and Chinese irregular troops. Hence the continued necessity for little periodic blitzkriegs and mopping up operations. In spite of the recent rift between the Communist and Chungking forces, it is believed that, in the main, all the Chinese forces are still solidly supporting the Generalissimo in his continued resistance to Japan.

2. North China.

During the period under review North China was quiet except for a continuation of Japanese mopping up operations. Japanese reports stated that Chinese units had been defeated and scattered in the Ordos desert (south of Paotow in Inner Mongolia), northwestern Shansi, central and southern Hopei, north Honan and in central Shantung. The Chinese military spokesman was silent about North China except to report the capture of Haiyang (northeast of Tsingtao on the Shantung coast) by Chinese troops on January 18th.

COMMENT: It is of little or no value to quote the figures given by the Japanese in their reports of mopping up operations as they are unimportant and obviously for home consumption - to show the people in Japan that the army is still busy in the occupied areas as well as on the front lines. It would seem, however, that the continued reporting of attacking and dispersing armed Chinese units well within the occupied areas would tend rather to make the people in Japan really wonder just how well "occupied" the areas actually are.

3. Central China.

Central China was the focal point of the principal activity during the period under review. Fighting occurred in the general area South Honan - Hupeh - North Kiangsi and Anhwei. The Japanese undertook two distinct drives, one northward along the Kinhan Railroad from Sinyang in south Honan, and one in central Hupeh. The

drive from Sinyang was reported by the Chinese to have been an attempt to push northward along the railroad to reach Chengchow just south of the Yellow River, but since the Japanese forces consisted at the most of only two divisions it is believed by the undersigned that the operation was just another short blitzkrieg to disperse the steadily encroaching Chinese forces in the area north of Sinyang, as has happened before.

On January 23rd the Japanese, in three columns, moved north from the Sinyang area. The right column from Changtaikuan north of Sinyang on the railroad moved north along the railroad and took Hsinantien on the 26th. The center column from Chushantien, eight miles northwest of Sinyang, moved northwest and took Maotsi also on the 26th, while the left column based on Yuho, twelve miles northwest of Sinyang, took Kuhsienchen to the northwest on the same day. On January 30th the Chungking military spokesman reported fighting still in progress on all three fronts, and on February 2nd the Japanese claimed the "operation" had been successfully completed. As this goes to press it is not known whether the Japanese have held their advance points or have returned to their original bases.

In coordination with the Honan offensive the Japanese also drove north in three columns of about 1,000 men each from Chungsiang (east of Han River in central Hupeh), and Kingmen and Tangyang (west of the Han). The column from Chungsiang moved north on the 23rd through Changshoutien and Fenglochen to take Liushuikou (thirty miles north of Chungsiang) on the 25th. The two western columns operated to the north of their bases for about fifteen miles but were reported to have been stopped and driven back by the 27th. In addition to the above the Japanese reported successful operations in the Ichang area in Hupeh, south of Nanchang in Kiangsi, west of Taihu Lake in Kiangsu and also along the Yangtze and in northwestern Anhwei Province. Unconfirmed reports from Shanghai stated that travelers from the interior insisted Japanese troops are being seen less and less in Nanking and Wuhu, their places being taken by Chinese puppet troops.

4. South China.

There was no important military activity during the past month in South China. On December 31st a report from Chungking stated the Japanese had concentrated 50,000 troops in the vicinity of Canton for a possible action against Hongkong, which proved, however, not to be the case. The Japanese reported successful mopping up operations on Hainan Island and also north and west of Canton. Chinese puppet troops were reported to have landed and dispersed Chinese remnants at Haiteng, southwest of Amoy in Fukien Province. Kwangsi, except for sporadic bombing by Japanese naval planes, was quiet.

5. Friction with Communist Troops.

Early in December the New Fourth (Communist) Army, which was operating in southern Anhwei, was ordered by Chungking to move north across the Yangtze and harass the Japanese from bases in central Anhwei. The area between Fanchang and Tungling (south of the river) was designated as route for the Fourth to cross the river. The commander of the Fourth Army, Yeh Ting, demanded 500,000 as moving expenses and an additional 500,000 for ammunition, and collected his army in the Fanchang-Kinghsien area. When the final order to move was received he decided to disobey it and, hearing that the Central Government's 40th Division was moving northeast toward Kinghsien en route to southwest Kiangsu for a rest, determined to attack it and thus force the Central Government to grant him further considerations. He moved his army south to Maolin and lay in wait for the 40th Division which was caught unprepared but defended itself when attacked. The Chinese commander of the 3rd War Zone, General Ku Chu-tung, thereupon took disciplinary action and sent troops against the Fourth Army, which was reported to have been surrounded and disarmed by January 12th. Japanese forces in the Nanking area also attacked units of this army which had penetrated into southwest Kiangsu, and the unusual situation occurred in which both Central Government and Japanese troops more or less cooperated against the Communists.

Just why the Central Government picked this time to oust the Fourth Army from southern Anhwei is difficult to understand, and it seems reasonable that the commander of the Fourth Army would refuse to leave an area well known to his men for one in the north which would undoubtedly prove hostile, without sufficient financial and other guarantees from Chungking. By January 25th, however, the Assistant Military Attache reported from Chungking that the clash had blown over and that there was little likelihood of further fighting between the two forces, but to date Communist news organs are demanding the release of the commander of the Fourth Army and punishment of those responsible for the attack on his troops.

6. Indo-China — Thai Border.

During the month of January sporadic ground fighting and some bombing and other air activity occurred along the Cambodia-Thai border. Information from French sources indicated that the French commander was handicapped by lack of concrete instructions from Vichy, and also by lack of troops, so the French tactics consisted largely in fighting delaying actions or withdrawing to prepared positions. Although the French were victorious in a naval engagement off Kochang Island (see map) on January 17th in which the French cruiser Lamotte Picquet sunk two Thai destroyers and damaged a coast defense vessel, the Thaians

were the aggressors in the land warfare. They crossed the border in at least two places - west of Pakse and at Poipet (see map) and forced the French to retire. They also bombed the towns of Vientiane, Thakhet, Kengkabao, Savanakhet, Pakse, Stungstreng, Siemreap, Sisophon and Pailin. French land forces made one thrust at Kemmarat.

Toward the end of January the Japanese received permission from Vichy and Bangkok to act as official mediators, and on the 28th an armistice was agreed to. After a meeting of the delegates of the three powers aboard a Japanese warship it was decided to repair to Tokyo to discuss the final terms. Reports from Bangkok reveal that the Thaians will insist on the return of that part of Indo-China west of the Mekong River in the Luangprabang area and that the border in the Pakse area be extended eastward to include the Mekong River.

COMMENT: Little surprise was shown by foreign observers when the Japanese offered their services as mediators. It has been felt all along that they have been indirectly encouraging both sides in the hope of bringing about a situation serious enough for them to act in the capacity of the dove of peace. As this goes to press Japanese warships are reported to be off Saigon and Camranh Bay as well as Haiphong, and when the terms of the settlement are made known from the Tokyo conference table Japan will undoubtedly have been granted military, air and naval concessions in both countries under the guise of "preserving the peace" of the Far East.

7. Air Activity.

During the period under review the following Japanese air activity was reported by the press:

December	28 -	Japanese	naval	planes	bombed	Kwangsin, Kiangsi.
,,	28 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	areas west of Hangchow, Chekiang.
,,	29 -	Japanese	naval	planes	bombed	Chengtu, Szechwan.
January	2 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan.
,,	5 -	,,	Army	,,	,,	Waichow, Kwangtung.
,,	6 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kweichow, Kwangsi.
,,	8 -	,,	naval	,,	,,	West River, Canton.
,,	10 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Lishui, Chekiang.
,,	13 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Tsingyuan, Kwangtung.
,,	14 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chungking.
,,	15 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Hengyang, Hunan.
,,	19 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Mekong River bridge, Yunnan.
,,	20 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kwangsin, Kwangsi.
,,	20 -	Japanese	planes	bombed		Kochiu, Yunnan,
,,	22 -	Japanese	naval	planes	bombed	Kunming, Yunnan.
,,	22 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Pishan, west of Chungking

January 23 - Japanese naval planes bombed Burma Road in Yunnan.
,, 26 - ,, ,, ,, ,, Chinese troops east of Anking, Anhwei.
,, 27 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese troops east of Anking, Anhwei.
,, 28 - Japanese army planes bombed Lungchow, Kwangsi.
,, 31 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese bases southwest of Hankow.
February 1 - Japanese naval planes bombed Chinese bases in Kiangsi.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, F.A.
Assistant Military Attache

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THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY,
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WILLIAM MAYER,
LT.COL., FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report -Feb. 5 to March 5,1941 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:
Source: Press and AM/A reports from Chungking
Reliability: Good

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 4 1941

Summarization of Report
When Required North China quiet. Japanese drives in Hupeh and south Honan terminate with both sides claiming successes. Japanese land in Bias Bay in Kwangtung. Bombing activities continued by Japanese air force. Indo-China — Thailand armistice extended to March 7th with negotiations in Tokyo still unsettled. Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. North China
3. Central China
4. South China
5. Central Government-Communist Friction
6. Air activities

1. Summary.

During the period under review North China was again free from major military operations, and the only activity in the south was a Japanese move near Kowloon which resulted in the occupation of Tamshui in Kwangtung. The Japanese drive in Honan came to an end on February 9th, the result being indecisive but causing considerable casualties on both sides. The remainder of Central China was quiet except for occasional Japanese mopping up operations in Kiangsu, Hupeh and central Anhwei. Air activity continued as usual. No final settlement was reached between the Central Government and the Communist forces, but no further dangerous clashes were reported by the Chungking spokesman, although the Japanese claimed these had taken place in north Honan. The Tokyo conference continued its squeeze play on Bangkok and Saigon, but as this goes to press the conference has not achieved results other than to cause the Japanese to lose their patience with the Vichy Government. It is expected that the French

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will eventually give in, which will bring about further military, air and naval concessions to the Japanese.

2. North China

As in our last report no important military operations occurred in North China. The Japanese reported the completion of mopping up operations in various parts of Shansi Province but no mention of this was made by the Chungking spokesman. On February 12th a report from Paotow (Suiyuan Province) stated that Japanese units from that area had completed a three day action against some 700 enemy troops in the region southeast of Paotow across the Yellow River. Hopei and Shantung were also quiet. The American consul in Tsingtao reported that on February 17th Chinese guerrillas raided the town of Litsun near Tsingtao and released 250 political prisoners. One train wreck was reported to have taken place in North Honan. From reliable information reaching Peiping it appears that the Peiping-Kaifeng express was partly derailed and damaged by a land mine placed under the tracks near Fenglo on the Hopei-Honan border.

3. Central China

The Japanese drive north from bases near Sinyang in southern Honan continued until February 8th, and on the 9th the Japanese spokesman reported a successful completion of the operation. Both Chinese and Japanese reports tend to obscure the actual results, but from an analysis of both it appears that the Japanese right column which moved north along the railroad from Sinyang occupied Suiping on the railroad January 31st, and sent detachments to occupy Hsiping to the north and Wuyang to the west the same day. The two columns based on Chushantien and Yuho converged on and took Miyang January 29th and then moved through Paoanyi to take Fangcheng February 3d. From there the Japanese wheeled southwest to positions along the Pai River opposite Nanyang which Japanese sources claim was occupied February 5th. Chinese sources state that a counterattack begun January 31st forced the Japanese columns to withdraw to the vicinity of their original positions near Sinyang. The American consul in Hankow reported on February 28th that in the two weeks previous to that date about 30,000 Japanese troops and equipment had returned from the Honan front and had proceeded down the Yangtze River. He also reported Japanese sources as admitting their casualties in the Honan fighting had reached 6,000, while the Chinese spokesman reported them as high as 20,000. The Consul further stated that in spite of the movement of Japanese troops down the river there was no indication of any Japanese withdrawal from the advanced positions in the Shasi-Ichang area in Hupeh.

During the period under review the Japanese press reported successful mopping up operations in the Tsaoyang area in northeastern Hupeh, in eastern Kiangsu and in central Anhwei.

4. South China

On February 4th a Japanese force based on Shumchun on the Kowloon-Canton railroad, together with another force which landed in Bias Bay on the same day, converged and occupied Tamshui to the northeast of Shumchun. This was apparently a move to cut the Chinese supply route through Tamshui and Waichow to Shaokuan on the railroad north of Canton. The Japanese also reported mopping up operations in the river area west of Canton. A Chungking dispatch of the 15th stated that the Japanese attacks had ceased and that Chinese troops were converging on Tamshui, which is still believed to be in Japanese hands. No other operations were reported from South China.

5. Central Government-Communist Friction

While no final settlement has been reached between the Central Government and the Communist forces, the Japanese are believed to be over optimistic in their reports of further serious armed clashes between the two forces. On February 25th Japanese sources reported serious fighting in northern Honan and southwestern Shantung, and also in northern Shensi. These reports have not been confirmed in Chungking. The Generalissimo has not relaxed from his determination to move the Communist forces to new positions in Central China but he has reportedly been considering their demands. These are mainly that the arrested leaders be released, that the New Fourth Army be allowed to reorganize, and that they be given further financial assistance. It is very possible that, unless their demands are given consideration, the Communist forces will again resort to violence and this is of course what the Japanese are hoping for.

6. Air Activities

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

Feb. 3d	-	Japanese	Army	planes	bombed	Nanyang, Honan.
,, ,,	-	,,	Naval	,,	,,	enemy bases in south Hunan.
,, 4th	-	,,	,,	,,	,,	,, ,, in Hunan
,, ,,	-	,,	Army	,,	,,	Nanyang, Honan.
,, ,,	-	,,	Naval	,,	,,	Hochwan, Szechwan.
,, ,,	-	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chungking.
,, 5th	-	,,	Army	,,	,,	enemy in Tsungfa area, Kwangtung.
,, ,,	-	,,	Naval	,,	,,	Nancheng, S.W. Shensi.
,, 6th	-	,,	Army	,,	,,	Yushih, Honan.
,, 7th	-	,,	Naval	,,	,,	Burma Road.
,, 9th	-	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan.

Feb.	12th -	Japanese	Naval	planes	bombed	Kunming, Yunnan.
,,	17th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kienli, Hupeh.
,,	20th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	enemy in the Ichang area.
,,	21st -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming and the Burma Road.
,,	,, -	,,	,,	,,	,,	enemy south of Anking.
,,	22nd -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Burma Road.
,,	24th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	enemy in north Kiangsu.
,,	26th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan.
,,	27th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Burma Road.

The most serious air disaster for the Japanese during February occurred when the plane carrying Admiral Baron Osumi and his staff crashed shortly after taking off from the Canton airfield on February 5th. Japanese authorities reported poor flying conditions caused the crash but later the Chinese claimed the plane was shot down by guerrillas. Japanese searching parties reported to have recovered the bodies and the Chinese claimed to have secured many important documents from the wreck.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Major, F. A.
Assistant Military Attache

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Record Section File No.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report, March 6-April 15, 1941 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability: RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 19 1941

Source: Press and A/MA reports from Chungking

Summarization of Report

When Required

North China generally quiet. Japanese make indecisive drives in Kiangsi, Kiangsu and Hupeh. Japanese initiate landing operations on Kwangtung coast. Air activity as usual.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. Mengchiang (Mongolia)
3. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Hopei
   c. Shantung
4. Central China
   a. Kiangsi
   b. Kiangsu
   c. Other fronts
5. South China
6. Air activities

1. Summary.

The military operations which occurred in China during the last month and a half may hardly be said to have been important enough to affect the general situation. The Japanese occupation of several coastal ports of Kwangtung Province offered a temporary check to the few remaining sources of supply open to the Central Government, but it is not believed that these landings were carried out with sufficient strength to assure permanent occupation. The Japanese drive in Kiangsi Province was indecisive, both sides suffering numerous casualties. In Hupeh the Japanese forces made a thrust to the west along the south bank of the Yangtze opposite Ichang, probably to test Chinese resistance in that area. North China was

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generally quiet and military activity consisted mainly of Japanese mopping up operations. The American Consul in Hanoi reported that 5,000 Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Tongking, destination unknown. In North China the intensification of Japanese efforts to cause the entire populace to aid the pacification campaign lent credence to the belief that more Japanese troops were being withdrawn for duty elsewhere, although no large movements were reported. In Tsinan the army commander Lieutenant General Iida was recalled to Japan and relieved by Major General Kazuji Dobashi, which is the first time since the Japanese occupation that the commander in that area (Tsinan south along the Tsinpu Railroad to Hsuchow) has not been a lieutenant general. Japanese reports claimed that on April 9th the acting commander of the Chinese 89th Army and the second in command of the 117th Division surrendered with 25,000 men. This was not confirmed by Chungking. They also reported that Communist troops in Hopei had been ordered to rebel against Chungking and that further friction between the Communists and Central Government troops had occurred in Shensi. While the Central Government-Communist disagreement has not been completely settled, Japanese reports concerning Communist disaffection are largely based on wishful thinking for it is well known that the anti-communistic attitude of the Japanese will do much to force the Communists to back any government in China which will resist Japanese aggression.

2. Mengchiang (Mongolia).

During the period under review Japanese sources reported that several hundred of Fu Tso-yi's men surrendered to the Japanese. They also reported successful mopping up operations in the Mengchiang area. Chinese sources failed to confirm or comment on these reports.

3. North China.

a. Shansi:

While engagements occurred in the southeastern (Lingchwan) area of Shansi Province, no decisive results were obtained by either the Chinese or Japanese. On March 9th the Japanese reported the beginning of a drive southeast from Changchih in three columns to annihilate the Chinese divisions in the Lingchwan region. Chinese reports state that the objective was to penetrate the mountains of southeast Shansi and contact the Japanese troops in northern Honan. While the Japanese reported the drive successful, Chungking sources claim the Chinese withdrew to the mountains and launched a counterattack on March 12th which forced the Japanese to withdraw to Changchih and placed Lingchwan again in Chinese hands. Both sides claimed many enemy casualties.

b. Hopei:

During the period under review only minor mopping up operations were reported by the Japanese in this province.

c. Shantung:

The Japanese reported two successful operations against Communist troops in Shantung, one near Yehhsien in the eastern part and one near Shangho in northern Shantung. The American Consul in Tsinan reported that, as an indication of the decreasing of the strength of the Japanese garrisons, the Japanese authorities in Tsinan had issued instructions to their nationals how to conduct themselves in the event of the temporary occupation of Tsinan and other cities by Communist, guerrilla or other Chinese troops. These instructions apparently included directions on packing and hiding valuables and filling containers with drinking water.

COMMENT: The Japanese have recently become concerned over their hold on North China. While there is no indication of a general uprising on the part of the Chinese in the occupied areas, the gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops for duty in Central and South China has left the important lines of communication rather thinly held, and greater efforts have been made to utilize puppet troops. In this connection the puppet press has urged the entire Chinese population of North China to unite in the "Public Security Intensification Campaign". It has been explained that up to the present the Japanese army has been the sole guardian of peace and order, and that now, after the first anniversary of the establishment of the Nanking Government, it is time for the Chinese themselves to coöperate actively with the Japanese in the maintenance of peace and order. The Japanese are still stubbornly training Chinese Pacification troops to operate locally against the guerrillas and guard the communication lines but it is doubtful that they will ever be able to prevent the continual disaffections on the part of these troops.

4. Central China.

a. Kiangsi:

The Japanese forces began a three column drive southwest from Nanchang in Kiangsi Province on March 15th (see map No. 1). The 33rd Division on the right moved from Anyi, and after taking Fengsin the same day without much resistance continued southwest and reached Tsunchienchieh on the 19th. When this column had reached a point half way between Fengsin and Tsunchienchieh, on the 17th, one regiment detached itself and moved westward, reaching Hengchiao on the Liao River on the 19th. This regiment then turned eastward, crossed the river and reached Huifu on the 20th. The remainder of the right column turned north from Tsunchienchieh and reached a point twenty kilometers

south of Huifu on the 20th. The movements of these two units after March 20th are obscure but it is presumed that they withdrew with the other columns and returned to Anyi.

The Japanese 34th Division which formed the center column moved out from Wanshoukung on March 16th and advanced southwest in two columns, with two regiments on the right and one on the left. The right flank force continued without much resistance till it neared the Tangpu-Kuanchiao line on March 19th when it met strong Chinese resistance. The left flank regiment of the center column plus another regiment which had been attached from the right flank shortly after leaving Wanshoukung, took Kaoan on March 17th, and from there the right flank regiment rejoined the right flank force and both units of the center column converged on Shangkao, which is believed to have been the objective of the entire operation. Chinese sources report the Japanese were stopped within a few kilometers of Shangkao on March 21st, while the Japanese claim to have entered the town. Another regiment of the center column with cavalry protecting its left flank moved southwest from Kaoan along the north bank of the Chin River and reached a point near Shangkao on the 21st.

The Ikeda independent brigade which formed the left column crossed the Chin River on the 16th at Shihtaokan and, following the south bank of the river, passed through Chiehfu and reached a point about 10 kilometers southwest of Shangkao on the 21st. At this stage of the operation the Chinese and Japanese reports vary considerably. The Japanese claim that their objective was reached, that the Chinese armies in the vicinity were defeated and scattered, and that the operation was a success. The Chinese maintain that their troops began a counterattack on the 22nd from Yifeng, Shangkao and southwest of Shangkao, and that this pushed back the Japanese flanks which exposed the center and forced the Japanese to withdraw before reaching Shangkao (Headquarters of the 9th War Zone). They claim to have retaken Kaoan on the 26th and Fengsin on the 30th, and that by April 1st all Japanese forces except isolated units had returned to their original bases, after suffering losses of 20,000 killed and wounded. This high casualty figure is undoubtedly greatly exaggerated as reliable sources in Chungking indicate that the 33rd and 34th Japanese Divisions consisted of only three regiments each, numbered from 213 and 218, and that each regiment consisted of only one or two battalions of about 700 men, the remainder of the two divisions remaining behind at the bases. The Chinese also claim they were aided by bad weather which prevented the use of planes and delayed ammunition supply.

b. Kiangsu.

In southern Kiangsu the Japanese conducted an operation which was reported to have as an objective the mopping up of Chinese troops west of Lake Tai. The Chinese reported the total number of Japanese troops involved to have been ten thousand but it is believed that actually

about half that number participated. On March 21st a Japanese column from Lishui (see map No. 2) moved east and took Shanghsing the same day. This force then divided and part moved east and took Liyang on the 22nd, while the rest turned south and joined a column which had moved west from Ihing. Another force moved westward from Changhing on the 21st, crossed the Anhwei border and turned southwest. All these units are reported by the Chinese to have returned to their bases by April 1st.

c. Other fronts.

On March 13th Japanese sources announced that their forces had voluntarily withdrawn from Wuning in northwest Kiangsi and from Tungcheng to the west in south Hupeh. The reason given was "to secure more favorable positions". Chinese sources claim that both towns were attacked and that the Japanese were forced to withdraw but since the Chungking official spokesman was silent regarding this it is believed that Chinese troops merely occupied the towns after the Japanese withdrawal. The only other military activity of any importance took place in Hupeh Province. On March 6th Japanese forces began a movement westward along the south bank of the Yangtze opposite Ichang, and on the 16th Chinese sources reported this force had been defeated and had withdrawn after suffering many casualties. It is believed that this move on the part of the Japanese was merely to test Chinese resistance to the west. On April 9th Japanese forces operating to the west of Hankow attacked Chinese troops in the vicinity of Anlu on the Han River, and by the 14th they reported that the Chinese had retreated to the mountains northeast of Anlu and that other Japanese units had crossed the Han river and were pursuing the enemy to the north. This is believed to have been another short Japanese blitzkrieg for the purpose of dispersing the Chinese forces in the area, but it will have no important effect on the general situation.

5. South China.

During the period under review the only military activity in South China consisted of Japanese landing operations at several points on the Kwangtung coast. These were naturally for the purpose of cutting the Chinese military supply lines to the interior. In the west landings were made at Pakhoi and Luichow, and east of Canton they landed at Honghai Bay and captured Swabue and a detachment advanced to the north and took Haifeng. Further to the east a landing was made at Kitchioh Bay which resulted in the capture of Lukfung to the north. On March 24th another landing was made at Haimen Bay (south of Swatow, and the Japanese took the port of Haimen and also Chaoyang to the north. It is believed that none of these landing operations were carried out with enough strength to permanently hold the positions taken, and that after the confiscation or destruction of any Chinese supplies which fell into their hands, the Japanese will withdraw.

6. **Air Activities.**

During the period under review the following air activities were reported by the press:

March 5 -	Japanese	naval	planes	bombed	Changteh, Hunan
,, 7 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese troops west of Ichang
,, 9 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Patung, Hupeh
,, 10 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan
,, 12 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese S.W. of Anking
,, 14 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chengtu, Szechwan
,, 16 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chengpu E. of Nanchang
,, 17 -	,,	army	,,	,,	Waichow, Kwangtung
,, 18 -	,,	naval	,,	,,	Chungking
,, 19 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chekiang-Kiangsi R.R.
,, 20 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	enemy in Hupeh
,, 21 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	,, west of Ichang
,, 26 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chekiang-Kiangsi R.R.
,, 30 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Tungcheng, Anhwei
,, 31 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chekiang-Kiangsi R.R.
April 1 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chengki, Hunan
,, 2 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	,, ,,
,, 7 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	,, ,,
,, 8 -	,,	planes		,,	Kunming, Yunnan
,, 9 -	,,	naval	,,	,,	Changsha, Hunan
,, 11 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chekiang-Kiangsi R.R.
,, 12 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Nanling, Kiangsu
,, 14 -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Hengyang, Hunan

Chinese bombers were reported to have bombed Japanese positions near Ichang on March 9th, and the Chungking press reported Chinese bombers bombed Japanese warships in Yulin harbor on Hainan Island on the 8th.

In the raid on Chengtu on March 14th Captain Freeman reported that 18 Japanese long range pursuits engaged 24 Russian E-15's flown by Chinese, with the result that one Japanese plane was lost due to an air collision while four Chinese planes were shot down and three forced down. He reported the Japanese planes were definitely superior to the Chinese in aerial combat. Colonel Barrett reported that Chungking military sources claimed that six Japanese planes were shot down while admitting the loss of fourteen Chinese, and that the Generalissimo was displeased with the outcome and had relieved the officer in charge of the air defense of Chengtu.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Major, Army of the U.S.
Assistant Military Attache

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

To accompany Report No. 9985

M. A. OFFICE, PEIPING, CHINA.

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

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Situation Report April 16-May 10, 1941 I.G. No. 6910

Brief Descriptive Title

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 18 1941

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Press and A/MA reports from Chungking
Reliability: Good

Summarization of Report When Required

Complete Chinese inactivity in North China and very little resistance to Japanese landings on Chekiang and Fukien coasts. Japanese initiate operations in Hupeh and continue mopping up operations in north Honan and Anhwei. Japanese aerial activity as usual.

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. Summary
2. North China
   a. Shansi
   b. Other fronts
3. Central China
4. South China
5. Aerial activity

1. Summary:

In North China the military activity during the period under review was characterized by the most complete lack of Chinese activity to date. Neither the Central Government forces, Communists or guerrillas endeavored in any way to harass the Japanese communication lines or attack any occupied positions. In South China also the Japanese had no trouble in landing and occupying practically all the important open ports, although they were later reported by the Chinese to have evacuated most of these. Military activity in Central China consisted of Japanese drives in Hupeh and mopping up operations in north Honan and Anhwei. Although the Chinese have done very well so far against the superior training and equipment of the Japanese, the recent cessation of activity is a bad omen and causes one to believe the Chinese army is sitting back on its haunches and waiting for the United States to pull its chestnuts out of the fire by declaring war on

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From M. A. China Report No. 9990 Date May 11, 1941
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Japan. In the meantime the Japanese are steadily going ahead with their cleanup campaign in south Shansi and if the Chinese state of inactivity continues it is very possible that they may cross the Yellow River and drive on Sian in Shensi. The Japanese are also able to control the occupied area of North China with fewer troops and the use of Chinese puppet troops along the lines of communication has increased

2. North China.

a. Shansi.

On May 5th the Japanese began a joint action in south Shansi and north Honan. In south Shansi units based on Hsiahsien, Yicheng and Chianghsien converged on Yuanchu on the north bank of the Yellow River and occupied the town on the 8th. At the same time other troops based on Menghsien in north Honan moved westward and took Tsingyang and Tsiyuan on the 7th. It is apparent that these moves met with little resistance on the part of the Chinese forces based in that area, but before the Japanese can attempt a crossing of the Yellow River in south Shansi without fear of harassing attacks on their flanks and rear it seems logical that they must clear out the Chinese troops based in the Chungtiao Mountains (along the border of south Shansi and north Honan). The crossing of the Yellow River presents many difficulties due to its width and current and although in the past the Japanese have contemplated crossing both at Tungkwan (in the extreme southwest of Shansi) and west from Kaifeng at Chengchow in northern Honan, to date they have been unable to do so. If, however, the present state of lethargy on the part of the Chinese forces in North China continues, it is very possible that the Japanese may be able to make crossing, and, with a foothold on the south bank, drive westward along the Lunghai toward Sian in Shensi Province.

b. Other fronts.

During the period under review there was no mention of any military activity in Hopei, including even mopping up operations. Japanese sources in Tsinan reported two successful mopping up operations in northern Shantung between May 1st and 5th. All other areas in North China remained quiet and nothing was heard from the Communist troops, which lends credence to the rumors that the Japanese are attempting to negotiate with them. (These rumors, however, are unconfirmed.)

3. Central China.

The Japanese reported successful operations against Communist troops south and east of Kaifeng in Honan and also against Central Government troops in central Anhwei. In north Hupeh Japanese troops (reported by Chungking to number 10,000) began on May 5th operations from Yingshan (west of the

Pinghan Railroad) against Chinese troops in the Tapieh Mountains along the Hupeh-Honan border. They also began what are presumably mopping up operations north of Anlu on the Han River, and north of Kingmen and Tanggyang to the west. As this goes to press the fighting in Hupeh is still in progress but since the Chungking official news organ stated on May 10th that the situation in Hupeh has not yet fully developed it is believed that the Japanese are meeting with very little resistance.

4. South China.

Between the 16th and 20th of April Japanese military units supported by naval forces landed and occupied all the principal open ports in Chekiang Province and also Foochow in Fukien. (See map). After taking Shaohing they moved west toward Shaoshan and southwest toward Chuki, occupying the latter on the 20th. From there they pushed south along the railroad but Chinese sources claim the Japanese were halted a few miles south of Chuki by a Chinese counter attack on the 27th. A landing was made at Chenhai on the coast which resulted in the capture of Ningpo, Fenghua and Kikow. Other landings were made at Shihpu, Haimen and Wenchow. From Haimen the Japanese occupied Taichow without a struggle. Further to the south another landing unit supported by planes and warships took the Changmen forts east of Foochow on April 20th and the next day overcame weak Chinese resistance and entered Foochow, in which town there was no fighting.

Chungking sources declared the landings on the Chekiang and Fukien coasts were practice runs as a prelude to the much talked of Japanese southward move in the Pacific, and that the operations were carried out by the veteran Guard, 5th, 18th and 28th Divisions. The Japanese press hinted that the landings were made to prevent the use of these ports as submarine bases by Britain and the United States in case of hostilities against Japan. Although the weak Chinese resistance at all points lent a "maneuver" atmosphere to the entire operation, it is believed that the landings were made for the purpose of capturing or destroying supplies for the Central Government. Wenchow was evacuated by the Japanese on May 3rd, and the Chinese reported that on the 10th all ports in Chekiang except Shihpu had been retaken by their troops.

5. Aerial activity.

During the period under review the following air activity was reported by the press:

April	15th -	Japanese	army	planes	bombed	the Chekiang-Kiangsi R.R.
,,	16th -	,,	naval	,,	,,	Chungking troops in Kiangsu
,,	18th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Changsha, Hunan
,,	18th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Haimen, Chekiang
,,	19th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Tungcheng, Anhwei
,,	20th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese east of Foochow
,,	22nd -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese south of Anking, Anhwei

April	22nd -	Japanese	naval	planes	bombed	Changsha, Hunan
,,	23rd -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Yochow, Hupeh
,,	26th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese north of Tungting Lake, Hunan
,,	26th -	,,		,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan
,,	27th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Shihtai, east of Anking
,,	29th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	bases in Szechwan and Hunan
,,	29th -	,,		,,	,,	Kunming
May	1st -	,,	,,	,,	,,	bases south of Anking
,,	6th -	,,	army	,,	,,	Sian, Shensi
,,	3rd -	,,		,,	,,	Chungking
,,	3rd -	,,	naval	,,	,,	Tungcheng, Anhwei
,,	7th -	,,	army	,,	,,	Tungkwan, Shensi
,,	7th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Mengtze, Yunnan
,,	7th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Chinese north of Canton
,,	8th -	,,	,,	,,	,,	Kunming, Yunnan
,,	9th -	,,	naval	,,	,,	Chungking

On April 28th it was reported that the new markings to be painted on the fuselage and wings of Central Government planes will be the blue sky-white sun national flag emblem, surrounded by two circles, one white and one red.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
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
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

May 11, 1941

To accompany Report No. 9990

M. A. OFFICE, PEIPING, CHINA.

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AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE REPORT.

History of Southern Provinces

No. 3. Date of Preparation: November 1, 1924.

To: Department of State. Date of Mailing: November 22, 1924.

Office: Consulate General, Canton, China.

Reference to request: Department's instruction of November 28, 1925, (through Legation at Peking)

Geographical designation: China (South).

Schedule No. and Subject: P2190 - Political Situation since 1911.

Title: Historical Sketch of Political Conditions in Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Kweichow Provinces since the Revolution of 1911.

Source: Records of American Consulate General, Canton.

893.00/5802

Douglas Jenkins,
American Consul General.

Reference to previous reports: None.

In the preparation of this report it has been found advisable to combine the records of events in the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Kweichow rather than to attempt a separate report for each province. Political developments in south China have, of course, centered in Canton, the capital of Kwangtung Province, and occurrences in Kwangsi and Kweichow have been dependent upon and intimately connected with developments in this city. Moreover, various political and military cliques in one

province

province have controlled affairs in the others, so that at times we have found Canton submitting to the dictates of the military governor of Kwangsi, while at other times we find officials in Kwangsi and Kwei-chow Provinces acting under instructions from Canton. The armies of one province have frequently invaded the territories of the others and the period under review has been marked by almost constant internecine strife.

The revolution against the imperial government became effective in Canton on November 8, 1911, when Chang Ming-chi (張鳴岐), Viceroy of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces fled on a British gunboat, and the Provincial Assembly assumed nominal control instead. General Chiang Tsun-kwei (蔣尊簋) was chosen provisional president and Hu Han-min (胡漢民) was elected tutuh or military governor. It was officially announced that the province would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Republic of China but events soon showed that the people of Kwangtung and Kwangsi were to be governed by various military cliques who would recognize the central government of Peking only when it suited their purposes to do so.

Hu Han-min had been educated abroad and was formerly a newspaper editor. He was and still is a prominent member of the Kuomintang Party and it is interesting to note that he is at present serving for a second time as governor of Kwangtung, having been appointed to that office by Sun Yat Sen.

On

On December 21, Governor Hu Han-min went to Hongkong to join Dr. Sun Yat Sen who had just been chosen President of the Provisional Republic and was then on his way to Shanghai. Ch'en Chiung-ming (陳炯明) was left in charge of Kwangtung Province as acting tutuh until Hu Han-min's return on April 27, 1912. Ch'en Chiung-ming was born near Waichow (惠州) in Kwangtung Province and as will be seen further on in this sketch was destined to play an important part in the affairs of Kwangtung. He had been a member of the former Provincial Assembly and was actually Vice Tutuh, having been elected to that office on November 18.

In spite of all these changes there was practically no fighting and only one man was killed. It soon became evident, however, that the new government was meeting with difficulties in maintaining order in the outlying districts. The treasury was left empty by the Manchu officials and the new authorities found it hard to raise the necessary funds for paying the army and meeting the ordinary expenses of administration. Appeals were sent to Chinese living in America, to the Straits Settlements and elsewhere, and in the course of time some funds were received from these sources, having been contributed by Chinese in sympathy with republican ideals.

During 1912 several elections occurred, including those for the provincial assembly, as well as for the national house of representatives. There were persistent rumors of corruption in connection with these elections,

tions, but no definite evidence seems to have been disclosed.

Because of the delicate political situation due to evident friction between certain naval and military leaders and the revolutionary government, the British authorities landed 300 troops on the British concession early in January, 1912.

The newly elected Provincial Assembly opened on November 6, 1913, with Hsieh Chi-yuan (謝己原) as president. Mr. Hsieh was the son of a native pastor and a member of the former Provincial Assembly. He was also a member of the Kuomintang Party. Tang Shao-yi (唐紹儀), formerly Premier under the new republic, was chosen to be one of the ten senators representing Kwangtung Province in the national parliament at Peking.

CH'EN CHIUNG-MING APPOINTED TUTUH.

As the year advanced it became more and more evident that Hu Han-min, the military governor, was getting out of touch with the Peking government and that friction was developing. He flatly declined to carry out certain instructions from Peking and on June 16 a mandate issued by President Yuan Shih-kai (袁世凱) appointed Ch'en Chiung-ming to be governor general or tutuh in place of Hu Han-min, who was named as a peace commissioner to Thibet. Instead of handing over the seals of his office to his successor, Hu Han-min left Canton unexpectedly on June 21, 1913, having placed the seals in the hands of the chief counselor of the Governor General's office. General Ch'en Chiung-ming

did

did not assume office until July 4, 1913. He enjoyed the support of the best elements in Canton and the indications were that his term would be successful and that the people throughout the province would enjoy a reasonable degree of peace and prosperity. Only two weeks after he entered upon his duties, however, General Ch'en suddenly declared Kwangtung Province independent of Peking. He issued a notice to the public in which he stated that he assumed charge as tutuh or commander-in-chief of the Canton expeditionary forces against President Yuan Shih-kai, whom he charged with various crimes and misdemeanors in the administration of his high office. Ch'en Chiung-ming failed to meet withthe cooperation and assistance which he expected from other military commanders in the province and was compelled to resign and leave Canton on August 4, 1921.

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NAMES NEW GOVERNOR.

Upon General Ch'en Chiung-ming's departure the commanders of the various military divisions declared the so-called independence of Kwangtung cancelled and on August 12 General Lung Chih-kuang (龍濟光), formerly a division commander in Kwangsi Province, became governor. He proved to be a staunch supporter of President Yuan Shih-kai and was ultimately appointed tutuh of Kwangtung Province by the Peking government. General Lung's regime marked the beginning of Kwangsi interference in Kwangtung Province. He governed with a high hand and showed little sympathy for the Kuomintang members and

other

other radicals and was evidently actuated by the policy of Yuan Shih-kai. The Kuomintang Party was dissolved and its headquarters in Canton closed, and Chen Ching-hua (陳 景 華), Commissioner of Police, was executed. He was a member of the Kuomintang Party and believed to have been in sympathy with Ch'en Chiung-ming's so-called declaration of independence. The story goes that he was invited to dinner by General Lung and that it was not until the meal was finished that he was told of President Yuan Shih-kai's telegram ordering his execution.

The news of the formal election of Yuan Shih-kai as president on October 6 (1913) was received with considerable evidence of satisfaction by the people of Canton. All public offices were closed for three days and a salute of one hundred and one guns was fired.

An exodus of Japanese women and children from Canton occurred (1915) as a result of the boycott movement growing out of the famous Twenty-one Demands made on China by Japan. A mass meeting was held on May 25, 1915 to inaugurate a so-called National Humiliation Day to be commemorated annually on May 7, the day on which the Chinese government acceded to the Japanese demands.

AGITATION FOR MONARCHY.

It was just about this time that the movement in favor of a monarchical form of government began to make itself felt in Canton. Chang Ming-chi, the former Vice-

roy

roy who fled from Canton in 1911, returned and assumed the office of Civil Governor on August 6, 1915. Numerous telegrams began to come in from agitators in Peking and elsewhere urging General Lung Chih-kuang, as well as the Chamber of Commerce and similar organizations, to express themselves in favor of a monarchy. It was rumored that General Lung telegraphed his approval to Peking and at a meeting of officials and representatives from various districts it was unanimously decided that a constitutional monarchy should be established and that President Yuan Shih-kai should be declared emperor. The announcement of Yuan's acceptance of the throne, which reached Canton by telegraph on December 12, 1915, was made the occasion of a public holiday throughout official circles, but the people generally seemed indifferent to the change of government.

As might have been expected the revolutionary elements which had been more or less crushed during Yuan's presidency again became active in 1916 and General Lung Chih-kuang took every precaution to prevent an outbreak as well as for his own safety. Tang Chi-yao(唐繼堯), then and now Tuchun of Yunnan, issued a proclamation on December 26, 1915, severing relations with the Peking government and reports became current that the provinces of Szechuen, Kweichow and Kwangsi had thrown in their lot with the revolutionists, whose headquarters had been established in Hongkong.

KWANGSI AND KWANGTUNG AGAIN INDEPENDENT.

On March 17, 1916, this Consulate General reported to the Department that information had been received to the effect that the province of Kwangsi had been declared independent of the central government. On April 6, 1916 Kwangtung Province was again declared independent by General Lung Chih-kuang. This action was a surprise as it was well known that General Lung was a staunch supporter of Yuan Shih-kai. It was assumed that General Lung was forced to act as he did through pressure brought to bear upon him by the Kwangtung navy which was then in sympathy with the revolutionary movement.

The situation became extremely tense as a result of the divergence of opinion between the various military factions occupying the province and a conference was arranged to take place on "Dutch Folly", a small island in Canton Harbor, at which it was hoped the various military leaders would reach an understanding. A clash occurred, however, and shooting began between the several bodyguards. Tang Hsueh-dun (湯覺頓), delegate of Lu Yung-ting (陸榮廷) and Liang Chi-chao (梁啟超), was killed.

It should be pointed out here that General Lu Yung-ting was at that time Tutuh of Kwangsi Province under appointment from Peking and had formerly been a division commander in the imperial days. Liang Chi-chao, it will be recalled, was a noted scholar and an official in Peking under the Manchu regime. It was common

gossip

gossip that the trouble at the conference was deliberately planned by General Lung Chi-kuang in order to rid himself of some of his most dangerous opponents.

YUAN SHIH-KAI DENOUNCED.

On April 21, 1916 circular telegrams were published from the four tutuhs of the southern provinces to the foreign consuls and others denouncing Yuan Shih-kai as a traitor, although Yuan had in the meantime renounced the imperial throne, and recognizing Li Yuan-hung (黎元洪), then vice-president, to be the lawful president of China. The telegram was signed by Tang Chi-yao, of Yunnan, Liu Hsien-shih (劉顯世) of Kwei-chow, Lu Yung-ting, of Kwangsi, and Lung Chih-kuang, of Kwangtung.

Ts'en Chun-hsun (岑春煊), otherwise known as Viceroy Shum, was selected as commander-in-chief of the so-called National Defense Army of Kwangtung and Kwangsi with headquarters at Shiu Hing (肇慶) and formally entered upon the duties of his office on May 1, 1916.

On May 8, 1916 a National Military Council (軍務院) was established, with Tang Chi-yao as president, Ts'en Chun-hsun as vice president, and Liang Chi-chao as chief delegate for governmental affairs. Among the other members were Liu Hsien-shih, Lu Yung-ting Lung Chih-kuang, Tsai Ao (蔡鍔), Li Lieh-chun(李烈鈞) and Chen Ping-kuan (陳炳焜). These were known as "Fu Chun" (撫軍).

Tsai

Tsai Ao was the first general to come out openly against Yuan Shih-kai. Li Lieh-chun was formerly tutuh of Kiangsi Province, but was defeated by Li Shun(李純), Tutuh of Kiangsu, and was forced to flee into Yunnan Province. Li Lieh-chun afterwards became commander of certain Yunnanese soldiers and attempted, without success, to regain his position in Kiangsi Province.

The object of the so-called Military Council was to concentrate the power of the southern provinces which had severed connection with the central government. As Tang Chi-yao could not leave Yunnan because of the duties of his office there, Ts'en Chun-hsun was to act as president. This Military Council was abolished on July 14, 1916. In the meantime Ts'en Chun-hsun had been officially appointed Tsuszeling (都司令), Supreme Commander of the National Defense Armies of the Liang Kwong - Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces.

LUNG CHIH-KUANG FORCED OUT.

The situation in Canton became critical in July (1916) when fighting occurred between the forces of Li Lieh-chun and Lung Chih-kuang at Yun Tam (源潭) on the North River about fifty miles from the city. It became evident that Li Lieh-chun and Ts'en Chun-hsun were endeavoring to close in on Canton and bring about the departure of General Lung Chih-kuang, whose attitude to the so-called Military Council had never been quite definite. Kong Moon, in Kwangtung Province, was captured by the forces of Ts'en Chun-hsun and a few days later Kwangsi and Yunnanese troops occupied Fatshan, some twenty miles from Canton.

Serious

Serious fighting continued until September 10, when General Lung Chih-kuang was finally forced to relinquish his command as tuchun of Kwangtung Province and Chu Ching-lan (朱慶瀾) assumed charge instead. General Chu Ching-lan had been appointed by the central government and this brought the province back under the control of Peking. The Provincial Assembly was reopened on October 1 in compliance with instructions from the central government. It will be recalled that the Assembly was dissolved on August 13 when General Lung Chih-kuang assumed control of Canton.

KWANGSI'S INDEPENDENCE CANCELLED.

Telegraphic advices dated August 24, 1916 announced that General Chan Ping-chun (陳炳焜), Tuchun of Kwangsi Province, had issued a manifesto declaring that Kwangsi Province had cancelled its independence and would thereafter be under the control of the central government at Peking.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY SEVERED.

On March 14, 1917, telegrams from Peking announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Germany. The news was not received with enthusiasm by the southern provinces, whose sympathies had been rather inclined to Germany due in a large measure to the suspicion and fear of Japan, Great Britain and France rather than to any especial friendliness toward Germany. It is also

probable

probable that the Cantonese leaders desired to embarrass the central government merely as a matter of general policy. The Kuomintang Party had identified itself with a protest sent to the government against the severance of relations with Germany and such Kuomintang leaders as Sun Yat Sen, Ts'en Chun-hsun and Tang Chi-yao had expressed themselves very vigorously on the subject.

In the midst of the discussion over Chinese relations with Germany, a presidential order was issued appointing General Lu Yung-ting, a Kwangsi leader, Inspector General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces, while Chen Ping-kuan, then acting military commander of Kwangsi, was named military governor of Kwangtung, and Tan Ho-ming (譚浩明), acting military governor of Kwangtung, was transferred to Kwangsi. The Inspector General of the "Two Kwongs" was given the right to correspond direct with the cabinet in Peking and to control the army, navy and river police of the two provinces. His headquarters were established at Shiu Hing (肇慶), with branch offices in Canton and Kweilin (桂林). This period marks the beginning of actual Kwangsi control in Kwangtung Province.

OPPOSITION TO PEKING.

The dissolution of parliament at Peking on account of the revolt in north China during June, 1917, was promptly followed by a declaration on the part of the southern provinces that the President lacked authority to take such action. Kwangtung Province took the lead in the opposition to the northern militarists and many

prominent

prominent Cantonese revolutionaries began to return, including Li Lieh-chun, Ch'en Chiung-ming and Hu Han-min. A delegate from the military governor of Yun-nan also arrived in Canton and a conference of representatives of the military leaders and general public of Canton was held under the presidency of the military governor to discuss the question of raising an expedition against the north.

Later, upon the initiative of the local members of the Kuomintang Party, a "citizens meeting" was held to discuss ways and means for supporting the national parliament against the militarists and to urge the government of Kwangtung to despatch an expeditionary force against the north.

On June 20, 1917 a joint telegram was sent by the military governors of Kwangtung and Kwangsi to the president and vice-president and to the provincial capitals declaring the provisional autonomy of the two provinces. The president was urged to uphold the republican form of government and to restore the parliament or to form a new one.

The telegram went on to declare that prior to the reestablishment of parliamentary authority all new laws would be considered ineffective and no cabinet organized in the meantime would be recognized; all military and civil affairs pertaining to the "Two Kwongs" would be for the time being administered by the respective provincial governments, excepting such important matters

as

as might be deemed advisable to submit to the president. In the meantime martial law had been declared in Kwangtung Province on June 8, 1917.

In spite of revolutions and propaganda, however, it soon became evident that the mass of the people were not interested in any expedition against the north and moreover that the military governor General Lu Yung-ting was by no means enthusiastic. He frustrated an attempt on the part of certain leaders to raise funds for the expedition and let it be known that he was not in sympathy with the revolutionists. The news of the coup d'etat at Peking (Chang Hsun's government) caused but little excitement in Canton, although most of the local newspapers assumed a hostile attitude.

SUN YAT SEN'S RETURN.

On July 16, 1917, Dr. Sun Yat Sen and a party of southern republicans arrived at Whampoa from Swatow by a Chinese gunboat. Dr. Sun announced that he had come to Canton to consult with local members of the Kuomintang as to the advisability of convening the old parliament and reinstating Li Yuan-hung as President.

It was not long, however, before Dr. Sun began to urge the military governor to send telegrams to Shanghai inviting the commander of the Chinese fleet to make Canton his base, that the members of the National Assembly be asked to come to Canton and convene parliament, and finally that two gunboats be sent to fetch Li Yuan-hung to Canton in order that he might administer the government of China from this city.

General

General Lu Yung-ting, the so-called commissioner of defense of the "Two Kwongs", as well as the military governors of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan, showed decided lukewarmness to Dr. Sun's proposals, and although they dispatched a telegram they merely requested the President to resume office, presumably at Peking, and did not suggest his coming to Canton. It was evident that the military leaders in the south wished, if possible, to avoid the creation of a formal provincial government in opposition to the north.

At the same time, however, Dr. Sun had the active support of several less important military leaders in and around Canton, including General Li Lieh-chun, of the Yunnanese contingent. Moreover, Admiral ChengPi-kwang (程璧光) suddenly declared the independence of the so-called First Squadron of the navy and came to Canton with his fleet. The Admiral brought with him Wu Ching-lien (吳景濂), speaker of the House of Representatives, C. T. Wang, vice-speaker of the Senate, and other members of parliament, all of which greatly strengthened Dr. Sun's policy and weakened the hold of General Lu Yung-ting and other southern military leaders. The general public, too, began to awaken to the fact that Canton was becoming a center of political activity.

SOUTHERN GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHED.

On August 25, 1917, the so-called parliament assembled in extraordinary session, the Kwangtung Provincial Assembly Hall being used for the purpose, and the "Military Government of the Republic of China" was formally

established

established with Sun Yat Sen as commander-in-chief. Three field marshals were chosen at the same time,- General Lu Yung-ting, then Inspector-General of the "Two Kwongs", General Tang Chi-yao, military commander of Yunnan, and Admiral Cheng Pi-kwang, the commander of the first squadron of the navy.

Dr. Sun assumed office as commander-in-chief on September 10, 1917, and the parliament then proceeded to the election of heads of departments or ministers as follows: Foreign Affairs, Wu Ting-fang; Home Affairs, Sun Hung-yi (孫洪伊); Finance, Tang Shao-yi; War, Chang Kai-ju (張開儒); Navy, Cheng Pi-kwang, and Communication, Hu Han-min.

In addition, an executive council of seven was formed as follows: General Lu Yung-ting, General Tang Chi-yao, Sun Yat Sen, Admiral Cheng, Tong Shao-yi, Ts'en Chun-hsun and Wu Ting-fang. It was agreed that Generals Lu and Tong and Dr. Sun were to have special charge of military affairs and to have equal rank, General Lu to be president of the council.

No sooner had the new military government been formed than friction began to develop between the civilian revolutionary leaders, such as Dr. Sun and Hu Han-min, on one side and the military leaders, including Governor Chen Ping-kuan, on the other. Admiral Cheng Pi-kwang assumed a neutral attitude and moved his fleet from Canton to Whampoa. General Lu Yung-ting supported governor Chen Ping-kuan in spite of the cry raised by Dr. Sun's followers of "Canton for the Cantonese". Dr. Sun was openly defiant toward

military

military governor Chen and it looked as if Canton were threatened with civil war.

Wu Ting-fang arrived in Canton on November 30, and Tang Shao-yi on December 4. These well known southern republicans had been invited by all the leading military and civil officials in the hope that they might succeed in uniting the various factions in the southern and western provinces and also in arranging for a basis of peace negotiations with the Peking government.

In the meantime a dangerous movement against Canton was begun by General Lung Chih-kuang, who it will be recalled had at one time been military governor of Kwangtung Province. General Lung had been appointed by the central government to be Inspector General of the "Two Kwongs" in place of General Lu Ying-ting, and was actually engaged in moving troops from Hainan toward Canton when intercepted and decisively defeated by the ships of Admiral Cheng Pi-kwang. General Lung Chih-kuang's attack was evidently a part of a plan on the part of the north to upset the southern government.

That this disturbance was a three sided affair, however, became evident when two gunboats attached to Admiral Cheng's command suddenly opened fire on the military governor's yamen in Canton on January 4, 1918. This attack was reported to have been instigated by Dr. Sun Yat Sen in the hope of replacing General Lu Yung-ting, the then inspector general of the two provinces and his henchman Mo Ying-hsien (莫榮新), who had

recently

recently become military governor of Kwangtung. Dr. Sun, as the head of the southern government, had long felt that Lu Yung-ting (leader of the Kwangsi clique) was not acting in good faith with the Kuomintang and other so-called progressive leaders in the southern and western provinces, and that while pretending to aid the Southern Government General Lu was actually strengthening his own military power.

After the bombardment of the yamen an effort was made to bring about a better understanding between the various local factions and it was agreed that the governor general would not execute any of Sun's adherents without first giving notice to the civil government and that the civil government was to have the right to approve of all appointments, especially those concerned with foreign affairs. The incident is said to have enhanced Sun's prestige, although this is difficult to understand.

PLANS TO OUST SUN YAT SEN.

On January 20, 1918 a meeting was held at the military governor's yamen to discuss the formation of a "Council of the Constitutionalist Provinces" and it appears that practically all the important leaders in the south attended in person or were represented by delegates with the exception of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, who took the position that the meeting made no provision for the participation of parliament in the deliberations of the council and did not define the relation, if any,

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the council was to sustain to the Southern Government which had been organized by the parliament.

Dr. Sun and his followers in the old parliament knew full well that the council would aim at the eclipse and eventual dissolution of the existing Southern Government, but in order to gain time and give the impression that they were prepared to compromise when necessary, Dr. Sun and his supporters expressed the opinion that although the Southern Government was constitutional it was not as representative as might be desired and they would be prepared to approve of any new government which would supply this defect. Out of deference to the views of Dr. Sun Yat Sen it was decided that the new government should continue to be known as a "military government" instead of a confederation of the constitutionalist provinces as originally proposed, but it was also agreed that the organization of the new regime would follow substantially the lines of the projected"council" as previously described.

On February 26, 1918, Admiral Cheng Pi-kwang was assassinated while he was about to land on the Bund from his headquarters on "Dutch Folly" Island. The assassin escaped in the crowd and although the military governor offered a reward of $50,000., no arrest was made. Well informed persons were of the opinion that the Admiral was assassinated as a result of the long and bitter struggle that had been going on between the Kwangtung and Kwangsi factions for the control of Kwangtung.

SEIZING

SEIZING THE SALT GABELLE.

The Southern Government, headed by Sun Yat Sen, issued an order on March 8, 1918, formally taking over the salt administration of Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces. The official announcement stated that the Southern Government would carry out all obligations arising in connection with the reorganization loan and added that the administration of the Gabelle would remain intact.

This action on the part of the local government immediately drew a protest from the British Consul General who inquired whether the authorities intended to repudiate foreign treaties and agreements. Dr. Wu, so-called Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied that the surplus salt revenue had been turned over to the Peking government which employed it for purposes inimical to the southern, or constitutionalist, cause.

Carrying out his policy of depriving the central government of the control of administrative agencies wherever possible, Dr. Sun issued an order on March 18 (1918) placing the Canton-Samshui Railway under the control of the Canton regime and appointing one of the revolutionary leaders managing director in place of the official who held office from the ministry of communications at Peking.

An interesting sidelight on the political situation may be gleaned from the fact that Dr. Wu Ting-fang and his son C.C. Wu visited the inspector general Lu Yung-ting at Nanning in March, 1918, to discuss questions regarding

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the proposed confederation of the southern and western provinces. General Lu is reported to have said that he was willing to accept office as one of the three so-called representatives for military affairs in the confederation on the understanding, however, that the term "government" was not to be used in connection therewith; that while the confederation would in fact be a government the term as such was obnoxious and should not appear.

It was evident that General Lu desired to safeguard himself against any possible rupture in his relations with the then president of China - Feng Kuo-chang (馮國璋). Moreover, General Lu showed his opposition to any amalgamation of the federation with the then government at Canton and expressed the hope that he could function independently. The inspector general left no doubt, it is said, on the minds of Wu Ting-fang and C.C. Wu of his opposition to Sun Yat Sen. On the other hand Dr. Sun openly questioned the integrity of General Lu's motives and expressed the fear that General Lu merely hoped to use the federation to eliminate the Canton government and Sun Yat Sen at the same time.

CANTON GOVERNMENT REORGANIZED.

On May 18, 1918, the bill providing for the reorganization of the southern government in connection with the confederation of the southern and western

provinces

provinces was finally passed by the National Assembly at Canton and the following directors of the "administrative council" were elected: Tang Shao-yi, General Tang Chi-yao, Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Dr. Sun Yat Sen, Admiral Lin Pao-yih (林葆懌), General Lu Yung-ting and General Ts'en Chun-hsun.

Admiral Lin Pao-yih was formerly captain of the cruiser "Haichi" and succeeded Admiral Ching upon the latter's assassination. All of the directors of the "Council" accepted office and began their duties either in person or through individual representatives.

On October 8, 1918 the National Assembly, better known perhaps as the Canton Parliament, adopted a resolution repudiating the election of President Hsu Hsiah-shung by the Peking parliament and authorized the government at Canton to function as the regular government of China and the "administrative council" to act as a cabinet. The session was a rather stormy one and several representatives were injured.

POWERS URGE REUNIFICATION.

A somewhat unusual step was taken by the foreign representatives at Canton on December 2, 1918, when the consuls of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and the United States handed a memorandum to the leaders of the Southern Government urging that differences with the North be adjusted through peaceable means.

Dr. Wu Ting-fang replied to the consular representatives to the effect that the government deplored the existence of the civil war in China; that the constitutionalists were fighting not for personal reasons

or

or because of legal technicalities but in opposition to militarism and to "make China safe for democracy" and asked that the associated powers cease supplying financial aid to the northern militarists. The communication ended with a promise that military advances would cease and that an effort would be made to open peace negotiations at some suitable place.

About the middle of January, 1919, ten delegates left Canton for Shanghai to attend a peace conference.

By a joint resolution of the senate and house of representatives of the Canton assembly it was decided on January 11, 1919, that the southern regime should be known as the "constitutional government" rather than the "military government".

MARITIME CUSTOMS QUESTION.

Dr. Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the Inspector General of Customs on March 6,1919, asking that Hongkong $3,000,000. of the customs surplus be paid over to the southern government. The money was finally paid but the question whether or not the southern government is entitled to share in the customs receipts is still open and has come dangerously near involving the foreign powers on several occasions. The powers take the position that the disposal of the surplus is entirely a Chinese matter. However, the Canton authorities have manifested an intention to seize the local customs by force, with the result that the Powers have found it necessary to announce that any such step would be met by force on their part because of the necessity under the treaties of preserving the integrity of the customs.

JAPANESE

JAPANESE BOYCOTT.

In the spring of 1919 agitation against Japan was renewed on the ground that the so-called "Twenty-one Demands" should be abrogated and also that Kiachow should be returned to China. There were numerous meetings of students and other demonstrations and a boycott against Japanese goods. In July of the same year the Canton parliament telegraphed the parliaments of the various allied and associated powers refusing to recognize the three clauses of the Versailles Treaty concerning Shangtung.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS END.

Representatives of the allied and associated powers of Canton handed a second memorandum to the Southern Government on June 5, 1919 expressing the hope that the so-called peace conference at Shanghai might be resumed and brought to a successful conclusion. Dr. Wu Ting-fang replied that the Peking government had already accepted the resignations of its delegates and that the conference could not be resumed.

Following the course taken by Peking the Canton government at the end of October issued a manifesto proclaiming the cessation of the war with Germany and explaining that the treaty of peace could not be signed as it contained the three articles regarding Shangtung. At the same time a resolution was adopted by a mass meeting of prominent officials and others expressing appreciation of the action of the United States Senate in declining to ratify the Shangtung clause of the peace treaty.

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On December 20, 1919 the Canton government protested against the proposed loan of $50,000,000. to the Peking government by the Continental & Commercial Bank of Chicago, to be secured by the wine and tobacco monopoly.

SUN YAT SEN RESIGNS.

As a result of friction with the military leaders Sun Yat Sen tendered his resignation as a member of the "administrative council" of the Southern Government and left Canton. It appears that the failure of the military leaders to permit the election of Wu Ting-fang as governor and the arrest of numerous students and prominent citizens induced Dr. Sun to take the step. On March 29, 1920, Wu Ting-fang also left Canton, taking with him about HK$1,800,000. of the customs surplus which had been allocated to the Canton government by the Inspector General of Customs with the consent of the Peking authorities. It appears that Dr. Wu left because of his inability to cope with the military leaders in Canton who had gradually been usurping the power of government.

The departure of Dr. Wu, who was a member of the administrative council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, marked an end of the council and to a great extent of the constitutional government. It is true that General Ts'en Chun-hsun continued to perform the duties of chairman and General Lu Ying-ting, residing at Nanning, and General Tang Chi-yao at Yunnan, continued in office, but these men took no active part in the work of the council,

being

being merely represented by their nominal delegates. In the meantime Sun Yat Sen and Tang Shao-yao joined Wu Ting-fang in Shanghai.

CH'EN CHIUNG-MING ATTACKS.

During the summer of 1920 General Ch'en Chiung-ming began an attack on Kwangtung Province with Canton as his objective. Swatow and Waichow were captured in due course and the fall of Canton seemed imminent. On September 22 General Li Fu-lin, an independent commander on Honam Island, adjacent to Canton, and the Commissioner of Police at Canton suddenly announced their opposition to the then government and demanded the resignation of General Mo Rung-hsin, Tuchun of Kwangtung Province. General Mo declined to resign, however, and Admiral Tang Ting-kwang (湯廷光) established himself as acting military governor on Honam Island in opposition to the existing regime.

On October 23 General Ts'en Chun-hsun announced his resignation as chairman of the administrative council of the Canton government and advised the southern and western provinces to renounce their independence and unite themselves with Peking. On the following day, the military governor, Mo Yung-hsin, issued a similar proclamation and added that he would turn over the government to Admiral Tang Ting-kwang and withdraw from Canton. On October 28 Tuchun Mo actually fled leaving his Kwangsi troops to return overland to their native province, and on the following day the advance guard of General Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces entered Canton, thus putting an end to what was

termed

termed the Kwangsi military occupation of Canton.

The first act of General Ch'en Chiung-ming was to issue a proclamation declaring null and void the announcements of Ts'en Chun-hsun and Mo Yung-hsin regarding the cancelling of Kwangtung's independence and Ch'en also declared his allegience to the Southern Government thus bringing himself into accord with Sun Yat Sen, Wu Ting-fang and other southern leaders.

SUN YAT SEN COMES BACK.

As was expected Sun Yat Sen, Wu Ting-fang and Tang Shao-yi returned to Canton (November 28, 1920) and resumed their duties as members of the administrative council. In the meantime General Ch'en Chiung-ming had assumed office as Tuchun of the province and had issued a number of admirable orders looking toward the improvement of local conditions, including the suppression of gambling and other vices. General Ch'en Chiung-ming was now in control of the entire province and the Kwangsi faction which formerly occupied Kwangtung was maintaining a precarious existence within the province of Kwangsi only.

General Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces were estimated at 80,000 men. In the meantime, however, Sun Yat Sen undertook the recruiting of troops to be under the direct control of the Southern Government, and this was naturally regarded as an indication of a lack of confidence by Dr. Sun in General Ch'en Chiung-ming and the beginning of friction which finally resulted in a break between these two leaders.

SUN YAT SEN AGAIN ELECTED.

On April 7, 1921, the old parliament met and elected Sun Yat Sen "President of the Republic of China". It was reported that 225 members were present and that 222 votes were cast for Dr. Sun. As the parliament originally had nearly 1000 members, the legality of Sun Yat Sen's election was naturally a matter of grave doubt.

Dr. Sun was inaugurated on May 5, and immediately issued a mandate appointing his cabinet as follows: Wu Ting-fang, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ch'en Chiung-ming, Minister of Interior and of War; Tang Shao-yi, Minister of Finance; Tang Ting-kuang, Minister of the Navy; Li Lieh-chun, Chief of Staff and Hsu Chien (徐謙), President of the National Law Court.

It was evident from the enthusiasm shown by the people in connection with the inauguration ceremonies that Dr. Sun enjoyed considerable popularity in Canton and that he had become a power to be reckoned with in the political life of China. It was noted, however, that the merchant class was decidedly lukewarm and showed no enthusiasm. There was also evidence of class consciousness on the part of various labor organizations, which contributed very materially to the demonstration in Dr. Sun's favor.

HOSTILITIES RESUMED BETWEEN KWANGTUNG AND KWANGSI.

Hostilities between Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces had been resumed about the time of Dr. Sun's inauguration and a body of Kwangsi troops under the command of General Ch'en Ping-k'un (陳炳焜), who had been appointed by Peking, actually invaded Kwangtung Province. This stirred Ch'en Chiung-ming to action and his Kwangtung army began an advance on Wuchow, which was captured on June 26 without serious bloodshed. Ch'en Chiung-ming continued to consolidate his successes in Kwangsi with the result that in the course of a few months the entire province was under his control and he had reached the highest point in his career.

PROPOSED EXPEDITION AGAINST THE NORTH.

It was about this time that Sun Yat Sen came forward with his proposed expedition against Wu Pei-fu (吳佩孚) and the North. General Ch'en Chiung-ming was bitterly opposed to any such movement because the people of Kwangtung Province were not in a position to provide the necessary funds.

Sun persisted, however, and began a triumphal tour through Kwangsi Province, visiting Wuchow, Nanning and finally arriving at Kweilin on October 15, 1921. At Kweilin Sun was received with all the honors of a real head of the state. He was supported by Tang Chi-yao and Li Lieh-chun and a number of other military leaders

who

who had collected in all some eight or ten thousand troops. When the end of the year came, however, Sun was still at Kweilin and it was evident that his northern expedition would not materialize.

MACAO BOUNDARY DISPUTE.

It was during the autumn of 1921 that the Macao boundary trouble developed. This was due to a dispute between the Portuguese authorities and the Chinese with regard to the boundaries of the Macao Colony. For a time it looked as if actual hostilities might develop but the trouble was finally adjusted through diplomatic negotiations.

REPRESENTATION OF SOUTHERN GOVERNMENT.

"President Sun" appointed Ma Soo (馬素) as the agent of the Southern Government in the United States and Wu Ting-fang, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made it known officially that the Southern Government desired to be invited to send delegates to the Washington Conference.

BREACH BETWEEN SUN YAT SEN AND CH'EN CHIUNG-MING.

Although Sun Yat Sen remained at Kweilin, it became evident as the year 1922 advanced that the proposed expedition against the North was disintegrating and that the friction between Sun Yat Sen and Ch'en Chiung-ming was becoming more acute. General Tang Chi-yao suddenly left Kweilin with his troops with the object of starting

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an attack on Yunnan Province. This brought forth a public denunciation from Sun Yat Sen. Conditions in Kwangsi Province continued to go from bad to worse and the Kwangsi clique, by which Sun was largely supported, was pressing for the overthrow of Ch'en Chiung-ming.

Sun Yat Sen returned to Canton in April (1922) and Ch'en Chiung-ming immediately resigned and left for his home at Waichow in Kwangtung Province. Dr. Wu Ting Fang was appointed civil governor. Many of the troops who had originally formed a part of the northern expedition began to return from Kweilin and Kwangtung and Kwangsi Provinces suffered from robberies and depredations committed by disorganized bands of soldiers and bandits.

Sun's retreating army passed through Wuchow in May en route to Shiuchow, the northern terminus of the Kwangtung section of the Canton-Hankow Railway. It was announced that the army of the northern expedition would change its base and that the attack on the north would be launched from Shiuchow instead of Kweilin.

The withdrawal of Sun's troops from Kweilin resulted in the flight of the governor of Kwangsi who had been appointed by Sun and the retreat of all Cantonese troops from Nanning, Wuchow and other important points in Kwangsi Province.

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On April 27 a surprise attack was made on the Chinese naval vessels in Canton harbor resulting in the capture of all of them. This attack was undoubtedly made on Sun's orders with a view to bringing about the reorganization of the personnel, which had not been entirely favorable to Sun's plans.

During the Spring of this year (1922) it was becoming increasingly evident that Sun was intriguing with the labor leaders to win their support. He pardoned a radical agitator by the name of P.S. Chan who had been convicted of murdering his wife and generally showed such a subservient attitude to labor leaders and the radical elements that the latter began to assume that the control of the government was in their hands. They bullied the local officials and undoubtedly had much to do with the organization and conduct of the great seamen's strike at Hongkong. Labor agitation also showed itself in the disorders which developed during the Spring in the Portuguese colony of Macao, when it looked as if fighting would occur between the Portuguese and the Chinese.

SUN DRIVEN OUT OF CANTON.

On June 1 Sun Yat Sen returnedtto Canton from Shiuchow where he had been haranguing the troops of the northern expedition. He came back because the discontent amongst the various politicians and military factions was reaching an acute stage and there was evidence of his position being in danger. His return, however,

failed

failed to save the situation. Canton was surprised and captured by Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops under the command of General Yip Kui(葉舉) on June 16 and Sun barely escaped to a gunboat in the harbor, which immediately dropped down the river to Whampoa. Sun did not leave Canton immediately but endeavored through intrigues to win back popular support and regain control of the city. It was evident that he expected his northern expedition at Shiuchow to come to his assistance. Yip Kui soon succeeded in smashing up the northern expedition, however, and Dr. Sun finally left Canton for Hongkong on a British gunboat on August 9. Before his departure Sun Yat Sen gathered several gunboats under his command and fought his way into the harbor and bombarded the city on two occasions. His ships then anchored just off the British concession on Shameen Island, where they remained until his departure.

While Sun was still in the harbor and hoping to regain control vigorous efforts were made to bring about a general strike and the labor unions were active in their endeavors to intimidate the people with a view to embarrassing the military authorities and securing the return of Dr. Sun. Some of the workmen in the electric power plant went out and attempts were also made to cut off the city's water supply. General Yip Kui took a firm stand, however, and the workmen were soon cowed into submission.

CH'EN CHIUNG-MING

CH'EN CHIUNG MING RETURNS TO CANTON.

On August 15 (1922) General Ch'en Chiung-ming returned to Canton and was chosen commander-in-chief of the military forces of the province. He immediately set about improving the finances and tried to consolidate his position. He was warmly supported by the merchants and most of the upper class of the Chinese and undoubtedly had the sympathy of many foreigners.

The labor element, however, was bitterly opposed to Ch'en Chiung-ming and continually endeavored to embarrass his administration. A number of bomb explosions occurred in public buildings, moving picture theaters etc., designed undoubtedly to frighten the people and weaken the government's position.

General Hsü Ch'ung-chih (許崇智), a Cantonese leader who remained loyal to Sun, entered Foochow and began the organization of an army with a view to invading Kwangtung Province and driving Ch'en Chiung-ming out of Canton. Towards the end of December Wuchow was occupied by an army made up principally of the Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops, with a scattering of Cantonese. The Yunnanese were commanded by General Yang Hsi-min (楊希閔) and the Kwangsi army was under Shum Hung-ying (沈鴻英). There was an abundance of evidence to show that Sun Yat Sen's agents were in close contact with these officers and that they had designs on Canton.

The notes of the Bank of Canton, which had long been weak, began to decline rapidly and Ch'en Chiung-ming's position showed signs of increasing weakness.

It

It was about this time that Dr. Sun gave out an interview to a Japanese newspaper correspondent in which he advocated an alliance between Japan, China and Germany, pointing out that this would effectively check European aggression in Asia. Later English language newspapers in the Far East published articles alleging that documents had been discovered showing that Sun Yat Sen had been in close touch with von Hintz, formerly German minister at Peking and subsequently German ambassador at Moscow.

CH'EN CHIUNG MING AGAIN DRIVEN OUT.

Combined Yunnanese and Kwangsi forces which captured Wuchow just at the close of 1922 continued their march down the West River toward Canton. Ch'en Chiung-ming's forces made half-hearted stands at one or two strategic points but did not check the invaders, who numbered some twenty thousand men. The Civil Governor Ch'en Hsi-ju (陳席儒) left Canton for Hongkong on January 11, 1923, and on the night of January 15 General Ch'en Chiung-ming himself slipped out of the city and transferred his base to Waichow in the eastern part of the province. Most of the Cantonese troops loyal to Ch'en moved out at the same time and the Yunnanese-Kwangsi army occupied Canton without resistance on January 16.

The invaders let it be known that they were in sympathy with Sun Yat Sen but they showed no consideration for the Cantonese troops remaining in the city and friction soon developed between the various armies. The Kwangsi

commanders

commanders undertook systematically to disarm the the Cantonese, who withdrew to Honam Island across the river from the city. General Wei Bong-ping, who had been appointed by Sun Yat Sen to reorganise the military forces in the city and establish order, was suddenly arrested and detained on the charge of having conspired against the Yunnanese-Kwangsi troops. Hu Han-min, who had been appointed Civil Governor a short time before, fled to the British concession and left shortly after for Hongkong. Sun Fo (孫科), the son of Sun Yat Sen, General Li Lieh-chün and others also fled to Hongkong.

DR. SUN RETURNS ONCE MORE.

In the midst of the confusion General Yang Hsih-min, the Yunnanese commander-in-chief, published a telegram urging Dr. Sun to return to Canton. At the same time the Yunnanese commander let it be understood that he was not in accord with the Kwangsi leaders. General Wei Bong-ping was released as a result of Yunnanese pressure and on February 21 (1923) Sun Yat Sen returned to Canton.

It may be of interest to note that in passing through Hongkong Dr. Sun was accorded an unusually friendly reception by the Governor and other British authorities. This was taken to indicate a change in British policy, which had been more or less unfriendly to Dr. Sun.

Abandoning the title of President of China, Sun Yat Sen assumed that of Commander in Chief of the Army

and

and Navy - Generalissimo. He established his offices at the Yunnanese headquarters and issued an order requiring General Shum Hung-ying, the Kwangsi commander, to withdraw his forces from Canton and take up positions on the West River. This was intended to rid the city of the Kwangsi faction and leave a free hand to the Yunnanese. General Shum Hung-ying failed to respond and by a rather strange coincidence a mandate was issued by the Peking government appointing him Director General of Military Affairs in Kwangtung and Kwangsi provinces. This mandate is supposed to have been issued at the instigation of Wu Pei-fu. Shum Hung-ying declined to accept the appointment but at the same time definitely refused to obey Sun Yat Sen's orders to evacuate Canton.

On May 26 the Yunnanese and Kwangsi troops finally clashed. The Kwangsi forces occupied the most strategic positions, but the Yunnanese proved themselves the better soldiers and forced Shum Hing-ying to evacuate Canton. There was brief but sharp fighting in which the Cantonese troops favorable to Sun Yat Sen joined with the Yunnanese. The Kwangsi forces attempted to concentrate at Shiuhing (肇慶) on the West River but were besieged and ultimately driven over the border into Kwangsi Province.

Dr. Sun finally established his headquarters in the Cement Works on Honam Island and undertook to organize his government along national lines, creating Departments of War, Finance, Interior and Foreign Affairs. He appointed secretaries to these departments, including Dr. C. C. Wu as Minister of Foreign Affairs

and

and Li Lieh-chun, Minister of War. Sun Fo, Dr. Sun's son, was appointed Mayor of Canton.

FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

Great difficulty was experienced by Sun Yat Sen in raising funds for the support of the troops and the administration. A series of unpopular tax measures were introduced by the municipal government and also by Sun Yat Sen's administration. At the same time the various military commanders were allowed to occupy rich sections of the city and province where they levied tribute from the inhabitants. The railways were also to all intents and purposes taken over by the troops, who demanded a share in the earnings regardless of whether or not the companies were paying operating expenses. The soldiers impressed coolies and other workmen and compelled them to act as carriers for the commissariat and other departments.

With the approach of summer the Sun regime launched an attack on Chen Chiung-ming's headquarters at Waichow, the Yunnanese army and the reorganized Cantonese troops, as well as a limited number of Kwangsi soldiers who had remained loyal to Sun Yat Sun, participating. Waichow was subjected to some bombardment both by artillery and airplanes and although a breach was made in the city wall, Ch'en Chiung-ming managed to hold out and finally raised the siege. As a reason for this attack Sun declared that it was necessary first to rid Kwangtung Province of traitors before an attack against Wu Pei-fu could be started.

Toward

Toward autumn the Sun forces found themselves attacked by considerable bodies of Ch'en Chiung-ming troops under Yip Kui, Lin Fu (林虎) and other commanders and for some inexplicable reason panic spread amongst the Yunnanese, who began to retreat without any semblance of order on Canton. Ch'en's troops followed them to a point within sight of the city and the capture of Canton seemed imminent.

For reasons which have never been clearly understood but which are assumed to have been political, Ch'en Chiung-ming's army suddenly ceased its advance and began to withdraw toward Waichow, and in the meantime Sun's forces were re-formed at White Cloud Mountain and other strategic points. As the year advanced it became evident that Ch'en Chiung-ming had definitely abandoned any intention of attacking Canton and Sun's forces slowly extended their lines toward Sheklung and other points on the Canton-Kowloon Railway.

KWANGSI PROVINCE.

The situation in Kwangsi Province continued obscure. Wuchow was captured by the Cantonese in July, but Nanning and Kweilin and other important cities remained in the hands of Kwangsi leaders. General Lu Yung-t'ing (陸榮廷) held Lungchow and Lin Ch'un-ting continued to occupy Nanning, while Shum Hung-ying, who had resumed nominally friendly relations with Sun Yat Sen, gradually worked his way back from Kwangsi Province toward Kweilin. Bandits and robbers infested almost the entire area of both Kwangsi and Kwangtung Provinces, so that travel became difficult and dangerous.

THREATENED

THREATENED SEIZURE OF MARITIME CUSTOMS.

In November Sun Yat Sen's attitude respecting the Maritime Customs became so threatening that the British and French governments ordered men-of-war to Canton. The other powers interested, including the United States, Japan, Italy and Portugal, followed suit and by the middle of December some twelve or fourteen war vessels had assembled and the consular body had notified the Sun regime that the threatened seizure of the customs would not be permitted.

The crisis grew out of the fact that the Sun government, as on former occasions, demanded a share in the customs surplus. This the Peking government declined to grant and Sun Yat Sen then announced that he would seize the customs.

The powers interested renewed their declaration to the effect that the disposition of the surplus was a matter solely for the Chinese authorities, but that the integrity of the customs would be maintained under the existing treaties. This situation was still acute when the year ended.

END.

In quintuplicate.

Copy to American Legation, Peking.

Copy to Commander, South China Patrol.

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J/W

A true copy of signed original. MDW.

Romanization used in Report and/or Canton Romanization.	Giles Romanization	Chinese Characters
Chang Ming-chi	Chang Ming-ch'i	張鳴岐
Chiang Tsun-kwei	Chiang Tsun-kwei	蔣尊簋
Hu Han-min	Hu Han-min	胡漢民
Ch'en Chiung-ming	Ch'en Chiung-ming	陳炯明
Hsieh Chi-yuan	Hsieh Chi-yuan	謝己原
Tang Shao-yi	T'ang Shao-yi	唐紹儀
Yuan Shih-k'ai	Yuan Shih-k'ai	袁世凱
Lung Chih-kuang	Lung Chi-kuang	龍濟光
Chen Ching-hua	Ch'en Ching-hua	陳景華
Tang Chi-yao	T'ang Chi-yao	唐繼堯
Tang Hsueh-dun	T'ang Chueh-tun	湯覺頓
Lu Yung-ting	Lu Jung-t'ing	陸榮廷
Liang Chi-chao	Liang Ch'i-ch'ao	梁啟超
Li Yuan-hung	Li Yuan-hung	黎元洪
Liu Hsien-shih	Liu Hsien-shih	劉顯世
Ts'en Chun-hsun	Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan	岑春煊
Tsai Ao	Ts'ai O	蔡鍔
Li Lieh-chun	Li Lieh-chün	李烈鈞
Chen Ping-kuan	Ch'en Ping-kun	陳炳焜
Li Shun	Li Shun (Ch'un)	李純
Chu Ching-lan	Chu Ch'ing-lan	朱慶瀾
Cheng Pi-kwang	Ch'eng Pi-kuang	程璧光
Wu Ching-lien	Wu Ching-lien	吳景濂
Sun Hung-yi	Sun Hung-yi	孫洪伊
Chang Kai-ju	Chang K'ai-ju	張開儒
Mo Ying-hsien	Mo Jung-hsin	莫榮新
Feng Kuo-chang	Feng Kuo-chang	馮國璋

Romanization used in Report and/or Canton Romanization.	Giles Romanization	Chinese Characters
Lin Pao-yih	Lin Pao-yi	懌光謙孚素舉智閔英儒科虎
Tang Ting-kwang	T'ang T'ing-kuang	蔡廷　佩　崇希鴻庸
Hsü Chien	Hsü Ch'ien	林湯徐吳馬葉許楊沈陳孫林
Wu Pei-fu	Wu P'ei-fu	
Ma Soo	Ma Su	
Yip Kwi	Yeh Chü	
Hsü Ch'ung-chih	Hsü Ch'ung-chih	
Yang Hsi-min	Yang Hsi-min	
Shum Hung-ying	Shen Hung-ying	
Ch'en Hsi-ju	Ch'en Hsi-ju	
Sun Fo	Sun K'o	
Lin Fu	Lin Hu	

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1925
MAR 25
WAR DEPARTMENT

C O P Y.

February 7, 1925.

His Excellency

Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman,

American Minister,

Peking.

Sir:-

I have the honor to make the following report:

1. Pursuant to your request I left Peking on January 19th and arrived at Shanghai 8:00 A. M. January 23rd.

The purpose of my visit was to investigate the military situation at and about that place; the circumstances surrounding the demand made at a meeting of the Consuls General in Shanghai for France, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Great Britain and the United States, on Marshals Chi Hsieh-yuan and Sun Chuan-fang that no Chinese troops remain within rifle shot distance of the foreign inhabited area of Shanghai in the future and that any such troops then within such distance be removed at once; and the unanimous opinion expressed by the same Consuls General that an international military force should be immediately sent to Shanghai to ensure compliance with this demand which was essential for security of foreign settlements. See telegram from Consul General, Shanghai, January 17, 3 p.m.

2. After a conference with Consul General Cunningham

and a subsequent one with Rear Admiral C. B. McVay, U.S.N., Commanding the Yangtze River Patrol, who had arrived in Shanghai from Hankow January 17th, I sent to the Legation the following radiogram, dated January 23, 1925:

"Have had consultation with Cunningham and Admiral McVay, confident present forces available from foreign war vessels and local volunteers ample to handle present conditions or any that may arise. Cunningham informs me that prior to meeting of Consular Body which resulted in demand quoted in telegram of January 17th, 3 p.m., he was visited by Pratt who said that among British there was desire that an international force occupy Soochow and Kashing. Cunningham objected as too far extended - Pratt suggested occupation Shanghai north and Lunghua junction. Cunningham said this matter for military and suggested that no Chinese troops remain in rifle shot foreign inhabited area. This phrase was adopted in subsequent Consular Body demand. At meeting which followed representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States seemed equally and spontaneously to desire international military force. Japanese Consul General passive with no opinion expressed. Holland representative passive. According to Cunningham's belief no consultation held by any foreign representative with military officers prior making demand and expressing opinion noted in his telegram of January 17th, 1500. Cunningham not sure that volunteers plus landing force would be sufficient for disarming and controlling

defeated soldiers seeking refuge foreign settlement. Pratt was sure they will not be. Cunningham has no opinion as to character of any international military force proposed, leaving that to opinion military officers. He expressed opinion that Pratt was affected in judgment of the situation by the desire of the British for an international military force for defense purposes. Believe Pratt a man of poor judgment. French Consul a person of brief experience. I believe Admiral McVay with his colleagues has situation thoroughly in hand and recommend no action be taken. I believe recommendation as to foreign military force result pressure on Consuls by business interests. This also opinion Admiral McVay."

3. The military situation then existent was briefly as follows:

Marshal Chi Hsieh-yuan was in occupation of Shanghai and the Lunghua Arsenal. He had under his command his own 6th Luchun Division and the 19th Luchun Division, a total force estimated at 6,000 men. Allied with him was Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, Commanding the 1st and 2nd Chekiang Divisions, totalling an estimated force of 6,000 men.

Marshal Chi had been called upon by the existing Government in Peking to resign his command and turn over Shanghai and the Arsenal to officers appointed by that Government. On his refusal to do so a Fengtien force had been sent down the Tientsin-Pukow Railway to attack him. This force was commanded by Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, formerly Tuchun of Chekiang and recently appointed Tupan of Kiangsu. It included a Russian unit variously estimated as from 600 to 2000.

I believe the first figure to be about correct. Marshal Lu remained in Nanking,- General Chang Tsung-chang, who had commanded the 1st Fengtien Army in the Chihli-Fengtien War, taking command in the field of active operations against Marshal Chi.

General Chang crossed the river at Pukow and advanced along the railway,- contact occurring between considerable numbers at Wusih on the railway.

To this point Marshal Chi moved all his forces and succeeded in repulsing several attacks from the Fengtien troops.

Marshal Sun was moving his divisions north on the west side of Lake Tai Hu, through Ishing, his objective being Changchow, on the railroad. Had this attack been made it would have cut the Fengtien communications and taken their forces in flank and rear. The military situation seemed in favor of Marshal Chi.

4. In itself the situation did not seem to present any great peril to Shanghai. However, it must be remembered that a sanguinary warfare had been waged about Shanghai during September and October of 1924, during which fighting had taken place within ten or twelve miles of the foreign settlements, and defeated soldiers had sought refuge in the city under foreign protection.

A few days previous to my arrival Marshal Chi had attacked General Chang Yuan-ming, who, under authority of a mandate from the existing Government as Defense Commissioner of Shanghai, was then in occupation of Shanghai and the Arsenal. Chang had been defeated and with some 10,000 to 12,000 of his men sought refuge in the foreign settlement of Shanghai. The soldiers were disarmed by the Shanghai Volunteer

Corps and Police, and detachments from foreign warships lying off the city. They had been placed in detention camps in different part s of the city, surrounded by barbed wire fences and under guard, and prior to my arrival had been sent by commercial boats to Tsingtao.

During the fighting which preceded their defeat, minor engagements had taken place very close to the city, some shots falling in the grounds of foreign residences.

These circumstances and experiences, the anxiety felt through the period of the internment of the defeated soldiers that they might overcome their guards and attempt the looting of the city, and the example of what had recently happened in Canton, combined to make acute a fear among the foreigners than another crisis might result from the warfare then going on, in which Shanghai's defences would prove insufficient, and the city would be given over to looting.

5. It was under these circumstances that the meeting of the Consuls General occurred , above alluded to. Mr. Cunningham tole me that prior to this meeting he was visited informally by Mr. Pratt, the British Consul General, who said that among the British there was a strong desire that an international military force occupy Kashing and Soochow. To this Mr. Cunningham objected as too extended an operation. Mr. Pratt agreed, suggesting an occupation of Shanghai North Station and Lunghua Junction. Mr. Cunningham demurred on the ground that this was a matter for military opinion and suggested that the demand be made as to

rifle shot distance, alluded to in my telegram of the 23rd. The meeting then followed as reported. I refer again in this report to Mr. Pratt's conversation with Mr. Cunningham, as I consider it very significant of British initiative in attempting to bring about an international foreign military intervention. It seems to me that Mr. Pratt was endeavoring to gain Mr. Cunningham's assistance and co-operation to this end, and would have liked to have it appear at the subsequent meeting that the British and American Consuls General were a unit in their opinion, if indeed it might not be possible to make Mr. Cunningham bear the whole burden. If this were not his purpose I cannot see why he did not omit his informal conversation with Mr. Cunningham and make the statements he made to him to the general meeting of the Consuls General instead.

6. In view of the tremendous foreign investments in Shanghai and the considerable number of foreigners living there, the heavy responsibility of the Consuls General is apparent.

I consider the demand made on Marshals Chi and Sun was reasonable and proper, and think they should be supported.

7. As reported in my telegram of January 23rd, I do not think the opinion of the Consuls General than an international military force immediately be sent to Shanghai to enforce this demand was justified by the conditions. On my arrival there were in the river and available ten foreign war vessels. From these, landing forces of sailors and marines, added to the Shanghai Volunteer Corps and Police, made a force as follows:

American	450.
Italian	450.
British	200.
Japanese	200.
French	1500.
Shanghai Volunteer Corps and Police	1750.
Total	4550.

An inspection of the limits of the foreign settlement and of the proposed distribution of troops indicated to me a complete ability of this force to accomplish either of two things:

1st. By fire action to prevent the entrance into the city of any number of defeated Chinese troops that might reasonably be expected to attempt to seek refuge there. This Admiral McVay told me was the course it was intended to follow. The defeated soldiers, or indeed any body of soldiers, would be warned not to enter. If they persisted in an attempt to do so they would be prevented by fire action.

2nd. If for motives of humanity or policy it was decided to admit defeated soldiers; to disarm, intern and guard them with no cessation of guard duty on the settlement limits.

8. This force would not be sufficient to move to and keep clear an area about the foreign settlements rifle shot distance in depth. But for obvious reasons I do not consider that such an attempt should be made.

9. On January 26th Marshal Chi was heavily attacked near Wusih. At a critical juncture in the conflict the 19th Division deserted him and joined the enemy, one brigade of this division opening fire on him. Marshal Chi was dragged from the battle

by loyal officers, protected by the remnants of the 6th Division and fled to Shanghai, arriving at Chapei at 10 A.M. on the 27th. He would not seek refuge in the foreign settlements. In company with Mr. Roy Anderson, I called on him at 4 o'clock that afternoon. He did not understand the failure of Marshal Suh to attack, and hoping that he would, awaited news to that effect when he proposed returned himself to attack. News reached him during the night of the hopeless nature of his predicament, and issuing orders to his forces to retreat on Hangchow and to keep out of Shanghai, he fled to Japan on the morning of January 28th, with ten members of his staff, on board the NIKKO MARU. I do not think Marshal Chi had more than 3,000 troops left, and these were cut off from Shanghay by the prompt arrival of Fengtien troops. Marshal Sun deserted Chi and joined the enemy.

10. I returned to Peking Feburary 4th.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. H. BARNARD,
Lieut. Col., F. A.,
Military Attache.

COPY.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTELL. DIV.
1927
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WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 12 1927

DOCUMENT NO. 6.

Resolution Relating to the Bolshevization of China Passed at the 7th Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party, Moscow, in the first part of 1927. This document was received by the Soviet Military Attache on March 28, 1927. The translation was made from a document not damaged by fire, which was discovered after photographs of the damaged document had been made.

Confidential

Resolution relating to the Chinese question carried at the VII Extended Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the International Communist Party, Moscow.

I. Imperialism and the Chinese Revolution.

1. The Chinese revolution is one of the most important and powerful factors which disturbs the stabilization of capitalism. During the last two years imperialism has suffered in China considerable defeats, the results of which will produce a considerable influence on the exacerbation of the crisis of the world capitalism. In consequence of the victorious advance of the National Army towards North China, the domination of the imperialists was practically undermined in half of the country.

Further victories of the revolutionary armies of Canton, supported by the mass of the Chinese people, will result in the victory over the imperialists, in the independence of China and its revolutionary unification, which will increase by many times the force of resistance to the influence of imperialism.

The fact that Sun Chuan-fang was unable to check the advance of the Canton Army has persuaded the imperialist powers that the traditional method of using the militarists for the defeating of the Nationalist revolutionary movement is no more effective. At the same time mutual rivalry does not permit the imperialist powers to unite for an open military intervention. Imperialism is looking for new methods which would correspond to the new situation. The new policy tends towards the recognition of the Canton Government. The initiative in this direction is taken by the American imperialists. Even England and Japan consider the recognition of the Canton Government as an admissible political measure. However, these are only diplomatic stratagems behind which hostile designs of the imperialists against the revolution are concealed.

2. The fundamental power of imperialism in China consists in the actual monopoly of everything that concerns the financial and industrial

life of the country (the salt tax, the mortgage of the customs revenues, railways, waterways, mines, heavy industry - all this belongs chiefly to foreign capital.) Should capitalism keep this solid base, it will find in China a serious support in the matter of stabilization of capitalism. Owing to its huge population, China is a market with boundless possibilities. It may become a most profitable field for the investment of capital, provided the necessary political guarantees are secured. The enormous resources of raw materials are hardly touched in China. Therefore imperialism will make desperate efforts to crush the Chinese revolution which threatens to overthrow it. If it does not succeed in crushing the latter by means of its traditional method - the provocation of civil war - or possibly by means of armed intervention, imperialism will try to frustrate the national movement of liberation which develops alongside the revolution.

In spite of the antagonism that exists among the imperialistic powers the possibility of an armed intervention still remains. Foreign intervention in China takes a peculiar form. In the present circumstances, imperialism prefers to effect the intervention by organizing civil war and financing the counter-revolutionary forces which are fighting the revolution. Just now it is being attempted to unite the troops of Chang Tso-lin with those of Sun Chuan-fang in order to check the advance of the National Army. It is quite evident that this united anti-revolutionary front will be created under the guidance and with the help of imperialism. The victory of revolution in China would deal to the world capitalism such a heavy blow that the imperialistic powers will strive by all means to crush it.

3. From the international point of view the Chinese revolution, be it but for its anti-militaristic character, is an essential part of

the international revolution. This fact is connected in China with the following most important circumstances which favor the further development and deepening of the Chinese revolution:

a) The competition of the imperialistic powers in China which weakens the position of the world imperialism.

b) The crisis of world capitalism.

c) The growth of the proletarian movement in Western Europe.

An armed intervention in China doubtless will meet with a resistance on the part of the labor classes in the imperialistic countries.

d) The development of the national-revolutionary movement in the colonies which doubtless will still more increase under the influence of the further development of the Chinese revolution.

e) The fact that proletarian dictatorship exists in the U.S.S.R. in connection with close geographical proximity of the latter to China and the geographical remoteness of China from the basic centers of the economic and military-political power of the imperialistic powers.

4. Parallel with the rapid development of the national revolutionary movement, the social forces participating in it are involved in a no less rapid process of regrouping.

The national revolution in China develops under such peculiar conditions that it differs substantially from the classical bourgeois revolutions of the western European states of the past century, as well as from the revolution of 1905 in Russia. The chief of these peculiarities is the semi-colonial position of China, which is dependent on foreign imperialism. Another difference between the Chinese revolution and the bourgeois - democratic revolutions of the past consists in that the Chinese revolution is taking place in the period of the world revolution and forms an integral part of the world's movement tending to destroy the capitalistic regime. This factor will define the history of the Chinese revolution and the grouping of the social forces that participate in it.

The class forces of the Chinese revolution unfold on the background of the extreme backwardness of the Chinese economy, which results from the feebly developed industrial capitalism, the primitiveness of the technique of the rural economy, the incredibly low standard of living of the mass of the Chinese population and the presence of numerous anachronisms resulting from a half-feudal system, all of which are being overthrown by the pressure of the revolutionary armies and involved in the struggle of the toiling masses of the towns and villages.

The chief peculiarity of the present economic state of China is the variety of forms that exist side by side in the Chinese economic state, from high finance down to the economic anachronisms of a patriarchal-clannish character with the predominance of different forms of commercial capital, small handicraft and domestic industry in towns and villages.

This is the cause of the feeble dissimilarity in the Chinese (meaning that the Chinese differ so little from each other), as well as of the deficiency of the organization of the fundamental politico-social forces of the national revolution.

Along with this are of the greatest importance the revolution of 1911, which, after having taken place, was frustrated; the collapse of the Central Government, which has become worse during the last year, and the fact that in a large part of the country organs of a military nature have been established by the Chinese militarists for the administration of it.

Chinese militarism is a social-political force which dominates at present the greater part of the territory of China. A peculiarity of Chinese militarism is the fact that being a military organization, it is at the same time one of the fundamental channels of original capitalistic accumulation in China, which rests on a whole system of governmental institutions of a semi-feudal character. The fact that there exist in China such governmental institutions as Chinese militarism is a result of the semi-colonial position of China, the dismemberment of the Chinese territory, the backwardness of Chinese economic

conditions and the considerable over-population of the Chinese villages.

The development of the national revolutionary movement in China rests at present on the agrarian revolution. The economic state of the Chinese village presents a picture of the closest interweaving of numerous anachronisms of a semi-feudal character with elements of developing capitalism.

The extreme backwardness of the Chinese economic state in general, together with the parcelling of landed property in China, the huge number of tenants and semi-tenants, the primitiveness of the technique of the small, as well as of the large rural economy, the huge agrarian over-population, together with the development of commercial agriculture and the process of class-stratification in the villages - all this exceedingly complicates the general situation in the villages and puts a series of obstacles in the way of the agrarian revolution in China.

In consequence of objective circumstances the class struggle in the Chinese village tends to develop in the following directions: Against foreign imperialism; against Chinese imperialism; against the remnant of large land-owner-ship; against the nobility; against the usurious commercial capital; and partly against the rich peasants who exploit the others.

5. The consecutive stages of development of the revolutionary movement in China are characterized by serious regroupings of the social forces. During the first stage one of the chief motive powers consisted of the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeois-intelligentsia who sought the support of the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie.

In the second stage the character of the movement changes and its social base is shifted to another grouping of classes. New and more revolutionary forms of the struggle are developing. On the Chinese arena a new factor of the highest order appears in the person of the laboring class.

The economic strikes grow into a political struggle against imperialism and become most important from the historic point of view. The proletariat forms a block with the peasantry, which enters into an active struggle for its interests, as well as with the petty town bourgeoisie and a part of the capitalistic bourgeoisie. This combination of forces brought about a politically corresponding grouping of parties in the Kuomintang and the Canton Government. At present the movement is on the threshold of the third stage and on the eve of a new regouping of the classes. At this stage of the development the motive force of the movement will be a block - of a still greater revolutionary character - the block of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty town bourgeoisie, while the greater part of the big capitalistic bourgeoisie will be excluded. This does not mean that the whole of the bourgeoisie, as a class, will quit the arena of the national struggle for liberation. Besides the petty and middle bourgeoisie some forces of the big bourgeoisie may also for some time more go hand in hand with the revolution.

But at this stage the proletariat will become more and more the leader of the movement.

In this period of transition of the national movement of liberation to a new revolutionary phase, the big bourgeoisie will see that the anti-imperialistic struggle effected under the leadership of the proletariat slips away from its control and becomes objectively a menace to its class interests.

It will strive to wrest from the hands of the proletariat the leading part, in order to crush the revolution and will try to exert an influence on the revolutionary movement by means of the ideology of bourgeois nationalism as a counterpoise to the ideology of class struggle.

6. Parallel to the grouping of the class-forces of the revolution the forces of the counter-revolution take also shape. This latter process is, in its turn, closely connected with the imperialistic policy and develops under its influence exactly in the same way as the development of the national forces is connected with the world revolution and is effected under its influence (the U.S.S.R. and the western proletariat.

Chang Tso-lin, Wu Pei-fu and Sun Chuan-fang strive to unite their forces to resist the victorious revolutionary movement. This counter-revolutionary block is created under the influence and with the help of imperialism. The big industrial bourgeoisie shows great indecision and tends towards predominance. Seeing that the militarists are no more an effective weapon for the crushing of the revolutionary movement, imperialism is looking for other allies in the nationalistic movement and resorts to a reconciliatory policy. Imperialism strives to induce the nationalistic bourgeoisie to break off with the revolutionary block. In order to strengthen the position of the agents of imperialism in the ranks of the nationalistic movement, a part of the big bourgeoisie and even some militarists who so far had stood aside of the national-revolutionary movement and were even hostile to it began to side with the Canton Government. The aim of thismanoeuvre is to wrest the leadership of the national-revolutionary movement from the revolutionary block of the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie and thus to impede the development of the revolution. The inspiration of all these machinations of the counter-revolution is the world-imperialism.

In this transitory period, when a gradual secession of the big bourgeoisie from the revolution is historically unavoidable, the proletariat must, of course, largely use all these parts of the bourgeoisie which still at present take an active part in the struggle against imperialism and militarism.

On the other hand, the proletariat and its party must tactically take advantage of all dissensions among the strata of the bourgeoisie which recede from the revolution, as well as of the dissensions among the different imperialistic groups, by no means forgetting their fundamental aim and conforming to the latter all their strategical manoeuvres and tactical measures.

III. General Prospects of the Chinese Revolution.

7. The general prospects of the Chinese revolution become very clear when the grouping of the classes is considered from this point of view. Although, historically speaking, the Chinese revolution at its present stage of development bears a bourgeois democratic character, it must get the character of a wider social movement. It is essential that the Chinese revolution should not result in the creation of such social-political conditions as would lead to a capitalistic development of the country. The Chinese revolution which is effected in the period of collapse of capitalism, is a part of the general struggle tending to overthrow capitalism and to introduce socialism. The structure of a revolutionary state is defined by the class on which it is based. It will not be a purely bourgeois-democratic state. The state will be a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry and other classes that are being exploited. It will be a revolutionary anti-imperialistic government up to the time when it will develop into a non-capitalistic (socialistic) one.

The Chinese Communist Party must strain every nerve to realize in the end this revolutionary aim of taking the way to a non-capitalistic development. Otherwise, i.e., if the bourgeoisie obtains victory over the proletariat and the bourgeoisie that leads it, the power in the country will practically fall again into the hands of the foreign imperialists, even though in new forms of domination.

8. The further development of the prospects of the Chinese revolution depends, in the first place, on the part which is played by the proletariat. The events of the last years have shown that a militarist revolutionary national front can be organized only under the leadership of the proletariat. The struggle against the hegemony of capitalists is successfully carried out only under the hegemony of the proletariat. This is a fundamental principle on which defines the tactics of the Chinese revolution.

The feudal-militaristic cliques which are the power de facto in a considerable part of the country are a reactionary force and agents of the imperialists. The native bourgeoisie, as a class, is comparatively little developed and is weak. The economically stronger elements of the bourgeoisie (the financial bourgeoisie and the compradores) are so closely connected with foreign capitalism by commercial and financial bonds that they have never participated in the anti-imperialistic struggle. The industrial bourgeoisie is hand in hand with the national-revolutionary movement, as long as the latter has a bourgeois-democratic character; but at the first signs of revolution it either withdraws or strives to resort to "sabotage". The petty bourgeoisie (the petty bourgeoisie-intelligentsia, the students, artisans, petty traders, etc.), are, in a country like China, a revolutionary party. It has played an important part in the past and will play one in the future too, but it is unable to act by itself and must go together either with the bourgeoisie or with the proletariat. When the bourgeoisie withdraws from the revolution or conspires against it, the exploited middle classes fall under the influence of the proletariat. In such circumstances the motive power of the Chinese revolution at its present stage is the revolutionary block with the proletariat as the predominant factor in this block.

IV. The National Revolution and the Peasantry.

At the present transitory stage of development of the revolution the agrarian question begins to become acute. It is the principal problem of the present situation. The class that will peremptorily take up this fundamental question and will be able to give a radical solution of it will become the leader of the revolution. In the present state of affairs in China the proletariat is the only class which is able to carry out a radical agrarian policy, which is the condition sine qua non of the victorious issue of the anti-imperialistic struggle and the

further development of the revolution.

The force of the Chinese militarism consists, on one hand, in the support which is extended to it by foreign imperialism, and on the other - in the support on the part of the class of native landowners. The domination of the militarists is founded on the enslaving semi-feudal system of oppressing and exploiting the hundreds of millions of peasants by the military-bureaucratic administration, the landlords, the nobility and the commercial and usurious capital, a system that thrives on the fact that the peasants have either no land or very little and are therefore compelled to become slaves of the landowners and usurers and supply the towns and armies with millions of coolies. The problem of throwing off the yoke of the imperialists and of exterminating all remnants of old feudal relations, the problem of national liberation, of the struggle for the revolutionary reformation of the inner social relations, all of which are organically connected, form the problem of the Chinese revolution. In order to overthrow definitely the militarists, it is necessary, as a part of the struggle against imperialism, to develop the economic and political struggle of the peasantry which forms by far the majority of the population. The apprehension that the fact of the class struggle in the village becoming acute might weaken the anti-militarist front is baseless. The collapse of the second People's Army (Kuominchun) brought about not by the counter-revolutionary forces but by the revolt of the discontented peasantry, bears witness to the dangers with which this situation is fraught.

The fact that the agrarian question is not handled boldly and that the numerous political and economic demands of the peasants are not supported is dangerous for the revolution. The refusal to give the question of the agrarian revolution a conspicuous place in the program of the national-liberatory movement for fear of irresolute and unreliable cooperation on the part of the capitalistic class is a mistake. This is not a revolutionary policy of the proletariat. The Communist party must not commit such mistakes.

10. A peculiarity of the present situation is its transitory character: the proletariat must choose between the prospect of forming a block with the higher strata of the bourgeoisie and the prospect of a further consolidation of its alliance with the peasantry. If the proletariat does not bring forth a radical agrarian program, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary struggle and will lose the hegemony in the national liberating movement. The bourgeoisie will again play the leading part under the direct or indirect influence of the imperialists. Under the present circumstances this may lead to the strengthening of the position of foreign capital in China and to the consolidation of imperialism.

The Canton 'people's government will not be able to keep in power and the revolution will be unable to win a complete victory over foreign imperialism and the native reaction as long as the question of national liberation will not be identified with the agrarian revolution. The growing process of stratification of the classes in the rural regions makes acute the struggle between the mass of the peasantry and the classes that exploit it. This class-stratification and the persistent struggle that ensues from it require strict attention on the part of the Communist Party, which must head the present movement and develop it by means of proper economic and political slogans.

11. Admitting that the Chinese Communist Party must put forth the demand of nationalization of the land, as the fundamental demand of the agrarian program of the proletariat, it is at present necessary to differentiate the agrarian in conformity with the economic and political peculiarities and in different regions of the Chinese territory.

In the questions concerning the power which has already been raised by the peasants' movement the Communist Party must support the tendency to overthrow the autocracy of the nobles and the village authorities in the villages and to substitute for the old semi-feudal officials the

lower organs of the revolutionary authorities who carry out the decrees of the revolutionary government and defend the interests of the fundamental mass of the peasantry. The participation of the peasants in the constitution of the organs of the district authorities must also be insisted upon.

In the territory of the Kuomintang government the program of the agrarian revolution must be put in a concrete form. The Communist Party and the Kuomintang must immediately carry out the following measures in order to attract the peasantry on the side of the revolution:

a) A maximum reduction of the rents.

b) The cancelling of various kinds of taxation of the peasantry and the introducing instead of them of a single rural economic progressive tax.

c) The maximum regulation and alleviation of the burden of taxation resting on the fundamental mass of the peasantry.

d) The confiscation of lands belonging to monastries, churches, reactionary militarists and those compradores, landlords and nobles who carry on civil war with the Kuomintang government.

e) The securing for tenants the right to perpetual leasehold of the lands they cultivate and the fixing of a maximum rent by the peasants' unions and the representatives of the revolutionary authorities.

f) The granting of full support by the Canton Government to the interests of the peasantry and, among others, the protection against oppression on the part of landowners, nobles and usurers.

g) The disarmament of the "min-tuans" and all other detachments of the landowners.

h) The arming of the poor and middle class peasants, submitting all such armed forces to the organs of the revolutionary government.

i) A maximum support on the part of the government to peasants' organizations, including peasants' unions.

j) The organization of cheap credit on the part of the State; the combatting of usury and the support of peasants' organizations and mutual assistance.

k) Help on the part of the government to cooperatives and organizations for mutual assistance.

12. It is the duty of the Communist Party to induce the Canton Government to carry out these measures as transitory to a more developed phase of the agrarian revolution. This very important task will be accomplished by means of forming peasants' committees under the guidance of communists. In the process of the development of the revolution the peasants' committees will acquire authority and power, which are necessary to realize the above mentioned demands, and will intensify the struggle by producing new demands of a more radical character. The peasants' committees are the base of the people's government and army in the rural regions.

In the parts of the country which are still controlled and governed by the reactionary militarists, the duty of the Communist Party is to incite the peasantry to fight feudalism, militarism and imperialism. In these regions the revolutionary work among the peasantry is especially important, because it will be the best means to break up the reactionary armies. The Communists must use all peasants' organizations, such as the "Red Spears", and establish their influence over them.

13. The attitude of the peasantry towards the revolution depends to a considerable amount on the behavior and actions of the national armies. According to the good or bad behavior of the revolutionary armies the peasants judge the new government. On the behavior of the army, on its way of dealing with the peasants and landowners and on its willingness to help the peasantry depends the attitude of the peasantry towards the new government. It is true that the revolutionary army met everywhere with an enthusiastic reception on the part of the peasantry. But it is also true that this enthusiasm abated with time. The needs of a long-lasting and difficult military campaign are entailing new hardships for the

peasantry. But the zealous support which the peasantry has given to the revolutionary armies will be stable, if the communists and other revolutionary elements who lead the movement will compensate the peasantry for their temporary hardships, by means of a regular and bold agrarian revolution, and if they take root in the mass of the peasantry.

V. The Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

14. The imperative necessity of obtaining an influence over the peasantry dictates also the relations which should exist between the Communist Party on one hand and the Kuomintang and the Cantonese Government on the other. The mechanism of the national-revolutionary government presents a very effective way to approach the peasantry, and the Communist Party must avail itself of this mechanism. In the recently liberated provinces a governmental mechanism of the type of the Canton Government will be established. The duty of the Communists and their revolutionary allies is to penetrate into the mechanism of the new government, in order to put into practice the agrarian program of the national revolution. This will be achieved by using the governmental mechanism for the confiscation of land and the reduction of taxes and for the lending of real force to the peasants' committees, thus gradually carrying out reforms according to the revolutionary program.

15. On this and many other similar reasons the opinion that the Communist Party must give up the Kuomintang is erroneous. The whole process of the development of the Chinese revolution, its character and its prospects demand that the Communists should remain in the Kuomintang and continue their activity in it. In order to increase their activity in the ranks of the Kuomintang with the aim to promote the further development of the revolutionary movement, the communists must enter into the Canton Government. Since the Canton Government was created the power has practically been in the hands of the right wing of the Kuomintang - of 6 Commissars 5 belong to the right wing. In spite of the fact that the Canton Government

could not exist without the support of the labor class; the laborers and peasants, even in the province of Kwantung have had to overcome all sorts of obstacles. Recent events have shown that the Communists must enter into the Canton Government in order to support the revolutionary left wing in its struggle against the weak and wavering policy of the right wing. The extension of the power of the Canton Government over a considerably larger territory makes the question of the participation of communists in the national government more pressing than ever.

16. The Communist Party of China must strive to have the Kuomintang developed into a real People's Party, into a solid revolutionary block of the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty town-bourgeoisie and other oppressed elements which have entered into a decisive struggle against imperialism and its agents. To this end the Communist Party must act as follows:

1) Systematically and persistently struggle against the right wing of the Kuomintang and the ideaology of Ta Tsi-tao and their endeavor to change the Kuomintang into a bourgeois party;

2) give a proper form to the left wing and enter into close collaboration with it, but without trying to substitute in it the members of the Communist Party in the work of leadership;

3) persistently criticise the center which vacillates between the right and left wings, between the further development of the revolution and an agreement with imperialism.

VI. Problems of the Chinese Revolution and the Character of the Revolutionary Government.

17. Lenin wrote: "Previous to the epoch of the world revolution, the struggle for national liberation formed a part of the general democratic movement. Now, since the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia and the beginning of the period of the world revolution, the struggle for national liberation is a part of the world proletarian revolution".

The program of the Chinese revolution and the structure of the revolutionary state it has produced must be established according to this conception. The process of class-differentiation, which goes along with the development of the revolutionary movement, confirms this conception. The Canton Government, in spite of its bourgeois-democratic character, contains in its essence embryons of a revolutionary petty bourgeois state - of a democratic dictatorship of a revolutionary block of the proletariat, peasantry and petty town-bourgeoisie. The petty-bourgeois democratic movement becomes revolutionary in China, because it is an anti-imperialistic movement. The Canton Government is a revolutionary one, first of all, owing to its anti-imperialistic character. Being first of all anti-imperialistic, the Chinese revolution and the government created by it must strike at the roots of the imperialistic power in China. The waiving of unequal treaties and the cancelling of territorial concessions are not sufficient for the weakening of the positions of imperialism. The blow must be dealt at the economic foundation of the imperialistic power. This means that the revolutionary government must gradually nationalize railway concessions, mills, mines, banks and enterprises belonging to foreign capital. By such act it will at once widen the narrow limits of the bourgeois democracy and will enter the stage leading to revolutionary dictatorship. It would be therefore a mistake to confine the problems of the Chinese revolution:

1) to the destruction of imperialism, and

2) to the abolishing of the feudal anachronisms, pretending that at its first stage the revolution bears a petty-bourgeois character. The Chinese revolution cannot destroy imperialism without overstepping the limits of a bourgeois democracy. As things stand at present the proletariat will lead the peasantry to the revolutionary struggle. The movement tending to abolish feudalism which is effected under the hegemony of the proletariat must needs change into an agrarian revolution.

In view of these peculiarities the problems of the Chinese revolution are as follows:

a) The nationalization of rail and waterways;
b) the confiscation of big enterprises, mines and banks which have the character of foreign concessions, and
c) the nationalization of the land which must be realized by means of consecutive radical reform effected by the revolutionary state.

VII. The Communist Party and the Proletariat.

In order to play a leading part in the revolution, the Chinese proletariat must consolidate its class organizations - political as well as economic ones. The foremost task of the Communist Party is the organization and education of the proletariat for this historical part. The numerical inferiority and the youth of the Chinese proletariat must be compensated by a powerful organization and the clearness of its ideaology.

The general federation of trade unions which already comprises hundreds of thousands of industrial workmen, as well as the national unions of railway workers and seamen, are the base of the Communist Party. It is the duty of the Communist Party to strengthen these organizations by attracting into them great masses of workmen. During the national revolutionary struggle of the last two years, the workmen's class has displayed a great force. In this active struggle it has acquired the hegemony in the revolutionary movement. On the base of these traditions and achievements the organizations of the laborers' class must be strengthened and developed as follows:

a) A mass of industrial unions must be created and all such unions must be amalgamated; the Chinese federation of trade unions must be consolidated.
b) The work among the masses must be intensified; the contact of the leading organs of the trade unions with the mass

of Chinese workmen must be consolidated and besides industrial workmen, tradesmen, workmen of domestic industry and of small workshops, as well as cultural laborers, must be attracted into the trade unions.

c) Greater attention must be paid to the economic struggle of the workmen, which must grow into a political struggle; tactics must be worked out for the strike movement; mutual help and strike funds must be organized, cooperatives, etc., must be created and assisted.

d) Education of the workmen's masses must be intensified by means of counteracting the reformatory methods.

e) The contact between the movement of the Chinese professional unions with those of the whole world, especially with those of the Far Eastern countries, must be consolidated.

19. In order to attract into the movement the mass of the workmen's class and to strengthen the position in the national revolution, the Chinese Communist Party must carry on agitation insisting on the following demands:

a) A complete liberty of action for the peasants' and workmen's organizations. The legalization of the professional unions. The promulgation of liberal laws on professional unions. The right of strikes.

b) Legislation relating to labor, 8-hour work days, weekly rest day, maximum of pay.

c) Social legislation. Sanitary inspection and conditions of labor, housing question, insurance, relating to illness, mutilation, invalidation, and unemployment. Protection of women and children's labor. Prohibition of women's night labor. Prohibition of labor in factories by children under 14 years.

d) Organization of factory inspection.

e) Cancelling of the system of fines and corporal punishment.

f) Removing of all sorts of military and police detachments from the factory premises.

g) Coping with unemployment; influencing of the unemployed by the trade unions; organization of labor exchanges connected with the professional unions.

20. At the present stage of the revolution there is a great fund of revolutionary energy that has not yet been fully exhausted, viz: the masses of town domestic workmen and artisans who are being ruined by imperialism and are manifestly hostile to foreign capital. It is the duty of the Communist vanguard of the proletariat to organize and attract these masses into the stream of the national revolutionary movement. Among others the Chinese Communist Party must to this end strive to obtain for these people:

1) The alleviation of the tax burden;
2) the organization of unions of domestic workmen and artisans;
3) the organization of workmen's societies.

VIII. The Task of the Communist Party as Regards Organization

21. The Communist Party of China is an organized force. It has leaders, forms its own cadres and leads the masses. The activity of the party has already acquired a considerable expansion and a stable form of organization. During the last half year the party has made great progress in filling its ranks, and this growth has chiefly been made by adding to it labor elements.

The peasants' part of the Communist Party is not numerically strong, yet the party is already doing extensive work among the peasantry.

One of the chief problems which the Chinese Communist Party is facing at present is the one of extending, deepening, improving and intensifying the work of education within the party.

The party has done a great deal in organizing a committee of Communistic young men. The Chinese Young Men's Committee has increased numerically and is active in .... of the work. The young people are a great revolutionary force in China. The revolutionary students and the young workmen and peasants are a force which can considerably accelerate the beginning of the revolution, if they are submitted to the idealistic and political influence of the Communist

Party. Nobody feels the imperialistic oppression as deeply and sharply, no one feels the necessity of fighting this oppression as strongly as the young men. This fact must be fully taken into consideration by the Chinese Communist Party and it must stimulate its activity among the young men.

One of the fundamental problems of the party is the struggle for its open existence.

22. New members must be enlisted, especially in industrial regions. The new members must be instructed by organizing for them short courses of lectures and conversations on questions concerning the program and tactics, and by making them participate in the daily work of the nuclei and through the latter, - in the whole work of the party.

A collective direction must be firmly established in the organization, from the Central Committee down to the nuclei in the factories and in the street.

The best party-workers must be more energetically drawn into the leading party work. The most persistent work is required in the strengthening and increasing of the cadres of the party. Special attention must be apaid to prepare secretaries for the nuclei and leaders of ffactions of mass organizations, as well as staffs of leading committees in the provinces and districts. The Central Committee and the provincial committees must have permanent traveling instructors chosen from the best local party-workers.

Cadres of travelling organizers for work in the villages must also be formed.

The activity and self-dependence of the lower active organizations, the nuclei and the general meetings of the members of the party, etc., must be intensified.

The factions, especially those of the trade unions, the leading organs of peasants' unions and the organizations of the Kuomintang, must be consolidated. A systematic and firm guidance in the work of the factions on the part of the party must be secured.

They must help to connect the revolutionary army with the labor-class and its organizations, showing them distinctly how important this help is to secure the victory in the war.

IX. The Armed Forces of the National Revolution.

23. The national revolutionary army is the greatest factor which brought about the victories over Sun Chuan-fang, and the extension of the territory over which the rule of the National Government extends. The national revolutionary army has played and can play in future its part only on condition that the revolutionary consciousness of the soldiers and their commanders is strong. It is therefore necessary that energetic political work should be not only done in the fundamental corps of the national revolutionary army, but that such work should also be organized among the politically uninstructed troops that have joined the national army, which can be done by means of travelling political workers. The Chinese Communist Party must display the greatest energy in order to intensify the political work in the army and to strengthen the left wing of the Kuomintang in the military nuclei.

24. All political workers must inculcate in the mass of the army the necessity of acquiring the confidence and the support of the mass of laborers, as well as of establishing a connection with Chinese revolutionary organizations for a common action against the enemies of the national revolution.

25. In connection with the victories of the national revolutionary army it is necessary to explain to the masses that without their cooperation the overthrow of the militarists by the people's armies cannot bring about a serious victory and that only the strengthening of the revolutionary organization and the struggle of the masses themselves can lead to such a victory.

26. One of the chief tasks of the Chinese Communist Party is to induce the mass of laborers and the labor organizations to lend their full support to the army and to its military work. They must help to connect the revolutionary army with the labor-class and its organization, showing them distinctly how important this help is for the attainment of victory.... (half line burned).

27. Considering that an armed struggle is unavoidably going to develop in the Chinese villages, the Communist Party must take all measures to induce the National Government to lend effective help, by means of military instruction, armament and supplies, to peasants' detachments and organizations, in order to get more influence on the revolutionary movement of the mass of the peasantry.

X. The Problems of the Communist Party in the Imperialistic Countries.

28. One of the most important and urgent tasks of the Communist parties of the imperialistic countries is to support by all means the Chinese revolution. This support must be carried out in the following way:

a) Agitation against military intervention in China. The danger of foreign intervention in China must be explained to the mass of the proletariat. The imperialistic policy of providing civil war in China and of lending financial and military help to the militarists must be exposed.

b) Demand of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Chinese territory and of naval forces from Chinese waters.

c) Propaganda among foreign troops and sailors in China.

d) Agitation in favor of immediate recognition of the Canton Government, as the really national government in China. These demands must be put forth at mass meetings and demonstrations of protest. Social-democratic and non-party workmen must be drawn into this campaign.

A true copy: (Signed) Kissinka.

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66
WAR DEPARTMENT

A-8289

COOPERATION WITH CHINESE REDS IN PEKING.

(A detailed report concerning funds and arms)

Matters of affair.

1. **Karakhan offers money to the students in Peking.**

What is the line of policy of the communist party?

a) Invitation to the scholars and students to join the party.

b) Cooperation of students.

The cooperation of student associations and coporations is undoubted: more than 200 students of all kinds of schools in Peking joined the party. The most competent students receive from the Russian embassador a monthly salary of from 20 to 80 dollars. (Tl: Probably the Mexican dollar used in China.)

The university of Peking is the place of assembly of these students and they are assembling in number 2 of the east fourth floor of the temple, where they study the theory of Marx and this is at the same time the place of meetings and of transferring the bonuses. -

2. **Karakhan offers to the bolshevik students money to buy the weapons of cooperation.**

Some students from Peking who cooperated with the bolshevik, followed by a mass of students asked the high administration to dismiss the hated president of education and the chief of police. As the government arrested some students, there is now a plot to organize a bolshevik university for which purpose Karakhan has given to a certain person 70,000 dollars.

3. **An amount of money was given by Karakhan to the bolshevik party in Shanghai.**

According to different reports dated May 30, the matter is as follows:

Translator's Note: Some of the Chinese and Russian proper names could not be given correctly; especially Russian names rendered by the Japanese Katakana are sometimes disfigured in such a way that their reading could not be understood.

Karakhan has sent to the bolshevik party in Shanghai an amount of money, about 400,000 dollars. Between the two mentioned, telegrams are sent constantly.

4. Russian government of workmen and peasants offer funds to Shanghai peasants.

Although there is talk that Russian Government of Workmen and peasant has sent 1,000,000 dollars to help the Shanghai peasants, I think this talk is exaggerated, but some money is unquestionably given.

5. Russian Government of Workmen and peasants offers arms to the Canton government.

The Soviet Government had sent 15,000 tons of arms to Canton to help Chiang-Chieh-Tan. Amongst the arms are:

54 guns, 105 machine guns, 20,000 rifles, 36 infantry guns, 300 trench mortars, 140 boxes of ammunition and 600,000 rifle rounds. The full price amounts to 400,000 gold rubles. The whole amount is divided into 4 parts, 3 of them being at Shang P'u Hsi and the fourth is already prepared to be sent from the Russian capital.

6. The purchasing contract between Russia and Ping Yu provides for a large quantity.

The most important part of the purchasing contract concluded between Russia and Ping-Yu on March 14, 1925 provides for 42,000 rifles with 100 rounds each. The cost of each is 20 gold rubles, the total being 840,000 gold rubles. Besides there are accessories worth 160,000 rubles. The rifles are old of the Mauser type 1881.

7. Russian Soviets supply Ping Yu with arms and troops.

A train with 8 airplanes and 10,000 rifles will be sent soon to Paot'ou through Kulun. There will be 20 Russian officers and one battalion of infantry. Six of them will join Ping's Chief of Staff Hsiung. The other Russian officers of the guard will join the north-west army. War material purchased by Ping in Shanghai will be sent from Vladivostok to Paot'ou by way of Udinsk.

8. Russia supplies Ping's army with arms.

At the present time the transportation from Borsia to Sampeizu has begun. Besides 50 automobiles are sent from Kulun loaded with airplanes

9. Russia supplies Ping with airplanes.

Russians, lately returned from Kulun to Mukden, who had connections there, said that out of 24 airplane units, one was quickly sent to Kulun.

10. Conclusion of a Russian-Mongolian railway contract.

Outer Mongolia and the Soviet technical committees concluded a contract for building the (Ko-run-to) railroad. The contract is already signed. The first date of the debt (2,000,000 rubles) is to be paid after the roadbed is completed. the second (6,000,000 rbles) after the railroad track and station are ready; the third date (2,000,000 rbles.) after the purchase of the rolling stock. The limit of the date is twenty years. The first payment is without interest, the second and the third with an interest of 6.5%. The party has the preferential right for the purchase of railroad property and material. From the Russian side the contract was signed by Urabrov (?) and Gaevsky.

「丹巴」全権巳

11. Soviet Government transports arms and ammunition to Kulun.

The Soviet government had loaded 5,000 shells on 12 automobiles to bring them from Chia-Ko to Paotou. Besides 12,500 rifles have already been sent to Kulun and distributed among the youth of Inner Mongolia in order to make a movement for a change of the government.

12. Arrival of Russian Arms in Peking.

On December 24 about 5000 Russian rifles arrived in Peking from Mongolia and were sent to Nan-Yuan.

13. Propaganda expenses of (M.S. Kem) the Local communist party in Kuan-Cheng-Tsu.

The M. S. Kem in Kuan-Chen-Tsu which has in its service Chinese, Japanese, Koreans and some refugees receives every month from D.R. Kem, 60 dollars (?) for propaganda. Japanese, Korean, Chinese and Russian refugees who live in Kuan-Cheng-Tsu and Changchun and follow the principles of bolshevism all receive propaganda expenses.

14. Soviet diplomatic officials make purchases in Mukden.

In the latter part of January new preparations for negotiations were made in Mukden. The movement is supported from the rear by the policy of the workmen's and peasants' government. People who are close to Chang-Tso Lin together with the representative of Russian-Mukden society concerning the purchase assembled January 28 and 29 at a place belonging to Japan, where Chinese diplomatic officials were invited and to whom 50,000 dollars were delivered.

15. Ping-yu received again supporting money from Russia.

Ping-yu has considered that the progress of the National battle is going from bad to worse and took resolution to depart on horseback. With an unofficial name he decided to carry out a policy friendly to Russia and the national party and in favor of the bolshevik parties.

Ping received previously from Russia every month 100,000 dollars support but the payment was stopped on account of inability. Lately the payment is restored again.

16. Red Russia makes supplies of arms and funds.

1) The National Army, particularly the second army has exhausted all money for military expenses. Now it obtained from Karakhan seven machine guns and 5 quick firing guns.

2) On the thirteenth of this month Lit'air took a small sum from the Far East Bank and received 600,000 dollars (元) from the International Bank. This money is for the expenses of the university and for the reds in Peking, who are friendly to Russia.

17. Arrival in Peking of a part of arms and ammunition sent from Russia.

Out of the first part of arms and ammunition which are sent from Russia to Peking in great quantities, Ping had organized a guard detachment.

18. Russian rifles and ammunition are offered to the National Army.

Of the rifles and ammunition lately purchased from Russia, for the National Army, 2,000,000 rounds arrived in Nan k'ou. 250,000 out of them were sent to Henan. A part was taken for the establishment of the defense near Wei.

19. Karakhan bribes Chinese students.

In addressing Karakhan said that as the present war is a dispute between Japanese imperialism and the principles of the repuglic and that if the war is lost China will be tied up for a long time, it would be desirable to send immediately 700,000 dollars and to open extraordinary negotiations with Hsuing. Besides Fan-Wu distributed on the 27th amongst students money, seven dollars to each, in order to prevent disorganization.

20. The governing body of the National Army, the National party and Kuomingtang men receive large rewards from Karakhan.

Many chiefs who belong to the bureau of Military affairs and their assistants had received special money from Karakhan. The amount was: to some of them 1000 dollars and to others 500 dollars a month. Besides these high officials there are many of the lower clerks who also received money.

Newspapers received: Sinhae daily 1000 dollars, Tokaimippo daily 500 dollars. Kokumintsushinsha daily - 200 dollars and two others 300 dollars each.

21. Red Russia sends to Peking iron helmets.

Headquarters of the guard in Peking transported 10,000 steel and iron helmets to the vicinity of Tientsin in order to distribute them among the officers and soldiers of the first line; they are stored in freight cars at the station Cheng Yang men. These iron helmets were purchased from Russia and brought lately from Mongolia.

22. The amount of the aid received from Russia by Yueh-Wei-Chun.

During the year 1925 Yueh-Wei Chun received from Russia an amount of 600,000 dollars and besides 3000 rifles and 80 machine guns.

About 29 Russian military men who were distributed in the Honan army and stayed for a long time in Hsi-Nai-ni are all registered as bolsheviks.

23. Red Russia offers to the National Army ammunition brought by sea.

Red Russia offers to the National Army a full load of ammunition, brought by the ship Oleg (2,500,000 rifle rounds) to Taku for the aid of the Navy of Mukden.

24. ~~U.S.S.R. Paid to Diaz 3,000,000 dollars.~~

~~U.S.S.R. brought into China goods by the way of Mongolia without paying taxes.~~

Year month day	April 1925	May 1925	June 1925	July 1925	July 1925	August 1925	August 1925	Sept. 1925
Kinds of goods	Infantry rifles	rounds	air-planes	Infantry rifles.	Machine guns.	Cavalry rifles	Guns	rifles
Quantity	1,500	200,000	2	10,000	17	8,000	40	20,000
Summary	Germany	-	1.600HP 2.300HP	Mauser	-		Russian	Russian

Sept. 1925	Sept. 1925	Sept. 1925	Sept. 1925	Oct. 1925	Oct. 1925	Oct. 1925	Oct. 1925	Oct. 1925	Nov. 1925	Nov. 1925	Nov. 1925	Dec. 1925
Trench Mortars	Air-planes	Light mortars motors	Air-planes	Cavalry rifles	Infan-try rifles	Re-vol-vers	Hand gren-ades	Pow-der	Small cali-ber field guns.	Ma-chine guns	Lances	Infantry rifles.
24	2	2	2	10,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	Yel-low seler 25 ~~bbls~~ barrels	20	20	8,000	5,000
	Large bi-planes	French 650 H.P.										Russian old guns with 200 rounds each.

25. Russia delivers arms to Ping.

On march 18 Russian officers brought to Peking by a train 12 airplanes (8 biplanes and 4 monoplanes) and some ammunition; besides there arrived 27 aviators and about 60 infantry soldiers.

All what is written above is trustworthy.

26. Red Russia transports rifles and ammunition to Kulun.

According to a telegram received on the 29th from the foreign office by the consul, 1,800,000 rifle rounds were sent from Ulinsk to Kulun, probably to be transported to Chang-Ne-Kou and to be offered to the National Army.

Conversation with Chinese reds in Peking.

Report on propaganda actions on the part of the workmen's and peasants' government.

Matters of affairs.

1. Propaganda of Red Russia.

Karakhan failed to establish a diplomatic office in Honan for the purpose of propaganda made out by the plan of the government in Moscow.

2. In the workmen's and peasants' embassy a Far East Headquarters is established (D.E.O.)

The workmen's and peasants' government has lately established in the Embassy in Peking a Far Eastern headquarters, where 150 men are working. From this headquarters are already sent clerks for connection to China, Japan and Korea where they will work with the consul-general and consuls. They have to obtain military and other secret information and to work for the propaganda of bolshevik principles.

2. Russia's secret agreement with Ping.

Karakhan has concluded with Ping a secret agreement which consists of 9 points. They are as follows:

1. To build a branch railroad through Outer Mongolia between Russia and China.

2. The north-west military district of China will be instituted as a buffer with the right to pass through it during a term of 5 years. The engagement of military instructors is to be limited to 60 men.

3. The allied government of Soviets will offer to the north-west army every month, 100,000 rubles.

4. Considering the contract of the purchase of arms which was made in Peking on February 13, 1925, the repaymont is to be started from 1930 and made during ten years. If the regulation of the bill is not made the money will be subtracted from the assistance money.

5. Russians will have the freedom of propaganda in the north-west district; only mass lectures must not be given.

6. If the criticism of the north-west district government is made by the soviet men engaged in propaganda no words must be said against them.

7. If Japanese Imperialists declare war on the Soviets, the north-west district army must give aid with 1/3 of its army. In case the Japanese Imperialists declare war on China the Soviet Government will send its aid, an army of 40,000 men.

8. The north-west army in Kulum must not invade the border of the Soviet Republic.

9. If Japan or England make an effort to seize Heim-Kiang or Inner Mongolia the mutual political influence of China, Mongolia and Russia must be used to prevent the completion of it.

3. ~~The intention of bolsheviks is organize a secret association.~~

The consul in Mukden Krakovetsky who is in connection with bolsheviks agents lately sent for propaganda has initiated the organization of an association the outside form of which is a hotel with all kinds of comforts, the applicant being Harry Frikks, a merchant of miscellaneous goods connected with the Russian reds. The wish to open the business was presented to the Japanese police station in Mukden and the permission was finally obtained and the equipment was quickly done. But it is known that this hotel is a meeting place of red Russians where all kinds of plots are to be brought forth.
At the present time the president of the committee of this secret organization '- Chrisanpet who is in relation with Krakovetsky, Frikks, Bulevsky and Brodsky; the members of the committee are Briukin, Oredsiu, Rabin, Korget and Suporoiny.

4. Organization of a bureau for propaganda of bolshevik principles.

In the office of the workmen's and peasants' Consul general in Mukden an office for propaganda is probably organised; the assistant Consul Skorokov being the manager. The monthly amount assigned for the propaganda is 20,000 dollars which will be sent by the international bolshevik bureau in Moscow. Preparations for organizing of secret propaganda are already established: Chief of the Mukden propaganda bureau: Skorokov. In charge of propaganda amongst white Russians in China, Kosebsky; In charge of propaganda amongst white Russians who live in Mukden: -Green; In charge of propaganda amongst ~~white Russians~~ Chinese troops - Yang; In charge of propaganda amongst Chinese Troops - Grigori; In charge of propaganda amongst Chinese students - Elknide. In Charge of propaganda amongst Japanese and Chinese merchants - Harry Fuks.

5. The opening of the Red Russian Hotel.

In Mukden on Chakuta street N 4 a Russian, Prokpen Moiota, had only a small restaurant business; now he has a good hotel which has been open since October 10.

Although Moiota is not a red he is visited by many Red Russians and in future this hotel will probably be recognized for the use of Russian Reds.

6. Plan of Shanghai bolsheviks.

The bolshevik party in Shanghai in connection with the rebels of Daihu had organized a bolshevik army and put at the head Sun-Fu-Fang. Lately an amount of 1,000,000 rbles. was received from Russia. The party of Sun has increased. Besides the above mentioned bolshevik party in Tientsin, Hankou and Shanghai has made a change in management and Russian Raitake(?) Keikofsky received the management. By this plan the whole country is divided into 3 parts: the South under Chiang, the middle under Sun and the north under Ping.-

7. A detachment of Russians and Mongols advances towards Peking.

According to Russian information from Mukden, Ping has organised a detachment of Russians and Mongols and marched from Chan-ja-Kou to the south towards Peking. From Peking he expects to reach Nankou.

8. The movement of bolsheviks between Peking and Tientsin.

a) Ivan Georgievich Fudsha (?) (who lives in Tientsin and is in charge of collecting Russian taxes) is now in connection with the army of Mukden whom he propagates the bolschevik principles.

b) The bureau of propaganda which is in the Peking workmen's and peasants Embassy bribes the post office clerks in all parts of China.

It makes instigations and propaganda by corresponding with all influential men of the guards of foreign embassies and takes pains in general to collect material.

c) There are sent about 200 men for the propaganda to all important cities in China from the department of foreign languages of the University of Moscow. Out of them 12 arrived in Tientsin.

9. The Red party threatens Eastern Chinese Railway.

Tong (a representative of Ping) has already collected for the Russian reds 600 mounted bandits who expect to take possession of the Eastern Chinese railway; the money is given from Juainov. Tong is in Vladivostok and exchanges telegrams with Ping's Chiefs of Staff, Yu.

9. Soviet sends troops to Mongolia.

Considering the rumor that the Soviet has sent troops to Mongolia the departure was still not made yesterday. The first part wears ordinary clothes. Most of the soldiers came one after another one month ago from Outer Mongolia, Hailar and different parts of Manchuria. The total amounts to 10,000. Tong who works at present for the 3rd International is in charge of the three Eastern Provinces.

10. Organization of groups for secret propaganda.

Lately the organization of groups of sailors for secret propaganda was calculated in the office of the Russian Consul. There are already some notable men but in future it is expected that there will be many.

11. A conference of Soviet representatives in Peking.

In the last days of February a meeting was held in Peking byt the Vice Consul of Harbin Kedsurovsky, the head of the Military Department of Chinese Railway. Gekker, the representative of the industry in Chinese Kurtishika, and the representative of the workmen's and peasants' government, Kubiaku Krakovetsky. Details of a plan for propaganda in Peking and Mukden were discussed.

12. Organization of a Russian Club in Mukden.

With the approval of the Chinese authorities a club will be opened in Mukden about the end of February. Amongst the organizers are: Prince Gansimukov, Lazar Prokofievich Jatsenko, able men from the Consulate Velchinsky and Zverev. This organization is supported by the money of the East Chinese Railway. But it is certain that actually the club is governed by the East China Railroad clerks who are on the side of the Soviets, backed by the assistance of the consulate, as a great part of employees belong to Soviet or are their political agents.

It is easy to see that this club is a place of collecting governmental reports.

13. The organization of bolshevik party in Peking.

About 200 men belonging to the Russian workmen's and peasants' bolshevik party arrived in the first part of January from Siberia, from the neighborhood of Chita, and a party of bolsheviks of about 120 men from Korai and Hung-Fan-Fu. Assembled in Peking there were organized new groups to examine the activity in China. The main office should be in Chita, and the organization is to be divided into three parts: one in Tientsin, one at Manchuria and one in Peking.

14. Connection of Russian bolshevik party with that of Chinese.

According to the words of those connected with bolsheviks representatives of the bolshevik party in Canton Kobekov and Boredin arrived lately in China fro Russia; they were accompanied by 13 or 17 men; the purpose is to make connection with the Chinese bolsheviks. Representaive on the part of China were: Wang and Tan-Ping-Shan.

The meeting was held at the Russian Embassy. The subjects for discussion were propaganda rules and the dividing of the country into propaganda districts; the establishing of branches and the distribution of funds. Besides Borodin told that he is glad to inform them that after a personal talk many students of all kinds of schools are ready to join the party.

15. The organization of an extraordinary meeting of the bolshevik party committee.

An extraordinary meeting was organized by the Chinese bolsheviks to consider the Central Committee and the sending of Chinese representatives to the Third International.

The purpose was as follows:

1. Decreasing of reactionary tendency.

2. Performing of political assassinations and other kinds of propaganda against the present great activity of the militaristic principles of Japan.

3. Making of propaganda amongst the reactionary soldiers of the troops.

1. Fighting against the self interest of militarism.

2. Why it can be the duty of the soldiers to make sacrifices of self interest?

3. Working for their association and union.

4. Working by every group of workmen and students against Japanese Imperialism and advancing of preparations for disarmament.

5. The above said committee will have the main office in Peking and its branches will be at all the other places. (Held at the workmen's and peasants' Embassy.)

6. The expenses to be paid by the kominternn.

(international bolshevik party)

16. A conference of representatives of Chinese Bolshevik Leaders.

In the workmen's and peasants' Embassy in Peking the representatives of ese bolshevik leaders had conferences: for the first time on February

26, for the second time on March 2, and for the third time on March 4. Most important affairs were taken up. Among the leaders assembled were: The Russian Ambassador, the consuls general from Mukden and Tientsin, members of the representatives of the people, members of the central executive committee, secretary of the Far East Section Kobiake, the all Russian Labor League, chief of the International Committee Losem, president of the Far Eastern republican committee from Khabarovsk in the Maritime Provinces Gamarnik, the Tokyo reporter Rosen , the Secretary of the counseller's office in Canton, German, the delegate of the Far Eastern state plan office Gekker, the chief of the East-Chinese Railway intelligence office, editor of the paper Tribuna Rambov and about 20 others.

G-2 Report

CONFIDENTIAL

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 WAR DEPT. AUG 24 1926

1. The contents of this report may be published freely in the United States provided they are sufficiently paraphrased to insure that Peking and China are not recognizable as the source, telegrams and dates of telegrams not alluded to as such, and that the source is not disclosed. If not published it is not to be used in exchange with any other country than France, nor shown to representatives of any other country than France. These terms are among those upon which I am able to get this information and I have given my word that they will be observed. I consider the source of this information (see Letter #5909) reliable and the information correct.

2. Serebriakoff has been defeated in his negotiations in Mukden. He has been called before the Communist Party for investigation on the score of having made excessive promises to Chang Tso-lin. He also is required to account for the expenditure of $400,000, the latter by order of Litvinoff. On the last day of his stay in Mukden, Serebriakoff verbally gave the Mukden Diplomatic Bureau of Foreign Affairs to understand that if any pressure is exerted by Mukden on the Soviets the latter will be compelled to take energetic counter measures.

3. Krakovetsky, Soviet Consul at Mukden, under order from Tchicherin has again told Chang Tso-lin that if bands of White Russians appear in Manchuria the Soviets will be obliged to bring troops for occupation of that area.

Comment by M/A: Serebriakoff is the Soviet Vice Minister of Communications, despatched to Mukden to attempt to straighten out differences between Russians and Chinese over the Chinese Eastery Railway. Both he and Krakovetsky are endeavoring to fill Chang Tso-lin's mind with doubt as to the safety of his rear if he moves too many troops to the attack on the National Army about Kalgan.

4. On June 12, 1926, the following persons arrived in Peking: Semenoff, Kollegoff, Feldman (cousin of the Director of the Russo-Asiatic Bank, Urumchi), Posobin and Coloff. There are reasons to believe that these persons will form the nucleus of a terrorist organization, their meetings all having occurred in the presence of Fortunatoff and Lebedeff. Dr. Fortunatoff, an adventurer from Vladivostok, and Lebedeff both are members of terrorist organizations.

Comment by M/A: It is believed that a terrorist organization exists in China. Certain circumstances in connection with the assault on one missionary and the murder of another in Chengtu (see Report #5904) support this belief. It may be too remote a possibility that a connection exists between these outrages and the above report, but certain well informed people see such a connection.

5. By telegram dated June 5th all Russian activities without exception connected with the Russian Embassy, including the Military Attache's office, are put under Karakhan's authority. This terminates the divided control that heretofore has existed and which reached almost an open breach.

6. On June 17th it was reported that representatives of Feng Yu-hsiang received through the Dalbank a draft for $2,000,000, which is being paid in Harbin and transferred via Hailar and Urga; and on July

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6th that Repin has arrived recently at Kalgan via Khailar and brought with him the last bi-monthly installment of about $5,000,000. As it was reported before 70,000 men of the first army are entirely supported and paid by S.S.S.R. - see agreement of April 15th. (See pars. 7 and 11. These amounts seem very large but I believe the reports correct.)

7. The military situation in Kalgan. Due to irregular freight and bad motor transportation the National Army is not getting a sufficient supply of arms and ammunition. The occupied territory cannot furnish sufficient forage and food. This occasions misunderstandings between the Russian and Chinese military leaders. National Army leaders demand the fulfilment of the agreement dated April 15th prior to again starting military operations. Agent's opinion is that military operations will start in the near future unless National Army leaders are bought off by Wu Pei-fu.

Under the agreement of April 15th referred to the Soviets promise to supply all ammunition and expenses for 70,000 men of the First National Army on condition that the expedition is to be under control of Kashirin with a mixed Russian and Chinese staff. The Chinese promised to take Shansi and Shensi, omitting Peking, and to endeavor to establish liaison with the southern (Canton) armies. The Soviets promised to supply 1,000 motor trucks but actually delivered only 650, while practically all the 750 light motor cars are out of order.

On July 6th further information was received as follows: Karakhan reports to Tchicherin that an additional agreement was made with Feng Yu-hsiang whereby in consideration for the help of the S.S.S.R., Feng will in every way fulfill all former agreements and use all his influence in order to help the S.S.S.R. to get the whole territory of Mongolia under the control of the Urga Government. This new Mongol Republic is to join the union of the S.S.S.R. and to accept in full their laws and constitution. On the other hand, Feng agrees to help the formation of a Mohammedan republic from the provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang which will also join the union of the S.S.S.R.

It is reported that Feng Yu-hsiang is at the present time somewhere in Mongolia and not in Europe. It is reported also that he sends his representatives to different places who assume his name in order to spread false rumors about his whereabouts. (No one seems to be able to say definitely where Feng is. There are newspaper reports that he has been elected President of the new Mongolian Republic.)

8. The organization of Red International Legions (military units) and their transfer to the frontiers of Soviet Russia is continuing. According to information received from Russia this movement is being vigorously pushed by Voroshiloff with great rapidity and success because it is clear to him that the Regular Red Army is becoming less and less dependable.

Soviet troops are again reported as being concentrated near Manchouli. There are said to be very few Soviet volunteers for the National Army in Kalgan.

9. The following were the representatives at the Third Kalgan Conference - end of March and beginning of April, 1926:

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Monmusso	France
Geshko	Germany
Jack Monte	Belgium
Kon - or Con	Czechoslovakia
Dorey	United States
Brown and Tom Mann	Great Britain
Radu	Roumania
Liukseta	Norway

10. Karakhan, on orders from Moscow, has made secret overtures to Dr. Yen for the formation of an alliance between China and the Soviets. Yen gave no answer. Lebedoff believes that in the near future there will be an official note proposing such an alliance to China.

Comment by M/A: This is very interesting but as yet no confirmation from Chinese is possible. I believe the report correct. Dr. Yen is W. W. Yen, who until recently was Premier of the Regency Cabinet. It is perhaps significant of a failure of Karakhan's overtures that Yen has been the target of National Army abuse in the last few days. The Lebedoff referred to is First Secretary of the Russian Embassy.

11. Soviet propaganda among the Mohammedans in Western China has been entrusted to Achun (a title meaning high Mohammedan priest) Mansur, and his chief assistant, Abdu Salianoff.

In Peking and Tientsin the Soviets maintain 156 secret agents, of which number 105 are Jews, 31 Russians and 20 of different nationalities. There are in addition agents of propaganda and leaders of Chinese nuclei, a total of 75 men all of whom speak Chinese.

12. The following concerns the counterfeit American currency prepared by the Soviets. Little has been obtainable of late as to the circulation of this counterfeit money though efforts have been made to get information concerning it. Agents report that the Soviet representatives have grown wary over the use of forged American notes, though a great deal of British currency is being put out.

Counterfeit United States currency is put on the market in very small quantities in Canton and Shanghai and only through the Soviet Oil Syndicate. We do not take any action against this in order to wait for a moment when an attempt will be made to throw a bigger quantity on the market. The main agent for the distribution of counterfeit United States dollars and English currency is the representative of the Oil Syndicate.

13. On July 6th it was reported that for the past two weeks the transport of arms and ammunition for the First National Army is being carried on very energetically. For this purpose the Mongol Government has commandeered 30,000 camels. Besides some 700 old trucks, formerly on hand, 250 new motor trucks were recently shipped from Russia.

The person in charge of transportation of arms and other supplies for the First Army is Repin, who is at the same time commander-in-chief of the Mongol "International" and Soviet volunteer military units in Mongolia. The former "Ataman" Annenkoff is at present commander of the

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Mongol cavalry. Kashirin is in command of International and Volunteer units. (See pars. 6 and 7. Referring to the camel transportation, it is used between Urga and Kalgan. Time necessary for trip, one month. Each load 300 lbs; total, some 4,500 tons.)

14. Reports from Canton: At the head of the government of Canton are, as before, Borodin and General Ho Hung-ming, who have made plans to establish on one hand better relations with foreigners, Britishers in particular, and on the other hand equip the army with arms and ammunition from Vladivostock and to plan an attack on Wu Pei-fu.

The statement of plans to establish better relations in Canton with foreigners, particularly British, confirms other reports from this office. I believe it is only for the purpose of making possible the northern expedition against Wu Pei-fu.

Karakhan has telegraphed to Moskow informing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War that he has on the 28th of June signed on behalf of Moscow an agreement to supply arms for the Canton Army.

In further confirmation of reported Soviet assistance to Canton is the fact that about twenty Soviet army officers of high rank recently arrived in China from Russia en route to Canton. None of these officers is of lower rank than battalion commander in the Soviet Army, while some are division commanders. Their services undoubtedly are to be used in preparations for the northern expedition and possibly with it.

15. Report from Shanghai: C. T. Wang, the well known Chinese radical who fled from Peking to Shanghai at the time the National Army was expelled from the former place, is endeavoring to induce Sun Chuan-fang to join the radical forces of Canton and Kalgan. Sun is conducting negotiations both with the radicals and the Wu-Chang alliance.

16. Report from Tientsin: The activities of Communist nuclei here as in other cities are increasing and have a railway strike as their immediate objective.

17. Ilyin, the representative of the Comintern in the northwest, concerning whom many reports already have been submitted, recently was sent to inspect the situation in Canton, Shanghai and Tientsin. His report is summarized as follows: Anti-radical efforts of foreigners in China are at present ineffective as diplomatic representatives, commercial interests and missionaries are working at cross purposes. The influence of the latter group is beneficial to the Soviets and Ilyin recommends an adjustment of communist propaganda to coordinate it with this influence. To this end he recommends sending a certain Mr. Johnson to China (Note by M/A - nothing is known of him).

18. He also recommends efforts for the organization of a general railway strike, the strikers to be induced to leave the railway lines and go into the interior, as otherwise the military will force them to work under threat of severe punishment. Away from the lines it will be necessary to pay them wages and to instruct them in the principles of communism. The merchant marine not being engaged in supplying the armies of Wu and Chang, a strike among the sailors is not necessary.

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19. Ilyin believes that if the agreement of April 15th (par. 7 above) is not carried out within the next three or four months, the National Army movement in Kalgan and the communistic movement in Canton will lose all the advantage they have gained. He proposes that Canton and Kalgan be supplied with arms as rapidly as possible; that the railway strike be organized; that C. T. Wang be induced to use his influence to bear on Sun Chuan-fang to join the National Army. (Note by M/A - the first two are being carried out.)

A summary of this report was telegraphed to Tchitcherin by Karakhan.

20. A division of opinion as to Soviet policy vis-a-vis China. Karakhan, Lebedoff (First Secretary, Russian Embassy) and the Consul at Harbin, backed by Trotsky's party in Russia, recommend aggressive action in Manchuria, provoking trouble between Chinese and Soviets and using this as an excuse to occupy the Chinese Eastern Railway zone with troops from Vladivostok. Tchitcherin, replying by telegraph to this stated that a council of the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs and others had decided that due to bad economic conditions in Russia, aggressive action against China was impossible for the present, and directed that efforts to bring about a revolution in China be confined to propaganda.

In addition to sums heretofore allotted for the purpose, the Third International has appropriated £ 1,000,000 for propaganda in China.

21. From Russia it is reported that the disagreement between the Jewish faction and that of Stalin, is becoming serious and has prospects of trouble.

Jewish faction: Trotsky, Zinovieff, Kameneff, et al.

Stalin's faction: Stalin, Kubisheff, Molotoff, Rikoff, Kalinin, Porkrovsky, Sosnovsky, et al.

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G-2 Report. 6900.

4-1

2657-D-284

RUSSIA (Combat)

Subject: Military Alliances and Ententes.
SOVIET AGREEMENT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MONGOLIA.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D.J. APR 28 1926

1. The following is a copy of a very secret document:

Chief of Staff of the R.K.K.A. VERY SECRET.
February 26, 1926.
No. 206. To
MOSCOW.

The Chief of the Artillery
Directorate of the R.K.K.A.

In accordance with a decision of the R.V.S. S.S.S.R. of the 24th inst. you are hereby instructed to take all necessary steps to despatch at once, by direct route, for the Military Reception Committee of the Mongolian National Army at KOBDO the following materiel:

P. 1. Three 76 mm (3") guns. (Note by MA: Correct designation is 76.2 mm or 3")
P. 2. One 152 mm (6") howitzer.
P. 3. Two field howitzers - 122 mm (48 line)
P. 4. Four Rozenberg and MAKLEN 37 mm guns.
P. 1-a 600 chemical shells, type "A" - 3"
P. 2-a 200 chemical shells, type "M" - 6"

from the artillery reserves O.N. (Note by MA: i.e., "of special Designation"), in which matter you will consult the Inspector of Artillery and Armoured Forces of the R.K.K.A. in regard to coordinating arrangements for carrying out these instructions.

(signed) S. PUGATCHEV.

2. Agent comments on this as follows:

At the request of the Mongolian Military Attache, the R.V.S. S.S.S.R. agreed on July 4, 1925 to the despatch of military materiel for the two regular divisions being formed in Mongolia (one at KOBDO, and one at URGA) under Soviet supervision, and the following stores were sent at the end of last year from the reserves stores in the Siberian M.D. :

a. Twenty-four 3" field guns, to provide a brigade of three batteries of four guns for each division.
b. One "Zenith" artillery four-gun battery, to provide two guns for each division.
c. 400 rounds of ammunition per gun.

The despatch of guns of other calibres, asked for by the Mongolian Military Attache, was not authorized on the pretext that it would be difficult to instruct the Nationalist troops in the use of guns of various calibres.

The Mongolian military authorities, who wished to develop their military strength as quickly as possible, considered the above materiel insufficient, while the R.V.S. S.S.S.R. pressed for the conclusion of a military

From: M. A. Riga Report No. 5088 Date: April 12, 1926.

agreement which would include a clause to the effect that the Mobilization scheme and dispositions of the Mongolian troops should be drawn up jointly with Russia, and agreed to by the Revvoensoviet, and in order to bring pressure to bear on Mongolia, held up the despatch of air-force materiel and chemical shells.

As a result the Mongolian government decided last January to send a special delegation to Moscow, under DZHADAMBA, the President of the Military Soviet of the Mongolian National Army, to conclude a military agreement, and by the middle of February, the following points had been agreed on:

a. Soviet Russia to supply materiel for the Mongolian National Army.
b. Soviet Russia to send military specialists and instructors from the R.K.K.A. staff to organize and supervise the technical training of the Mongolian National Army.
c. Arrangements regarding the distribution of the materiel sent by Russia for the Mongolian National Army.

A Mixed Reception Commission is now in existence at KOBDO, which is the military centre for the formation of Mongolian units, the duties of which are the reception, sorting out, and distribution of all materiel received from Russia. Zevandovskie, a representative of the staff of the R.K.K.A. is in this commission, with the right of a vote.

d. The dispositions of troops and the mobilization scheme for the Mongolian Army will be drawn up in conjunction with representatives of the staff of the R.K.K.A. and will only come into force when approved by the R.V.S. S.S.S.R.

The above clauses were signed by the Mongolian delegation on February 22, 1926, and on the 24th the Revvoensoviet agreed to the despatch of further materiel to Mongolia; as the attached letter shows, the necessary instructions were issued on the 26th. This materiel is to be taken from the O.N. reserves ("of special designation") which are at the disposal of the Inspector of Artillery and Armoured Forces of the R.K.K.A. to meet special emergencies.

The 600 type "A" - 3" shells referred to are filled with

Diphenil-Chlor-Arsin, and Diphenil-Tzian-Arsin in equal proportion.

The 200 type "M" - 6" shells for howitzers are filled with:

Etyl-Dichlor-Arsin	75 %
Etyl-Iodine-Atsetat	25 %

Note by MA:

This report is borne out by information received from another source, dealing with political relations between Soviet Russia and Mongolia, which states:

a. The S.S.S.R. agrees to leave in Mongolia all units now there, or moving there, and to keep on the Mongolian frontier at least one Infantry division and two Cavalry brigades, with the requisite Artillery and Technical troops, in readiness to move into Mongolia if required.

b. The Mongolian delegates expressed the wish that at least one of the two Mongolian Divisions being formed, would be trained and equipped in the

same manner as Red Army units.

It would therefore appear that two regular Mongolian divisions are being formed, and that their composition will be that of a Soviet rifle division.

Source: reliable.

* * *

TREVOR W. SWETT
Captain, General Staff.
Military Attache.

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G-2 Report

4-1

2657-9-281

3020

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Recent Soviet Activities and Plans.

(See Report #5782)

2657-9-281 (51)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 28 1926

1. On February 28, 1926, a report was received that Feng Yu-hsiang had been promised $7,000,000 in cash by the Soviets, half of which was paid him on February 23d, the remaining half to be paid on April 1st. He was also to receive from them munitions to the value of $3,000,000. This report received corroboration from an independent source.

2. On March 3, 1926, the following report was received:

On February 26th there was a conference at the Soviet Embassy between Soviet representatives, Chinese communists, representatives of the left wing of the Kuomintang, and delegates from Canton. The subject of the conference was the steps to be taken in the event of the defeat of the Kuominchun by Li Ching-lin, acting in connection with Wu Pei-fu. Russian opinion was that if the Kuominchun were defeated a coup should be at once executed in Peking, Tuan Chi-jui being arrested and the government seized by the Kuomintang. It was urged even by the Russians that this action should anticipate the defeat of the Kuominchun and that the coup be executed on March 7th. The Chinese delegates strongly opposed this plan because there was still hope that the Kuominchun would be victorious, and even were it not, there would still be plenty of time to decide on the coup and fix the date.

On February 27th there was a meeting in the Embassy attended only by the Russians who had participated in the discussion of the previous day. At this meeting Borodin, Egoroff (military attache) and Rambeh (representative from Harbin) supported the view of the Chinese expressed at the conference of the 26th. They decided not to insist on an immediate coup, expressing the opinion that the wisest course would be to let the Kuomintang retain what power it had, trusting that they (the Russians and more radical groups) would later be able to push them (the conservative members of the Kuomintang) aside and gain complete mastery. Accordingly a telegram was sent to all centers to that effect. These centers were directed in the meantime to foment strikes and riots, but to attempt nothing of a more general nature until they had received a signal from Peking. This signal to be the arrest of Tuan Chi-jui, whereupon bold and resolute steps were to be taken for a general rising in support of the communists. In case the rising was successful, a government to be established in Peking on the lines of the present government in Canton. In case of the complete defeat of the communists in Peking, they plan to retreat to Kalgan and organize an independent communistic state similar to that in Canton, and including Kansu, Mongolia, Sinkiang, Shansi, Shensi and the Three Special Administrative Areas.

Borodin and the other Russians who have heretofore advocated immediate action now realize that Ilyin was right in counselling delay. They have sent for him to return to Peking from Kalgan.

Feng is said to be more completely than ever under Soviet control. He is said now to be only a tool in their hands to do with as they will.

The Soviets and the radicals generally are much encouraged over the apparent lack of cooperation between Li's and Wu's attack, and the failure of Chang Tso-lin to take a hand.

From M/A, China Report #5836 April 14, 1926

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3. On March 6, 1926, the following information was obtained of the personnel attending the conferences proceeding in the Russian Embassy:

Kubijak - Secretary General of the Oriental Section of the Central Executive of the people's Commissariat. Acting as president.
Grandt - Consul General at Harbin; representative of farmers and workers of the Chinese Eastern Railway.
Lepse - President of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of all Soviet Republics.
Gamarnikk - President of the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee at Habarovsk.
Gekker - Delegate in the Far East of the Department of National Enterprises.
Krakofsky - Consul General at Mukden.
Rosen - Tass Correspondent at Tokyo.
Meldaniloff- Chief Commissioner of the Customs at Pogranichinaya.
Leonoff - Delegate of the Third International at Shanghai.
Gingeroff - Delegate of the International Labors Union.
Budkewitch - Special Agent of the International Labors Union at Chefoo.
Golman - Secretary of the Advisory Committee at Canton.
Smoleshoff - Tass Correspondent.

4. On March 8, 1926, report was received that on March 2nd Karakhan, Borodin and Egoroff had received the following telegram from Stalin, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communistic Party:

"By all means stop anti-communistic propaganda. Taking advantage of the lack of cooperation among the foreign powers take resolute steps, in contact with Canton and in accordance with the previous instructions, in order to get our aims."

5. On March 15, 1926, the following report was received:

Up to March 1, 1926 there were in the ranks of the First National Army 5,200 Soviet citizens; of these 500 are Chinese who have lived for several years in Russia, received their education there and have become naturalized Soviet citizens. 1500 are Buriats and the balance are Russians.

Of these 700 are special service troops - chauffeurs, telegraph linesmen, signal men, operators, etc., and are distributed in small groups throughout the whole army. The remainder are divided into four independent mixed detachments, in composition corresponding to a Chinese mixed brigade. These detachments are not under Chinese but Russian command, though they cooperate with the general command of the First National Army. Munitions of all sorts for this force are coming from the Soviets. All these Russian units are on the south front.

In addition to the foregoing about 2500 Soviet troops are with the 2nd and 3rd National Armies operating against Wu Pei-fu. An additional 2,000 Soviet troops are now coming from Kalgan with other reenforcements being sent from that area.

During March, in addition to all the foregoing, 2,500 will join the National Army. 7,500 Mongolian cavalry, commanding by Russians and Buriats, are now reported as in the area south of Peking and Tientsin. There will thus be a total of 20,000 Soviet troops contributed to the National Army by April 1st.

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Moscow. On March 11th at a sitting of the Central Committee of the Communistic Party (which lasted for five days) a resolution was carried out to precipitate the revolution in the East, for which purpose 100,000,000 rubles have been assigned. Simultaneously all measures must be taken to stir up a revolution in Poland and Roumania.

At the same sitting, on account of a report of the Commissary of War, Voroshiloff, the following decision was made:

(1) To eliminate from the special "protecting revolution" troops ("Okhra" troops) peasant and other untrustworthy elements and replace them by communistic troops.
(2) To take immediate measures to prepare the Soviet Army for military actions. All preparations must be completed before July 1st.
(3) 250,000 troops to be advanced to the Polish and Roumanian frontiers.

Peking. Karakhan has lately required from the Kuominchun's leaders an immediate start of the offensive, threatening otherwise to discontinue the supply of ammunition and money and to break off all agreements. In case of a defeat of the Kuominchun resulting from their inactivity, its leaders would not get permission to enter Soviet Russia.

A few days ago Borodin suggested a personal terror in China. According to his plan a "dare-to-die" corps should be organized which would start terroristic attempts against the local prominent foreigners. Karakhan and Shirokoff (a representative of Sverdloff) vigorously opposed this suggestion calling it a mad plan which might not only ruin all communistic work in China but stir up indignation against the 3rd International throughout the world. Nevertheless Borodin insists on his scheme, and has sent by diplomatic courier a report in connection therewith to Moscow for approval.

Kalgan. The work with regard to the organization of the communistic army has begun. This work is intrusted to Kashirin (commander of the 1st Siberian Army; a famous war time officer), who has to complete all organization before July 1st when the new army is expected to start war against Peking and Honan. The Ourga-Kalgan road will be equipped by that time with 1000 lorries and 1000 light motorcars.

It is planned in Moscow to despatch from Soviet Russia about 40,000 Buriats, Kalmyks, Kirghizs and sovietized Chinese (mostly communists) to China who would enter into the communistic army as international volunteers and thus form a nucleus of it. About 20,000 Kalmyks and Kirghizs from the Volga and Altai regions are now being transported to the east.

9. From other sources it has been learned that there has been considerable pressure from Moscow applied to the Soviet Embassy to bring about local disturbances, and that Karakhan has resisted these efforts. There are reports that Karakhan is to be relieved shortly, and that Borodin, among others, has been asked if he will accept the appointment in his stead. Following the recent anti-Soviet activities in Canton (see Report No. 5821) a large number of Reds have come to the Embassy in Peking, where there was already present a considerable number, as noted in previous reports. In the last few days practically all of these people have left Peking for Kalgan.

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Referring to the telegram from Stalin (see report of March 8th): Borodin is responsible for the following plan for the furthering of Soviet aims in China and the creation of a national revolutionary force cooperating with Canton:

An army of 75,000 communists is to be organized in northern China which is to be a model of discipline and order, refraining from all levies on and abuses of the people. The cost of this army is estimated at $20 per man per month, one-half of which is to be supplied by the Soviets. A military school is to be established in Peking or Kalgan on lines identical with that of the Whampoa Military Academy, Canton. Borodin believes that this plan should be readily accomplished in from six weeks to two months as the nucleus around which it is to be carried out will be present in the 20,000 Soviet personnel above alluded to. The organization of the communistic army is to be based on Russian regulations.

6. On March 26, 1926, the following report was received:

Borodin's plan for the creation of an army of 75,000 strong has been completely approved by Moscow. Two schools will be established, one in Peking and one in Kalgan.

In connection with the communistic army of 75,000, a scheme of volunteer service of Soviet citizens in this army has been suggested by the Third International and the Society "Friends of China". Mr. Kubijak, Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Eastern Siberia, was ordered to Peking especially to investigate this matter and to work out a plan to make it effective. The suggestion submitted by him has been approved by Moscow simultaneously with the approval of Borodin's plan. They have authority to proceed with this plan.

A conference at the Soviet Embassy attended by Chinese and Soviet communists has decided to attempt a coup. Local Chinese radicals were timid in acquiescing and Kubijak disapproved it, but it was decided upon nevertheless. The coup is to be effected by an attack on Tuan by a unit of the 1st National Army. Tuan is to be captured and a new national government proclaimed. It is recognized that the National Army will be driven out of Peking, but the plotters state their purpose accomplished if they can retreat on Kalgan (retaining Tuan as a prisoner) and announcing that they, a real national government, have been driven out of Peking by the tools of the imperialistic powers. This plan is not considered as of such dangerous possibilities as the plan of the communistic army to be based on Kalgan.

The following are the names of those, other than Chinese, who accompanied the student demonstration of March 18th: Sorokin, Russian; Bogdanoff, Avessarionoff, Tzyripoff - Buriats.

7. On April 1, 1926 information was received that on March 29th Karakhan, Borodin and Kubijak had received the following telegram from Stalin: "The lost situation must be restored notwithstanding any expense and sacrifices of the revolutionary proletariat".

8. On April 9, 1926, the following report was received:

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10. Comment by M/A. It has been evident for some time that there has been much divergence of opinion among the personnel in the Soviet Embassy, both those of the diplomatic staff and of the 3rd International, as to the course that should be pursued. They have been divided into two parties, one favoring violent and immediate action in the hope of starting a revolution, or at least of throwing Peking into disorder; the other a retirement of the National Army on Kalgan accompanied by no overt acts.

The former feel that all the effort and money spent in the last few years on fomenting anti-imperialism, social unrest and a revolution and establishment of a government in China closely affiliated if not allied with Soviet Russia, may be lost if action is not taken to resist what they term the activities of reactionary forces. They are the violent radicals, mad with desire to precipitate in China another revolution comparable to that in Russia; to succeed here, though they have failed elsewhere, in extending their "World Revolution"; and who are prepared to take desperate chances to that end. Though events in Canton have given cooler heads pause for thought, to these rabid ones they convey nothing. They feel Canton not wholly lost, or if lost for the moment not irretrievable. They go further and say that even if lost, it does not alter the need for action in the north. Canton may be disregarded; it is Peking that counts. These are the ones responsible for the shooting on March 18, and it was the more conservative ones who oppose them that were found that day quaking at their desks, so undone with apprehension that they could not control their shaking lips nor trembling hands.

The more conservative element feel that for the ultimate aims of Russia nothing is to be gained by incitement to violent deeds in China. They recognize the futility of an attempt to extend to it their own theories of government. They fear that not only will attempts in either direction bring them the disrepute of failure, but that the failure will involve much more than they can afford to risk.

The objective of this element is not that of Soviet nor of Imperial Russia. It is national, age-old, and devoid of party significance. It is the expression of an urge and need that will not be denied and that is not devoid of dignity. Repulsed as have been the previous efforts of Russians to achieve it, only a temporary set-back is admitted, and again and again their forces will form and advance. Blocked in the west, they must and will have an outlet to an ice-free port on the Pacific, and all that would go with such an extension of their influence across all Asia. To the already adequate sufficiency of the urge of this objective is and for twenty years has been added the desire to wipe out the disgrace of the Russo-Japanese War and to regain what was lost at that time.

Had the Soviet battle-cries of anti-imperialism and revolt fired the Chinese as they hoped it would and a grateful and allied Soviet China resulted, perhaps their task would have been accomplished and their objective reached, for it seems certain that a united China assisting the Russians must have swept Japanese opposition away. Perhaps, too, the infection would have spread to Japan and a Pan-Asiatic alliance of Soviet countries resulted. But this attempt has failed. From the time that the failure was recognized the saner element directing Soviet affairs in the East has changed its views as to the policy to be adopted toward China, and I believe that now it seeks to make this a policy entirely subsidiary to the main Asiatic objective, though as helpful to the latter as may be.

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This element recognizes what were the weaknesses of the Russian position in 1904 and seeks now to correct them. In addition to the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, which were found all too long for supply, it seeks the establishment of a new line running from Lake Baikal through Urga and Kalgan to Peking. As a motor road this route already exists and is in constant use. It is planned to build a railway along this line as soon as possible. Though the area traversed by and contiguous to this line it is trying to create political entities allied with or under Soviet dominance. From these it is hoped to draw forces that will assist in any physical effort that may have to be made.

Throughout China this element is striving to create an impression of friendliness, to gain the good-will and cooperation of the Chinese, though to that end not willing to relinquish what hold is being gained in Mongolia, trusting there rather to artifice in diplomacy and the creation among the Mongolians of a sentiment favorable to an existence independent of China.

Instead of, as in the days of the Czar, approaching and dealing with China as one of the powers that bound her with treaties and denied her sovereignty, as indeed the most overbearing of those powers, the plan now is to come to Peking as friends and liberators, offering equality in the family of nations.

It would be a great error to misinterpret this attitude as one of genuine and disinterested friendship toward China. It is this error that the unthinking Chinese commit. In conversation with certain of them of sane thought on other subjects, but now obsessed with the belief that only the "unequal treaties" are responsible for holding back their country from the position they desire for it, these repeat with hopeless fatuity the assertion that of all foreign nations only Russia is their friend. They discount as negligible or exaggerated Soviet domination in Mongolia. Such Chinese as these, plus the element always radical, and such others as students, that the Soviets may subsidize, may be expected to continue to cause trouble. Willing to sacrifice everything to the furtherance of their aims, it is from them that help is looked for by the element among the Soviets that still cling to the hope of a bloody revolution.

But Lincoln's dictum as to fooling the people is applicable to the Chinese. Closely as the Soviets hold their mask of disinterested friendship, now and then it slips. Striving to make victorious the Kuo Sung-ling revolt, the Soviets precipitated the Chinese Eastern Railway crisis of December, 1925. It was not an error but the failure of a desperate attempt to retrieve a slipping opportunity. They bitterly regret and seek to minimize the result. Nevertheless in this and elsewhere, knowing that the intelligent Chinese penetrate their disguise and are aware of their plans, they seek to retain what measure of Chinese friendship they may and to consolidate their position for the eventual struggle with Japan.

It is this attitude that explains the foregoing reports as to the northwest. The saner element among the Soviets, both here and in Russia, seek to extricate from the warfare in northern Chihli and about Peking as much as possible of the National Army upon which they have expended such considerable sums. Basing it upon Kalgan, they will there

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strive to forge of it a weapon to their use. Cut off there from any other source of supply of munitions, it will be dependent upon them. The establishment of a military school comparable to that at Whampoa will increase its efficiency. The inclusion in its ranks of communists and of Soviet trained personnel is part of the plan. Protected by this force, remove from usual lines of travel, they hope to consummate their far-reaching plans for the creation of a northwestern political area from which they may descend upon Peking as opportunity presents, or turn westward and threaten India.

Retaining and strengthening their control of the Chinese Eastern Railway, with reenforcements for the garrisons of the Maritime Province, their northern Manchurian line is the upper jaw of a pincers. The Baikal-Urga-Kalgan line, extended at the proper moment to Peking, is the lower. And not satisfied that the closing of these will crush Japan, they hope to be able to send Mongolian troops forward from the fulcrum to operate against Japanese lines of communication. They hope for aid in the struggle from Chinese troops. From bitter experience they know the value of partisan bands in campaigns on the Manchurian plains. It was there and in such service against them that Chang Tso-lin earned praise and promotion from the Japanese. If they cannot get this Chinese help, they at least intend to do all in their power to keep the Japanese from having it. And they are making similar efforts to gain Chinese friendship during the struggle.

This plan seems sound and infinitely wiser than any other course pursued in the past or that is now possible of execution. The elements of time and Chinese politics operate in its favor. Nothing is to be gained from the present use in warfare of the National Army. It might be that this army could hold on to Peking in the warfare now proceeding, but if it did it would leave the allied anti-radical forces still in alliance and undestroyed and their return to the attack almost certain. On the other hand, with its withdrawal to Kalgan, Peking would be occupied by allied troops that inevitably would fall out and weaken themselves by further struggles, leaving Peking open for reoccupancy by the National Army.

It seems certain that Lu Chung-lin in persisting in his hold on Peking is acting contrary to Soviet desires. Lu's action may be explicable on the grounds of a perception of the possibility of personal gain. Or it may be that he is trying to effect an alliance or at least understanding with Wu Pei-fu or Chang, that would result in his severance of connection with the balance of the 1st National Army. It is to be noted that Lu is holding Peking with only that portion of the 1st National Army that was under his personal command - some 40,000 men. The balance has already withdrawn to Nankow and Kalgan. Chang Chih-chiang, in command at Kalgan, is reported to have sent repeated orders to Lu to withdraw, and finally out of patience, to have announced that no further supplies would be sent from Kalgan to him.

I think it probable that these saner counsels among the Soviets will prevail and that though all danger of Soviet inspired trouble in Peking is not yet passed, its probability daily becomes more remote.

I also think that the warfare now proceeding is only a surface manifestation of the continual struggle between Russia and J apan in which each maneuver for advantage by one side is countered by the other. Japan is doing all that she can, without boldly appearing in the open, to check the Russian plans in the northwest; to crush the National Army, and to strengthen her position in Manchuria. Having failed in her former efforts to accomplish the first two by means of the Fengtien Army alone, she has furthered Chang's alliance with the notoriously anti-Japanese Wu.

A. Gasnier

G-2 Report

CONFIDENTIAL

4-1 2657-9-281 1926 3020 APR 1

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Recent Soviet Activities and Plans.
(see Report No. 5739)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., MAR 30 1926 2657-9-281

1. On January 21, 1926, a report was received that during the conference still continuing at the Soviet Embassy the difference in views of the conferees as to the action which should be taken has become more marked. Two days ago Ilyin spoke for two hours opposing Krutkovsky's plan. His remarks were received with jeers and hisses, until losing his temper, he singled out one particularly offensive Jew and threatened him if he did not cease his manifestations of disapproval.

Mrs. Larineff (see par. 14, Report 5739) had returned from Kalgan convinced that no demonstration should be attempted earlier than April but is now in favor of immediate action, in which she is joined by the majority of the conferees.

My informant stated that the situation in Peking has become more serious than it had ever been and that Soviet Russians under the direction of the Soviet Embassy were constantly arriving. He stated there were between 100-150 persons ostensibly attached in one capacity or another to the Embassy and in the city itself between 400-500 Soviet Russians. In Kalgan there are 1,000.

He stated that the Chinese Eastern Railway crisis if brought to a head in Harbin would almost certainly precipitate trouble in Peking and further, that the origin of the Chinese Eastern trouble is to be found in the aid the Soviets thereby give to the Kuomingtang by keeping Chang Tso-lin from sending large forces south of the Wall.

2. On February 1, 1926, the following was received:

On January 26th Mrs. Larineff communicated to the Communistic Conference a telegram received from Mr. Stalin, the General Secretary of the Russian Communistic Party and newly appointed Chief of the Oriental Section of the Comintern. After stating that all work in the Oriental Section had been entrusted to him and only his orders were to be followed, he continued:

> "All our work in connection with the world social revolution has not so far brought desirable results. But unless the world social revolution is attained, it will be impossible for us to fulfil the will of Ilyitch (Lenin). We must therefore use all our strength to raise a revolution in China, because it is the only country where our efforts may be crowned with success. I ask all the comrades to do their best to raise a revolutionary wave in China, and for that purpose we are despatching to China comrade Sverdloff with a new group of the responsible workers. The special instructions are following by a dip-courier."

Krutkovsky (Chairman, Committee of Five) has been recalled and on the 26th of January left for Moscow via Kalgan. Mrs. Larineff is temporarily conducting his work.

At the meeting of the Communistic Conference held on the 27th of January it was decided to support the National Army in the coming struggle and to help it to get the supreme power in Peking. A telegram to that effect demanding a credit to the amount of $8,000,000 for the expenses in connection therewith has been sent to Moscow. General Feng

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has agreed to put himself at the head of the National Army and to unite its groups. There are about 5,000 Red Russian troops in the National Army, and it was decided to increase them gradually to 10,000. Feng is now in Kalgan.

Russians in Peking: 500. Personnel, Soviet Embassy: Men - 83, women - 26.

Note on Sverdloff. Is younger brother of Jacob Sverdloff, who ordered execution of Imperial family. Jacob was killed by workmen in Petrograd. Sverdloff speaks English, French and German; was Commissioner of Siberian Railway and lately has been on staff of Soviet Embassy in Berlin. He is a much more important figure than Krutkovsky.

Krutkovsky was recalled because of the fact that everyone learned of his mission; his bad relations with Karakhan; his excessive expenditures for insufficient returns. It is said that of an original 50,000,000 gold rubles he has left only one and a half millions.

The military party in Soviet Russia is planning a war in the spring on Poland and Roumania as a popular measure.

3. On February 11th the following was received:

The following resolution carried at the joint session of the Asiatic Section of the Comintern and the representatives of the Government on the 30th January has been communicated by Mrs. Larinoff to the members of the Communistic Conference under date of February 7th:

"The aims of the U.S.S.R. as well as of the Comintern in the Asiatic countries being quite different from those in Europe and in America, the Asiatic Section of the Comintern prescribes to all representatives of the Comintern the following instructions:

"1. All open propaganda of the communistic ideas, especially in addresses of the official representatives, must be stopped and instead our unofficial comrades must be charged with this work. As for press campaign and public addresses, this must be concentrated in the local national communistic cells, and our comrades should only direct this work.

"2. The official representatives must work in accord with the local national, even imperialistic and bourgeois, elements by all possible means trying to develop and consolidate among them the idea of national self-consciousness and in no way exposing the aggressive policy and plans of the U.S.S.R. and the Comintern. Our principal object in China and in Japan is to unite these two countries on the basis of the pan-Asiatic policy, to tear them away from America and Europe and deprive the latter (America and Europe) of their Far Eastern commercial markets.

"3. The representatives of the Third International must in accord with the official representatives carefully and skilfully carry out the work of the Comintern paying their principal attention to the psychology of the people-masses and taking into consideration local conditions and circumstances.

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"4. Both - the official representatives and the representatives of the Comintern - must exert themselves to get as the first result a military and economic alliance of the U.S.S.R. with Japan and China assisting the first in her colonial and commercial aspirations and leaving for themselves possibilities for the aims of the Comintern and by no means forgetting the second and final result - the social revolution in those two countries and their future adherence to the U.S.S.R.

(The clauses No. 5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 12, having no relation to China and Japan, have not been read.)

"13. It is evident that our hopes on the economical might of the U.S.S.R. and on the realization of the Comintern's plans in Europe have failed. It is also evident that availing ourselves of not yet settled economical crises in Europe and the absence of the political accord between America and Europe, we must concentrate all our energy on the work in Asia where our aim is to put ourselves (for the first time even together with Japan) at the head of the Asiatic nations and by our alliance with them to strike a decisive blow to the Anglo-Saxon nations.

"14. The secret order of January 6th to all official representatives is the result of a decision taken by the Comintern at its joint session with the government representatives on January 4th. Let our party comrades not be surprised by all our official concessions which are urged by pressing necessity of the revolutionary moment. They must not forget that we are surrounded by the bourgeoisie on one side and by the 2nd International on the other. There can be no question about any surrender of our revolutionary positions, and therefore the said order is not open to any discussions.

"15. In view of the importance of the present moment and the necessity of quick actions, we are obliged to despatch representatives to all countries where the responsible work is being carried out."

4. On February 21, 1926, the following was received:

In view of the approaching decisive conflict between the National Armies and their opponents, urgent and energetic measures are being taken by the Soviets to support General Feng. The number of Russians who are communists (civilian and military) in the region of the National Armies, which on February 1st was 8,000 men, is constantly increasing. In Peking there are more than 1,000 Russian communists - 650 civilians and 400 military men.

At the present moment the First National Army represents a very well armed and well organized military force.

Taking into consideration the constant influx of funds, ammunition, instructors and men from the Soviets to General Feng's army on one side, and financial difficulties and the lack of cooperation among the leaders of the anti-National Army group on the other, one cannot

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Recent Soviet Activities and Plans.

fail to see that the coming struggle will be very long and stubborn and that General Wu Pei-fu and his allies have a very difficult and heavy task before them.

The Communistic Conference was closed February 12th. All representatives went back to their places with a strict order to follow instructions given by the Centre. The following resolution has been carried by the said Conference:

> "The absence of a strong central government, continual civil war, and complete impotence and disaccord of the European powers in China, have created here a most favourable situation for a social revolution especially in the sea-ports where the town proletariat could easily get power into their hands. We should advise therefore the Centre to keep China in view and to pay special attention to her Western regions. To direct work there we should recommend our comrade Grigorovitch."

5. Comment by M/A: From an entirely independent source I have had confirmation of the passage of the resolution quoted immediately above, and information that it was transmitted to Moscow by telegraph. I consider it of much importance, and think it probable that there will be trouble at the sea-ports fomented by the Soviets. This is particularly the case in regard to Shanghai. The first anniversary of the incident in that city of May 30, 1925, may be a critical time.

6. It is requested that this and other reports on this subject be treated as strictly confidential. Certain matter contained in such reports in the past has been published in American newspapers and in other ways has found its way back to Peking. While this matter may have been received from other sources than this office, as it has been identical with matter in my reports it has been embarrassing to my sources and may result in closing some of them to me.

S W Barnett

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WAR DEPARTMENT
SEP 12

SUBJECT Soviet Activities and Plans in North China.

From M/A, China

No. 5523 Date August 1, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

3020

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 11 1925

1. A reliable source reports that from July 15th to July 18th a conference of Russian delegates of the 3rd International took place in Kalgan. Those attending were Ilyin, Bliikher, Konoplev, Moshkovtch, Leiman, Grishkovitch, Katin (Lesman). There were no Chinese present. The following decisions were reached.

2. To concentrate attention on propaganda among Chinese soldiers; this work to be carried on through communistic nuclei and instructors.

3. To check the influence of the foreigners and missionaries who are working against the spreading of communistic doctrines. In this to resort to any measures which will embarrass, impede and harass the foreigners, including the organization of bandit raids and the commission of excesses.

4. To appoint trustworthy men to important posts and at the same time to maintain surveillance over the work of Russian special agents (Spetzs) and Chinese agents.

5. To complete the organization of motor transportation between Urga and Kalgan and force out from this business private owners of motorcars.

6. To expel from Mongolia all Russians of different political faith from the Soviets.

7. Comment: There is considerable evidence of Soviet propaganda among Chinese soldiers. I am inclined to think it a very important matter. Chinese soldiers are habitually in arrears of pay, and in some commands are held in rigid discipline. The Soviets promise increase of wages, prompt payment and opportunities for loot and blackmail. In this connection please see report #5521, paragraph 7.

Propaganda among the civilian element is proceeding systematically all over China. The agents are generally disguised as poor Russians, peddling clothes. They proceed on foot from village to village and are having a profound influence upon the Chinese in making them believe that of all foreigners only Russians are their friends. With this as a starting point they dwell upon the deplorable state of the Chinese and hold out the hope of its national revival and greatness through means to which the Russians will help them.

Referring to the motorcar transportation between Urga and Kalgan, please see report #5522.

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SUBJECT Soviet Activities in China.

From M.A Peking.

No. 5516 Date July 17, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 12 1925, 19

3020—Stability of Government.

1. The following has been received from a reliable source:

2. "Kalgan.—The peculiar feature of the local demonstrations is the participation of troops which are openly involved into the anti-foreign movement.

"Transportation of arms from Urga is going on in hot haste. (The full particulars about arms will be given in the next report).

"The offensive against Peking which has been planned on the first days of July is suspended because of some difficulties with Ho-nan generals who under different pretences kept from direct cooperation with General Feng, what they have promised him before. On the 2nd of July General Feng together with Colonel Ilyin left for Honan but, according to information received July 12, so far no agreement with Honan has been reached.

"In connection with change of the situation the following instruction has been received from Moscow:

"You must get into contact and close cooperation with Canton; refrain from direct actions; increase anti-foreign propaganda in press and in official declarations. Canton is instructed accordingly."

"Mr. Bliikler is summoned to Kalgan to direct in case of need military operations. Several agitators are sent to Ordos and Alashan in order to stir up a revolt in due moment.

"Canton.—Officially the head of the Canton Government is Mr. Sun-Wo (Son of late Sun Yat-sen), but the real power is in hands of the left wing of Kuomintang who dominates Canton and is acting under instructions from Moscow.

"The Canton Government takes the most resolute measures against all who disagree with them, and in the issue the population is completely terrorized.

"The Communists are trying now to lead propaganda among the foreign troops in Canton. To that effect several foreign Communists arrived now to Canton, among them are: 3 Frenchmen, 2 Englishmen, 4 Italians and even some Coreans. The propaganda among the foreign soldiers so far does not bring much result.

"The general situation in Canton is very far from being quiet and favorable to foreigners. A new outbreak may happen any moment.

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"Harbin.--There are about 4500 members of the Communistic Party in Manchuria, 3000 of which are employees on the Chinese Eastern Railway and the rest in majority are acting as agents from Moskow. Besides that there are 3000 Comsomols (Communistic youths) and 2000 pioneers (Communistic boyscbuts).

"The number of Chinese Communists in Manchuria reaches 6000.

"All propaganda business is in hands of Mr. Sliepak, former officer, now representative of a Russian transport company.

"Manchuria is quite prepared to the action in accordance with the general plan.

"One of the principal reasons of suspending direct actions was news about the unsincerity of the Japanese promises. According to information received from Mr. Copp (Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo) in case of the occupation of the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone by the Soviet a Military Japanese intervention will follow immediately."

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SUBJECT Soviet Activities in China.

From M.A Peking

No. 5503 2657-D-28 (4) Date July 14, 1925., 19

Replying to No. 2657 Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 17 1925

3020

1. The following has been received from a reliable source.

Referring to the final sentence of par. 4 of this report, and sub-par. (a), par. 1, Report 5489, it has been definitely established that the center of all Soviet propaganda in China is Vladivostok and not Harbin.

2. "General outline of the Russian Communists activity in China (up to the 15th of June).

3. "Canton:

The Canton Government possesses a very good (from the Chinese point of view), very well armed army, numbering 60,000 men, with several years of fighting experience. There are in that army 500 Russian instructors with Colonel Tortumatoff as the head. He is Tartar by origin, jurist by education, graduate of the Kazan University, officer of the old Russian Army. During the civil war he joined the Reds and was fellow-champion of Kaslirine and Blickher (two notorious Red commanders).

4. "There are Communistic nuclei in each regiment and division. The Communistic Party has 40 Communistic nuclei, the number of members being about 33,000, half of which belong to the army. Besides 60,000 men of the 1st Army, there are about 30,000 troops which are less reliable but also very well armed.

Since the death of Sun Yat Sen the leadership of the army as well as the Communistic Party is practically in the hands of Borodin and Tortumatoff.

At present moment the Canton Government is planning:

1. To create a discord between foreigners.
2. To use all means to provoke Great Britain.
3. To organize revolts among Chinese.
4. To put foreigners into necessity of using arms.
5. At favorable moment to organize the massacre of foreigners and then to start a social revolution. In any case to use all possible means to provoke an Anglo-Chinese war.
6. Not implicate America and Japan.

Canton is in close connection with Vladivostok.

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5. "Shanghai.—All propaganda is in hands of Mr. Jebrovsky (graduate of the Vladivostok Oriental Institute), who, before Colonel Ilyin came to Kalgan, was working there and is considered an expert in organization and propaganda work. At his disposal are about 70 Russian agents. Besides that, Mr. Jebrovsky has a very well trained group of Chinese Communists (about 50 men) who have recently arrived from Moscow. This group is organizing among students and workmen the Communistic nuclei; the number of Communistic members up to 15 June was 7000.

6. "After the Shanghai incident many Russian agitators came to Shanghai from Vladivostok and Harbin. Up to 15 June about 150 Russian Communists arrived at Shanghai or during the period after 30 May.

7. "The strike movement is supported financially by Jebrovsky. The funds are delivered through the Dal Bank and the Soviet Commercial Representation. From 1 to 15 June $175,000 had been spent for that purpose.

8. "The presence in Shanghai of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops makes Jebrovsky's work much more difficult.

9. "The 1st of June the organization of the Red Guard was started. Up to June 15, 11,500 men were enlisted, and 5000 of the (most reliable) are armed with pistols and rifles of various types.

10. "Tientsin.—All propaganda work is in hands of the Soviet Commercial Representative who is acting through Dr. Pertsel (Jew), Mr. Epstein (Jew dealing in dental instruments), and others, about 35 men. The work here is only recently started and therefore results are not yet considerable.

11. "Russian military experts in civilian clothes are coming almost every day from Moscow. Up to 15 June about 50 of them arrived in Tientsin.

Some measures to start organization of the Red Guard are being taken.

12. "Peking.—There are about 175 Red propaganda agents in Peking now. 31 of them are living in the Soviet Embassy, 144 outside of the Legation Quarter. Several new arrivals have been noticed recently. Out of the newly arrived agitators, 16 are living in the Central Hotel, 10 in the Wagons Lits Hotel, 9 in the Peking Hotel and 17 in private houses.

13. "5 Communistic nuclei for men and 1 for women are organized. The number of Chinese Communists is about 3000.

14. "The organization of the Red Guard is started. 1400 men are already enlisted, out of which 360 men are armed with pistols.

"The Embassy keeps itself strictly isolated from this work giving its instructions in most secret way.

15. "A very big scandal has recently arisen in Chinese Communistic circles, as it was disclosed that some of the Chinese Communistic local leaders have embezzled the funds entrusted to them.

16. "The general scheme of the Kuomintang and Russian Communists is as follows:

Canton after necessary preparations should strike the first blow by rising against foreigners, and by proclaiming a social revolution.

Immediately after that General Feng Yu-hsiang should occupy Peking and extend his influence to Shangi and Shensi.

At the same time a Mahomedan revolt should break out in Hsin-chiang and Kashgaria promptly followed by a revolt in the Chinese Tibet, and a new Republic established which with support of the Reds should join the Union of the Soviet Republics.

Simultaneously in the Chinese Eastern Zone strike and disorders should begin and as the result the Soviet troops should occupy the Railway Zone."

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SUBJECT Soviet propaganda and objectives in China.

From M/A Peking.

No. 5489 Date June 26, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

2930

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 4 1925

The following report has been received from reliable sources-

1. "In consequence of the growing activity of communistic propaganda among the troops and owing to the presence of Chinese agitators returning from Moscow, the General Staff at Mukden has given orders to establish the most severe control over the soldiers, officers, their relations and correspondence. The guilty shall be called to appear before a court-martial of the 1st category, that is to say, one empowered to sentence to the penalty of death.

"In the vicinity of Tsitsihar, at Margen, on the road to Sakhalen, on June 4th, 250 carts loaded with rifles, cartridges and 3 mountain guns were seized. On the same date 60 Chinese and 11 Russians who had been attending the Oriental courses at Moscow and Vladivostock were arrested. They were bearers of instructions concerning the distribution of these arms, destined for the detachments of the Professional Unions of the district of Miandouhe-Anda. The points of delivery were on the line west of Miandouhe, Boukhedou, Tsitsihar and Anda. After deciphering these instructions 12 persons were arrested at Miandouhe, 22 at Boukhadou, 41 at Tsitsihar, 9 at Djalantoun, and 21 at Anda. They are workmen members of the "Dorkom" and other Unions and all belong to the communistic party. After the sentence of the Court Martial at Harbin, these persons were shot on June 15th. When the Soviet Consul asked for information in regard to the fate of these people, he received the reply that they were connected with an organization whose purpose is to organize a rebellion on Chinese territory and that they were sent to Kirin to be judged according to martial law.

"Part of the documents taken on the arrested Chinese on the Eastern Line were deciphered. The result surpasses in interest all that could be expected.

"(a) The E.M. (Note. Either a person or organization unknown to this office, M.A.) presumed that Harbin was the center of transmission of bolshevik propaganda and work. It is now proved that Harbin is really that center. The Central Executive Committee of the 3rd International for China, Korea, and in part for Japan)principally for its concessions in China), is located there.

"(b) The organization of the professional unions is the starting point of the agitation among the Chinese and the troops.

"(c) Three military warehouses were discovered; they contained

11,000 rifles	71 machine guns
2,500,000 cartridges	1,400 shells
2,641 hand grenades	124 gas pots.

6 large guns

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"According to the documents it is presumed that five other warehouses are established.

"Among the arms seized 45 per cent are Russian and 55 per cent German; the latter are new, carefully packed and come directly from the factories.

"The documents show the existence of:

(a) An organization of spies for Manchuria at Progranichnaya, and up to Mukden.

(b) A liaison organization, and agents, members of the Kuomintang party and partisans of Feng.

(c) The establishment of an absolute liaison with the 3rd International source of strikes and movements against foreigners in China and in particular against Japan and England.

(d) A program of work for the agitators, and a schedule for the establishment of their speeches.

"Thanks to this information it has been possible to arrest at Kharbin the members of the Chinese Central Committee of the 3rd International, among whom were three Russians. With one of them, on June 13th, a great number of documents appearing to be very important but not yet deciphered, were found.

"The purpose of the propaganda is to cause a second Boxer movement in China, utilizing to this end the nationalist excitement, so as to obtain the abolition of extraterritoriality, of concessions, the establishment of Chinese courts, the withdrawal of armed foreign forces from China, and the abolition of the foreign guarantees granted by the Protocol of 1901.

"In order to convince the masses and to give them the certainty of success, it is indispensable to explain to them the liberation of Turkey (from foreign control) which country was under worse conditions than those existing in China, and which was carried out with the support of the Soviets.

"To ensure greater success for this propaganda and to stir up revolts it is necessary to excite the lower instincts of the crowds by provocative action on the part of foreigners and to find some Chinese fanatical enough to designate them as leaders of the people (which was the case at the time of the Tainin revolt).

"It is indispensable to obtain the divided action of the foreigners and cause discord among them to prevent them, when the revolt is beginning to develop, from acting jointly.

"Require that instructions be given to excite the people first against the English and Japanese, until a special order is given, leaving alone for the moment, the Italians and French.

"It is indispensable to cause, about August 1st, a new civil war between the Marshal and Feng, as well as disturbances in the district Shanghai-Nanking, and in the valley of the Yang Tze.

"To support this propaganda 5 million and half were put at its disposal since the beginning of its organization.

"According to the last documents, the local organizations must provoke an uprising of the masses in the three Provinces of the East about the beginning of the month of August, and create, whatever the cost, serious incidents in order that the SSSR. may protest and that the animosity of the people may be awakened."

2. I believe that there is good reason to accept this report as accurate.

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G-2 Report

3020

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 2 1927

Report of a Conference held at the Russian Embassy Peking, in January, 1927.

Present:

Lebedeff	Petrovsky	Chernikh
Sergeef	Golubtseff	Trophemoff
Goncharoff	Lialina	Kolin
Stepenchuk		

1. Situation in S.S.S.R. (Reported by Lebedeff, Chief of Staff of Budenny and Commander of all International Legations in Soviet Russia.)

The present situation is extremely difficult. We have received defeat after defeat from both a political and economic point of view and the internal disagreements in the Communistic Party have taken a very intensive form. Our foreign organizations from day to day are getting more and more demoralized. This was especially noticeable after the failure of the British coal strike. Moreover, the chauvinistic and fascist movements in European countries are growing, and even the democratic and social democratic parties of Europe are against us. Our economic situation is such that we face immediate bankruptcy. I have to admit that all our organizations abroad cost us monthly about forty million rubles. The British strike with the preliminary liquidation expenses cost us about seventy million rubles. We have come to the conclusion that we cannot afford to maintain on the same scale our foreign organizations. Some of these organizations are drawing money without achieving any results. We have also come to the conclusion that social revolutions in Europe and America are absolutely impossible at the present time. On the other hand the situation in our own country does not permit us to remain inactive. In addition to all these setbacks, we have also come to the conclusion that the Third International is too complicated an organization on the one hand, and absolutely unproductive on the other hand. Consequently, we have concentrated all the work of administration of the S.S.S.R. and the revolutionary propaganda of Europe in the Political Bureau.

Comment by M/A: The impressions contained above are constantly reiterated by the source from which this material is obtained, and by all the White Russians in China. At present no Red Russian contacts are available to officials of our Legation, thus preventing any estimate of internal conditions in Russia based on varied sources.

2. At a special meeting of the Political Bureau on the 7th of December, after long discussions for the purpose of finding a solution to our problems, the Political Bureau has made the following plan of action:

a) Taking into consideration the mentality of the Asiatics, knowing their uncivilized state and the depressed financial situation, and especially their inborn hatred of white races, the Political Bureau has ordered all organizations of the Communistic Party to concentrate their work on Asiatic countries, and partly in South Africa.

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Subject: Soviet Activities.

b) To use primarily the slogan "Asia for Asiatics" as a basis of propaganda.

c) Definitely and energetically to stimulate the masses in Asia against the white race, as well as the local bourgeois and the authorities. The Political Bureau is going to increase the power of local "responsible workers" in order to achieve better results.

d) To support in every respect the actions and endeavors of Japan to attain the hegemony of all Asia, especially with respect to China.

e) To use all means to drag the European countries into a war with the Asiatic countries, in order to prevent European countries from recovering from their losses from the World War.

f) As the present political situation is favorable only in China it is necessary to use all means to turn it to our account, but under no circumstances to go against Japan. It is necessary to use all means to interest the masses and bring them into play. When the masses are aroused, we shall be masters of the situation.

Comment by M/A. The mention of the necessity of not conflicting with the Japanese recurs in all reports from this source. There seems always in Soviet plans a tendency, superficially at least, to play up to the Japanese aspirations to the hegemony of the Far East. I am confident that Russia is bent on widening the differences between Japan and Western Powers. In all recent incidents, Japan is noticeably spared violence and unfavorable propaganda directed primarily at Britain, but secondarily at western peoples. However, I can only see in this maneuvering an attempt to delay the evil day when Japan, in her own interest, must acknowledge that Soviet activities are a menace to her interests.

3. The Political Bureau realizes that we may be defeated in this game but realizes also that we have no other way of coping with the present situation. This is why we must resort to such dangerous expedients as fomenting riots among Asiatics. We must recognize the fact that our Red Army, having been out of action for a long time, and due to the difficult economic situation and anti-communistic propaganda, is getting more and more unreliable. Our people are discontented, and the only reason this discontent is not shown openly is due to our strict regime. But even so we see cases of sabotage. Among ourselves we have very good revolutionary workers but we have a limited number of people with creative ability. The N.E.P. has created a new class of bourgeois which is more difficult to handle than the old one on account of its cunningness. The hopes for the year 1926 did not materialize and we came to the conclusion that to cope with the present situation we must create a new war to keep the army busy, and at the same time introduce military communism in

4. After a discussion of this report and additional information given by Lebedeff, the Conference wrote up the following resolutions:

That the Conference agrees to the plan of the Political Bureau and makes the following suggestions:

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a) That the military force in the Far East, east of Lake Baikal, be brought up to 200,000 bayonets, and west of Baikal, to 100,000.

b) That our actions in China should be hastened since we cannot afford to adopt a policy of observation. We must keep the initiative in our hands, since only in this way can we prevent our enemies from coordinating their actions.

Comment by M/A. We have had quite reliable information from British sources that April 1, 1927, was set as a time when concentrations along the Manchurian frontier would be effected in order to synchronize with the contemplated Nationalist spring effort and embarrass Chang Tso-lin. From the same British source, I hear that this threat will be expedited, but that it will be sheer bluff for fear of arousing Japanese suspicions.

5. Report of Sergeef, Representative of Borodin.

a) Arms and ammunition supplied in 1926 from Vladivostok to Canton:

Rifles and pistols - 200,000, with 1,000 rounds of ammunition for each.
170 pieces of artillery with 500 projectiles for each piece.
$4,000,000 of equipment.
850 mines.
Equipped a chemical factory for production of poisonour gases.
Paid on account of loan $56,000,000.
Spent on Chinese Communist Party, $22,000,000.
From the beginning of our work with the Kuominchun the total expenditure has been $250,000,000, which includes all money spent on propaganda work all over China.

Comment by M/A: These financial estimates are probably greatly exaggerated but we have no means for checking them.

b) Japan is well informed of our actions in Canton but expects to be able to use them for her own benefit. Saburi is keenly watching all developments and believes a nationalistic movement will not harm Japanese interests.

Comment by M/A: Japan is very cautious about causing any irritation to genuine Chinese nationalistic aspirations, but there is no suggestion that Japan expects any success from the present Cantonese movement. From recent conversational hints thrown out by Japanese officers they seem quite sure and quite content that the movement has temporarily reached its high water mark.

c) Borodin, in the opinion of Sergeeff, acts too much in the interest of Chang Kai-shih and Yen. Chang Kai-shih really has no sympathy with the communistic movement but has the mentality of all other Chinese militarists. It is known that a considerable amount of money handed to Chang Kai-shih for military operations did not reach its proper

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

destination and it is consequently recommended that instructions be given to Borodin to cooperate in full with the Chinese Communist Party and not with Chang Kai-shih. Sergeef made criticism of the floating mines not having been supplied in time and stated that at the present time it is impossible to use them in action. The taking of the British Concession at Hankow was not done at Chang Kai-shih's initiative but was entirely due to Borodin and Sergeef.

Comment by M/A: The foregoing is in keeping with general foreign opinion and may or may not have been heard in the Conference. It is not known who is meant by Yen.

6. Resolutions of Conference:

a) In order to stir up the masses in a more efficient manner, to use as a basis for propaganda the mottoes of both the October Russian revolution and of the Boxer movement.

b) To demand from Chang Kai-shih and Yen the immediate fulfilment of the December agreement. In case of failure, to discredit both of these persons in the eyes of the masses.

c) In those regions where we are in occupation to employ all methods of the October Revolution for both exciting and controlling the masses.

d) This resolution to be telegraphed to Borodin.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report.

RUSSIA (Combat).

Subject: Military Policy with Reference to China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 5 1927

A translation of a newspaper article of April 13, in submitted. The writer of this article is very familiar with Russian affairs, particularly its politics and national defense. The article is of interest in view of the situation in China, as it deals primarily with this phase and discusses Mongolia as a probable area for Russian military bases. In addition the locations of bases and troop units are mentioned.

Russians' Preparation for Interference in China; Mongolia as the Military Base.

Even if it should appear fool-hardy to predict a military intervention in China by Russia as a result of recent events, still it can be insisted that Russia, for a long time, has not allowed any opportunity to pass without carefully preparing for such an intervention.

Long before the Cantonese succeeded in instituting at Canton a 'Technical Revolutionary Base for the Southern Chinese' - to use an expression that was employed by the Executive Committee of the Third International - the authorities from the Kremlin had slowly and patiently worked for a preparation for a future crisis to establish such a base for North China, a type of Asiatic advance post. This was found in Mongolia. As an actual fact, this state, in spite of all masquerading behind an illusionary unconcern, is hardly anything else but one of the sister Soviet republics which the dignitaries of the Soviet Union endeavor to group under the proletariats' emblem.

As early as 1925 there was published on July 9 in the 'Krasnaja Zvjezda' an article by Mr. Danzan, the diplomatic representative from Mongolia in Moscow from which the following is quoted: 'The Mongolian Army is the Red Army's faithful disciple. Its fortune is closely bound with that of the Soviet troops. The Mongolian army differs from the Red army in only few insignificant local ways, but the principle underlying its organization is the same. The Mongolian army is built upon the same foundations and follows the same aim as of its Russian model.' This could hardly be expressed more plainly. The Soviet government has in a very clever way understood how to benefit by the request for help which it received from Mongolia in Nineteen Twenty (1920. On this occasion the aim was to rid the country of the Chinest troops and of the Russian Whites led by Baron Ungern-Sternberg, and under the guise of establishing a Mongolian army the Russians have literally

FROM: M. A. SWEDEN. REPORT NO. 374. APRIL 21, 1927.

flooded the country with their own troops and at the same time crowded in a great number of officers in command positions. Likewise the Soviet heaped upon the local dignitaries all manner of decorations. Russia has changed the country to a real military vassal.

The present commander-in-chief of the Mongolian Army, Tchoi-Balsan, is actually, within the meaning of the word, an advance agent for the Soviets' politics. During 1920-'21 he commanded a column in the closest co-operation with the Red troops and was one of the members of the Mongolian diplomatic mission that was sent to Moscow to request the help of Russia.

The authorities of Kremlin have not spared any attention for his account and Tchoi-Balsan was accordingly decorated with the Order of the Red Flag and was invited to continue his military education in Russia. For sometime he pursued the courses at the General Staff Academy in Moscow, an example which was followed by a large number of Mongolian officers. The Red General Staff finally established for their oriental comrades' special military courses under the name of "The Combined Institute of Instruction for the Asiatic People" or the "United International School".

It is Tchoi-Balsan who has negotiated the secret treaties that finally changed Mongolia to a subsidiary part of the military district of Siberia. At fixed intervals conferences took place at Moscow between the leaders of Mongolia and of Russia within the political as well as the military spheres. In March, 1926, after the first skirmishes between the Soviet authorities and Changtsolin, Mongolia's President of the Council, Amour, and a representative from the Mongolian Kuomintang's Party Central Committee, Diadamba, were sent to Moscow where they met Su-Fan, representative of the Chinese Communistic Party and General Hu-Hanming, the Chinest Kuomintang Party's accredited representative in Russia. It was on this occasion when in co-operation with the Executive Committee of the Third International and the Russian People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the fundamental principles were promulgated for the program that the politics of the Soviet Government now follow in Asia and by which the co-operation between Canton and Russia are in the fullest accord. Russia should accordingly avail herself of Mongolia as a corridor to lay hold of the Chinese counter-revolutionaries.

To clearly see the well grounded hopes that are placed by Moscow in the Mongolian assistance, it is sufficient to refer to the work which at that time was given out by the Soviet Russian Orientalist comrade Kalinikov, written under the title 'The Mongolian Revolution and the National Movement'. 'Mongolia', writes Kalinikov, is a factor of the greatest importance in the awakening of the Asiatic people. The events that transpired in Tibet and resulted in the final undermining of the English influences, can be directly ascribed to the pressure brought to bear by Mongolia.

What Russia appears to expect from Mongolia for an eventual conflict with Changtsolin is a co-operation in an enveloping and comprehensive movement on the Manchurian forces' right wing.

FROM: M. A. SWEDEN. REPORT NO, 374. APRIL 21, 1927.

The Mongolian army cannot be considered in any way as a negligible quantity. At mobilization its strength can be brought up to at least 60,000 fully trained men but this official figure should be accepted with the understanding that it can be considerably increased by reason of the newly acquired Soviet means. The government in Moscow had, as early as in July, 1925, decided to place the whole Buriat-Mongolian population that resides in the territory of Siberia, under obligatory military training, a population that had up to this date been exempted from military service. The inhabitants are enrolled in troop units that are called 'National', but in no way are they different from the actual Mongolian troops. Commanded by Russian officers they will, in case of threatened war, be incorporated in the regular army of Mongolia and this union of closely related people will give the Red General Staff the possibility to exert even a more active pressure on their Mongolian vassal.

Furthermore, all the higher positions in the Mongolian army are now in the hands of Soviet officials. At least 3/4 of the permanent command cadres are made up of Russians. In Mongolia the Soviet General Staff employs the same methods as used in Afghanistan but on a much greater scale. Russia agrees to deliver war materials solely upon the conditions that the delivery is followed up by a great number of Russian instructors. At present practically all of the war material in the hands of Mongolia is of Russian origin. Mongolia possesses airplanes for bombardment and reconnoissance, two detachments of heavy artillery, armoured motor cars and a great supply of gas equipment. The preparation to develop Urga and Kovdo and to convert them into arsenals for Russian use was begun a long time ago.

The Russian General Staff has profited by experience gained during the Russian-Japanese War and will no longer, in the event of warfare in the Far East, be dependent upon a far distant base. Hence, everything has been changed. Russian Eastern provinces and the Siberian military district as bases are in position to provide troops in the field with all necessities. A large ammunition plant has been built at Orenburg and an artillery plant is in operation at Perm, but it is at Omsk in particular where the central point for delivery of munitions in located. This city is equipped with factories for producing artillery pieces, ammunition and airplanes and it is here that the Siberian Air Fleet is located. Finally, there are a number of military schools for infantry, cavalry and artillery in Siberia, the most important being at Tomsk, Omsk and Irkutsk.

On the other hand, the troops in Siberia have received noteworthy re-inforcements since 1925. The strength at present is 4 army corps, the 12th, the seventeenth (17th), the 19th and the 21st, each of which consists of two active divisions. To the active divisions there must be added the territorial divisions, so without doubt the army corps consists of 4 divisions. Furthermore, there are 6 cavalry brigades well equipped

with machine guns (16 machine guns per squadron) and with light artillery. The Siberian troops in addition to the usual artillery provided, have special detachments of mountain artillery.

There is every reason to believe that at present the Siberian troops have been further re-inforced by troops from the Volga military district where six divisions are stationed and with troops from the North Caucasus where the 9th and the 15th Army Corps are stationed.

Finally, It must be reminded that the Soviet Union sometime ago sent Michael Laschevitz, a former leader for the opposition to Trotsky, to the East as chief for the Chinese East Railway through Manchuria. This appointment can now be explained for other reasons than domestic politics. Laschevitz is thoroughly familiar with the military district in Siberia where he commanded the troops in 1925 and where he even functioned as Chairman of the Revolutionary War Committee. It is almost self evident that he would resume his position in the army in case of war, as he has had opportunity to study the military and political situation in Mongolia."

In conversation with several prominent Swedes, it was learned that the belief in Sweden is that Russia has too many internal troubles and the Soviet regime is too unstable to attempt any serious intervention in China.

To date nothing of interest relative to China has come up here. The Press contains the usual cable news and the editorials are of no special value, indicating a rather superficial knowledge of the Chinese situation.

Frederick A. Holmer
FREDERICK A. HOLMER,
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

FROM: M. A. SWEDEN. REPORT NO. 374. APRIL 21, 1927.

4-1
1927 2657-9-281
3020
WAR DEPARTMENT
MAR 15

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 15 1927

1. In spite of the steady progression of Soviet troops eastward in Siberia, there will be no demonstration by Siberian troops in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone without a very definite understanding with Japan that such demonstration is not directed against her. (M/A: This is believed to be quite true.)

2. Tchernikh reports that the recent liberal concessions to the Chinese on the part of Britain, together with her positive military preparations, are causing the Japanese considerable confusion. They frankly do not know what attitude to assume.

Tchernikh definitely states that since America is definitely mobilizing her forces for action against China and Japan he can obtain no results from his pour parleys in connection with "your telegram No.__".

He states that for more than three weeks he has been awaiting an answer from the Japanese in connection with a subject which is unintelligible to the agent.

(M/A: The effect of the foregoing appears to be that recent developments have caused Japan to show considerable hesitancy in continuing with negotiations looking to a definite agreement with Russia. The reference to the United States is palpably absurd. It is not believed that any Japanese-Russian negotiations have taken place in Peking.)

3. Tchernikh takes credit for stopping the negotiations between O'Malley and Chen, mentioning that the action was taken in accordance with instructions from the Russian Embassy here. (M/A: This may be Tchernikh's pride or a product of the agent's suspicion.)

4. Tchernikh states that if the British stop their troops in Singapore he can hold the situation in China in hand. (M/A: Eugene C hen has asked for this.)

5. In reporting the general political situation in the South he states, "Thanks to our efforts the influence of Chiang Kai-shek is decreasing. Everything is now going through the Political Bureau at the head of which we have placed Sun Fo, who thinks himself destined to be a great revolutionary figure". (M/A: This believed to be correct.)

6. The same source very clearly reports that a project is now under discussion at Hankow that in case "we" do not obtain what we want in the present negotiations to seize all available British subjects and hold them as hostages. (M/A: This is suspected of being White Russian suspicion.)

---

7. In Siberia there are 3 Red Armies and no other known units. These armies have been staging eastward for the past two months, and at present their composition and position are about as follows:

From M/A, China Report No. 6064 February 11, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

5th Red Army plus 15,000 Red Legion and 10,000 political Okrana extend from Irkutsk to the east. Headquarters recently at Verkne Udinsk now moving to Chita.

3rd Red Army plus 5,000 Red Legion and 5,000 political Okrana follow the 5th Army. Headquarters recently at Omsk now moved to Irkutsk.

12th Red Army in region of Ural Mountains. Headquarters now moving from Perm to Omsk.

(M/A: This is believed to be generally correct by British officials. The French Military Attache tells me, however, that French sources in Moscow belittle Russian war preparations. They believe Soviet Russia incapable of making war. The British and French views are quite divergent. While I have great respect for French opinions on this subject, I am inclined to the belief that Russian military activities are to be observed with care.)

8. Data on Organization. The Red forces are organized on the triangular system which apparently is normal all down the line.

The normal Army consists of 3 corps.
1 corps consists of 2 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division plus auxiliary troops.
Strength of an Army is estimated slightly under 100,000.
Strength of a corps is estimated roughly at 30,000.
Each infantry regiment has 6 4-gun batteries attached.
1 battalion has an approximate strength of 1,000 bayonets.
Each company has 6 machine guns, making a total of 18 machine guns to the battalion.

(M/A: Confirmation or correction of the above is desired from the Russian Section. The agent assures me that there is an "Army" organization in Russia.)

9. There are hidden in the woods near Station Yakeshi, on the Chinese Eastern Railway, some 40,000 rifles which were intended to arm Russian irregulars and Chinese communists in the insurrection intended to be led by Yang Cho, who was recently killed by Chang Tso-lin. Attempt is now being made to work these rifles eastward toward Harbin but Chinese officials have some knowledge of the matter and are watching the movement. Numerous arrests have been made among the Russians in connection with this attempt to arm communists in Manchuria.

10. There are said to be 13,000 Russian and Chinese communists available as soldiers in the Chinese Eastern Railway Zone.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Legation
1 Tientsin
1 Japan
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
FEB 18
WAR DEPARTMENT

Y·2

1927 2657-J-287
3020
73

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 17 1927

1. The contents of this report are to be treated as noted for previous reports on this subject, the source being the same.

A conference will be held at the Embassy in Peking soon after January 10th. The following persons have been appointed to this conference:

Sergeeff, representative of Borodin
Lebedeff, Chief of Staff of Budenny
Mukian, (Georgian)
Ilyin, Military Specialist
Kubiak, Governor of Amur Province
Stepanoff, formerly an a.d.c. to Trotsky
Grishin, from Hankow (Secretary of Borodin)
Lashevitch

The program of work of the conference is as follows:

(1) Question of transfer of the Embassy from Peking to Wuchang.
(2) Advisability of sending Soviet troops to the South.
(3) Supply of arms and equipment to the Cantonese Army.
(4) Discussion of the plan of campaign against North China in case of necessity of war.
(5) Negotiations with Japan.
(6) Grishin's report on propaganda.
(7) Lashevitch's report on negotiations in Harbin and Mukden.
(8) Sergeeff's report on financing the Cantonese Army.
(9) Lebedeff's report on the dislocation (stations, movements and concentration plans) of Soviet troops in Eastern Siberia.

Chernich's Despatches.

The Soviet Embassy in Peking has information that Great Britain has coordinated its actions in China with Italy and that a very strong policy will be adopted by these powers against Canton. It is possible that Great Britain will recognize the Cantonese Government, in order to represent actions against Canton as actions against a legal and independent government and not as interference in China's internal affairs.

The temporary deadlock in negotiations with Japan is due to the uncertainty of the issue of Franco-Japanese negotiations. There is no doubt that the treaty will be signed, as Japan, having previously agreed in principle on all points of the treaty, has not proposed any important alterations.

Chernich reports that Saburi has definitely refused any other cash advances to the Cantonese but has made certain promises with regard to Customs' operation in South China, and assured the government of the willingness of Japan to make a treaty with the Southern government.

From M/A, China Report #6025 January 12, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Soviet Activities.

Litvinoff's Telegrams to Chernich, Borodin and Tokyo Embassy.

"The present discontent with Soviet authority in Russia could be coped with only on the condition of complete success of a revolutionary government in China. This success has to be achieved with the least expenditure of money and without creating any complications with J apan. The very existence of the Soviet power depends on this success.

"Our object is to reach at any cost an agreement with Japan and we are ready to agree with any conditions which may be imposed by the Japanese. The chief point to be used in these negotiations is the danger of war with the United States without the assurance of complete safety from the rear. Instructions to follow."

250 young Chinese trained in Russian "propaganda schools" have arrived in Canton and will gradually be sent north.

Borodin has received instructions to organize a Cantonese "Red Guard" out of the select troops.

Litvinoff insists on immediate fulfilment of all clauses of the treaty with Canton. Eugene Chen believes it premature.

In reply to the request from Moscow to make a report on the possibility of putting floating mines on the Yangtze, Borodin reports that sufficient Russian technical staff is at hand in Hankow, and that the project is quite feasible due to the existence of many iron works on the Yangtze equipped with the required machinery.

Borodin was warned against the danger of Cantonese troops stationed in northern provinces looting local cities, which will make a very bad impression in the north.

Chernich reports that Chusoff established an intelligence service at the British, Italian and Japanese Legations in Peking.

C hernich reports that General Sutton discussed with the British Legation the question of the organization of new White Russian units in North China to be financed by Great Britain.

On J anuary 20th a new shipment of counterfeit currency will be sent from Vladivostok to Canton. Printing presses sent to Canton are idle on account of the illness of the Chief Engraver. A certain Geissler has been sent from Moscow to take his place.

2. From the meagre information I have as to the actual source of the foregoing material I am of the opinion that it consists generally of three kinds, namely, occasionally facts, White Russian speculations and White Russian propaganda. The facts are rarely of great importance but they show clearly how varied and widespread are Soviet activities in China. The speculations may have some value as indicating White Russian suspicions based on a little information. The White Russian propaganda is probably pure fabrication transmitted with a view to creating or keeping alive prejudice in America against Soviet Russia. The alleged negotiations with Japan are probably of this nature. Although the suggestion of negotiations between Japan and Russia are constantly reported by this Russian source, any vital agreement between them is believed to be remote. Russia's principal concern is to prevent as long as possible any active interference by Japan with the Soviet's present malign activities in China.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Japan
1 File
1 Legation

G-2 Report 2930

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Raid on Compound of Former Imperial Russian Legation Guard.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2657-9-28/1 WAR DEPARTMENT RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

1. On April 6th at 11:15 a.m., the premises of the Dalbank and the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, adjoining the Soviet Embassy on the west, and the compound containing the former barracks of the Imperial Legation Guard, lying westward of the private properties in question, were raided by Fengtien authorities.

2. The Senior Minister, acting for the Protocol Powers, gave written permission to the Fengtien authorities to send a limited number of Fengtien soldiers and armed police into the Legation Quarter for the purpose of searching the Dalbank and the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, on the grounds that these places were known to be the headquarters of subversive Soviet agitation against the Chinese Government. The Fengtien authorities, however, exceeded the authority and raided at the same time the compound of the former Russian Legation Guard. This compound contains the offices and residence of the Soviet Military Attache, offices of the Russian Boxer Indemnity Commission, offices of the Tass News Agency, the Russian Club, and residences of employees of the Soviet Embassy and of Chinese political refugees.

3. The raid was carried out by uniformed police, Fengtien soldiers and plain-clothes men, altogether about three hundred men. The police and soldiers were used almost exclusively as guards and pickets, while the actual searching was carried out by plain clothes detectives. The raid was carefully planned and well executed. It took the people living in the compound completely by surprise. When the grounds were being surrounded and the gate forced, a Russian look-out fired a pistol shot, evidently intended as a warning signal. Some men attempted to escape by climbing over the north wall, which separates the compound from the British Legation, but were forced to return by a British sentry.

4. The total number of people arrested during the raid was about sixty, including seventeen Russians. The Russian Manager and the Accountant of the Dalbank, who were among those arrested, were released the next day, together with about ten Chinese employees of the Bank. According to the Tass News Agency the following Russians, who are supposedly all employees of the Soviet Embassy, were arrested:

Morosoff, Ivan - Secretary of the Consulate of U.S.S.R. at Kalgan.
Dymchinsky, Ivan - office clerk.
Gamberg-Maisky, Benjamin - Chinese Interpreter.
Kiseleff, Nicolai - typist.
Samsakoff, Kousma - typist.
Vasin, Paul - technical assistant.
Iliashenko, Feodor - English translator.
Tonkikh, Ivan - Expert attached to the Military Attache.
Malisheff, Ivan)
Tolkacheff, Michell) all members of the guard at the
Verkhotin, Vladimir) Embassy of U.S.S.R.
Ognieff, Nicholai)
Skatkin, Nicolai - Professor at the Peking National and Law Universities.
Konstantinoff, Miceal - Student of the Institute of the Oriental Languages in Leningrad.
Grigorieff, Ivan - Student of the University of Vladivostok, Oriental Faculty.

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Raid on Compound of Former Imperial Russian Legation Guard.

The Chinese prisoners, with the exception of some employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway and house servants, are all members of the Kuomintang and communists of more or less importance. The most prominent of them is Li Ta-chao, who represented China in the Third Internationale. He is the well known member of the Kuomintang and communist agitator who was responsible for all the demonstrations and mass meetings in Peking which followed the May 30th affair of 1925 in Shanghai. He also arranged, together with Hsu Ch'ien, the students' demonstration on March 18, 1926, which resulted in the shooting of a number of students by the bodyguard of Tuan Chi-jui. He seldom appeared in public, preferring to be the man behind the scenes. Since March, 1926, he never ventured out of the grounds of the Soviet Embassy until he was arrested during the raid. Among the prisoners are his wife and two daughters.

5. During the systematic and thorough search of the raided area, which lasted all day, the following articles were found:

a) A vast amount of Kuomintang and communistic propaganda material in the form of pamphlets; propaganda posters; pass books for members of the Kuomintang; red silk identification badges with the Soviet sickle and star stamped on them; thousands of small paper flags with Kuomintang and communistic inscriptions, as used in Kuomintang parades and demonstrations.

b) 26 rifles, an assortment of mostly old models; 19 pistols of various makes; 1 Thompson automatic sub-machine gun; 1 Bergman automatic rifle; 1 Diana Luftgewehr (a very effective German air rifle); a quantity of small arms ammunition.

c) A list of 4,000 members of the Communist Party in the Peking area; an elaborate diagram showing the numbers of active Kuomintang members in the various countries. (This diagram shows that the Philippine Islands have 2100 active Kuomintang members.)

d) A set of seals, intended for the Kuomintang government which was to be established in Northern China (list attached).

6. During the raid an attempt was made by the Military Attache's office to burn some records in a large stove in the office. The local fire brigade, however, succeeded in putting out the fire and a number of the documents were recovered.

7. According to a statement issued on April 12th by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the General Headquarters of the Ankuochun, the following documents were found in the carload of literature seized during the raid:

1. Reports by the Soviet delegate accredited to the First Kominchun. Records of conversations between Karakhan and a certain Mr. Lin, representing Feng Yu-hsiang.

2. Reports sent to the Soviet Embassy in Peking by the Soviet Military and Political Commission in Canton.

3. Reports by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China urging for closer relations between the Second Kuominchun and the Soviet delegates.

4. Reports by the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking

CHINA (Population & Social Conditions)

Subject: Raid on Compound of Former Imperial Russian Legation Guard.

relative to his trip to Canton and the results of his investigations on the political and military affairs in the South.

5. Letters between Li Ta-chao and the Soviet Embassy in Peking.

6. Detailed plans for Soviet supply in the organization of cavalry troops in Chahar, Mongolia, and Manchuria to be put under the command of Feng Yu-hsiang.

7. Letters between military experts appointed by Moscow and Karakhan and the authorities of the First, Second and Third Kuominchun and the Cantonese troops.

8. Confidential letters and reports by the Russian Commander in Feng Yu-hsiang's Army.

9. Private reports made by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China on the military and political situation in China.

10. Reports submitted by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China to the Political Department in Moscow.

11. Certain general reports made by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China.

12. Communications between the Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy in Peking and his subordinates in the provinces.

13. Confidential telegrams and reports between the Military Attache of the Soviet Embassy and the Moscow Department of War on the one hand and between the Attache and his subordinates and investigators in China on the other.

14. Reports by Lattin (under the nom de plume of Hsieh Fu-lin), Chief of the Soviet Military Secret Service in China.

15. Reports on military plans of the Mukden troops submitted by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China.

16. Reports made by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China on the Honan situation.

17. Reports made by Krauzj, Chief of the Soviet Military Secret Service in China.

18. Reports by the Soviet Military Secret Service in China on the conditions of the peasants in Honan, and the Second Kuominchun.

19. Reports made by the Soviet Military Secret Service in Honan on the military movements of the First Kuominchun.

20. Reports on military affairs in Honan submitted to the Soviet Embassy in Peking by the Soviet Military Secret Service in Kaifeng.

CHINA (Population & Social
Conditions)

8. Most of the above documents evidently were taken from the office of the Soviet Military Attache. They throw an interesting light on the functions of the Soviet Embassy and particularly on the nature of the work of the Military Attache. They also show that the Soviet Embassy has an extensive military secret service organization in China.

9. The raid on the compound established beyond all doubt the fact that it contained the headquarters of the communists and the Kuomintang, and that most elaborate and detailed plans and preparations had been made for the overthrow of the government in Peking and for the establishment of a Kuomintang regime.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Attached:
List of seals
Propaganda poster.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 Japan
1 File

4-1 Emu
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.
1927 2657-9-28
JUN 3
80
WAR DEPARTMENT

LIST OF SEALS FOUND IN THE RUSSIAN COMPOUND DURING THE RAID OF APRIL 6, 1927

1. China Political Council of the National Party, Seal of the Peking Branch.

2. China National Party, Seal of the Executive Committee of Jehol.

3. China National Party, Seal of the Office of Superintendent of Jehol.

4. China National Party, Seal of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Province of Sinkiang.

5. China National Party, Seal of the Secretariat of the Political Council, Peking Branch.

6. National People's Conference, Seal of the Office of the Parties and Groups representing the Grand Conference organized by members.

7. China National Party, Seal of the Executive Committee of the Province of Kansu.

8. China National Party, Seal of the Executive Committee of the Province of Shansi.

9. China National Party, Seal of the Executive Committee of the Province of Chihli.

10. China National Party, Seal of the Executive Committee of the Province of Kirin.

11. Investigation Department of the Executive Committee, The Grand Humiliation Assembly of all Circles in Peking, protesting against British and Japanese Imperialism, murdering our countrymen.

12. Propaganda Department of the Executive Committee, The Grand Humiliation Assembly of all Circles in Peking, protesting against British and Japanese Imperialism, murdering our countrymen.

13. Financial Department of the Executive Committee of the Grand Humiliation Society of all Circles in Peking, protesting against British and Japanese Imperialism murdering our countrymen.

14. Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Grand Humiliation Society of all Circles in Peking, protesting against British and Japanese Imperialism murdering our countrymen.

15. Ling. (Literally translated, "spirit, force or efficacious".)

16. Mi. (Secret)

17. Information Office for the Northern District.

18. Same as 17.

4-1
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1927
2657-9-28A
AUG 24
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 22 1927

SOVIET PLOT IN CHINA

Peking

1927

No. VI (The End)

(Documents 29-32 inclusive)

Published

by

The Metropolitan Police Headquarters.

Foreword

For the past few years the Soviet Embassy and its adjoining premises had been notorious as the headquarters of subversive Soviet agitation against the Chinese Government. Towards the close of March alarming reports were prevailing in Peking about the growing activities of the communists.

For the sake of maintaining law and order in the Metropolis, the local police and troops, with due authorization of the competent authorities in the Legation Quarter, effected on April 6th a search of the premises of the Dalbank and the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway, adjoining the Soviet Embassv on the west.

During the search fire broke out in the office of the Soviet Military Attache, located in the compound of the former Russian Imperial Legation Guard, lying westward of the private properties of the Dalbank and Chinese Eastern Railway. The fire brigade which was on the scene entered the office of the Soviet Attache, together with the police, to extinguish the fire. It was found then that in that office an attempt was being made to burn up documents, over which kerosene had been poured. The fire brigade succeeded in extinguishing the fire and most of the documents, although partly burned and damaged by water and kerosene, were saved.

During the systematic and thorough search of the premises in question the following articles were found:

(a) A mass of documents, which throw an interesting light on the functions of the Soviet Embassy and particularly on the nature of the work of the Military Attache.

(b) A vast amount of Communistic propaganda material in the form of pamphlets; propaganda posters; pass-books for members of the Communistic Party; red silk identification badges with the Soviet sickle and star stamped on them; thousands of small paper flags with communistic inscriptions; as used in communistic parades and demonstrations.

(c) An assortment of rifles and pistols of various makes; one Thompson automatic sub-machine gun; one Bergman automatic rifle; a great quantity of small arms amunition.

(d) A list of over 4,000 members of the Communist Party in the Peking area; an elaborate diagram showing the numbers of active members of the Communist Party in various countries.

A number of Communists, Chinese and Russian, were arrested during the search, the most prominent of them being Li Ta-chao who had represented China in the Third Internationale.

The raid established the fact that the compound of the former Imperial Russian Legation Guard contained the headquarters of the Communists in which most elaborate and detailed plans and preparations had been made for the overthrow of the government in Peking and for the establishment of a communistic regime.

The captured documents proved conclusively:

(1) That the Soviet Embassy had a most extensive political and military secret service organization in China, which conducted a thorough espionage everywhere, even in the foreign legations in Peking.

(2) That the so-called Soviet advisers and military instructors in the South are members of the various councils of the Kuomintang and the Communists; that they participate actively in the affairs of the aforesaid parties and that they were paid by the Soviet Government through the Military Attache in Peking.

(3) That the Soviet Government with its Embassy in Peking acting as an intermediate agency was furnishing arms, munitions and other war supplies to the enemies of the Government to which its Embassy was accredited.

The Metropolitan Police Headquarters,
Peking, China.
April, 1927.

DOCUMENT No. 29.

A letter from Allan W——?, the Representative of the Communist International in "PROLETKINO", a Soviet motion picture concern, to Comrade Slepak, the former Manager of the Rosta News Agency in Peking, suggesting the organization of branches of "Proletkino" in China. The letter states that *"this work will not only afford the best and greatest possibility of propagating Soviet Russia and communism, but will give also a sure income"*. It is also mentioned that the "Proletkino" has branches in America and other foreign countries.

:PROLETKINO:
: Moscow :
Joint Stock Co. for
PROLETARIAN KINO

Confidential

P R O L E T K I N O

Section
Part

23 November, 1923
No. 1475
Moscow
Tvierskaya Street No. 34

To Comrade Slepak
PEKING
CHINA

Dear Comrade,

As you may be already know here in Moscow exists a film undertaking "PROLETKINO" which produces proletarian film and organizes propaganda against the bourgeois film. The film is-as you know-a very fine weapon in the class-struggle, and much can be done with the film on the field of propaganda and agitation-especially in the Eastern countries, where the analphabetism still is very great.

In America and in the Scandinavian countries we already have our PROLETKINO branches, and it would be of the greatest value if we also in China could have a branch of PROLETKINO established. What do you think about the possibility? Could you organize our Chinese branch of the PROLETKINO?

The PROLETKINO would be able to furnish you regularly with moving pictures from Soviet Russia, illustrating the life of the workers and peasants. But not only news-films, industrial and educational films can be sent thru the PROLETKINO but also fiction-film; i.e., art films, dramas, comedies, etc. Already we have one romantic comedy: "Kombrig Tuanov", with gives pictures from the Red army and the country life. In these days our second film will be ready: "On Duty" giving a story from the fight of the Young Communists and the Cheka against the counter-revolution in Soviet-Russia.

Please let us know what you think about the possibility of organizing one or more branches of PROLETKINO in China. The work will not only afford the best and greatest possibility of propagating Soviet Russia and Communism, but will also give a sure income, if properly organized and developed.

Perhaps it will not last long, if you work energetically, before we will be able to send a camera-man to you, who regularly can take Chinese pictures for PROLETKINO, especially news films, which would have a great value in Europe and America, event. Australia.

From our American Department you will get American films very cheap, from our Scandinavian branches Swedish a.o. films or if you find it more convenient you may order all these things thru us here in Moscow. We can also furnish you with German films, etc.

The propaganda character of the PROLETKINO should not be of ficially known, but you start with neutral news films and Soviet-Russian pictures and later you more forward.

Yours for the communism,
Allan W———?
COMINTERN representative PROLETKINO

P.S. Please enclosed find an article in German about the Foreign Activity of the PROLETKINO. -A.W.-
Please answer in Russian!
Greetings to Borodin!

DOCUMENT No. 30.

Five pages of a 58 page Summary Report relating to South China, written in the early part of 1926. The first 27 pages of the report are missing. This document shows that *the so-called Soviet instructors were in fact at the head of the departments, but that for political reasons were called the advisers to the chiefs of the departments.*

(P. 28)

.....existed until 1925, when the Political Bureau was not yet organized and the Governor was concerned with the administration of the province and the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs was in charge of the relations with foreigners. At that time the Consuls were often conducting even separate negotiations with responsible officials, who frequently either decided themselves certain questions or exercised their influence over such decisions. But, beginning from 1925, even personal negotiations of responsible members of the Government had to be previously discussed by the Political Bureau. Thus the foreign policy was being coordinated and made uniform; it had already been indicated (see Paragraph 5) what kind of policy this was.

The mutual relations of the U.S.S.R. Consul with other Consuls were strained enough; he had more or less lively intercourses and correspondence with German and Japanese Consuls. He had besides an occasional correspondence with British, French, Swedish and Danish Consuls; with the last mentioned three—only in connection with their arrival and assumption of office, and with the British Consul—concerning the "Dosser Case".

In 1924 the question was raised concerning the return to the U.S.S.R. of the former Russian Consulate General building, now held by England (at Shameen), but these negotiations did not yield any results and finally terminated.

7. Our Influence.

All above-mentioned forms of Government organization, as well as the policies of this Government have been worked out and carried through with the direct participation and under the influence of our political director (Adviser to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party)

(P. 36)

.....necessity, these meetings may be called more frequently by the President of the Council.

General Staff.

The General Staff is a technical organ of the Military Council. Our military director (Assistant of the Chief of the Group) acts, in reality, as Chief of the General Staff, but his official position is that of the Adviser to the Chief of the General Staff. By 8 December 1925 there were as yet no strict Regulations governing the General Staff, i.e., the Regulations were being prepared simultaneously with the organization of the General Staff—in June, 1925—but were subject to continual alterations in connection with the everyday work. By that time there were the following Departments in the General Staff: Operations and Intelligence Divisions (including "communication" service), Administration and Inspection of Supplies and of the Navy. The last two Departments were considered as independent and were subordinated directly to the Military Council. Apart from the General Staff there was an Aviation Bureau, which claimed to be subordinated directly to the Political Bureau. Our instructors were, in fact, at the head of all these Departments, but officially they were called advisers to the Chiefs of Departments. By the end of December our instructors held even officially the posts of Commander of the Navy and Chief of the Aviation Bureau, but at the first opportunity they had to become advisers again, because it is politically inconvenient for our instructors to hold official posts, whereas our influence does not suffer in the least from their transformation into advisers again.

B. The Subdivision and Organization of the Army.

By June, 1925, there were as yet no definite forms of organization in the army of the Southern-Chinese Republic. Each military group was called differently; their names were based principally upon provincial designations. There were armies of Yunnan, Kuangsi, Hunan, Canton, Honan, Shensi detachment, etc., besides, there were many separate Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and even Battalions. .....The most conspicuous among.....

(P. 56)

.....prevail on individual generals to put at its disposal the sources of local revenues.

The following are the weak points of the Revolutionary Government: insufficient unity and insufficient stability of the centre of the Kuomintang Party, which consists of quite diverse elements of the population and, by its nature, is subject to constant vacillations. For the time being the overwhelming majority of the party-centre is under the influence of and in alliance with the left wing, i.e., with the Communistic Party and Comsomol (Communistic Youth Union) and under our political leadership. But *in case that we make mistakes in our guidance and the left wing becomes too enthusiastic about plans, which are too radical for the present time, then the possibility is not excluded that a split will occur in the center and a considerable part will go over to the side of the right elements*, who, notwithstanding a series of defeats, do not cease the struggle against the radical policy of the Kuomintang and the Revolutionary Government at Canton.

Sometime ago the better class bourgeoisie was able to draw over to its side the middle and the small bourgeoisie, especially the merchants' guilds, and to organize at Canton its own military force—"Merchants' Militia" or "Paper Tigers" who turned against the Revolutionary Government but were suppressed and destroyed by this Government. Now these classes of population, except the better class bourgeoisie, are supporting the Government, but in case of too radical a policy and mistakes on the part of our political leadership, they might again turn against the Revolutionary Government.

The army also is not yet wholly fashioned in a political sense; individual generals are still enjoying considerable influence and under favorable circumstances some of them may make a revolt against the Revolutionary Government and unite the malcontent elements of the population under the political slogans of the right wing of the Kuomintang. On the other hand the technical equipment of the army is considerably worse than that of the Northern Armies, and when the collision with the latter occurs, which will inevitably take place, when the influence of the Revolutionary Government spreads to the neighboring provinces, it is difficult to say whether the revolutionary ardor and the political. consciousness of the Revolutionary Army will successfully hold out against the technical superiority of the enemy; and of course the defeat of the Revolutionary Army will give the counter-revolutionaries a favor able opportunity inside Canton itself.

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In order that these weak points be not changed into fatal ones, our most skilful guidance is necessary because this guidance plays an important part at Canton. The least mistakes painfully affect the left wing and still more painfully the centre and the Revolutionary Government. If our leaders become enthused for measures too radical for China's real conditions, the Government will begin to carry them through and provoke the discontent of a part of the population, the discontent of which will be immediately made use of by the opponents of the Government among the right Kuomintang, in order to draw over to their side the majority of those elements of the Party who belong to the small bourgeoisie under the slogan of "struggle against bolshevism". That our leadership plays an exceptional part there can be seen from the fact that the Kuomintang Party, such as it now exists, has been created by us, i.e , the program, the regulations and the forms of constructive work of the Party have been worked out under our political leadership, according to the R.C.P. (Russian Communistic Party's) standards, but in conformity with the conditions prevailing in China. All guidance with regard to the Party and the Government has been carried on until recently with the closest participation of our political director, and there has not yet been a case when any measures proposed by us were not accepted and put into effect by the Government.

For the very short period of existence (two years only) of the Party in its organized form, a stable and skilful nucleus to guide the Party and the Government has not yet been worked out. Therefore our political leadership has to take into consideration all the elements of social changes, in order to pursue a correct policy.

The left wing of the Kuomintang in the future will have to proceed with great care as regards an extensive communistic work, but on the other hand, it must concentrate on the work of organizing peasantry and workmen under the revolutionary slogans of the left Kuomintang.

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These organizations, under the guidance of the left wing, will counter-balance, to a considerable extent the right elements and the vacillating centre and, moreover, will give the possibility of keeping in future under the influence of our leadership and of the left centre the Government, consisting ofthe elements of the center.

It is necessary to carry on the political work in the army on a most extensive scale and to try to introduce into the political organs of the army as many workers from the left wing as possible (this is already being done). The army must be trained in the new methods of warfare, i.e., the tactical preparedness of the army must be improved. *It is necessary to take all measures to improve the outfitting and supplying and the technical equipment of the army generally. In this respect our material aid is necessary.*

The Government already has a concrete financial basis and, at the same time, it is working out plans for the economic development of the Kwangtung province, such as: construction of the Whangpoa port, roads of communication, etc. But as yet the Government has no proper organ of audit and control; no such organ, however, is in existence elsewhere in China. The embryons of these organs have been already created, but the development of their activity is proceeding very slowly. It is necessary to intensify, through our guidance, the work in this direction, but care should be taken that the Revolutionary Government does not undertake enterprises the execution of which would be beyond its powers, because in that case it would uselessly waste its small means which can be utilized for other enterprises which are easier accomplished and are more urgently needed.

DOCUMENT NO. 31.

Pages 1, 3 and 4 of a 13 page document, showing the organization of the South China Group of Soviet Military-Political workers. Paragraph 4, Section III, states clearly that "*The Chief of the Group receives all his instructions from the Military Attache in Peking*".

Page 1.

REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE SOUTH-CHINA GROUP OF MILITARY-POLITICAL WORKERS.

Section I.

TASK OF THE GROUP.

1. To organize and instruct a National-Revolutionary army in the south of China for national liberation from the yoke of Imperialism and for unification into one independent democratic republic.

2. To give every assistance to the Government by working in the army and among the population in order to promote its democratic principles.

3. To make pepular the doctrine of communism and of Sovietism and to work towards bringing about complete rapprochement and (mutual) support between (China and) the U. S. S. R., and to create in the army, in the labor organizations and in the peasantry the desire (pledge) for a further revolutionary movement.

4. To keep informed about the counter-revolutionary forces of China *and the people oppressed by them* or about the people of adjacent countries.

5. To make an exhaustive study of China and especially of its southern part.

Section II.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUP.

In order to carry out the task indicated in Section 1 the Group is organized as follows:

1. A Chief Military Adviser is attached to the National-Revolutionary government and to the Commander in Chief of the National-Revolutionary army. He is at the same time the Chief of the South-China Group who directs the whole work of the group and is responsible for it.

9. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the Senior Adviser of the corps, *and they carry out the latter's instructions in their units.*

10. The diviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political matters.

11. The apparatus for the work of the Chief of the Group is the Staff of the Group. The Staff collects and digests the information as to conditions in the National-Revolutionary army and in the armies of the neighboring provinces, arranges the information of the advisers and of the Military Attache in China, and works out the plans of the current work of the group, attends to the personal affairs of all co-workers and their pay as well as to the economic affairs of the group.

12. At the head of the Staff of the group stands its Chief who is directly subordinated to the Chief of the Group.

Section III.

THE CHIEF OF THE GROUP.

1. The Chief cf the Group is responsible for the whole military-political work of the Russian advisers in the National-Revolutionary army.

2. *Exerting the maximum of his influence* he directs the work of the Commander in Chief in conformity with the aims of the Group

3. Through the Russian advisers in military units he carries out measures corresponding to the aims of the Group.

4. The Chief of the Group receives all instructions from the Military Attache in Peking. As regards questions of a political character, he co-ordinates his decisions with (those of) the Chief Political Adviser of the Canton Government.

Section IV.

THE DEPUTY-CHIEF OF THE GROUP.

1. The Deputy-Chief of the Group assists the Chief of the Group in all matters relating to military operations, administration and training of the army.

2. He is wholly responsible for the work of the General Staff, its departments and inspectorates and works daily at the Staff.

Section V.

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE GROUP FOR POLITICAL MATTERS.

1. The Assistant for political matters, as the senior adviser of the political Intelligence Department, directs the whole political work in the units of the National-Revolutionary army.

2. He keeps in close contact with all party organizations (Kuomintang as well as Communist) and with the civil political organizations, being the link between the Chief of the Group and these organizations.

3. The Assistant for political matters is subordinated only to the Chief of the Group. With the latter's knowledge he corresponds with the Chief Political Adviser of the National Revolutionary Government on questions of a general political character.

4. To the Assistant for political matters are subordinated:

a) the Deputy Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department;
b) the advisers of the sections of the Political Intelligence Department;
c) all senior political advisers in the army;
d) all political advisers in the units of the National Revolutionary army.

DOCUMENT No. 32.

An extract (pages 1 to 4) of a document containing instructions relating to the work of the Soviet Intelligence Department in China. It shows that certain work is to be done "along the lines of the Communist International", that secret service agents are to be provided with diplomatic and service passports and are to live under the roofs of official representatives of the Soviet Government.

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Page 1.

Especially Secret.
Personal.

THE WORK OF THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT IN CHINA.

The Aim.

a) The thorough study of the organization and the strength of the armed forces of China and the constant observation of the whole situation which has an influence on the development and the strengthening of the army, b) the systematic collecting and arranging of all information and material concerning the armed forces and resources of China in connection with the assistance afforded by the foreign powers who take an interest in the Chinese situation (especially Japan and England), c) the timely information of our allied centre (Moscow) of the local Peking centre and of the Siberian Military..... via Vladivostok on these subjects-these are the three aims of the work of the Intelligence Department in China.

The direction and the scope of the work are defined by two factors: a) the possibility of wars of the U.S.S.R. with Japan and China and b) the possibility of the development of a national-revolutionary movement in China itself, which would contribute to the weakening of the position of imperialism in Europe and in the New World (the blockade of the U.S.S.R.). The first factor dictates the necessity of a very minute study of North China and Korea, as the places of future armed conflict (as the points of departure for an offensive and for a strategical concentration in the first period of the war and as the organised rear-bases is the following periods) with their various resources, their organised armed forces and the connection of the latter with the national-revolutionary movement (the live and dead centres). The second factor dictates a similar study of the rest of China as the source of reserves of all sorts in the struggle against the local and foreign imperialists and, consequently, as of possible active allies of the U.S.S.R. in its fight against aggression on the part of Japan, England, America and others.

In the actual situation in China in the foregound are two principal militaristic groups-the Mukden group (Chang Tso lin) and the Chihli group (Wu Pei-fu)-as regards their attitude towards the people's armies, towards Canton and towards the foreigners, in the background are the unfolding national movement, the organizations of workmen, of peasants and of the intelligenzia who more and more are being involved in the struggle between the Chinese militarists and who by their influence, in some way or other, equalize the forces, the means and the forms of this struggle. This situation will of course have an influence on the choice of objects and on the extent of the study, as well as on the tempo of the work and on its organisation. However, the study of the actual conditions in China from the above mentional viewpoint must naturally be regulated and directed according to the plans of operations and intentions of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. which is the only authoritative organ for the whole military work and which acts through the respective central organ of the Intelligence Department and is concert with the Department for military operations and others. These plans and intentions of the Moscow Centre must form the basis of the whole intelligence work in China in time of peace and war: they must constantly regulate the whole process of the study and the evaluation of the general situation in China. This fixes also the principal objects of the study on which the prospects of the work, its tempo and its strict limits depend. For details see our "established program", the details of which must be worked out on the spot in accordance with the aims of the practical work of the Political Representative (Ambassador), the Military Attache (who directs the work) and along the lines of the Comintern.

The Task.

The aim of the intelligence work in the first place is carried out by the organisation of a widespread net of uniformly recruited agents to which end proper people must be found, trained, and guided. It is necessary that the net should be so prepared and organized in each region that its transition from

a state of peace to a state of war can be easily effected and that this net might continue working without interruption, punctually and regularly fulfilling its functions. This last condition requires an especially careful organization and a ready and solid contact with the centres and with our active forces, no matter whether they are armies, groups of partisans, or bandits. It follows that the whole organisation must be strictly centralised, having parallel branches of its net completely separate from each other (and above all kept secret from similar organisations of other departments), but being directed and supplied by one centre-Peking which is directly subordinated to Moscow.

The Form of the Organisation.

The organs of the Intelligence Department may, for the time being, dwell under the roof of the institutions of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (Embassy and Consulates), but the possibility is not excluded of their being "established" on "the street"-under the flag of a commercial firm, a restaurant, etc.[x]

In the beginning of the work it is advisable and more economical to use the official roofs of the political and commercial representatives, etc., especially in view of the difficulty for European Russians to establish connections with the Chinese. For the same work the roofs of the instructors in the Chinese armies are also necessary, but this is admissible only where the confidence in our instructors has been fully established, where the instructors have already penetrated into the Staffs and have a strictly official "face", as e.g., in Canton. Anyhow, being under such a "roof" one must always have additional more reliable and more secure means of organizing agencies, to gather materials, to keep them and to send them to wherever it is necessary.

[x] The Japanese have such "roofs" in Manchuria and the Germans are doing something similar in Central China.

The Mutual Relations of the agents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

The resident (agents) of the Intelligence Department in China carry out the tasks imposed upon them by the Political Representative concerning current military matters, and supply him with summaries of their information. They do the same for the Military Attache. On the other hand the Political Representative and the Military Attache transmit to the resident (agents) all information relating to the established program which they receive through their agencies. The resident agent uses this information for his summaries.

If the situation requires it, the Political Representative supplies the resident agents of the Intelligence Department with diplomatic and service passports and gives them the possibility of establishing connections with official circles for carrying out the orders of the Centre and in order to secure, to a centain degree, their personal inviolability during their travels and the secrecy of their work on the spot.

Similar relations must exist between the Resident Agents, the Consuls and Consuls-General on the spot: but in each case this question must first be discussed and solved with the Political Representative.

The local organs of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs are obliged to supply the resident agents with proper quarters which will guarantee the safety of their work and the safe-keeping of their secret materials. They are also obliged to render to the organs of the Intelligence Department every assistance in their work.

The relations with the State Politicol Department (G.P.U.)

The Agents of the Intelligence Department on the spot must receive directly from the agents of the Foreign Section of the State Political Department all information concerning military matters, i.e., all materials that throw light on the established program, whenever they get them. So far such materials have not been communicated at once or have been only partly transmitted, as a personal favor. This parallelism is harmful to the work, as it prevents the materials from being properly arranged, the verifying of the information, their extending and systematisation and, in connection with all this.

THE KUOMINCHUN

(The First, Second and Third Kuominchun Armies)

Translated from Soviet Reports
Prepared in September, 1926

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BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST KUOMINCHUN ARMY.

In comparison with the armies of the Mukden and Chihli groups, the so-called "Kuominchün" armies (the I-st, the 2-nd and the 3-rd) originated and were organized within a very short period of time. The origin itself and the formation of armies of this new group was not a slow process of "natural selection" of some definite homogeneous units. The process of separation of the Kuominchün armies from other militaristic groups was of short duration, almost mechanical, and the creation of "civic armies of the Chinese Republic" was effected through the unification of various army units around national revolutionary slogans which were, so to speak, "borrowed" from elsewhere. Only afterwards, during the course of further political events, on account of geographic and economic conditions and under the influence of such subjective factors, as the work of the Kuomintang party, the influence of the U.S.S.R. and the ever rising wave of the national revolutionary movement in China, an attempt was made to put these slogans which had been prematurely adopted, gradually into effect, at first of course only half-heartedly, superficially and in a peculiar way, with considerable and sometimes even quite unexpected vacillations and deviations. This process of carrying national revolutionary slogans into effect was going and still is going very slowly and with difficulty. Not only did it not end with a complete "merger" into the real national revolutionary movement of the Chinese people, but even in those rare cases, when the leaders of the Kuominchün group got in touch with the popular movement, it was to a very considerable extent only conditional.

All that has been said above will be easier to understand, when the question relating to causes of the separation of Kuominchün armies from other groups is examined. It is a well-known fact that the Kuominchün armies were separated from the Chihli group which was actually headed by

Wu P'ei-fu. During the fight of the Chihli group first against the Anfu party and then against Mukden, Wu P'ei-fu obtained the hearty support of many capitalistic circles of China and of a part of the intelligentsia. The ever developing Chinese bourgeoisie could not stand any more the insolent usurping policy of Japan which was literally strangling the nascent Chinese industry. The venal Government of the Anfu party, acting under the slogan "Asia for Asiatics", was carrying out a policy which was agreeable and advantageous only to the Japanese imperialism, and in order to further the aims of this imperialism, did not stop even at causing direct damage to the national interests of China. Japan, using this government as a tool in fact "governed" China and regarded it as a colony. The famous "21 demands" actually destroyed the independence of China. Then, under the pressure of the public movement, even among Chinese militarists an opposition arose to the bare-faced, anti-national, pernicious policy of the Anfu party and its Government. The venal policy of this party called forth a particularly sharp protest on the part of the newly formed Chihli group. In the summer of 1920 the Anfu party was defeated by Wu P'ei-fu who was at that time in alliance with Chang Tso-lin.

After the downfall of the Anfu party, the Japanese began to strengthen their influence through another accomplice, Chang Tso-lin, and used him for the purposes of robbing China. During the World War England and America were entirely plunged into European affairs and paid only little attention to China. They perceived, however, after the war that their ally, Japan," appropriated " China and took root there economically and politically to such an extent that this new state of affairs began to threaten them with the complete annihilation of their (particularly England's) former influence and importance in China. The consolidation of the position of Japan in China particularly threatened British financial interests. Therefore, during his fight first against the Anfu party and then against Mukden, i.e. against the powerful influence of Japan in China, Wu P'ei-fu, besides the help he derived from the Chinese nationalistic bourgeoisie, also obtained considerable support and assistance on the part of England and America.

After the victory of the Chihli group over the Anfu party and over Mukden, i.e. after a slight weakening of the Japanese opressive policy towards China, the Chinese nationalist and progressive bourgeoisie and intelligentsia perceived that by lending their support to Wu P'ei-fu they attained only one result, viz. one yoke was replaced by another. Formerly there was the Japanese yoke which was now replaced by the British. To say more correctly, there were two yokes, equally heavy and pernicious to their own Chinese industry. Wu P'ei-fu by his aspirations and tendencies actually proved to be the same reactionary militarist as others and became in the British hands the same tool for the oppression of China, as Chang Tso-lin in the hands of the Japanese. The progressive Chinese bourgeoisie which longed for the development of the national industry and for the national unification of China, perceived that its hopes that Wu P'ei-fu would realise the national aspirations of China, had not been justified by past events. For that reason among that same bourgeoisie which was quite recently giving its whole-hearted support to Wu P'ei-fu a "stratum" was formed of the nationalist and progressive bourgeoisie and intelligentsia which stood in opposition to Wu P'ei-fu. This discontent with the anti-national policy of Wu P'ei-fu found its reflection also among some of his generals, such as Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang Chih-chiang, Li Ming-chung, Lu Chung-lin, Hu Ching-yi, Sun Yüeh and Yüeh Wei-chün.

These Generals began to look for means of realizing the aspirations of that class of the young bourgeoisie which was in opposition, and finally, during the second Mukden - Chihli war, they cut themselves off from Wu P'ei-fu and formed a new group called the Kuominchün.

Thus the Kuominchün group was the product of the young nationalist bourgeoisie which in the policy of Wu P'ei-fu was looking for, but did not find, the realisation of its aspirations.

The newly formed armies of the Kuominchün group, the I-st, the 2-nd and the 3-rd, were at first not sufficiently strong to enter <u>territorially</u> into contact with the progressive bourgeoisie which had placed them into the foreground, i.e. they were not able to occupy by armed forces the industrial regions of the middle and lower Yangtse valley and to make there

their permanent quarters.

The first Kuominchün occupied the poor and thinly populated regions of the North-western China where industry was in an undeveloped state and where its sole support was the not numerous and comparatively poor bourgeoisie of the commercial class.

The 2-nd Kuominchün army occupied Henan, formerly a rich province with a well developed industry, but on account of several causes, such as war against Shensi, internal disorders in the army itself etc., and being surrounded by enemies only, it could not within a short time establish close connections with the local commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and all the time it was in Henan, it conducted itself as in a conquered country, the more so because it was a perfect stranger to Henan (Shensi troops were the nucleus of the 2-nd Kuominchün).

As to the 3-rd Kuominchün, during the whole period of its existence it had, properly speaking, no territory of its own and moved constantly from one place to another. Therefore there could not be any question about establishing ties with the local population.

As regards the "real" national revolutionary movement, these armies were not connected with it or with peasantry and workers. They did not even make an attempt to establish such a connection which was quite foreign to their nature, especially after the waves of the labor movement in the summer of 1925 compelled even the nationalist bourgeoisie to turn abruptly " to the right ", " backwards ", and to give up all co-operation with the large masses of the people.

The Kuominchün group may thus be regarded as a prototype of another group which recently also cut itself off from the Chihli party, viz. the Sun Ch'uan-fang's group or the so-called "Alliance of five provinces". At any rate, fundamental causes which lead to the separation from the Chihli group both of Sun Ch'uan-fang and of the Kuominchün, were identic. The difference lay in the time and territories, but this difference had a very great influence upon the formation of the "political aspect" and upon the vitality, in the sense of "standing upon sure ground", of both groups.

1. Whereas Feng Yu-hsiang, owing to the above-mentioned causes, did not succeed in relying "territorially" upon that stratum of the bourgeoisie which had promoted him, Sun Ch'uan-fang having at his disposal a rich region, both in commercial and industrial respects, obtained at once a firm footing which was necessary for his further growth in conformity with the aims and problems of the bourgeoisie which had given rise to the group of Sun Ch'uan-fang.

2. On the other hand, the nationalist bourgeoisie underwent a change as a result of the labor movement in the summer of 1925 and became different from that bourgeoisie which existed at the time of the origin of the Kuominchün.

These two factors equally left their mark upon both sides.

Sun Ch'uan-fang having a rich commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as his social base, can look forward to the future with perfect equanimity. He stands in no need of making his "orientation" to the masses of the people or to left parties. For Feng Yü-hsiang, however, who is backed only by a commercial bourgeoisie, there is a vital necessity not only to "make advances" to peasantry, to the labor movement and to the Kuomintang, but he must link closely his fate for a long time with the national revolutionary movement of the Chinese people. Only then the policy of the Kuominchün group will be able to "straighten itself". Only then it will cease vacillating and will obtain a firm and steady footing which will afford it not only the possibility of standing upon sure ground, but also the conditions necessary for its further growth and influence in the political life of China. Only then it will be possible for it to become the pivot around which the genuine national revolutionary elements of the Chinese people will revolve.

The origin of the 1-st Kuominchün dates from the second Mukden-Chihli war, i.e. from the autumn of 1924, when it appeared on the wide arena of the struggle between various Chinese militaristic groups, as an independent and relatively powerful factor which cut itself off from the other groups and exerted its influence upon the course of events in China.

Both the origin and the further development of the 1-st Kuominchün is closely and indissolubly connected with the personality of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang.

As early as during the first Mukden-Chihli war in 1922, some units of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang played an important part. The 20-th Brigade of the 11-th Division, under command of Gen. Li Ming-chung, dealt a crushing blow to the troops of Marshal Chang Tso-lin in the battle of Paoting fu. Another unit of Feng's army, under command of Gen. Chang Chih-chiang, also distinguished itself in the battle of Changchow against the troops of the Henan Tuchün who had gone unexpectedly to the side of Mukden. This battle was the most bloody during the whole campaign of 1922.

After the 1-st Mukden-Chihli war and the defeat of Chang Tso-lin, Wu P'ei-fu appointed Feng Yü-hsiang to the post of Tuchün of Henan, the richest province of China. Six months later, however, Feng Yü-hsiang was compelled to leave this lucrative post, which promised him so much in the future. The fact is that soon after his appointment to the post of Henan Tuchün, a conflict occured between Feng Yü-hsiang and Wu P'ei-fu. The latter appointed one of his devoted adherents as High Military Adviser to Feng Yü-hsiang. Feng immediately ordered him to be shot, because this "commissary" who had been forced on him as an adviser, was his personal implacable enemy. This fact bears testimony to the degree of Wu P'ei-fu's distrust of Feng Yü-hsiang and also to Feng Yü-hsiang's confidence of standing upon sure ground, because he, disregarding his usual extreme cautiousness was not afraid of Wu P'ei-fu and put to death his devoted adherent.

In retaliation for this action, Feng Yü-hsiang was relieved from his post of Henan Tuchün, under the specious pretext of being appointed to the post of Inspector-General of the North-Western Region. This new office was a very honorable one, even a promotion in comparison with the post of Henan Tuchün. Actually, however, it gave no real authority, because it did not yield any revenues and thereby did not afford him the possibility of maintaining his own troops (it is generally known that for Chinese General an office without the possibility of keeping his own troops is an "empty

place"). Thus this "Irish promotion" actually removed Feng Yü-hsiang from all political activities and eliminated him, as a militarist who had already begun to come up on the surface.

Feng Yü-hsiang, however, took with himself to Peking not only his main (11-th) Division, but also, in agreement with the then Prime Minister Chang Shao-tseng, the 7-th, the 8-th and the 15-th Mixed Brigades. Thus the attempt of Wu P'ei-fu to reduce Feng Yü-hsiang to naught did not succeed.

When the 2-nd Mukden-Chihli war began, Feng Yü-hsiang was still holding the post of Tupan of the North-Western Region. During this war Feng Yü-hsiang was the main cause of the complete defeat of Wu P'ei-fu. The latter ordered Feng Yü-hsiang to concentrate his troops at Jehol (Ch'engte) in order to deal a blow to the rear and to the flank of the Mukden army, whereas the main forces of Wu P'ei-fu were to strike in the direction of Shanhaikwan. (The troops of Feng Yü-hsiang were then known as "the 3-rd Army" and constituted a part of the troops of Wu P'ei-fu).

The following were the general conditions under which the definitive separation of the Kuominchün armies from other militaristic groups took place.

As has been already mentioned, the troops of Feng Yü-hsiang during the most critical moment of the 2-nd Mukden-Chihli war were at Jehol. Gen. Hu Ching-yi with his first Shensi irregular division, about 20,000 men, was in the region of Tientsin (T'ungchou!) Gen. Sun Yüeh with his 15-th Mixed Brigade was Commandant of the Peking Garrison. Both Gen. Hu Ching-yi and Gen. Sun Yüeh did not curry favor with Wu P'ei-fu. Therefore Feng Yü-hsiang could reckon upon their support, in case he made an open move against Wu P'ei-fu. Besides, Feng Yü-hsiang felt himself at that time so powerful that he decided to get rid of his unreliable chief Wu P'ei-fu who neither liked him nor afforded him the possibility of an advancement. Having previously come to an agreement with Generals Hu Ching-yi and Sün Yüeh and having made sure of their support, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang unexpectedly moved, on October 21, his troops from Jehol to Peking. Gen. Sun Yüeh admitted these troops without objecting into Peking which was occupied

by them in the night of October 23. Here at Peking Feng Yü-hsiang, Hu Ching-yi and Sun Yüeh agreed between themselves concerning further united actions against Wu P'ei-fu. At the same time the question relating to the creation of "Kuominchün armies" was decided in an affirmative sense, in conformity with the motion of Generals Sung Liang-jen and Chang Hung-yu, commanders of brigades in the army of Feng Yü-hsiang. The Declaration issued on October 24 and signed by Feng Yu-hsiang, Hu Ching-yi, Sun Yüeh and Mi Chen-piao and all Commanders of brigades, was to the following effect:

"Actuated by our conscience and for the purpose of maintaining peace in the country, we have decided on October 23-rd that our troops should be recalled from the front and that in agreement with various armies a Civic Army of the Chinese Republic should be created. To fight for the country and for the people shall be the foremost task of this army. As to national problems, these must be entrusted to competent persons who shall elaborate salutary solutions and thus open a new era. In case somebody starts the fight anew and causes injury to the country and to the people, we shall deal with him peremptorily by force of arms".

The Kuominchün group, including the 1-st Kuominchün, was thus created on the basis of carrying on a fight against "militarists" under the slogan of "protection of the country and of the people". At that time Chang Tso-lin stopped open hostilities and let Feng Yü-hsiang and his allies deal with Wu P'ei-fu in order to prevent him from organising a new offensive move. Feng Yü-hsiang had to clear the Peking and the Tientsin regions of Wu P'ei-fu's adherents, Sun Yüeh did the same in the Paoting fu region and Hu Ching-yi took upon himself to clear Honan of Wu P'ei-fu's adherents and to establish there his headquarters.

As a result, Wu P'ei-fu with a small number of his adherents fled to the south, first to Nanking and then to Wuch'ang in Hupei. He chose the Hupei province as his base and began to gather again around himself forces, in order to reenter the "world stage" at an opportune moment and under suitable conditions.

Chang Tso-lin, after several conferences with the leaders of the

newly created "kuominchün group", succeeded at last in organising a new Central Government, headed by Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui. From the very outset, however, frictions began to occur between Chang Tso-lin and Feng Yü-hsiang both of whom were trying to exert influence upon this new Provisional Government, in order to be able to derive more revenues.

In the end of 1924 or in the beginning of 1925 Feng Yü-hsiang joined the Chahar Special Administrative Area to the Suiyüan area which was already under his jurisdiction. On December 11 he was appointed Director (Tupan) of Defense of the North-Western Frontier and on January 14 he moved his headquarters to Kalgan where he began to reorganize his forces. He exerted all his efforts in order to increase the number of his troops and to improve their organization and armament. After establishing his headquarters in Kalgan, Feng Yü-hsiang began gradually to extend his influence also to the Metropolitan area in which he finally succeeded.

At that time (January 1925) the armed forces of Feng Yü-hsiang, i.e. the 1-st Kuominchün, consisted of the following units:

1. His main (11-th) division.

2. The 1-st and the 2-nd temporary divisions (newly formed).

3. The 8-th and the 25-th mixed brigades.

4. The remnants of the 6-th (old) brigade, of the 3-rd (newly formed) brigade and of the 7-th mixed brigade.

All these units were stationed in the Kalgan-Suiyüan region. Besides, Gen. Lu Chung-lin had at his disposal some units of the 4-th division, about 5,000 men. The army of Feng Yü-hsiang thus numbered about 45,000 men.

Such is the brief outline of the history of the origin and of the development of the 1-st Kuominchün which, in view of the peculiar conditions prevailing in China, is de facto nothing but the biography of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang.

THE FIRST KUOMINCHUN ARMY.

A. Discipline.

In comparison with the 2nd and the 3rd Kuominchün and also with the armies of other groups, discipline in the units of the 1st Kuominchün is very strict. Cases of failure to execute orders issued by superior officers are not known. In this respect, i.e. with regard to absolute obedience to superior officers, discipline in the 1st Kuominchün army, as testified by eye-witnesses, may be regarded as exemplary. This will be more easily understood, if the following factors are taken into consideration:

1/ The enlisted personnel of the army is relatively homogeneous. Volunteers are enlisted principally among the village youth and a certain selection in this respect is also practised.

2/ Bandits ("Hunghutzu") and "tufei" are not admitted into the army.

3/ Old soldiers of the rough neck type who had nothing in common with the population and were spoiled by previous wars, were discharged from the army during the Summer of 1925.

4/ Commanders of all grades who obtained their commissions from the ranks, did not cut themselves off from the enlisted men but paid attention to their needs and enjoyed great popularity among them.

5/ The commanding officers of the 1st Kuominchün more than the leaders of other armies took care of soldiers both as to supplying them with food, necessary articles and money (there were no interruptions in connection with the supply service during the last war) and as regards attention to the wounded and invalids.

6/ A certain amount of political work was being carried on both among officers and enlisted men. Officers and soldiers alike were taught that they should be real defenders of the people and that their principal

task was to defend the people and their rights. Soldiers in one of the units of Feng Yü-hsiang's army were asked what their attitude would be, if Feng Yü-hsiang desired to be a ruler of China like Yüan Shih-k'ai. The soldiers answered that in that case they would kill him. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang approved very much of such answers.

7/ The part christianity plays in this respect is also worth mentioning. Many commanders utilize christianity very skilfully, in order to maintain by its aid the discipline of their troops.

The above-mentioned factors explain to a considerable degree the fact that among the troops of the 1st Kuominchün desertion, pillage and violence to local inhabitants occur only in exceptional cases.

During the military operations of 1925-1926 all eye-witnesses asserted that "there was an exemplary discipline among officers and soldiers of those units of the 1st Kuominchün which operated in the Jehol area and around Tientsin and that no cases of desertion or loot were reported" (agent's report dated December 20,1925). " Desertion, looting and violence to local inhabitants occur only occasionally and in exceptionally rare cases. Cases of going over to the side of the enemy were not known. In comparison with the units of the 2nd and 3rd Kuominchün, discipline among enlisted men of the 1st Kuominchün is much more rigid" (agent's report dated January 7, 1926).

Besides the above-mentioned means of <u>moral order</u> used for the maintenance of discipline, other means are also widely applied, such as beating with bamboos, imprisonment and shooting. Sometimes even for an insignificant transgression offenders are pitilessly beaten with bamboos. For instance, for an unintentional discharge of a rifle both the guilty soldier and his direct superior were given each one hundred blows with bamboos and an order was issued giving a severe reprimand to the battalion commander. Measures used in the units of the 1st Kuominchün army for the maintenance of discipline are very severe. For instance, a deserter from the 27th regiment, after being arrested, was shot by order of the Commander of the 4th brigade of the 6th division (agent's report dated January 7, 1926).

It is necessary to point out that gradation as to punishments for breach of discipline is totally lacking and that there is no conformity between offences and punishments for them: either merciless beating with bamboos or shooting. Therefore many offences in the military service remain unpunished, and this circumstance undoubtedly affects in an unfavorable manner the performance of official duties.

B. Mutual relations between officers and enlisted men.

When on duty officers treat soldiers severely, but without petty cavils. It is felt that officers did not cut themselves off from the common soldier. Particularly this may be said with regard to commanders of various ranks. It can be easily percived that a mutual understanding has been established between them and the enlisted men. Col. Yen, who formerly served in the ranks and therefore may be regarded as a representative of the majority of commanders in the 1st Kuominchün army said: "We are of the people, we grew up together with the soldiers, hardships of campaigns have no difficulties for us, we always set an example during battles and go ahead; we are in no need of a special bodyguard, we look after all needs of the enlisted men". This saying of Col. Yen is quite true.

Mutual relations between enlisted men and officers when off duty are quite simple: soldiers do not show any special obsequiousness or subservience towards officers, they behave themselves freely (i.e. with ease) and politely, within the bounds of the usual Chinese reserve.

Mutual relations between enlisted men and generals are of a quite another kind. With very rare exceptions a very sharp border line is traced between them. On one side, there is arbitrariness, harsh treatment, cruelty; on the other side, there is a slavish fear.

C. Attitude of enlisted men and officers towards the local population.

Attitude of enlisted men and officers towards the local population is quite friendly.

"In the Jehol area soldiers and officers of the 1st Kuomin - chün treated the local population in a quite friendly manner. There was not a single case of looting or violence".

"When some units of Feng Yü-hsiang's army were stationed at Nankow, one battalion organised a meeting in which workmen participated. Soldiers and officers fraternised at this meeting with the workmen. After this meeting was over, money and clothing were collected among the personnel of this same battalion and distributed among workmen".

"When the troops of the 1st Kuominchün were stationed around Tientsin, they behaved themselves towards the peaceful inhabitants in a quite friendly manner. There were no cases of looting or violence".

"Units of the 1st Kuominchün pay reasonable prices and in cash for all products which they take from the population. With the same promptness they pay for all carts and pack animals (camels) which they hire".

The above-mentioned facts are all taken from agent's report and are absolutely trustworthy.

The attitude of the population towards the troops of the 1st Kuominchün is quite friendly.

"When some units of the 1st Kuominchün were stationed in the Jehol area, the local population of practically all villages in this area met them with enthusiasm, saying: "Our saviors came to save us from robbers and extortioners". Local inhabitants themselves caught the remaining Mukden soldiers, brought them to units of the 1st Kuominchün and asked that they be shot for violence and robberies they had committed.

D. Economic conditions.

The ration of the soldier in the 1st Kuominchün, whether in peace time or during war, is very scanty. In peace time in the morning a saucer of cooked rice and a small bread, a plate of rice soup and two small breads (in rare cases a small piece of meat) for dinner; in the evening "tea", i.e. hot water, because no tea leaves are put in on account

of the shortage of money; sugar is generally not used. During war in the front line and in the rear the soldier gets unleavened bread twice a day and a soup of noodles or of rice with cabbage or other vegetables once a day; besides this sweet biscuits are given to front line soldiers. The cost of the rations is deducted from the pay of the soldiers. The principle of cooperation is practised with regard to the food and cooks are hired.

Arms and equipment are provided by the army, but in some units soldiers must buy shoes at their own expense. Soldiers in the army wear cloth shoes. Officers wear half-boots or, as an exception, top-boots. The majority of cavalrymen wear half-boots or top-boots.

On the march the pack of the soldier consists of the following articles: a rolled up overcoat, one pair of spare shoes, an umbrella, two bandeliers with cartridges: one serves as a belt, the other is worn across the shoulder. Soldiers do not carry foodstuffs, this is done by the transport service. Winter clothing is all padded. When in the front line, each soldier besides padded clothing receives a sheep-skin coat, trousers of the same kind, warm gloves and a cap with ear-laps. During battle, particularly when an attack is prepared, fur clothing is taken off and is left behind in the rear. Soldiers attack in their padded clothing.

Privates get $6 to 8 Mex. per month. Pay per month of officers is indicated in the following table:

1. Commander of a squad: $ 15 Mex.
2. Commander of a platoon: $ 20 "
3. Commander of a company: $ 120 "
4. Commander of a battalion: $ 170 "
5. Commander of a regiment: $ 240 "
6. Commander of a brigade: $ 480 "

Actually neither enlisted men nor officers get their pay as due, because the money for the upkeep of the 1st Kuominchün must come from the Peking Government. The latter, however, on account of the chronic shortage of funds, has not paid the army for the last 10 months. Nevertheless the

higher command of the first Kuominchün army manages somehow in advancing the troops from local financial resources some money for their everyday existence, in account of their regular pay. As a result of the troops receiving their pay in the form of such advances, the regular pay is usually in arrear up to 30% a month.

The Director General of the North-western Defense prepared regulations concerning 1/ payment of an allowance to families of those who have been killed or slightly wounded and 2/ payment of annual pensions to invalids of war and to those who have been severely wounded during the last war.

Allowances to families:

	of those who have been killed or died from wounds.	of the disabled
Colonel	$ 5.000 Mex.	$ 1.000 Mex.
Lieut. - Colonel	$ 3.000 "	$ 800 "
Major	$ 2.000 "	$ 800 "
Captain	$ 1.000 "	$ 500 "
Lieutenant	$ 800 "	$ 400 "
2nd Lieutenant	$ 600 "	$ 200 "
Sergeant	$ 300 "	$ 100 "
Private	$ 200 "	$ 80 "

Annual Pensions:

	to totally disabled.	to partly disabled.
Colonel	$ 3.000 Mex.	$ 2.000 Mex.
Lieut.- Colonel	$ 2.000 "	$ 1.600 "
Major	$ 1.500 "	$ 1.200 "
Captain	$ 800 "	$ 600 "
Lieutenant	$ 600 "	$ 500 "
2nd Lieutenant	$ 400 "	$ 300 "
Sergeant	$ 200 "	$ 150 "
Private	$ 140 "	$ 100 "

E. Sanitary Service.

Details relating to the general organization of the medical service in the 1st Kuominchün are not available. Only data concerning such an organization during war time are available.

Due attention is paid to the evacuation of the wounded and to their treatment. However, owing to the poor organization of the sanitary service in the army generally, the condition of the wounded prior to their evacuation into the rear is very hard. The wounded are picked up regardless of any danger for their carriers and then brought on stretchers or in motor cars to the chief evacuation point or to its branches, situated near the front line. First aid accorded the wounded consists only in the dressing with a bandage. At the chief evacuation point the medical aid also consists only in dressing. No other aid can be given on account of the lack of medical instruments, of a medical staff and of proper accomodation. From the evacuation point the wounded are evacuated in two ways: the lightly wounded are evacuated in motor cars and the severely wounded by sanitary trains.

Passenger coaches and freight cars are adapted for the use as sanitary trains. Bedding is laid on the floors of the cars. The bedding consists of a mattress, of a sheet and of a thick quilt.

The condition of the wounded and of the sick in evacuation points is hard. Buildings are not heated. The wounded lie on "K'angs" and on the floors without mattresses, only wrapped in their overcoats. Sanitary trains are not heated.

Procurement of Officers' and Enlisted Personnel for the First Kuominchün Army.

A. Enlisted men.

The procurement of enlisted men for the 1st Kuominchün Army is done on the same basis as in the armies of other militaristic groups, i.e. upon the principle of voluntary enlistment.

The enlistment of volunteers is done not at regular intervals, but only when deemed necessary. In the spring and summer of 1925 old soldiers were discharged from several army units. In connection with this and also on account of the considerable increase of the numerical strength of the army, the enlistment of new volunteers was being carried on uninterruptedly until quite recently.

The recruiting of volunteers is done by military and civil authorities on the spot (Tut'ung), by army headquarters or directly by the units concerned.

There are special Recruiting Bureaux attached to Tut'ung "Yamen".

There is a special "Sub-section for recruiting" in the Adjutant Section at the headquarters of the army.

Army units detail special officers for recruiting.

It is a peculiar feature of the 1st Kuominchün army that volunteers for enlistment into units of this army are selected among natives of other provinces, i.e. those which are not subordinated to Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang, such as Honan, Shantung, Chihli. This is explained chiefly by the fact that the territory which is occupied by the 1st Kuominchün army, is very thinly populated; there are only 12,000,000 inhabitants in Kansu and in three Special Administrative Areas of Suiyüan, Chahar and Jehol (comparative density of population: 46 inhabitants to a square mile in Kansu, 528 in Shantung, 376 in Honan and 281 in Chihli). It is quite natural of course

that in such overpopulated regions it is much easier to find volunteers.

Recently, however, the 1st Kuominchün began to enlist volunteers in its own region. For instance, volunteers for the newly formed 35th mixed brigade were selected exclusively among natives of the Kansu province. For the newly formed 7th, 8th and 9th cavalry brigades mohammedans of the Kansu province were enlisted. Inhabitants of the Chahar area were enlisted into the 1st Chahar separate brigade. As to the 1st, the 3rd, the 5th and the 6th infantry divisions, they are enlisting volunteers in the Metropolitan area.

It follows from the above that recently the 1st Kuominchün began to enlist volunteers for its units among the local population.

Chiefly the poorest strata of peasantry are enlisted into the army and only a small percentage of volunteers is recruited in towns from among handicraftsmen, rickshа-pullers, coolies etc.

The method of enlisting "volunteers" for the 1st Kuominchün is somewhat different from methods which are used in other armies.

The enlistment is principally done in villages among the healthy village youth not corrupted by hard conditions of life in towns which the poorest classes are leading there. In distinction from other armies (the 2nd and the 3rd Kuominchün included), bandits ("hunhutsu") and deserters from other armies were not enlisted in the 1st Kuominchün. In towns volunteers were enlisted as an exception and only in cases of special urgency. As to other details and terms of enlistment, they were the same as in other armies. The recruiting agent accompanied by several soldiers started for places where recruiting was to be done, made the conditions of the enlistment and of the service in the army public, enlisted volunteers and advanced them 40 to 50 cents. Volunteers to whom money was advanced, were considered recruits and were then sent directly into units concerned where they were grouped into separate companies, in order to undergo there a preliminary military training. In villages each volunteer was required to produce a guarantee from the headman of the village or from two merchants or from two well-to-do peasants, i.e. those who owned land. These guarantors were

answerable with their properties, in case the soldier whom they guaranteed, deserted and took away arms or other government equipment. Such method of enlistment yielded certain positive results. There were very few cases of desertion in the 1st Kuominchün. The army treated the local population very well and cases of robbery and of violence to local inhabitants took place very rarely. In towns such selection among volunteers was not done.

According to terms of enlistment, only persons of not less than 25 years of age and perfectly healthy were admitted into the army. In practice, however, only the second condition (concerning physical fitness) was observed. As to the age, the majority of recruits who were enlisted in 1925-1926, were 18 to 25 years old. For the cavalry (the 1st, the 2nd, the 3rd, the 4th, the 5th and the 6th cavalry brigades) volunteers 18 to 22 years of age were enlisted.

During the war of 1925-1926 there were cases, when soldiers who went over from the enemy, were enlisted into the 1st Kuominchün (for instance the cavalry in the Jehol area). Generally speaking, owing to the necessity of making replacements in some units and of increasing the numerical strength of the army within a short time, the quality of enlisted men was considerably lowered recently. Formerly units of the 1st Kuominchün army were relatively homogeneous as to their composition and in its ranks there were few soldiers who previously had served under generals of other groups (as has been already mentioned, the majority of old soldiers were discharged in the summer and sent home). On account, however, of the enlistment of prisoners who were captured in the Jehol area and in the battle of Tientsin, this homogeneity was somewhat broken, although not to a very considerable degree.

Terms for which volunteers are enlisted differ, but they are never less than three years. Besides, the volunteer obligates himself to remain in the army in case of war, even after the expiration of the term of enlistment. Notwithstanding the fact that volunteers are enlisted for a definite term of service and sign a contract, in practice, however, this contract is only a fiction. Usually, after being enlisted into the army,

the soldier cannot leave it of his own free will. Disregarding any contract whatever, the soldier is kept in the army so long as the army is in need of him, and is discharged only when the army is no longer in need of him.

In view of such methods of enlistment, of general conditions of service in the army and of the indefiniteness of terms of enlistment, there cannot be any question about creating "reserves" of soldiers who have been discharged from the army.

It is worth while to mention the project of creating in the Chahar area Military settlements or Colonies, in order to concentrate in some definite regions those soldiers who have been discharged from the army. This project was printed in the army newspaper "The Young Soldier". Some extracts from it are given below.

Art. 1. Military settlements or colonies have for their aim the turning of soldiers to husbandry. As a first experiment, 1000 "ch'ing" of land are allotted in the Chahar area to one brigade.

Art. 3. A definite number of farms shall be established on these 1000 "ch'ing" of land; each farm to consist of 15 households and to till 120 Chinese "mu" of land or twenty acres.

Art. 8. After three years soldiers are discharged from military service and are given each a plot of land with buildings, also agricultural implements and oxen.

Art. 9. Distribution of discharged soldiers to different villages and allotment of plots of land shall be done under the supervision of an officer specially detailed by the headquarters of the Director of Northwestern Defense.

Art. 10. Villages of discharged soldiers are organized on the same principles as military settlements. In each village the office of headman is created. Headmen are elected and then confirmed in their offices by the Tupan.

Art. 13. Money which has been spent for the equipment of households for the discharged soldiers, shall be paid back by the latter within three years at definite intervals, beginning from the first year of

sewing.

(We could not establish, whether this project has been put into operation. Probably there was no time to do it, because the war broke out soon after its publication).

B. Noncommissioned Officers.

The overwhelming majority of noncommissioned officers did not receive any military education either in schools or in special courses.

Enlisted men are promoted to noncommissioned officers: 1/ for special zeal in the service and because of military knowledge, 2/ for distinguishing themselves, 3/ by special favor and 4/ after the completion of studies in special courses which have been established in some army units and in the Tut'ung Yamens. There is, however, in the 1st Kuominchün Army a quite insignificant number of noncommissioned officers of the last category, i.e. those who completed their studies in these special courses. The question relating to the procurement of noncommissioned officers for the 1st Kuominchün is in no better position than in other armies, i.e. no proper solution for this problem has yet been found. And as compared with some units of Wu P'ei-fu's army for which noncommissioned officers are drawn from the so-called "training troops", the state of affairs in this respect in the 1st Kuominchün may be regarded as quite unsatisfactory.

C. Officers' Personnel.

Officers' personnel is divided into the following four categories:

1. Those who obtained their commissions from the ranks.

2. Those who graduated from normal military schools, i.e. with three-year courses.

3. Those who have completed special Courses which were organized in Tut'ung "Yamens".

4. Those who have completed short term courses in infantry, cavalry and artillery schools.

As has been mentioned before, the majority of officers in the

1st Kuominchün army belong to the first category, i.e. those who have obtained their commissions from the ranks. These officers did not of course receive any theoretical preparation, but possess very good practical training, because almost all of them are old companions in arms of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang and participants in periodical Chinese civil wars. Officers of this category hold all higher posts in the 1st Kuominchün army, from company commander up. Recently, however, officers who were commissioned after serving in the ranks, have been appointed to higher posts, such as commanders of brigades or regiments, only after receiving some theoretical preparation in the special School for Higher Commanders, at Kalgan. Some officers, after completing their studies in this school, were promoted generals and appointed brigade commanders; former majors were promoted colonels and appointed regimental commanders.

There are very few graduates of military schools with three - year courses in the 1st Kuominchün. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang admits such officers into his army most unwillingly, because the majority of them have already served in other armies. They usually hold only "auxiliary" or secondary posts, such as advisers attached to army staffs, assistants etc.

Generally speaking, the problem of procuring officers' personnel for the units of the 1st Kuominchün has not as yet been properly solved. The creation of a system of schools for officers of various ranks was actually interrupted by the war which broke out in December 1925, and these several tens of officers who have succeeded in completing their studies in these schools (before the expiration, however, of the school term), could not of course either give any perceptible results or change the general "physiognomy" of the army as regards its officers.

In view of the existing system of procuring officers' personnel for the 1st Kuominchün, there cannot be any question about creating "reserves" for replacement of officers in command.

Thus the question relating to the procurement of commanders of various ranks is in a much worse condition in the 1st Kuominchün army than in armies of Chang Tso-lin and of Wu P'ei-fu. There is in the army of

Chang Tso-lin a considerably greater percentage of officers who are graduates of military schools, Chinese as well as foreign. Wu P'ei-fu also pays serious attention to the creation of a personnel of trained commanders. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang began only recently to pay due attention to the theoretical preparation of his officers. Formerly, however, an unlimited devotion to Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang was almost the only standard of evaluation of officers. There were neither definite requirements with regard to standard nor regulations or orders in connection with the military service. Promotions and advancements depended entirely upon "chances" and upon the favor of superior authorities.

Characteristics of Higher Officers of the First Kuominchün.

ng Chih-hiang. Gen. Chang Chih-hiang is an old companion in arms of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang. During the first Mukden - Chihli war, being in command of a brigade, he distinguished himself in the battle of Cheng - chow, in Honan. Afterwards he held successively the posts of Com - mander of the 5th division, of Tut'ung of the Chahar special administrative area, and of Commandant of the cavalry. Now he acts as de - puty for Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang.

Chang Chih-hiang is a Christian and a sincere believer. He is against all innovations, because they inevitably lead to the centralization of the army command and to diminution of the authority of Tu-t'ung or Tupan. He did not receive any theoretical military education and is a paragon of the Chinese inertia and stagnation. He does not allow his subordinates to display any initiative whatever. His intellect is not large enough and he is cunning and insincere. His attitude towards the U. S. S. R. is very reserved and his disposition towards Russian advisers is hostile. Recently he criticised very severely in the press the radical tendencies of the youth. He denounces with all means at his disposal "bolshevism" which is imputed to all leaders of the 1st Kuominchün. When necessary, however, in special cases he does not mind delivering "left" speeches.

He is one of those generals who are most devoted to Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang.

i Ming-chung. Gen. Li Ming-chung, former commander of the 6th infantry division and Tut'ung of the Suiyüan special administrative area, holds now the post of commander of the Metropolitan Defense Force.

Li Ming-chung is a believing Christian and maintains a close

connection with missionaries. When speaking on general political topics, he expresses the idea that "without the aid of foreign capital China cannot develop". His attitude towards Marshal Tuan Ch'i-jui is quite friendly. His attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is reserved and unfriendly and he says so publicly. His relations with Russian advisers are good and he follows their military advices. He is a very influential general and is quite devoted to Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang. In his personal life he is somewhat conservative.

hung-lin. Gen. Lu Chung-lin, former Commander of the 1st division, is a devout Christian. He is a clever and cunning man. He takes great interest in politics and in a political sense is a nationalist and a conservative. As regards military science, he is behind the times.

Yu-fen. Gen. Liu Yu-fen is Commander of the 2nd infantry division.

Liu Yu-fen has been the whole time in Kansu and therefore his "political attitude" could not be ascertained as yet. His attitude towards the U.S.S.R., however, is quite friendly.

g Chin-sheng. Gen. Cheng Chin-sheng is Commander of the 3rd division.

Cheng Chin-sheng is a nationalist and a conservative and takes but little interest in politics. He is very worried, because his division is of poor quality. He is backward as regards military science.

Che-yüan. Gen. Sung Che-yüan, former Commander of the 11th division, is now Tut'ung of the Jehol special administrative area, Commander of the 1st cavalry division and concurrently commander of the cavalry corps.

Sung Che-yüan is well versed in military tactics, resolute, energetic and is well prepared for the post of divisional commander. His attitude towards Russian advisers is friendly. He thinks, however, that it is necessary to have them only during peace for the purpose of training the army. During war he gives them absolutely no work and

disregards their advices. His attitude towards the U.S.S.R. is very friendly. He is a fighting general and holds a very high opinion of himself.

n. Kou. Gen. Kou, Inspector General of Army Training, is a very influential person. In the beginning his attitude towards the U.S.S.R. was hostile, but recently it improved somewhat.

n Fu-chiang. Gen. Han Fu-chiang is Commander of the 1st infantry division.

Han Fu-chiang is a very clever man, well versed in military science, who continues to improve his knowledge by further studies. He has been serving under Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang for more than ten years and is very devoted to him. His attitude towards the U.S.S.R. and Russian advisers is somewhat reserved.

e Cheng-k'ai. Gen. Kuo Cheng-k'ai is Commander of the 2nd brigade of the 1st division.

Gen. Kuo Cheng-k'ai is an intelligent officer, well informed in military matters and very fond of military science. He has been serving under Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang since 1921 and is very intimate with him. As regards politics, he is a nationalist.

ang Shu-sheng. Gen. Chang Shu-sheng usually fulfils various diplomatic errands of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang and exercises a great influence upon him. He works for a rapprochement between Feng Yü-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin.

i Hsiang-chou. Gen. Li Hsiang-chou is Commander of the 2nd cavalry brigade of the 1st cavalry division.

Li Hsiang-chou is an energetic and able commander, very fond of his military profession as a cavalry officer. He works very hard in order to improve his military instruction so as to be better prepared to perform his duties. His attitude towards the U.S.S.R. generally and Russian advisers in particular is quite friendly. By his poli-

tical convictions he is not a conservative.

Gen. Li. Gen. Li is Commander of the 5th brigade of the 2nd cavalry division.

In the opinion of the Chinese, Gen. Li is one of the most prominent generals of the 1st Kuominchun as regards military training. Truly he is very well versed in military science and takes great interest, but is rather poorly prepared for the service in cavalry units. He is a great patriot. His attitude towards the U. S. S. R. is quite indifferent.

Col. Yen. Col. Yen is Commander of the 1st cavalry regiment.

Col. Yen is the best regimental commander in the Chinese cavalry. He is well versed in cavalry matters and very fond of his work. His attitude towards the U. S. S. R. is friendly. Relations between him and Russian advisers are quite good.

Col. Yang. Col. Yang is Commander of the 5-th cavalry regiment.

Col.Yang is a very intelligent and clever man. His general education is rather poor. He is very poor in reading and writing,but he is a good fighting officer, firm in character and sure of himself. For his frankness and roughness he is not liked by his superiors.

Characteristics of the Officers' Personnel of the 1st Kuominchün.

The officers of the first Kuominchün army can be divided into two distinct groups:

1. Officers without education in Military Schools who were commissioned after long service in the ranks.

2. Officers who are graduates of Military Schools.

The majority of officers in the 1st Kuominchün army have obtained their commissions after long service in the ranks. The higher officers, especially generals, are almost exclusively officers who have not received a theoretical military education.

Officers who have received some military education in Military Schools, are holding posts of Commanders of middle rank.

Feng Yü-hsiang himself said about the officers of the two groups during a conversation with a foreigner: " Officers belonging to the 1st group are men who obtained their commission after long service in the ranks. They lead the same life as the soldiers and are my men. Officers of the second group are graduates of various schools. The majority of them are adherents of Wu P'ei-fu and they act as assistants to commanders belonging to the first group".

We must add that officers of the first group during the whole period of their military service were together with Feng Yü-hsiang, whereas those of the second group, before entering the army of Feng Yü-hsiang, had served in other armies. There are really many adherents of Wu P'ei-fu among officers of the second group.

One of the best regimental commanders, Col. Yen who is the commander of the 1st regiment of the 1st cavalry brigade characterises the officers of these two groups as follows: "We are of the people. We grew up

together with the soldiers (Col. Yen obtained his commission after serving in the ranks). As regards mental and physical qualities, we are above "them" (i.e. the educated officers). Hardships of campaigns are not for us difficult to bear. We always set an example in battles and lead our men. We are in no need of special bodyguards. We write our orders on a stone and we do not need an organized staff office. We treat peasants with care and attend to all needs of the enlisted men. These "others" (graduates of military schools) are men who cut themselves off from the common soldier whom they do not understand. During battles they usually are far behind in the rear. They need a large bodyguard and an organized staff office from which they direct the army". Col. Yen adds then that Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang is well aware of the value of officers belonging to both groups and appraises their qualities in his own way.

As has been mentioned before, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang considers officers who have obtained their commissions after serving in the ranks as the best ones. He tries to preserve their simple habits of life and organizes for them special courses of instruction in order to raise their standard. As to officers who are graduates of military schools, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang takes their defects into full account, but tries to make the best of them, because these officers still are qualified force necessary to command the army.

Thus higher officers of the 1st Kuominchün cannot be considered as representing a "monolith" whole. There is a deep gulf between the two groups and a silent latent struggle is going on all the time. This is a struggle for better posts and promotion in rank which can be explained by competition only. A class antagonism also lies at its basis, because officers who are graduates of military schools belong to well-to-do classes, whereas officers who have obtained their commissions after serving in the ranks, were formerly peasants who possessed little or no land. Commanders of the 2nd group passed through a very hard school first as soldiers and then as junior officers.

The fact, however, that Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang likes officers

better who formerly served in the ranks, does not prove that in this respect he is guided by some "democratic point of view". In appraising his commanders Feng Yü-hsiang puts above all their devotion to him and not military knowledge or ability. The most devoted and loyal to Feng Yü-hsiang are those commanders who have obtained their high posts not on account of their military knowledge or personal qualities but only owing to Feng's favor. To lose this favor means to lose everything, both rank and lucrative posts.

The most prominent commanders of the 1st Kuominchün such as Gen. Chang Chih-kiang, Gen. Li Ming-chung, Gen. Lu Chung-lin, Gen. Sung Che-yüan etc. (their personal characteristics are given separately), they all obtained their commissions after serving in the ranks, and the majority of them are former peasants. During their long service in the army, however, they have lost long ago all connection with the peasantry and, on account of their present official position, are now closely connected with the well to-do classes of the population, so that if some of them can be used for the liberation of China from the yoke of imperialism, they may also be used with equal success for the suppression of the workers' and peasant movement.

As to officers of the middle and lower rank, the majority of them also did not receive their education in military schools, but were commissioned after serving in the ranks. Some of them received some military instruction in the special courses for officers which were established in Tupan's (or Tut'ung) "Yamens". The majority have not yet lost their connections with the villages. This category of officers is the most fertile soil for propaganda of national revolutionary ideas. The majority of them are beginning to take an interest in the political life of the country, but the work of the left party organizations, on account of existing conditions, is carried on on a very small scale because Feng Yü-hsiang permits the carrying on of political work in his army only within definite limits, only when necessary and useful to him.

As to officers who are graduates of military schools, they not only do not hold high posts, but generally do not have independent functions. In most cases they are "advisers" without definite functions or assistants to officers who obtained their commissions from the ranks. In any case they

do not play conspicuous parts in the army.

(Characteristics with reference to the military training of officers will be given in the chapter " Preparedness of the Kuominchün for war").

Armament of the First Kueminchün Army.

A. Infantry.

1. Rifles. The infantry is armed with rifles of various models and calibres (eleven models and four calibres). The following rifles are known to be in use: German 7.9 m.m. rifles, model 1888; Japanese "Arisaka" 6.5 m.m. rifles, model 1905; Russian 3-line rifles, model 1901; "Mauser" 6.8 m.m. rifles, model 1913, manufactured at the Hanyang arsenal.

The following units are armed with 7.9 m.m. rifles: the 1st division, the guard brigade and partly the 5th, the 6th and the 11th divisions.

The following units are armed with 6.5 m.m. rifles: the 3rd division and parts of the 5th and of the 6th divisions.

The following units are armed with Russian 3-line rifles: the cavalry and part of the 11th division.

It is not known with what kind of rifles the 9th and the 10th Kansu cavalry brigades are armed.

Recently attempts were made to arm several units of the 1st Kueminchün with rifles of the same model. In view, however, of the shortage of rifles, it was impossible to put this into effect and therefore units in the same division are still armed with rifles of various model, which makes the ammunition supply quite a problem.

The total number of rifles available is 79,000 to 80,000.

2. Machine guns. The 1st Kueminchün army is armed with machine guns of 12 models and of 4 calibres (mostly of 7.9 m.m. calibre). The following models are mostly in use: "Maxim", "Skoda", "Thompson" and "Colt".

The 1st infantry division is wholly armed with "Maxim" machine guns of Russian make; besides, in the 1st brigade of the 1st division a company armed with "Madison" light machine guns is attached to each battalion.

In the 3rd division there are 12 "Maxim" machine guns of Russian make, 10 "Skoda" and 10 "Colt" machine guns.

In the 6th division there are "Maxim" machine guns manufactured at the Shanghai arsenal.

The total number of machine guns is 340 to 350.

3. Bombthrowers. The total number of bombthrowers is 84 to 90, mostly of an Italian make.

4. Minewerfers (trench mortars). Some units of the 1st Kuominchün are armed with minewerfers, but their number is insignificant. No information is available as to the exact number of minewerfers and their makes.

5. Hand grenades. There are 25 to 27 thousand hand grenades in the 1st Kuominchün army.

6. Automatic pistols. There are about 8,000 automatic pistols in the army. Two battalions of the guard brigade and bodyguards of Divisional Commanders are armed with them.

B. Artillery.

Artillery units are also armed with cannons of various models and calibres:

1/ "Krupp" 75 m.m. mountain guns manufactured at the Shanghai (Kiangnan) Arsenal,

2/ 37 m.m. mountain guns,

3/ "Krupp" field guns,

4/ "Arisaka" field guns,

5/ "Skoda" field guns,

6/ 75 m.m. field guns,

7/ heavy howitzers,

8/ mortars of antiquated pattern,

9/ 3-inch field guns and

10/ anti-aircraft guns (high-angle guns).

The artillery battalion attached to the guard brigade is mostly armed with "Krupp" 75 m.m. mountain guns, manufactured at the Shanghai Arsenal; besides, there are also in the same battalion mortars of an anti - quated model (suitable for transportation on pack animals).

The 1st brigade of the 1st division is armed with "Krupp" 75 m.m. mountain guns and the 2nd brigade with "Krupp" 75 m.m. and "Arisaka" field guns.

The 3rd division is armed with "Krupp" mountain and field guns (mountain guns manufactured at the Hanyang Arsenal).

The 5th division is armed with "Skoda" field guns and "Arisaka" mountain guns.

The question as to models of artillery guns in other divisions could not be ascertained.

Prior to the war of 1925-1926 3-line field guns were stored in the Artillery School.

The total number of artillery guns is 200 to 210.

G. Armored trains.

The 1st Kuominchün army has now at its disposal three armored trains: No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3.

Armored train No. 1. Partly armored locomotive. One armored platform on which is mounted one 75 m.m. gun in a turret and six machine guns, two in turrets and four in loopholes. Two armored cars for rifle firing (machine guns can also be used). Two control platforms loaded with railway equipment and tools. The crew is well trained. Two infantry platoons are attached to this armored train.

Armored train No. 2. Partly armored locomotive. One armored platform with a 75 m.m. field gun and one 75 m.m. mountain gun in turrets and

four machine guns, two in turrets and two in loopholes. Two armored cars for rifle firing. Two central platforms loaded with railway equipment and tools. Two infantry platoons are attached to this armored train.

Armored train No. 3. Unarmored locomotive. One armored platform mounting one Russian 3-inch field gun, model 1902, and 5 "Maxim" machine guns, one in a turret and four on their own tripods which can be used for firing from loopholes, which are made in the sides of the armored platform for the purposes of flank firing and have small armored doors. Dead space for machine guns 10 to 12 paces. Two armored cars for rifle firing and two central platforms. The crew of this armored train was formed by detaching men from the armored trains No. 1 and No. 2 and by adding several specialists from other special units. They have not as yet completed their course of training for service on armored trains.

These three armored trains constitute " a group ". The group has also at its disposal three hand cars, one armored and armed with a machine gun and two unarmored.

Armored trains have no horses of their own. Attached to the group are:

a/ one car for the staff of the group,

b/ one kitchen car,

c/ two water tank cars,

d/ two cars loaded with railway equipment and materials,

e/ one armored car for the bodyguard and

f/ one car with a long range gun.

D. Cavalry.

Cavalry is armed with 1/ rifles (some cavalry brigades are armed exclusively with Russian 3-line rifles), 2/ sabres and 3/ spears.

All cavalry men are armed with rifles, but there is shortage of sabres and spears.

Machine guns are of "Madison" model, but the number of machine guns actually available for the use of cavalry is not sufficient.

Artillery consists of 75 m.m. field and mountain guns. During the military operations in December, 1935 cavalry had only six artillery guns at its disposal.

Supplies and Supply Service of the First Kuomintang Army.

A. Military Industry.

The High Command of the 1st Kuomintang Army has neither military works nor arsenals at its disposal.

1. The Kalgan Mint was adapted for use as an Arsenal which consists now (i.e. in 1926) of the following workshops:

1/ Foundry which consists of two sections:

a/ Copper foundry in which all brass parts of artillery guns can be cast, and

b/ Cast-iron foundry.

2/ Coke plant (coke to be used for founding).

3/ Copper rolling workshop which turns out sheets about one arshine or 2.33 feet wide.

4/ Stamping workshop which is equipped with presses.

5/ Locksmith's shop.

6/ Fitter's shop which is equipped with:

a/ 12 turning lathes,

b/ 2 friezing lathes,

c/ 2 planing machines and

d/ 3 drilling machines.

7/ Forge which is equipped with ten furnaces.

8/ Woodworking shop which is capable of manufacturing rifle stocks, but is not equipped with special machinery.

There are three steam-engines; two of 250 H.P. each and one of 500 H.P. 250 H.P. engines can be utilized for military purposes.

This Arsenal is now turning out:

1/ Hand grenades made of cast-iron.

2/ Rifle belts which, however, on account of the lack of experienced technical personnel, are of a very poor quality.

In addition, the arsenal is capable of doing the following work:

a/ to repair artillery guns, machine guns and rifles;

b/ to manufacture all parts of the machine guns, except barrels;

c/ provided specialized drilling machines are installed, the manufacturing of machine guns will be possible;

d/ change of tires (iron hoops) for wheels and repair of wheels are done.

Were this arsenal provided with an experienced technical personnel, it could do monthly the following repair work: of about 300 rifles, or of 20 machine guns, or of 10 artillery guns.

The Kalgan Arsenal does not possess specially equipped store houses for the storage of arms and munitions.

2. Besides this "Arsenal" at Kalgan, a Workshop for making minor repairs was established at P'ingtich'üan, a station on the Peking-Suiyüan Railway and a terminal point of the motor road from Urga.

This Workshop is located in an ordinary large Chinese house and is equipped with the following machinery:

1/ one turning lathe with a 2 H.P. hand motor,

2/ one drilling machine with four presses and

3/ one forge furnace.

In view of the great shortage of necessary tools, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang purchased, in November 1925, at Tientsin, 28 turning lathes, friezing lathes, drilling machines, etc., for the equipment of the P'ingtich'üan Arsenal which it was planned to open at the beginning of 1926.

No data concerning the further utilization of this machinery are

available.

(Translator's Note: Information relating the purchase at Tientsin of machinery for the P'ingtich'fan Arsenal is also confirmed by agents' report dated November 28, 1925).

3. The railway engine-house (depot) at Kalgan has been also adapted for the use as a repair shop for arms, but what kind of arms are being repaired there and to what an extent, is unknown.

4. As both Arsenals, i.e. at Kalgan and P'ingtich'fan, bear rather an improvised character and belong to the type of machine shops not being equipped with any technical appliances, they are not capable of turning out chemical products and therefore cannot be adapted even for the manufacturing of powder.

5. There are no factories for the manufacture of rifle cartridges or shells at the disposal of the 1st Kuominchün Army.

All that has been mentioned before, represents the only resources which the 1st Kuominchün Army has at its disposal. Strictly speaking it has none, because the above-mentioned workshops having such a poor productive capacity, cannot be taken seriously, the more so if one takes into consideration the ever increasing numerical strength of the army and, as a consequence, the ever increasing need of arms and of their repair. Compared with the armies of Chang Tso-lin, of Wu P'ei-fu or of Sun Ch'uan-fang, the army of Feng Yü-hsiang is placed in this respect in a most disadvantageous position. Whereas his present and would-be enemies have at their disposal first-class arsenals possessing a very great productive capacity, such as Hanyang, Shanghai (Kiangnan), Mukden and Tsehou Arsenals, Feng Yü-hsiang has virtually nothing. As to the creation of a military industry, this is also beyond Feng Yü-hsiang's actual forces, because his economic resources and possibilities are very small.

B. Foreign Aid. Purchases Abroad.

It is hardly possible to dwell much upon foreign aid and purchases abroad. It is only necessary to mention that the delivery of arms for Feng Yü-hsiang's Army from abroad is connected with great difficulties. Feng Yü-hsiang who occupies a borderland territory far from the sea, has no safe sea port at his disposal and is in a very difficult position in this respect as compared with his enemies.

C. Organs of the Army Supply Service.

Two Departments are in charge of the Army Supply Service, viz. 1/ Commissariat Department and 2/ Ordnance Department. According to the scheme of organization, these Departments are to be subordinated to the Chief of Staff of the Kuominchün Army. In fact, however, they do not depend upon him.

The Commissariat Department fulfils the function of supplying the troops with foodstuffs, forage, all necessary articles and money and allots money to other department for the purpose of making various purchases.

The Ordnance Department having received from the Commissariat Department the necessary grant of money, makes purchases of armaments and of other equipments. Besides, it is the duty of this Department to supervise the productive activity of the Arsenal and of various workshops and also the condition of army units as regards their armament and equipment.

It was not possible to ascertain the exact organization of the Supply Service in the army units. During the war army units organized special Purchasing Commissions which purchased foodstuffs and forage from the local population. In addition, by order of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang, special Supply bases were also established during the war for the purpose of buying from the local population with ready money foodstuffs and forage.

There is a complete absence of more or less definite data as regards 1/ the procedure of supplying army units with artillery, engineer and sanitary equipments, 2/ the detailed list of articles with which army units are to be supplied, and 3/ the specified minimum periods for which the articles supplied shall last. It is necessary to mention, however, that although army units lacked properly organised means of transportation, the troops during the last war had not to experience any special irregularities with regard to the Supply Service.

Procurement of Animal Transportation for the First Kuominchün.

Horses and carts are procured for the 1st Kuominchün by purchase from the local population. The question concerning purchase of horses does not meet with any special difficulties, because the army occupies the territory, where cattle breeding is one of the principal occupations of inhabitants. Inner Mongolia alone has 2,000,000 horses and 40,000 camels. The Kansu province is also rich in horses and camels. This wealth in "nomadic" resources afforded Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang the possibility of creating within a comparatively short period of time a very numerous cavalry (ten cavalry brigades). Recently a new method was introduced in this respect, viz. of enlisting volunteers who possessed their own horses and of paying a definite amount for each horse. This method was especially in practice, when the Kansu cavalry (the 7th, the 8th and the 9th cavalry brigades) and the 1st Chahar cavalry brigade were being formed. Besides purchases of horses from the local population, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang also has at his disposal "Government Breves of Horses and Cattle Pasturages" in the Special Administrative Area of Chahar. Although these pasturages are nominally the property of the Central Government, actually, however, they are at the disposal of Feng Yü-hsiang. In connection with purchases of horses the latter is constantly meeting with great difficulties on account of his small financial resources. The average price of a good horse is $ 80 Mex. During the last war the task of procuring horses for the army was sometimes made easier owing to the capture of horses from the enemy. For instance, more than 1,000 horses were captured from the enemy in the Jehol area. Cases of requisition of horses from the local population were not reported, at least not up to the last war.

As regards the procurement of other means of transportation for the army, it is usually effected in two ways: purchase from the local

population or hire. In view of the fact that there is no specially organized transport service in the 1st Kuomintang, provisions, forage and munitions are transported on hired camels and horses. Such transport service is organized only during war and is then distributed among various army units.

Army Training and Military Education in the Hsüeh Kuominchün.

A. Enlisted Personnel.

a/ Infantry. Until the fall of 1925 the training of the infantry, as of all other branches of the military service, was carried on in accordance with "old methods", i.e. there was practically no training of the infantry for war. It is a well known fact that training in the field is the basis of the training of troops for war and this training in the field was not practised in the 1st Kuominchün army. The training of infantry consisted chiefly of such drills, as marching, manual exercises with rifles, close order drill etc. Rifle practice was also on an unsatisfactory footing. Target practices were held very seldom, once or twice a year, and only 3 to 5 rifle cartridges per man were used. Tactical exercises were most primitive and consisted of sending out of patrols and of deploying into skirmishes which were aligned as if with a ruler. There was no adaptation to the terrain and no consideration given to enemy fire.

Since the fall of the 1925, however, Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang became "conscious" of the necessity of using a more rational method of training both of enlisted men and of officers and the infantry began gradually to apply new methods of training.

In order to be able to use proper methods of training, it is of course necessary to have properly trained officers, but such officers personnel was lacking. Despite this, however, new methods of training began to be used in some infantry units with the aid of foreign instructors. More attention was paid to field training, to the adaptation to the terrain and to the proper organization of advance guards and reconnaissance.

Rifle practice was properly organized and several target practices were held, as well as manoeuvres. As no data are as yet available as to methods, programs and intensiveness of this new training of infantry, it is difficult to say definitely, what progress it succeeded in making in this direction. Taking, however, into consideration all the intricacy of this new training and the unpreparedness of officers for this task, one may safely assume that the infantry went to the war (which began in December, 1928) "equipped" only with old habits and methods as regards tactics, because new tactical methods could of course not take very deep roots in the army within such short period of time, as two months. The military operation around Tientsin, as well as the subsequent operations, may be quoted as an example in this respect. Nevertheless one can say that with regard to the training of its infantry units the 1st Kuominchün army has made great progress, because the chief obstacles, such as inertia, failure to understand the advantages of the new training of officers, heterogeneity as regards organization and armament of units etc., have been to a considerable extent surmounted and the training of infantry has been put on a proper footing. The new training (in the sense of "re-training") of senior commanders and the training of junior officers is being carried on in the 1st Kuominchün army very intensely and this circumstance will undoubtedly prove to be a decisive factor in connection with the proper training of infantry for war.

b/ Cavalry. The training of cavalry is almost like an innovation in the 1st Kuominchün army, because cavalry itself, as a separate branch of the army, was organized only quite recently. Prior to the creation of the cavalry corps, there were the so-called "cavalry detachments", but these were practically "mounted infantry" which did not feel sure enough when on horseback. There could not be any question as to "training" in these detachments, because all their time was spent in fighting bandits and in guarding frontiers. As soon, however, as several cavalry brigades had been organized, the work of training was immediately

started in some of them. As the lack of instructors and trained junior officers greatly hindered the work of training, first a Cavalry School for junior officers was established.

Training schedule of the 6th cavalry brigade is given below:

Subjects.	Contents.
1. Making military reports in the field.	Cavalry men ride out on the road and, under the direction of their superior officers, are taught how to act in connection with different military situations and manoeuvres of the enemy.
2. Participation of dismounted cavalry in battle.	Cavalry men quickly dismount and scatter and then assemble again.
3. Exercises in connection with patrol duty.	Ways and means in passing through all kinds of terrain. Methods of patrol duty.
4. Scouts (field exercises).	Orders. Writing of orders, distribution of duties.
5. Participation of dismounted cavalry in battle.	
6. Scouts (field exercises).	

Notes: 1. This schedule shall be put into force beginning November 9.

2. Each instructor first gives theoretical explanations in the class room, then tactical exercises in the field.

3. As regards other methods, necessary explanations shall be given during the training in connection with " the participation of dismounted cavalry in battle ".

Training schedule of the 14th regiment of the 6th brigade:

Hours.	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday
6.30 to 7.30 a.m.	Field exercises	Drill regulations.	Rifle practice.
6.30 to 7.30 p.m.	Development of an "energetic spirit".	Necessary informations relating to horses.	Riding.

	Thursday	Friday	Saturday.
6.30 to 7.30 a.m.	Education	Riding	Army Regulations
6.30 to 7.30 p.m.	Drill regulations.	Rifle practice	Field exercises.

Notes: 1. This program shall be put into force beginning October 24.

2. Special attention shall be paid to field training.

3. Nobody is allowed to miss instructions without sufficient reason.

4. Before dinner 60 characters (reading) shall be taught (obligatorily).

The work of cavalry training is carried on very intensely. From the very beginning this training has been put on a proper footing, i.e. the training as regards tactics is principally done by exercises in the field (Special attention shall be paid to field training. Each instructor first gives theoretical explanations in the class room, then tactical exercises in the field follow). Great attention is also paid to the development of better horsemanship. It is difficult of course to train cavalry properly within a short period of time, the more so because instructors are lacking. Nevertheless good results have been attained in connection with putting

cavalry training on a proper footing.

2/ Artillery. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang pays serious attention to the training of artillery men. Until the fall of 1925 artillery was only taught how to fire at short ranges and from open positions. Technique of firing was quite primitive. No attention was paid to horse artillery training and to duties of artillery scouts and telephone operators. Generally speaking, artillery was "neglected". Most of the guns available were unserviceable, without proper sights.

Beginning October 1925 artillery training was started in accordance with the following plan:

Training program of artillery units of the North-western army during the winter period.

Training begins on October 15, 1925, and ends on March 15, 1926. The term of training consists of five months or 100 working days (20 working days per month) or 600 hours (six hours per day).

The rest of time shall be kept at the disposal of battery commanders.

The term of training is divided into two parts:

Part 1: training of sections, three months or 60 days.

Part 2: combined training of batteries and battalions, two months or 40 days.

The battery is divided into the following sections: a/ gun crew, b/ drivers, c/ scouts and d/ telephone operators.

The first two sections are training on a battery scale; detachments of scouts and telephone operators, however, are combined into a battalion detail. In order to direct the work of training for each section are appointed an officer, as a responsible chief, and the necessary number of officers-instructors; for the battalion detail an assistant battalion commander, as chief, and two officers, who have completed special courses, as assistants.

Training schedule for the 1st part of the winter period from October 15, 1923, to January 15, 1924, i.e. 360 hours.

Subjects	Gun crews	Artillery drivers	Scouts	Telephone subscribers
Horsemanship	---	200	60	30
Gun drill	180	30	--	--
Materiel	60	20	10	10
Gunnery	10	--	60	20
Fire control instruments	--	--	30	20
Communications	5	5	30	120
Artillery tactics	10	10	60	30
Military chemistry	5	5	5	5
Concealment	10	10	20	20
Artillery emplacements.	20	20	20	20
Army regulations	60	60	60	60
Topography	--	--	35	25
Total:	360	360	360	360

Note: Relating to the training schedule for the 1st part of the winter period.

A. Scouts.

a/ Horsemanship: 60 hours. Riding, jumping. School of the trooper, riding over obstacles. Care of horses, diseases of horses, stable management.

b/ Materiel: 10 hours. General information relating to guns. Guns of the respective battalion. Ammunition.

c/ Gunnery: 60 hours. Trajectory. Angles. Rules of firing. Direction. Firing at distant ranges.

d/ Fire control instruments: 30 hours. Battery commander's telescope, binoculars, compass. Their mechanism and use.

e/ Communications: 30 hours. The mechanism of the telephone. Laying of telephone lines. Telephoning. Repairing and damaging of telephone wires. Signaling.

f/ Artillery tactics: 60 hours. The use of artillery. Nature of artillery fire. Artillery positions. Observation points. Reconnaitering work. Duty of artillery scouts in the field.

g/ Military chemistry: 5 hours. Information as to asphyxiating gases, their action and protection from them.

h/ Concealment: 30 hours. Importance of masking. Signs by which a battery on the march, during rest and in battle can be detected. Measures relating to concealment. Masking of observation points.

i/ Artillery emplacements: 30 hours. Digging of emplacements and trenches.

j/ Topography: 35 hours. Scales, conventional signs, orientation. Making of map sketches.

B. Telephone operators.

a/ Communications: 180 hours. Telephone and its mechanism. Repairs. Batteries and wires. Laying of telephone lines. Repairing of damaged lines. Discovering of internal breaks. Transmission of commands and messages. Signaling.

(For horsemanship, materiel, fire control instruments, gunnery. artillery tactics, military chemistry, concealment, artillery emplacements and topography see section A. Scouts).

C. Gun crews.

a/ Gun drill: 180 hours. Goniometers and handling of them. Gun sights and aiming. Changing of gun mounts.

b/ Materiel: 60 hours. Mechanism of the gun (details relating to the breech block). Damages to material. Keeping of materiel in good order

during rest, on the march and in battle. Small arms and ammunition.

c/ Gunnery: 10 hours. Trajectory. Effect of shells.

d/ Communications: 5 hours. Laying of telephone lines and guarding of them. Telephone conversation. Brief information as to the mechanism of telephones. Use of communications.

e/ Artillery tactics: 10 hours. Employment of artillery. Positions and the occupation of them.

f/ Military chemistry: 5 hours (see section A. Sapsis).

g/ Artillery emplacements: 20 hours. Emplacements for guns and ammunition. Trenches for gun crews.

B. Artillery drivers.

a/ Horsemanship: 200 hours. Horses and their care. Diseases of horses. Stable management. Driving in pairs. Draft. Occupying gun positions, limbering and unlimbering. Saddling and harnessing.

b/ Gun drill: 30 hours. Use of geniometer. Laying of the gun.

c/ Material: 30 hours (see section A. Sapsis).

(Translator's note: This program for the training of artillery was taken from the artillery drill regulations which were in force in the former Imperial Russian army and which have been adopted without alterations by the Red Army).

The war which broke out later prevented the carrying out of this program in its entireness. Something, however, has been accomplished in connection with the training of artillery men. Therefore during military operations of the 1st Kuban'chan army its artillery was able to accomplish its mission.

B. Officers.

As has been pointed out in the sections "Commanders" and "Procurement of Officers' Personnel", the majority of officers obtained their commissions after serving in the ranks and consequently they did not receive any theoretical training. Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang decided to use more rational methods as regards the training of his army and first of all began to pay special attention to the training of his officers. Therefore in June, 1925 he established the following schools:

1. Higher Officers' School. Enrollment: 36 (14 regimental commanders, the rest battalion commanders etc.).

2. Machine gun School. Enrollment: 144.

3. Engineering School and Communication School. Enrollment: 80 (in two schools).

4. Counter-espionage School. Enrollment: 60.

Note: All these schools were established at Kalgan.

5. Artillery School at P'ingtich'ian. Enrollment: 116 (60 of them graduated from the Nanyüan Artillery School and were then sent to this School for "additional instruction" of one month).

6. Cavalry School at Fengchen. Enrollment: 250.

7. School of "fighting groups". Enrollment: 100.

8. Military Students' School. Enrollment: 700.

In most of these schools the duration of the course was intended to be 3 months, in the Military Students' School one year.

The following subjects were taught in most of these schools: tactics, rifle firing, training as instructors, topography, military engineering. Towards the end of the course war games and then manoeuvres were projected.

Officers ranking from Major to Colonel, who were in the Higher Officers' School did not receive previously any military education and obtained their commissions for services rendered. Direct method of teaching

was used in this School. Officers studied very conscientiously and took great interest in their studies. This School, in view of the theoretical unpreparedness of officers, was actually a primary school.

There were three squadrons (companies) in the Cavalry School: one for officers and two for non-commissioned officers. The establishment in this school of a machine gun company and of an artillery platoon was projected, but for technical reasons was not put into effect. Training schedules were prepared weekly. The chief work in connection with the training was carried on by the Chinese under the supervision of "foreign" instructors.

Originally it was intended to send battery commanders to the Artillery School. Actually, however, platoon commanders, as candidates for posts of battery commanders, were sent. There were in the school Russian 3-inch guns and German 75 m.m. guns for training purposes.

At the beginning there was a Machine gun section in the Artillery School, but later it was reorganized into a separate Machine gun School.

The Military Students' School was divided into seven companies. Its aim was to make military students pass through all phases and stages of military training.

Officers were trained not in schools only.

Lectures in artillery tactics were delivered to officers of the artillery brigade under the direction of "foreign" instructors.

In the 2nd cavalry brigade, on the initiative of the brigade commander, tactical studies for officers were organized under the direction of foreign instructors.

Thirty officers graduated from the Senior Officers' School; in addition, eight officers left this school before completing the course (altogether 38 officers). The majority of graduates received good posts; a

number were appointed brigade or regimental commanders.

Seventy officers and 170 non-commissioned officers graduated from the Cavalry School.

114 graduates left the Artillery School. Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the students were enlisted men and only a small number of them were officers they received such a good training in this school that most of them were appointed battalion or battery commanders and only a few of them were appointed platoon commanders.

One hundred forty graduates left the Machine gun School. They are well trained as to firing and know how to take apart and set up again machine guns of different models.

There were no regular courses of instruction in the Engineering School and the Communication School. The students of these schools succeeded only in mastering elementary methods of building fortifications.

There were sixty students in the Counter-espionage School.

The School for "special fighting groups" was intended for one hundred men, but only fourteen graduated and were then sent into the rear of Chang Tso-lin.

The Military Students' School functioned for about two months, but was closed by Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang just before the war broke out. Students were sent to infantry, artillery and machine gun units. There is some ground to suspect that the real cause of the closing of this school was the fear of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang that this school would afterwards become a "nursery" of agitators who would act in a spirit undesirable for Feng Yü-hsiang.

War Preparedness of the First Kuominchün.

The military operations around Tientsin were a sort of " test " for the 1st Kuominchün and a good school from which it could derive some useful lessons. Around Tientsin it came into collision with some of the best army units of the Mukden group. These military operations, on one hand, revealed all the defects of the higher command of the 1st Kuominchün army, the lack of a proper organisation as to administering and directing the troops, the poor preparedness of its generals as regards tactics, the inability of coordinating the functions of the different branches of the army and the insufficient preparedness of army units as regards manoeuvering.

On the other hand, these military operations showed that Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang had been quite right in introducing a new and more rational method of training for his troops, officers as well as enlisted men,because even such little knowledge which the troops had succeeded in acquiring within the short period of training in accordance with "new methods",produced great results. The artillery fire, according to the testimony of eye-witnesses, was well directed and effective. Commanders who had received instruction in school under the guidance of foreign instructors, began to put in practice their newly acquired knowledge and this circumstance also yielded some positive results.

Below is given the description,by a competent eye-witness of military operations around Tientsin,of the methods relating to the administration and the direction of the troops of the 1st Kuominchün.

Organisation and Methods of Administration in the 1st Kuominchün.

What strikes the eye-witness most is the poor preparedness of the higher command (for instance, of General Chang Chih-kiang, Commander-in-chief on the Tientsin front) for the administration and direction of large masses of troops. Around Tientsin, for instance, large masses of troops,

about 60,000 bayonets, operated. As to means and methods of administration and direction, however, those actually used were perhaps adequate for a brigade but not for larger units.

The majority of the Chinese generals have some dim notion as to the necessity of having "main" forces and "secondary" forces, which corresponds to a certain extent to the idea as to the "main" and the "auxiliary" blow. No systematic study of the terrain exists. The value of the terrain is appreciated only in accordance with former experience and memories of previous military operations. In most cases the grouping of forces is only insufficiently adapted to the terrain. The reconnoitering work in army units is organized very poorly and the information obtained through it usually does not go beyond the limits of the unit which sent out the reconnoitering party. In view of all these circumstances the troops very often meet with unexpected local obstacles.

On account of the poor training of the Chinese generals (among whom, however, there are very intelligent and clever men), operations are often conceived if not poorly, at least without a finishing touch. In most cases the Chinese generals keep in mind the nearest objectives of action, but have no perspective as to further operations. For instance, in the order issued by Gen. Chang Chih-kiang in connection with the projected offensive movement the occupation of five villages was indicated as a mission, but nothing was said as to what the troops were to do following this occupation. This explains the fact that after the occupation of Tientsin the enemy was not pursued. The so-called "exploitation of the victory" was thus absent.

As regards <u>the evaluation of the enemy forces</u> and <u>the collection of information relating to them</u>, the commanders are very little troubled about the almost complete absence of data. They consider it quite possible and, perhaps, even normal to base themselves upon such obscure information, as that "the enemy is in such and such region". Generally speaking, <u>the organization of the reconnaissance work is very poor.</u> Each army unit employs its own agents who work on its behalf. General centralization in this respect and the comparison of data obtained through different reconnoitering

agents do not exist. Each commander has his own agents just as other units employ their own.

From what has been said it must become manifest that even the commanders of large units, such as divisions and brigades are quite helpless in so far as military operations are concerned. There is no reciprocal coordinated action on the part of those large units; they only try to fall into a line. As a result, they are not united in a single common objective of action and, in view of the fact that the general situation is not sufficiently clear to them, they are always afraid of getting into a scrape.

This helplessness as regards military operations emanates to a considerable degree also from the fact that the apparatus of the army administration and the organization and means of communication are absolutely not commensurate with the large army masses which are at the disposal of the Chinese Commanders. These masses of troops are armed with up to date means of warfare and, in consequence, have a tendency to spread out on a wide front, particularly the more so, because they are afraid of being outflanked. Means of communication, however, have no single centralized organization in the army (they are in the so-called "technical regiment"). This organization, together with the staff, is improvised, depending on the information obtained by the army after the declaration of war and the out - break of hostilities.

It is another great defect of the Chinese Commanders that they do not understand the role of the staff and staff work. The staff is only the personal office of the commander who strives to display his authority as regards command. There can be no question as to the creative elaboration by the staff of the decision rendered by the commander. It seems that no such problem is even given the staff. Its usual task is to write out an order in strict conformity with the directions of the commander.

Military operations around Tientsin were also characterized by the absence of a unified command, because three Generals (Chang Chih-kiang, Sung Che-yüan and Li Ming-chung) were present there, each of whom displayed a tendency for centralization. Thus the commander-in-chief (Gen. Chang Chih-

kiang) at best could only try to coordinate actions, but could not act as a commander with full powers. A very poor orientation on the part of each general towards the other two ensued as a result. For instance, for days Gen. Chang Chih-kiang did not know, what was done in the army of Gen. Li Ming-chung etc. Only those directives which were sent out from Kalgan by the Tu-pan, served to a considerable degree as a means for coordination.

Staffs proved to be nothing else but organizations without any definite form. Being only a personal office of the commander (even as such they were improvised only after the outbreak of war), they were correspondingly characterized by the absence both of a clear-cut organization of the staff apparatus itself and of a precise distribution of functions and duties between staff officers. The latter were rather orderlies attached to the commander than real chiefs of sections (it seems, however, that there were not even sections in the staffs). Only the Chief of staff enjoyed a certain influence with the Commander, but strove to display in his work the same authoritativeness, as the latter.

The technique of the staff work and the training of staff officers are apparently not high and are quite commensurate with the command. Not only the general idea of the intended operation is very often not stated definitely in the order, but the troops are also not informed definitely as to the place and time of the operations. There are no demarcation lines and limits for the movements and for coordination of actions. This is of course the fault of the commanders.

No general reports including data as to the reconnaitering work and military operations are made. In their place there exists in the army, since the outbreak of hostilities (even since the offensive move on the part of Sun Ch'uan-fang), a very poorly compiled general information. This information often consists of unarranged material, such as newspaper articles, agents' reports, radio news etc., and is therefore not easy to digest, especially if one takes into consideration that frequently sources of information are not quoted, their reliability is not indicated, their value as estimated by the commanders is not mentioned, conclusions are absent etc.

General conclusions on questions pertaining to the army administration.

Principal conclusion: Commanders and their staffs, their preparedness and organization, means of communication and their organization, in a word the whole administrative apparatus of the army is totally inadequate with the great army masses, the needs and requirements of which it is supposed to serve. This apparatus is out of date as regards its proper development and is insufficient for the large army masses which are scattered on a large front. The unsound tendency of the Chinese higher command for centralization only serves to stifle the personal initiative of the commanders of separate army units. Actually, however, it is impossible to put this centralization into real practice. Thus centralization is not attained, but personal initiative of individual commanders is stifled. This system leads to the following results:

1. The unity of command was practically non-existent, the more so because individual influential generals displayed a tendency for independence (this circumstance still aggravated the situation).

2. The uninterruptedness (continuity) as regards army administration was absent. This was principally the result of the lack of means of communication or of the poor organization of them.

3. As the commander who has met with a failure still tries to make a report about it and sometimes in an exaggerated form, partial failures lead often to the revocation of a previously taken decision and, as a result, a new decision is made in haste. This again leads to a certain chaos in connection with the carrying out of a military operation.

Thus under actual conditions which prevail now in China, there can be no question about such matters, as the preparation of a military operation in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, in the sense of the creation of a single and well thought out idea, a proper regulation with regard to written orders, a persevering and consequent carrying out of an operation etc. The importance of all sorts of contrivances, intrigues, political combinations, machinations etc. is still very great and these factors prevent

the Chinese commanders from paying due and serious attention to proper calculations as laid down in the plan for the military operation. From the above it does not follow of course that it is not worth while to aim at the proper organization with regard to the army administration and direction, i.e. to the command and to the staffs. On the contrary, it is most urgently necessary to do it and, probably, that one of the Chinese military groups which will take a proper course in this respect and will be able to carry out adequate measures of a reorganising character, will obtain greater advantages as regards the proper direction and handling of troops (which has not the least importance in military matters).

Under the existing conditions, some definite, and of course a proper, organization of the army administration is required most urgently. So far, however, it is non-existent. It is generally known that in order to attain this object it is necessary:

1. To give an adequate preparatory training and education to the would-be military commanders.

2. To organize properly, relatively speaking, of course, staffs and to procure a trained personnel for them. It is necessary to establish a "staff service school".

3. To extend the communication service in the army. For that purpose communication troops must be detached from the so-called "technical regiments", in order to form an independent net in the army organism. Such consolidated organization of communication troops will unquestionably give a proper technical basis to the apparatus of the army administration.

Besides, and this must be done in the very near future, it is necessary to try:

1. In case hostilities break out again, to form a Military Council of those very generals each of whom was until now a de facto commander.

2. To provide adequate means of communication and transportation at least for the apparatus of army administration.

Infantry in Action.

As has been already pointed out the units which constituted the 1st Kuominchün went to war still accustomed to their old tactical ways. When in positions, the troops were evenly spread out along the whole front, thus displaying their fear of organising a strong "fist" at the expense of the secondary sections of the front. Skirmish lines were too deep and rectilinear. The adaptation to the terrain and the proper utilization of it were a rare phenomenon. A strong tendency for gathering in companies was easily observed in the troops. The rifle fire was unsatisfactory (all Chinese armies are very poorly trained in this respect), i.e. not well-aimed; the direction of fire was not satisfactory enough and fire discipline was very poor. The infantry man, as a fighter, is enduring, cool-headed and brave enough and, when wounded, bears his sufferings with surprising patience.

Generally speaking, military operations demonstrated that army units, on a whole, were trained very poorly as regards tactics and that a long preparatory training on rational lines was absolutely necessary, in order to be able to utilize the troops to their full capacity.

Use of Machine Guns.

The use of machine guns was in most cases inefficacious. The experience in this respect revealed that machine gun crews were trained very poorly. Cases when machine guns did not work at all occured quite frequently. Commanders of infantry units only insufficiently utilized the full value of machine guns. Flank fire was used in rare cases and even when used, mostly without any effect.

Cavalry.

Cavalry of course could not as yet act as a "real" cavalry. It was in reality rather "mounted infantry". The proper training of cavalry is a very intricated matter and within the short period of time which the cavalry of the 1st Kuominchün had at its disposal, it was difficult to do

something more in this respect. During the Tientsin and the subsequent military operations the absence of efficient higher commanders of cavalry was felt very strongly. Cavalry was quite a new branch of the service in the 1st Kuominchün army and therefore the overwhelming majority of cavalry commanders belonged to the infantry, beginning from the Commander of the cavalry corps and Commander of the 1st cavalry division Gen. Sung Che-yüan who formerly was commander of the 11th infantry division. The high command of the whole army group demonstrated its inability to utilize cavalry properly and on rational lines. Generally speaking, the cavalry of the 1st Kuominchün could not act as "cavalry" during the war of 1925-1926. When at times it took part in the fighting it did it as an infantry. (Concerning cavalry in action during the recent war cf. the report "Cavalry of the 1st Kuominchün Army" by comrade Solovieff).

Artillery.

Artillery made great progress as regards firing. It is well trained and its fire is in most cases well directed and effective. It is bold in action and capable of self-sacrifice in order to accomplish some common mission. In many cases artillery was the last to retreat under the enemy rifle fire directed from a close range. The majority of batteries fired from open or semi-covered positions. Those batteries which made an attempt to fire from covered positions, fired at random, on account of the absence of technical means of communication and poor observation. Generally speaking, the artillery of the 1st Kuominchün, as an "accompanying" unit, revealed itself at its best. For the time being it would be difficult to require from it something more, "on account of circumstances which do not depend upon it", such as absence of technical means of communication, irregular and casual character of supplying with munitions, insufficient practice as regards firing from covered positions etc.

Armored Trains.

Actions of armored trains were bold and determined and their fire well-aimed. The part they played in general military operations was great

and in some instances of fighting it bore even a decisive character. In fighting the best armored trains of the enemy (from the White Russian Shantung Brigade) they were not at all inferior to the latter.

With the available data it is difficult to judge the relative superiority with regard to tactics of the two sides, i.e. the 1st Kuominchün and the Mukden army. The one fact only does not leave room for any doubt, namely that the 1st Kuominchün encountered in Li Ching-lin and his army a worthy enemy whose army in some respects, especially in the unity of command, technique of the army administration and better training of the officers in tactics, was even superior in fighting value. For making more definite and wider conclusions, however, the data which are available are insufficient, as they are both one-sided and not complete enough.

General Conclusion.

A. Economic resources which Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang has at his disposal are quite insufficient for the present numerical strength of the 1st Kuominchün (100,000 regular troops). The daily expenditure for its upkeep reaches 60,000 dollars. Taking into consideration the poverty and scarcity of the population in the territory under his jurisdiction, he cannot positively count upon the increase of his material resources, at least not in the near future. The recent war, on the one hand, caused a large increase of expenditures for the maintenance of the army and for the conduct of the war; on the other hand, it reduced considerably his revenues. Commerce fell into decay. Export of raw materials to Tientsin ceased altogether. Feng Yü-hsiang's own Bank which he had established at Kalgan, began to become financially unstable. Revenues from the Peking-Suiyüan Railway also decreased, as almost all of the time this railway was engaged in the transportation of troops and therefore the goods and passenger traffic had to cease.

The shortlived occupation of Tientsin was of very little financial use to Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang. Therefore the domination over the Metropolitan area, where he can "exercise his influence" upon the Central Government, i.e. to make use of the latter's revenues, and also of the revenues of the Metropolitan Area itself from which a minimum of $ 600,000 monthly is derived, is a vital question for the 1st Kuominchün, because the basic territory of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang (Special Administrative Areas of Chahar and Suiyüan and the Kansu province) is not able to produce the funds necessary for the upkeep of the army in its present numerical strength.

B. Leaders of the 1st Kuominchün have so far not yet revealed their real "political face". The non-conformity of their policy with these national revolutionary slogans which they have previously adopted, begins to deepen still more and more. We can quote such instances as the intention of Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang to start fighting "red principles"; letters of Generals Chang Chih-hsiang and Li Ming-chung referring to the education of youth; shooting of the revolutionary - minded youth at Peking, when the garrison consisted of Kuominchün units; the gradual penetration, in view of the weakness of Feng Yü-hsiang's economic resources, of the Japanese capital into the territory occupied by the 1st Kuominchün (creation of the Sino-Japanese Bank at Kalgan), which circumstance will undoubtedly influence the Kuominchün policy.

On the other hand, however, a certain discontent with the reactionary policy of the leaders of the 1st Kuominchün and a tendency to create in the army a real nucleus of the "people's army" can be observed now among some commanders. Their group, it is true, is still very weak and has as yet no definite form, but it took deep roots in the army and can therefore have a great future, because, in case Marshal Feng Yü-hsiang, Gen. Chang Chih-hsiang and others continue to carry on their reactionary policy and definitely break off all relations with the national revolutionary movement, this group will perhaps in the course of time head the real "Kuominchün" (i.e. people's army) elements in the army.

G. Notwithstanding, however, all its defects, as regards training for war, its armaments and the helplessness of its higher command, the 1st Kuominchun demonstrated during the recent war a/ that it has great fighting value, b/ that it is superior to its enemies as regards morale, c/ that it succeeded in winning the sympathy of the population (nothing of the kind happened to any other Chinese army in the past); d/ that it has many possibilities for its further development, provided, however, one very necessary condition is complied with: that is, if it establishes closer connections and throws in openly its lot with the national revolutionary movement of the great masses of the Chinese people.

The Second Kuominchün Army.

In comparison with the 1st Kuominchün, the 2nd Kuominchün Army is characterized by a great heterogeneousness. The commanders of separate units enjoy a very great independence which renders the work of administering and directing the army in accordance with some definite plan very difficult. At present the majority of the army consists of natives of the Shensi province which are grouped in units of their own. On account, however, of the losses in battles, of desertion and of the new levies, these units are becoming more and more mixed with natives of Honan. There are some brigades which formerly were part of Wu P'ei-fu's troops; their commanders still preserve their sympathy with the latter.

The "Army of State Restoration" of Fan Shih-ming, alias Fan Chung-hsiu, considers itself only as an "allied army", not at all subordinated to Yüeh Wei-chün. All arrangements concerning this "army" without exception, depend entirely upon Fan Shih-ming. Any kind of financial dependence of this army from Tupan Yüeh Wei-chün is not known. Among the troops of Fan Shih-ming there are several hundreds of Southerners. According to latest reports, which need verification, Fan Shih-ming's army has been re-organized into the sixth division.

Procurement of Enlisted Personnel. As regards methods employed in connection with the procurement of enlisted personnel, the 2nd Kuominchün Army does not in any way differ from other Chinese armies, particularly from Feng Yü-hsiang's army (see the report relating to the 1st Kuominchün). No reserves are available, nor are men specially trained for the purposes of replacement.

Officers' Personnel. As in Feng Yü-hsiang's army, the majority of officers in the 2nd Kuominchün obtained their commissions after serving in the ranks. The minority only consist of graduates of Chinese or foreign

military schools. There are no definite requirements or special regulations in this respect (see the report relating to the 1st Kuominchün).

Arms. Even approximate data relating to the quantity of arms which the 2nd Kuominchün has at its disposal, are not available, but as far as we know, about one third of enlisted men have no rifles at all.

More than ten models of rifles are in use for the armament of infantry, but the "Mauser" 8 m.m. rifle (manufactured in China) may be regarded as the standard rifle. Only battalions are equipped with rifles of one model: rifles used in regiments and divisions are of different models.

According to statements of many Chinese commanders of units, an average 200 to 400 cartridges are available per rifle.

There are very few machine guns in the 2nd Kuominchün. On an average there were not more than ten machine guns for a mixed brigade or even a division until the machine guns from Hupeh were received.

According to some reports, certain units have bombthrowers (minenwerfers).

Bodyguards of generals are equipped with "Mauser"pistols.

Most of the rifles are old, worn out and badly kept. A considerable percentage of cartridges are of an unsatisfactory make, many are damp and rusty.

The following arms and munitions have been recently received from Hupeh (September 1925): 5,000 (according to other reports, 10,000) rifles, cartridges and 100 machine guns of simple model (such as made by the Germans since 1918 for use in the position war), with fixed sights.

Japanese carabines are available in the cavalry; the number of sabres and spears is very small.

Artillery is also equipped with guns of different models. The following are more or less standard models: a/ "Krupp" 75 m.m., manufactured in Hanyang arsenal, b/ "Arisaka" 75 m.m. field guns, c/ Japanese 75 m.m. mountain guns. Some guns are of a smaller calibre: 37 m.m. and 57 m.m. There are also 6 quite new Japanese howitzers.

Arsenals. There are two arsenals in the Honan province for the manufacture and repair of arms.

A. Kaifengfu: Is capable of turning out a/ rifles, b/ machine guns, c/ spare parts for them, d/ spare parts for artillery, e/ rifle cartridges. It also can repair small arms and artillery materiel.

The monthly production of the arsenal is at present as follows: a/ about 130 rifles, original cost about $50 Mex.; b/ 500,000 cartridges, original cost 6 to 8 cents; c/ 4 to 5 machine guns and d/ about 30 "peels" of powder (about 1000 lbs.).

No sufficient data are available as to the maximum potential production capacity of this arsenal with its equipment. Provided, however, some small alterations are made with regard to the organization of work and some machines are replaced, the production of rifle cartridges may be increased by 20%.

B. Kunchsien (or Hsiao Yi, near Loyang): Can manufacture besides small arms and munitions artillery guns and shells. The producing capacity is unknown. It is superior, however, to that of the Kaifengfu Arsenal.

Actually not a single unit in the 2nd Kuominchün is up to standard both as regards organization and numerical strength. In many units the number of men and horses is below the standard (artillery guns are carried by men). As to artillery guns and machine guns, not only their number is usually below the standard, but in many units they are even totally lacking.

Characteristics of officers. Officers of the 2nd Kuominchün resemble in general, those in Feng Yü-hsiang's army (see the report relating to the 1st Kuominchün), but are considerably inferior to them as regards moral qualities. Officers of the 2nd Kuominchün are almost all opium smokers and pass their time in idleness. Training work in units is done by non - commissioned officers, who drill the men only in a dull and unimaginative manner. Embezzlement of government funds is very much in vogue. The authority and prestige of Tupan Yüeh Wei-chün do not stand high enough in the eyes of his subordinates. It appears that in the 2nd Kuominchün (therein

also like the difference between it and the 1st Kuominchün) officers do not value particularly their authority and prestige. There was a case, when in the presence of our instructors and several junior officers, the chief of staff of a brigade and the assistant to a regimental commander of the same brigade quarrelled and called each other fools.

Training for war. With the exception of those units in which our instructors are working, the work in connection with the training for war is about same as it was in the 1st Kuominchün army, before our instructors took charge of it.

Living conditions in the 2nd Kuominchün. Living conditions in the 2nd Kuominchün are, generally speaking, the same as in the 1st Kuominchün army, with the following differences: less care is taken of enlisted men; cruel punishments are often inflicted for insignificant offences; during training beating with bamboos is used quite freely; barracks in some units are kept in disorder and are very dirty; it is not known, whether soldiers are provided with bedding. Soldiers are also used for (civilian) work, but to a lesser extent than in the 1st Kuominchün army. They also do not receive their regular pay, and the discontent which arises in this connection is periodically allayed with the distribution of "pocket money". According to the statement of a certain quite reliable junior officer, the total cost of upkeep of a soldier, i.e. clothing, food and maintenance of barracks, is $27 to 31 Mex.

Only little attention is paid to such question as "education" of enlisted men. Whereas in the 1st Kuominchün army "christian sermons" are delivered for the benefit of soldiers and conferences for the discussion of political questions are held, in the 2nd Kuominchün army only "lessons of ethics" have been organized during which precepts of Chinese sages are read and soldiers are taught loyalty to their superiors.

Generally speaking, the 2nd Kuominchün army, especially in the economic sense, does not essentially differ from the armies of ordinary militarists of China and, only on account of several subjective causes, is in the camp of the enemies of Chang Tso-lin.

The Third Kuominchün Army.

Characteristics of Officers.

a/ Higher Command. According to the general opinion, higher officers of the 3rd Kuominchün Army, as regards their general and military development, are superior to generals of the 1st Kuominchün army. Almost all higher officers are graduates of different military schools, having taken part in recent Chinese civil wars, they have considerable fighting experience.

As regards political convictions, some are communists, some right Kuomintang men and others violent reactionaries (as for instance, Gen. Ho Sui).

In contrast with the generals of the 1st Kuominchün army, generals of the 3rd Kuominchün enjoy greater independence and submit to Gen. Sun Yüeh only with reservations.

b/ Senior and Junior Officers. Senior and junior officers approximately resemble those of the 1st Kuominchün army, but many of them have received their education in military schools. Besides, they are by far not so well-disciplined and so exacting towards their subordinates, as officers of the 1st Kuominchün. On the other hand, in the opinion of many persons, officers of the 3rd Kuominchün are much more cultured, than officers of the 1st and the 2nd Kuominchün armies.

Procurement of Officers' and Enlisted Personnel.

a/ Enlisted men. In contrast with the 1st Kuominchün army, soldiers for the 3rd Kuominchün were recruited from among all strata of the population, such as former Imperial guard, "Hunghutzu", "t'ufei" (bandits)

and the peasant youth. Natives of many provinces (Chihli, Shantung, Honan, Shensi etc.) serve in the 3rd Kuominchün army. There is no central organ in charge of the enlistment of volunteers (at least we could not discern the activity of an organ of such kind). On account of the weakness of the central army administration and of the great independence of military commanders, the enlistment of volunteers was done exclusively on the initiative of commanders of the units and out of their own funds. The staff headquarters of the army was only post factum informed that the enlistment of volunteers had been made by the commanders of the units; sometimes, however, it was not even informed at all.

The method used in connection with the enlistment of volunteers was the same as in other armies, only the terms of admission into the army were somewhat less strict as to guarantees. Special attention was paid to the physical fitness of volunteers.

On account of such indiscriminate system of recruiting and of the presence in the army of many old soldiers who "went through thick and thin", discipline among enlisted men is much more lax than in the 1st Kuominchün.

b/ Commanders. The procurement of commanders, both senior and junior, for the 3rd Kuominchün army bore a "haphazard" character. Officers were engaged among those temporarily out of employment who formerly had served in various units which for various reasons had been disbanded. The majority of officers in this army have received a theoretical training in various Chinese military schools and, as regards their military education, they are superior to the majority of officers of other Kuominchün armies. The 3rd Kuominchün army has no military schools of its own for the training of officers' personnel, although Gen. Sun Yüeh himself realizes the necessity of establishing such schools. There was recently a project of establishing a Students' school at Paotingfu, but it was afterwards put off, on account of recent events, such as the retreat of the army from the Tientsin Area.

Armament of the Third Manchuria Army.

a/ Infantry. Infantry is armed with rifles of many different models, mostly German and Japanese; there are also Russian and Italian rifles. 2/3 of rifles are of the "Mauser" model, manufactured in the Hanyang Arsenal. Many rifles are quite unserviceable. For instance, in the 3rd Mixed Brigade of the total number of rifles available (4,000) only one third, i.e. 1,000, are more or less serviceable (only 20%, i.e. 200, are really good). The same proportion as regards rifles can be also observed in other units.

There are 130 to 140 cartridges per rifle. Shortage of rifle cartridges is quite a usual phenomenon.

Machine guns. Only a small number of machine guns is available. There are different models of machine guns, but the majority are of "Maxim" and "Hotchkiss" models, most of them manufactured in the Hanyang arsenal. The majority of units have no machine guns at all. When available, they are concentrated in Machine gun Companies.

Minenwerfers (bombthrowers). There are minenwerfers in some brigades. For instance, in the 3rd mixed brigade there are minenwerfers in each regiment and in each cavalry company.

b/ Artillery. Artillery of the 3rd Kwominchun army is equipped with field and mountain guns. The majority are "Krupp" 75 m.m. Most guns are obsolete models. The number of guns in an artillery battalion varies from 4 to 9. 20 to 30 shells are available per gun. Artillery battalions have no combat trains. As to the transportation of munitions, both generally and during battles, artillery battalions organized it quite independently buying or requisitioning for that purpose means of transportation belonging to private owners.

c/ Cavalry. Most of the cavalry men are armed with carbines and rifles. Formerly they were equipped also with sabres and spears, but these were discarded, because they did not know how to handle them properly.

Supply Service in the Third Kuominchün Army.

1. The question relating to the supplying of the 3rd Kuominchün army with all necessities is an extremely indefinite and enigmatic one. This army has no arsenals or repair shops of its own, because it does not occupy territory permanently. It also has no funds to buy arms, munitions, foodstuffs and forage, because it has no regular sources of revenue. Its revenues are very problematical and indefinite.

As regards supplies the 3rd Kuominchün was always dependent either on the 2nd or the 1st Kuominchün.

2. We could not clear up the question relating to the organization of supply organs. During the recent war district magistrates (Chih - hsien) were often held responsible for the upkeep of the units of the 3rd Kuominchün army stationed within the borders of their respective districts (as, for instance, the 3rd and the 15th mixed brigades in the Paoting district).

During military operations army units usually took foodstuffs and forage from the local population, but by what methods and on what terms, could not be found out. But generally speaking, the fact has been established with certainty that the supply service of units with regard to forage and foodstuffs was most unsatisfactory.

3. The accoutrement and the equipment in the 3rd Kuominchün was poor.

4. The munition supply was poor. Shortage of shells and rifle cartridges was always felt.

5. Army units had no transportation service of their own and generally used privately owned carts for the transportation of army property and of munitions during battle.

6. At present on account of the loss of bases (Shensi, Paotingfu area, Tientsin), the condition as regards supplies of the 3rd Kuomin - chün army as a whole and of its separate units borders on catastrophe.

Condition of the Third Kuominchün Army.

Discipline. Discipline of enlisted men and officers of the 3rd Kuominchün is not strict enough. Cases of looting, desertion, violence to the local population and failure to execute orders of superior officers are routine matters.

This is chiefly explained by the absence of a proper system for the regular and sufficient supply of troops with necessities and the poor quality of the personnel. It has been pointed out above that in connection with the procurement of enlisted men for the army there were no strict or definite regulations relating to selection of recruits and therefore many most undesirable elements entered the 3rd Kuominchün.

It is quite natural that, under fighting conditions, when the supply service is inadequate and done in a haphazard manner, it is difficult to preserve and to maintain discipline in the units which are filled with such "elements". Commanders also quite realize this fact. For instance, when a foreigner pointed out that looting of the population which was frequently done by men belonging to the 8th mixed brigade, would finally lead to a complete demoralization and disorganization, Gen. Meng, commander of this brigade, answered that "he himself realized all this perfectly well, but could not do anything, because he was not able to supply his troops with all necessities". Therefore other commanders also wink at such cases, as looting of the local population etc.

During the recent retreat some units lost all vestige of discipline, disobeyed their superior officers, and more resembled armed bandits, than military units.

Officers and enlisted men are not welded into a single whole. Officers constantly quarrel among themselves for posts or on account of party dissensions. For instance, in the 3rd mixed brigade a serious struggle is going on between officers-communists and officers who are partisans of Wu P'ei-fu. Generally speaking, this tendency of favoring Wu P'ei-fu is developed very strongly among officers of the 3rd Kuominchün. When at the

beginning of 1926 Wu P'ei-fu entered again the arena of struggle among Chinese militarists, all units without exception sent their representatives to greet him - perhaps more as a measure of "precaution for all possibilities". The higher command does not enjoy any particular popularity among enlisted men and officers.

In some units (in the 1st and the 3rd regiments of the 3rd mixed brigade) there are nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party. Both officers and enlisted men are members of these nuclei.

War Preparedness of the Third Kuominchün.

There are no concise data available as to the preparatory training of the 3rd Kuominchün army as regards tactics, but on account of the fact that it had no permanent territory of its own and was compelled constantly to pass from one place to another: from Paotingfu to Honan, from Honan to Shensi and then again to Hsch'ang, Tientsin, Peking etc., it had practically no time to pay attention to the preparatory training of troops. During the whole period of its existence it actually had no "peace time": expulsion from Paotingfu by Li Ching-lin, struggle against bandits in Honan, conquest of Shensi and the war of 1925-26.

Military operations around Hsch'ang in December, 1925 and again in February - March, 1926 demonstrated that <u>the training of the army units was poor in all respects</u>. Both infantry and artillery fire was unsatisfactory and machine guns which were available were not fully utilised. Even a relative unity of command was non-existent. Every brigade commander acted just as he liked. When an important mission had been set for the 2nd reserve brigade of Gen. Hu Te-fu, namely the securing of the rear of the northern group (the 2nd and the 3rd armies) in the direction of Tsehow from where the Shantung army started its offensive movement, this General Hu Te-fu contrived somehow to move during two days a distance of only 17 "versts" (about 19 kilometres), i.e. he actually did not execute the order of the

commander of group.

During the offensive movement of Gen.Li Ching-lin against Ho-ch'ang in February, 1926, the units of the 3rd Kuominchün army definitely proved that they had no fighting value at all. They were not able to show the enemy the least resistance and retreated in the greatest disorder. Whole brigades retreated under the pressure of even small mounted patrols of the enemy. As to cavalry of the 3rd Kuominchün army, it caused only panic among its own troops.

According to the latest reports, units of the 3rd Kuominchün army have lost all capacity of fighting and are in need of a thorough reorganization.

Below is given the evaluation of the 3rd Kuominchün as made by a foreign instructor, who was eye-witness of the recent military operations of this army.

"During my stay with the troops of the 3rd Kuominchün, I had the opportunity of studying to a certain extent the organization, living conditions and general arrangements relating to this army and became acquainted with officers' and enlisted personnel and with the technique of the army.

My observations made during military operations permit me, firstly, to make certain conclusions concerning both good qualities and defects of units and, secondly, to propose several measures calculated to increase the fighting value of this army.

1. Generals of the 3rd Kuominchün army (Gen.Hu, Chief of staff; Gen. Ts'ao, Chief of operation section; Gen.Meng, Commander of the 6th brigade; Gen. K'ung, Commander of the 7th brigade, and Gen. Hsü, Commander of the 1st division) made a very good impression on me. For instance, during a one hour conversation with Gen.Hsü I gradually came to the conclusion that he is a very clever and very quiet worker, capable of deep reflection. His method of thinking with reference to military operations is very clear and proper. He understands very quickly the idea of his interviewer. Apparently he is quite foreign to unnecessary ceremoniousness and idle talk.

Generally speaking, I consider generals of the 3rd Kuominchün as being considerably superior to generals of the 1st Kuominchün army.

2. The rest of the officers' personnel is approximately the same, as regards their standard, as in the 1st Kuominchün, but officers in the 3rd Kuominchün are considerably less disciplined and less smoothing towards their subordinates.

3. Enlisted men have excellent fighting qualities, but for many reasons their fighting value is reduced to a minimum.

4. The organization of units is extremely confused. The following are the most salient points in this respect:

a/ There is only one division (because division, as an organization comprising smaller units, such as brigades, is non-existent) and therefore there are too many commanders who are subordinated to the chief of staff of the division.

b/ A brigade consists of two infantry regiments and of artillery, engineer and cavalry battalions. Brigades are not strong enough.

c/ A regiment consists of two infantry battalions and of machine gun and minenwerfer companies. Battalions are small as to numerical strength. The regiment is bulky and difficult to administer.

d/ A cavalry brigade is composed of 300 combatants. All the rest of cavalry is attached to infantry brigades, as cavalry battalions.

5. The supply service is organized very poorly. Soldiers are badly equipped as to clothing and poorly armed. Shortage of foodstuffs and of rifle cartridges is quite a usual phenomenon. The supply service generally is a very haphazard matter. In most brigades there is no regular transportation service. As an exception only the 1st division has some motor trucks.

6. Means of communication are quite insufficient. Regiments, batteries and brigades are not connected by telephone wires and are not provided with telephone sets. Such means of communication, as motor cars and bicycles, are also lacking. Communication between brigades and army staff headquarters is maintained by radio and by mounted messengers; between

brigade staff headquarters and regiments as well as smaller units by foot and mounted messengers.

7. The preparatory training of officers' and enlisted personnel for war is quite insufficient. The morale of troops is poor both on account of the bad supply service and the recent failures at the front. Discipline among the troops is lax (looting, panic). Disciplinary punishments are hardly inflicted at all, although officers enjoy the same authority with regard to the infliction of punishments for breach of discipline, as officers in the 1st Kuominchün.

It is necessary to undertake a long and tedious job in order to make the 3rd Kuominchün a real fighting force. Under the present conditions, when fighting is still going on, such work is of course impossible. But it is necessary, in my opinion, to carry out the following measures immediately:

1. As far as possible to replace those units of the 3rd Kuominchün which are at the front now, and to move them to the rear.

2. To reorganise army units moved to the rear, particularly regiments and brigades, in accordance with the scheme of organisation which is in use now in the 1st Kuominchün army, and by all means organise them into divisions. To add half a squadron of cavalry to each regiment and to transfer the rest of cavalry into the cavalry brigade (army cavalry).

3. To make "a cleaning" of officers' and enlisted personnel. For that purpose, to remove from the army those elements which are demoralised, ill disciplined and subject to panic.

4. To provide equipment (clothing) and rifle cartridges for reorganised units and to establish for them a supply organ with a regular supply service.

5. To supply army units, such as regiments, batteries and brigades, with means of telephone communication.

6. As the methods of education and mutual relations between officers and enlisted men in the 3rd Kuominchün are much more democratic than in the 1st Kuominchün army, I consider that, parallel with the

introduction of a rigid discipline and of punishments for breach of discipline, such as inflicted in the 1st Kuominchün, it will be quite expedient and opportune to introduce also in the 3rd Kuominchün army the system of regimental political instructors, selected from among Kuomintang men.

THE WHAMPOA MILITARY SCHOOL.

(A report compiled from a number of lengthy reports on the Whampoa School found among Soviet Documents, which were taken from the Office of the Soviet Military Attaché during the raid of April 6,1927)

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THE WHAMPOA MILITARY SCHOOL.

Introduction.

The political and military Soviet advisers who in 1923 arrived in Canton found themselves confronted with the typically Chinese lack of organization in all organs of the Government. Well aware of the fact that in order to accomplish their ultimate purpose, they first of all had to put the Kuomintang Government on a firm basis, and that this could be done only with the aid of a well organized and disciplined armed force, they started with the reorganization of the so-called Kuomintang Army which consisted of a number of Army Corps - and smaller units - under the command of more or less independent militarists. The first step in the reorganization was the establishment in the spring of 1924 of a military School at Whampoa, which was called "The Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton". As nucleus for this School the 1st Army Corps was chosen and General Chiang Kai-shih, the Commander of this Corps and a close adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, was made the head of the School. The avowed purpose of the School was to supply to the Revolutionary Army well trained junior officers, who were "politically conscious and devoted to the revolutionary cause". This School had in October 1924 about 1000 cadets.

The Whampoa School must be considered as having been founded by Soviet Russia. Not only was the idea of organizing this school conceived in the first place by Soviet advisers, who prepared the regulations and did everything else in connection with its organization, but the Soviet Government also furnished the necessary equipment and certain financial subsidies. In a report entitled "The dvelopment of the Canton Government" the Senior Soviet adviser states: "This School was in the beginning kept up with our (Soviet Russia) funds." Later in a letter dated March 17,1925 from Moscow to the Soviet Military Attaché it states in reference to this School:" Galen (the Senior Military adviser) has been given 100,000 roubles for the upkeep

of the Whampoa School for two months. As to further subsidies of Whampoa a definite estimate must be submitted".

Besides the Whampoa School which, properly speaking, was the school of the 1st Army Corps, individual commanders of other army corps were still maintaining their own army corps schools. In January, 1926, however, the Military Council of the National Revolutionary Army issued an order as to the organization of the Sole or Central Military Political School. In consequence of that order, all army corps schools became subject to gradual liquidation, and all their commanding, political and instructor personnel as well as all property were handed over to the Central School. The school of the 1st army corps, the so-called Whampoa School, being the best of the army corps schools, was taken as a basis for the organization of the Central School. The object of the consolidation was "by concentrating all forces and funds, to consolidate and to make uniform the training of the junior officers of all branches of the service and of the political personnel of the National Revolutionary Army".

The Central Military Political School was opened on March 8th, 1926, and in October of the same year the 4th graduation took place, when 2,500 new troop officers, graduates of this School, joined the National Revolutionary Army.

The 5th enrollment of cadets was completed in January, 1927. These newly enrolled cadets, 2,650 in all, finished their training in July, 1927, and were then ordered to come to Nanking to report for duty.

In May 1927. Chiang Kai-shih, then Commander in Chief of the Kuomintang Army, intended to transfer the Whampoa School to Nanking so as to bring it under his immediate personal control. The School was to be called the Nanking Military Academy with Chiang Kai-shih himself as director and Gen. Niu Yung-chien, who is considered a good military man and who at one time under Feng Yü-hsiang was the head of the North Western Military Academy, a dean of the Academy.

The resignation of Gen. Chiang Kai-shih from all his posts put an end to all projects as regards a Military Academy, but now, with the re-

turn of Gen. Chiang to the south and his possible ascendency to power, this project will probably be revived again.

It is generally believed that the School owed its success to the organizing genius and thoroughness of the Soviet advisers and to the fact that more than 80% of the cadets were young peasants of the Chekiang province. Gen. Chiang Kai-shih, himself a native of this province, made it a point that the majority of the future officers must be his fellow provincials who he knew would stand by him in time of need. Consequently most of the higher officers in the National Revolutionary Army were Whampoa graduates who hailed from Taichow, Chichow and the other hilly districts of Chekiang. These men were young, hardy and dependable, and they proved so faithful to their cause and leader that two thirds of them have been killed in action. It is true that a few of these graduates have turned against Chiang Kai-shih and are now fighting on the side of T'ang Sheng-chih and Chang Fa-kwei, but all these are not Chekiang men, and they were never very friendly towards Chiang Kai-shih, even when at Whampoa.

Description of the School.

We find the following description of the School, under the title "The premises and the interior arrangement" and "The Armament", in the report of Zigon, the Deputy Senior Adviser of the Central Military Political School at Whampoa, dated October 30th, 1926:

"The premises, most of which are located on the island Whampoa, were occupied by the remaining cadets and the servants and upon inspection were found in perfect order. On the other hand, the premises which were vacant since the departure of the cadets to Saho (where field-exercises were being conducted prior to two day manoeuvers), were in the greatest disorder. The furniture was scattered about in the rooms and the floor was covered with rubbish. The class rooms which were inspected, were found to be very much neglected. The furniture was scattered and they were filled with rubbish. No school equipment was to be seen except boxes with sand which looked rather like dust bins than like "sand boxes". When questioned the

officers who accompanied us, replied that these boxes were used for teaching tactics (terrain-boards). As to school equipment and books, matters stood very badly, and the officers themselves said that there was almost no equipment at all in the School. In the store rooms for sapper implements the latter were lying on shelves in disorder and standing dirty in a corner.

The School was mostly armed with Russian 3-line rifles manufactured at the American factory "Remington". The rifles were new, but not kept sufficiently clean. Rust could be observed on the metal parts. The cartridges were never cleaned. Some of the stocks of the rifles were broken. The machine gunners were armed with Russian "Maxim" machine guns which were not kept sufficiently clean and in good order. The cadets in general did not know how to handle Russian arms. Not only the cadets, but even officers were not acquainted with the sight. At target practice an officer asked whether the Russian sight was calculated in steps or meters. The commander of the 1st regiment complained that in his regiment the chambers of some rifles had burst during the shooting, and I replied that such cases might happen, when the bullet or the barrel in general were not kept clean. As far as I know, such accidents had happened also in the Russian army with the Remington rifles manufactured in 1918. In order to find out the reason for it, a commission had been appointed, which found that there had been overtempering during the manufacturing."

A. Kuomintang Military School at Whampoa. 1924-1926.

The detailed organization of the Kuomintang Military School at Whampoa during the first two years of its existence, i.e. in 1924-1926, was provided for in the "Regulations of the Military School for Officers of the National Guard in Canton" which were prepared by Soviet advisers in the first half of 1924.

(These regulations were in English and extracts are given here with only the most necessary corrections. As most of the Soviet advisers spoke only Russian, and very few Chinese spoke Russian, orders, instructions etc., were first written in Russian, then translated by Russians into English, and from the English by Chinese into Chinese. It may be imagined, how much the originals lost in these translations by usually very incompetent translators.)

Object of the School.

The Military School is established for the training of junior officers of infantry, and its cardinal object is to prepare good combat officers with a good political education, viz. revolutionary military men (Art. 2).

Duration of the course.

The School course is fixed at six months (Art. 2).

Military education.

The military education at the School is divided into two parts: the teaching and training or theory and practice. The greatest attention must be paid to field service, i.e. how to direct troops on the battlefield. Politically the cadet who graduates, must be able to explain to the soldiers the idea and the principles of the Kuomintang Party and the political situation in China (Art. 5).

Cadets.

The cadets of the school must consist of volunteers of the whole country, principally of youths of the age from 18 to 25 who are gra-

duates of middle school or have qualifications equal to it, and of military men, viz. literate soldiers and non-commissioned officers. Members of the Kuomintang Party or its sympathizers are preferred. All applicants who wish to enter the School, must be examined by the special committee appointed by the Generalissimo (Art. 3).

Before entrance the cadets must give their written consent to submit to all rules and regulations of the School (Art. 6).

The cadet must fulfil promptly the orders and instructions of his commanding officer except when it is evident that it is treachery which he must immediately report to the Chief of the School (Art. 7).

The cadets must live at the School (Art. 11) and are supplied with everything, such as clothes, food, stationery etc. (Art. 10).

The cadets are in the military service and receive pay, the scale of which is determined by the Generalissimo. A part of their pay is deducted for their food and the rest is given them for their extra expenses (Art. 12).

After completing the School course, the cadets must pass examinations which are given by a committee of high military men and political workers appointed by the Generalissimo (Art. 13).

The graduates of the School receive diplomas as second lieutenants and are obliged to be in the Government service one year for every two months they have been at school. They have no right to resign without the special permission of the Government and their appointments must be approved by the Generalissimo or by another head of the Government (Art. 14).

Chief of the School.

The Generalissimo is the Chief of the Military School for officers of the National Guard in Canton (Art. 1).

Officers and their duties.

The officers of the school must be military men who are educated and experienced in command of troops. The instructors must be well educated military men. They must follow in the training and teaching the directions of the Generalissimo or persons appointed by him (Art. 4).

The duties of various officers and officials of the School are as follows:

The Assistant Chief or Second in Command of the School is subordinated directly to the Generalissimo. He receives from the Generalissimo orders and instructions and must carry them out and also report to him all the affairs of the School. He controls and instructs officials and functionaries of the school who all are subordinated to him. He manages the affairs of the school and is responsible of the whole state of it (Art.17, a/).

The Chief of the Political Department is appointed by the President of the Kuomintang Party and is subordinated directly to him. According to his instructions, he controls the political life of the school, directs the political education of the officers and cadets, instructs the lecturers on political subjects and is responsible for the whole political life of the Kuomintang group and the representative of the Party in the School. He countersigns all the orders of the Assistant Chief of the School, and should he refuse to countersign an order, this order must be reconsidered by the Generalissimo and the President of the Kuomintang Party (Art.17, b/), and note at the end).

The Chief Training officer must be a good military man well experienced in command of troops and not less than a regimental commander. He receives the instructions from the Assistant Chief of the School as to how to train and drill the cadets, and carries these out. He directs the commanding officers, instructs and trains them himself and is generally responsible for the whole military training of the School (Art.17, c/).

The Chief of the Department of Instruction (Educational Dept.) or the Chief Instructor must be an officer with a high military education. In accordance with the instructions from the Assistant Chief of the School, he works out all plans of training and teaching the commanding officers and cadets, prepares training schedules and gives them for verification and approval to the Assistant Chief. He controls the lectures and is responsible for all military educational affairs of the School (Art.17, d/).

The Chief of the Administrative Department or the Chief of Staff manages all administrative affairs of the School. He keeps the service

records of officers and cadets and the muster roll of the School and manages the correspondence with governmental organs and the statistics of the School. He reports daily to the Assistant Chief of the School the number of cadets, officers etc., prepares projects of the orders of the day and gives him these for verification and signature, after which they are to be multiplied and sent to all necessary places. He controls the safekeeping of all documents of the School, of the archives etc., directs the guards and is generally responsible for all administrative affairs of the School. (Art. 17, e/).

The Chief of the Sanitary Department or the Chief Surgeon, who must be a doctor of medicine, controls the sanitation of the School and the state of health of the officers, cadets etc., he manages the hospital and the dispensary of the School and is generally responsible for all its sanitary conditions (Art. 17, f/).

The Chief of the Supply Department or the Military Commissary (Intendant) of the School takes care of all supplies, money etc. He must obtain everything on time, controls the correct and economic expenditure and also the regular accounting and inspects the buildingd and takes care of their cleanliness and order. He controls and directs all work of the supplying and is generally responsible for the whole economic state of the School, (Art. 17, g/).

Lecturers and instructors in political subjects are subordinated to the Chief of the Political Department and carry out his instructions. They must prepare beforehand their lectures and give them to the Chief of the Political Department for verification and approval. According to the schedule of instructors, they must deliver lectures to the cadets as well as to the officers in political subjects and also take part in all political work of the School.

Lecturers and instructors in military subjects must have a good military education to be able to deliver lectures and to explain their subjects to cadets successfully. They are directly subordinated to the Chief of the Department of Instruction and must prepare their lectures beforehand and give him them for examination. According to the schedule, they must deliver lectures in military subjects to officers and cadets and also instruct

them, how to carry out these subjects in practice. They are obliged to be present, when their subjects are practised in the field, in order to inspect and direct these practical exercises (Art.17, h/).

Commanding officers must have a good practice in commanding troops, in order to be able to train and drill the cadets successfully. They must see that their troops are in the best of conditions as regards discipline and order, that the cadets are supplied with all they need at the time and that they are working successfully. They must be all the time among them to help them in their work, to explain what they do not understand etc. They must report daily to their senior the progress of the cadets, their living conditions, the state of their health, their conduct, their needs etc.

Battalion commanders are directly subordinated to the Chief Training Officer and carry out his instructions as to training and teaching according to the order of the day. They report to him daily about the state of their battalions, instruct and direct company commanders and generally are responsible for the state of their battalions.

Company commanders are directly subordinated to their respective battalion commander, carry out his instructions, report to him daily about the state of their companies, instruct and direct platoon commanders and generally are responsible for the state of their companies.

Platoon commanders are directly subordinated to their respective company commander, report to him daily about the state of their platoons, carry out his directions and instructions and, on their part, direct and instruct their squad or section commanders. They are responsible for the state of their platoons and must be always among the cadets as their nearest seniors to whom they can apply in all their needs (Art.17,i/).

Aides-de-camp or Adjutants must be military men. They are attached to their senior officers and are obliged to fulfil all the errands given them by the latter (Art.17, j/).

The Commander of the Guard is subordinated to the Chief of the Administrative Department. He must observe and keep the order within the region of the School buildings, put out and inspect the guards according to

instructions and is responsible for the order and safety of the School (Art.17, k/).

Assistant Commanders are subordinated to their senior officers, assist them in the work, fulfil their orders and instructions, and when the senior officers are absent, replace them and fulfil their duties (Art. 17, l/).

Managers of various sections and offices, most clerks, are subordinated to their seniors, receive from them orders and instructions and are responsible for the fulfilment of their respective duties (Art.17,m/).

In addition to the above-mentioned, there are other persons employed in the School, viz. non-commissioned officers, clerks, servants, workmen, coolies etc. (Art.19).

Expenses of the School.

All officials and other persons employed in the School receive salary according to their ranks and functions (Art. 20).

The salaries of the commanding officers, lecturers and instructors are divided into three classes and may be gradually increased every six months, provided their work is satisfactory (Art. 21).

The Chief of the Supply Department or the Military Commissary must prepare for each half year a detailed budget of the School, including salaries and other expenses and give it to the Assistant Chief for inspection and presentation to the Generalissimo for approval (Art. 24).

As to unforeseen expenses which are not provided for in the ordinary budget, the Military Commissary must also prepare an estimate of them and present it to the Assistant Chief for inspection and to the Generalissimo for approval and sanction (Art. 26).

The Military Commissary must control the economical expenditure of all School funds, inspect the correct accounting of them and make a monthly report as to the state of accounts to the Assistant Chief of the School and to the Generalissimo (Art. 27).

The Generalissimo appoints periodically auditors to whom the Military Commissary must give all the books, documents and accounts for the purpose of auditing (Art. 28).

Regulations.

The present Regulations must be approved by the Generalissimo and put into effect as soon as possible (Art. 29).

As to other Regulations they must be drawn up by the Assistant Chief of the School and presented by him to the Generalissimo for approval (Art. 30).

B. The Central Military-Political School of the National Revolutionary Army. 1926-1927.

As a consequence of the report drawn up by the Chief of the General Staff, relating to the reorganization of the Whampoa School, an order was issued by the Military Council in the beginning of 1926, in accordance with which the Central Military Political School of the National Revolutionary Army, directly subordinated to the Military Council, was opened on March 6th.

Object of the School.

The object of the Central Military-Political School, as defined both in the above-mentioned report and in the Statutes relating to its organization, is as follows:

1. By concentrating all attention on only one school to obtain the best political training possible for the officers.

2. By means of a centralized organization and sole direction of the political work to do away with the provincial separatist tendencies of the officers.

3. By concentrating in the school the best command and instructor personnel to get the best and uniform military preparation of the officers.

4. By using the money allotted to school affairs on one school only, to get the maximum improvement of educational and economic equipment of the school as well as of the allotment to the cadets of all kinds of equipment and provisions.

Chief of the School.

In accordance with the order of the Military Council, General Chiang Kai-shih is the Chief of the School and General Teng is his deputy. Both the Chief of the School and its Military Commissary are directly subordinated to the Military Council.

Council of the School.

In order to harmonize all educational questions, to coordinate the general work of the school with the ideas and tendencies of the Military Council and to elucidate questions connected with the procurement of students for the school and with the subsequent service of its graduates, a Council or Advisory Board is established composed of the Chief of the School, as chairman, and of the High Adviser of the Military Council, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Political Directorate and the High Adviser of the School, as members.

Pedagogical Council.

In order to define the general progress of cadets, to harmonize the programs of various classes and to regulate the inner life of the School, a Pedagogical Council is established which works in accordance with instructions issued by the Chief of the School and the Council or Advisory Board, and which is composed of the Chief of the School as chairman, of his deputy as vice-chairman, and of the following members: the Political Assistant of the Chief of the School, the Assistant of the Chief of the School in charge of economic affairs, the Chiefs of the Political, Infantry, Artillery, Technical and Supply Sections, all Head or Chief Instructors of the School and all Russian Advisers.

Division of the School.

The School is divided into the following sections:

1/ Political,

2/ Infantry,

3/ Artillery,

4/ Supply and

5/ Technical.

Each section, except Political and Technical, is sub-divided into two classes:

1/ Officers Class. and

2/ Non-commissioned officers class

In the officers class a Preparatory class is also established to which young officers of the army who have had no military training, will be admitted and prepared for admittance into the officers class.

Duration of the Course.

The duration of the course is 8 months for the officers class and 4 months for the Non-commissioned officers class.

Cadets.

The number of cadets in the School is based on the number of platoon commanders and political workers needed for the National Revolutionary Army.

Cadets are recruited partly from among students and partly from enlisted men of the army and cadets of various army corps schools. All candidates, after passing through the Medical and Mandate Commissions, must undergo examinations given by the special Examining Commission which is appointed by the Chief of the School.

Special importance is attached to the Mandate Commission, the duty of which is the careful selection of cadets. Candidates whom this Commission finds undesirable, are not admitted for examinations. Special instructions were prepared for the Mandate Commission and also a list of questions to be used in the competitive examination. Most of these questions, altogether 36, are of a purely political character, as can be seen from the following list:

1. Why do you intend to enter the School?
2. Who are the chief enemies of China?
3. By what means can the Chinese people be helped?
4. What is the difference between imperialists and militarists?
5. What is the purpose of the National Revolutionary Army, and how does it differ from the armies of militarists?
6. Who are Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu?
7. What is the basis of the doctrine of Dr. Sun Yat-sen?
8. What is the attitude of the Kuomintang party towards the peasantry?

9. What are the "Three Principles" of Dr. Sun Yat-sen?
10. Who is Lenin?
11. Which branch of the army service do you like the most?
12. What are the problems with which officers and political workers of the National Revolutionary Army are confronted?
13. How does the policy of our Government differ from that of Chang Tso-lin?
14. For what purpose do Labor Unions exist?
15. Why was the strike declared? What are its purposes and aims?
16. What is Hongkong? Who wields the power there?
17. What are the fundamental phases of the Chinese Revolution?
18. Which provinces surround Kwangtung?
19. Which are the principal towns in China?
20. Which are the principal rivers of China, and which oceans surround China?
21. Why do several dialects exist in China?
22. How large is the population of China?
23. Where is the capital of China?
24. What countries, besides China, are known to you?
25. Which country is the most hostile? Which country is the most friendly?
26. What is the chief occupation of the inhabitants of Kwangtung?
27. Why does the foreign capital strive to penetrate into China?
28. Is there any difference between the doctrines of Confucius and of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, and in what does it lie?
29. What is the purpose of the political work in the army?
30. What is the object of the Northern Expedition?
31. Can the national revolutionary movement gain a victory without being supported by the world's revolution?

32. Who carries on the principal fight for the world's revolution?

33. What is the main force in the national revolutionary movement?

34. What is the part of the peasantry in the national revolutionary movement?

35. Can the national revolutionary movement gain a victory without the participation of the peasantry, and why?

36 To whom do the peasants pay taxes and in which way?

Cadets who have successfully completed their studies in the Non-commissioned officers Class, are sent to military units for (practical) active service as squad leader for a period of 3 months, and later, after recommendation from their superior officers and after passing the examinations for admission, they are admitted into the officers Class.

Cadets who have successfully completed their studies in the officers class, are promoted to the lowest rank of officer and are sent to army units as platoon commanders.

Three Departments.

The Central Military-Political School consists of three Departments, viz. Educational, Political and Sanitary. The chiefs of these Departments also act as Assistants to the Chief of the School.

Chief of the Educational Department.

The Chief of the Educational Department holds the rank of Major-General and is the Deputy of the Chief of the School and at the same time his Assistant in all matters pertaining to the education and military training. He directs and regulates all work of this Department.

The Educational Department is an organ which 1/ directs all instructive and educational work of the school, 2/ prepares programs and schedules of lectures, 3/ regulates the work of instructors, 4/ collects materials as to the progress of cadets in their studies, 5/ supplies the Pedagogical Council with information as to the characteristics of cadets with regard to their studies etc.

Assistants of the Chief of the Educational Department.

In conformity with the number of Sections of the School, the Chief of the Educational Department has five Assistants, each holding the rank of Colonel, who are the Chiefs of the respective Sections, i.e. 1/ Political, 2/ Infantry, 3/ Artillery, 4/ Supply and 5/ Technical.

Chief of the Political Department.

The Chief of the Political Department is the Assistant of the Chief of the School for political matters. He is appointed to this post by the Political Directorate or P.U.R. and is responsible to the latter for the direction of the political work in the School, but administratively he is directly subordinated both to the Chief and to the Military Commissary of the School.

The Chief of the Political Department 1/ superintends the whole political life of the School, 2/ directs the work of the party nucleus, 3/ takes a direct part in the decision of all questions of educational character and 4/ is responsible for the political and moral state of the School.

Assistant of the Chief of the Political Department.

The Assistant to the Chief of the Political Department is the Chief of the Political Section and is subordinated to the Chief of the Educational Department with regard to educational matters and in all other respects to the Chief of the Political Department.

The Assistant of the Chief of the Political Department 1/ directs the work of the Political Section of the Educational Department, 2/ prepares programs of political subjects and schedules of lectures and 3/ coordinates the work of political instructors.

Assistant of the Chief of the School for economic affairs.

The Assistant of the Chief of the School for economic affairs (Quartermaster) is the Chief of the whole economic apparatus of the School. He is directly subordinated to the Chief of the School, but as regards questions pertaining purely to supplies, he is also subordinated to the Chief of the

Central Administration of Supplies.

His official duties are: 1/ to draw up all estimates of the School, 2/ to provide all provisions and equipment which the School requires, 3/ to obtain from the Central Administration of Supplies all artillery and other supplies which the School requires, 4/ to receive necessary financial allotments and 5/ to distribute them in conformity with the respective items of the school budget.

Chief of the Sanitary Department.

The Chief of the Sanitary Department is the Chief Surgeon of the School. He is directly subordinated to the Assistant of the Chief of the School for economic affairs, but in purely medical matters he also follows instructions of the Sanitary Inspectorate of the General Staff.

Both the Hospital and the Dispensary are in his charge, and the whole medical personnel, as well as all employees of the Hospital and of the Dispensary are subordinated to him.

Instructors.

The Instructors of the Central Military-Political School are divided into three categories:

1/ Chief Instructors,

2/ Senior Instructors and

3/ Junior Instructors.

For all principal subjects which are taught in the School, such as political instruction, tactics, artillery, topography, supply service, engineering etc., there are one Chief Instructor and several Senior and Junior Instructors. All Chief and Senior Instructors and also a part of the Junior Instructors belong to the regular staff of the School and, as such, must have not less than 5 hours daily of instruction work. In addition in case of need, instructors from outside may also be engaged by the School, but these do not belong to the regular staff. Commanders of units may also be employed as Junior Instructors.

As principal attention is paid to the practical work and field exercises, lectures are shortened as much as possible. They are

given by the Senior Instructors who receive directions for each series of lectures from the Chief Instructor of the respective Department and from the Adviser of the School.

School day.

The School day of the cadet lasts 9 hours, of which 2 hours are used for political training, but in the Political Section 6 hours are allotted for political work and 3 hours for military training.

Club.

Great attention is paid to the out-of-school work of cadets. To that end the organization of a Club has been started, and the construction of the Club building will be completed in the nearest future.

Political Section.

The political training as given in the Political Section of the Central Military-Political School is based on the following ten theses:

1. Cadets must be given to understand that the duty of the Kuomintang army consists in elucidating the policy of Sun Yat-sen and the declaration of the Assembly of the National Representatives of China, as well as the order of the Central Executive Committee to the effect that "the soldiers must obey the Nationalist Government and their commanders and sacrifice themselves for the sake of their party and their country."

2. Cadets must be taught the special spirit of the Kuomintang Army and to submit to the political training and to accept political work of our party.

3. Cadets must know that the Chinese Revolution is a part of the world's revolution, that the Chinese soldier is a part of the world's army, and that our life is closely connected with the life of the whole world.

4. Cadets must be taught that the object of the Chinese Revolution, from the inside point of view, is to overthrow the militarists and, from the outside point of view, to overthrow the imperialists.

5. Cadets must be taught that the Chinese Revolution is

an international Revolution and by no means a local political revolution.

6. Cadets must be taught that the duty of the revolutionary soldier, from the point of the army organisation, is to sacrifice his freedom to the army and, from the point of view of the party, to sacrifice his freedom to the party. If one serves in the army of the party, one must not insist on personal freedom. To insist on it us unworthy of the revolutionary soldier.

7. Cadets must be taught that rank in the army is a duty impesed on an officer and that by no means does it isolate him from the soldiers, as it was during feudal times.

8. Cadets must be made to understand that everybody's duty is to die for the party and the people without regret.

9. Cadets must be taught that, in order to be able to solve social problems, it is above all necessary to comprehend historical and political motives, social phenomena and conditions, as well as the relations between social and natural phenomena. To be able to decide all these questions, a good knowledge of the revolutionary social scimnces is necessary.

10. Cadets must be taught that the life of our party depends upon all its members who uphold the discipline and program of our party and the principles of Sun Yat-sen. A very important duty towards the party is therefore incumbent on every member of the party.

The political work is divided into two parts:

1/ the political study and

2/ the general political work.

The political study is carried on by the Political Department and the Chief of this Department is responsible for it. The purpose of this study is to give the cadets a theoretical political education which is necessary for revolutionary military men, and to inculcate into them the radical standpoints which will help them to comprehend the contradictions of the modern society and to make clear the puzzled modern situation. This study is divided into a/ lectures and b/ practical work in groups consisting of 10 to 15 cadets, the so-called "seminaries". Cadets must attend both of them. The

lectures give theoretical ideas relating to political sciences, and later these ideas are discussed in detail by the groups of cadets under the direction of special instructors.

The following <u>political subjects</u> are taught in the Political Section of the School:

1. Outlines of Political Economy and Political Science.
2. Imperialism in China.
3. The Short History of Revolutionary Movements in other countries.
4. The History of the Revolutionary Movement in China.
5. The History of the Kuomintang and its future prospects.
6. The Platform of the Kuomintang.
7. The Land Question.
8. The Labor Question.

For convenience's sake these political subjects which are taught in the School, are divided into:

a/ ordinary political training and

b/ special political training.

A. <u>Ordinary political training</u> embraces the following subjects:

1. The history of the Chinese Kuomintang Party.
2. The doctrine of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (nationalism, democratism and socialism).
3. The history of the imperialistic aggression in China.
4. The Russian revolution.
5. Imperialism.
6. Outline of the political economy.
7. Social problems.
8. Political work in the army.
9. Problems of the party organization.
10. Socialism.
11. Special lectures.

B. Special political training embraces the following subjects

1. The history of the Chinese Kuomintang Party.
2. Doctrines of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
3. The history of imperialistic aggression in China.
4. The history of the world's revolution.
5. Imperialism.
6. Outline of social sciences.
7. Outline of politics.
8. Outline of economics.
9. The history of social revolution.
10. Social problems.
11. Socialism.
12. Questions of the party organization.
13. Political work in the army.
14. Special lectures.

The general political work is carried on by the Kuomintang group and by the Club of the School, under the direction of the party representative and of the Chief of the Political Department, and has for its purpose: a/ to draw cadets into active political work and to give them the opportunity to put into practice their theoretical knowledge; 2/ to give the commanders and the other personnel of the School radical political ideas by means of practical work in the Club and in the Kuomintang group of the School. It consists chiefly of lectures and discussions on current political topics, of meetings which serve as practical examples, of the distribution of political literature etc. Its general purpose is to show, how to use and to put into practice the theoretical political knowledge.

Infantry Section.

The Infantry Section is headed by the Chief who holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, prepares all educational programs and directs the whole training and educational work of the cadets of the Officers and the Non-commissioned Officers Classes.

All cadets of both classes, i.e. Officers and Non-commissioned

Officers Classes, form two regiments. Commanders of these regiments are subordinated to the Chief of the School as far as operations and field-service training are concerned, but they also follow the directions of the Educational Department in matters pertaining to the education and military training.

Artillery Section.

The Artillery Section is divided into two classes and is headed by the Chief of the Section who holds the rank of Colonel. The Chief has the authority of a commander of an artillery regiment and is subordinated directly to the Deputy Chief of the School (Chief of the Educational Department) from whom he receives all instructions and directions with regard to the Artillery Section. He prepares the programs and schedules of studies, in accord with the Chief Instructor in artillery, and directs the work of the instructors of the Section. The Chiefs of both Classes act as his Assistants.

A. The Officers Class is headed by the Chief of the Class who holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and has the authority of a commander of an artillery battalion. He is responsible for the whole work of this class.

The Officers Class as regards enrollment is equal to a platoon, and cadets of this class are recruited either from among young men from civil life or from artillery units; graduates of the Non-commissioned Officers Class are also admitted, after three months of active service, to the officers Class. They must be not more than 25 years of age, physically fit, "politically" reliable and satisfy generally all the requirements of the school program.

As a military unit, the Officers Class forms a platoon headed by the platoon commander who in educational matters is subordinated to the Chief of the Artillery Section and, as regards operations and the field service training, to the Chief of the School. Two Instructors, each holding the rank of Lieutenant, act as his Assistants and direct the military training of cadets of this class. Instructors who belong to the regular staff of the School, act as lecturers in special subjects, i.e. artillery tactics, artillery, general tactics and topography.

The duration of studies is 8 months. During this period cadets become acquainted with the theory and practice of the artillery art, but on account of the shortness of this period, they are taught only the minimum which is necessary to junior officers of the artillery battery. Political subjects and social sciences are also taught.

After the completion of their studies in the Officers Class, cadets are promoted to the lowest commissioned rank and are sent to artillery units of army corps as junior officers, viz. platoon commanders and assistant battery commanders.

B. The Non-Commissioned Officers Class is headed by the Chief of the Class who holds the rank of Captain and has the authority of a battery commander. He directs the training and the education of cadets of this class.

The enrollment consists of 60 cadets who are recruited from among the best soldiers of artillery units. They must be physically fit, know how to read and write, have some knowledge of arithmetic and be "politically" reliable.

As a military unit, the Non-commissioned Officers Class forms a battery with the Chief of the Class acting as battery commander, and is divided into three groups. Six Instructors holding the rank of lieutenant, are on duty with this Class. Three of them are the heads of the groups and the other three act as their Assistants.

The duration of studies is four months. Instructions are given in general military training, in artillery and also in political subjects and social sciences. Only the most elementary theoretical knowledge is imparted to cadets of this Class.

After the completion of their studies in the Non-commissioned Officers Class, cadets are sent to various military units for active service as non-commissioned officers, viz. gun section chiefs or gun commanders, sergeant-majors, chiefs of "liaison" or scouting Sections etc. After three months of active service the most able of them are sent to the Officers Class to continue there their studies.

C. Three batteries are attached to the Artillery Section as School batteries, viz.:

1/ a battery of "Arisaka" field guns,

2/ a battery of "Krupp" mountain guns and

3/ a battery of mountain guns of smaller calibers, i.e. 37 m.m. and 47 m.m.

Supply Section.

The Supply Section is divided into two classes, and its object is to train men for the supply service of the National Revolutionary Army.

General military subjects are taught both in the Non-commissioned Officers and the Officers Classes by ordinary Lecturers of the School, and special subjects by specialists who belong to the special Lecturers' Group.

The Supply Section is headed by the Chief of the Section who is subordinated directly to the Deputy Chief of the School (Chief of the Educational Department). He 1/ directs the whole work pertaining to the educational, military and political training of cadets, 2/ prepares plans and programs of studies and 3/ is responsible for the general state of affairs in his section. The Chiefs of both Classes act as his Assistants in this respect.

A. The object of the Officers Class is to train experienced workers for the Supply Service to fill the posts of Assistant Regimental Quartermasters and downwards.

The enrollment is 75 cadets. Those officers of the army and navy who are not more than 25 years of age, have a general education corresponding to that which is required for admittance to other Officers Classes of the School, and who have served in the army for not less than three months, are admitted into the Officers Class after passing examinations in accordance with the general requirements of the School.

The Officers Class is divided into three groups headed by Instructors, each of whom directs the field training of his group.

The duration of studies is eight months. After the completion of their studies in the Officers Class, cadets must undergo examinations in

accordance with specially drawn up programs. Those who pass them successfully get their appointments to various posts through the Central Administration of Supplies which keeps records of all graduates of the Supply Section. These cadets who fail in these examinations, are sent back to their respective army units.

B. The Non-commissioned Officers Class trains supply men of lower grades.

The enrollment is 150 cadets. They are recruited from among the most intelligent and quite literate enlisted men of the army and navy who are not more than 25 years of age and who for more than one year have been in the field service or have fulfilled duties in connection with economic affairs. Young men from civil life are also admitted to the Non-commissioned Officers Class, provided they pass examinations in accordance with the requirements for admittance into the Officers Classes of the School.

The Non-commissioned Officers Class is divided into six groups which form two companies. Field service training is carried out under the direction of officers belonging to these companies.

The duration of studies is 4 months. After the completion of their studies in the Non-commissioned Officers Class, cadets must undergo examinations. Those who pass them successfully, are sent on active service for a period of three months. After the expiration of this period, the best are sent to the Officers Class to continue there their studies, and the rest are appointed to various posts.

Technical Section.

The Technical Section is divided into two classes, i.e. the Military Engineering Class and the Communication Class, and its object is to train junior officers as specialists in military engineering and communication services for the National Revolutionary Army.

The Technical Section is headed by the Chief of the Section, holding the rank of Major-General who is appointed to this post by the Military Council on recommendation of the Council or Advisory Board of the School and is subordinated directly to the Chief of the School. He 1/ directs the

whole work pertaining to the educational and military training of students of both classes, 2/ regulates the work of instructors and 3/ is responsible for the work of the Section itself and of the classes.

In view of the short duration of studies, viz. 8 months, and of the necessity of mastering special subjects, students for both classes of the Technical Section are recruited exclusively from among junior officers, i.e. 2nd lieutenants, of the National Revolutionary Army.

I. Military Engineering Class. As regards field service training, the Military Engineering Class has the same organization as an engineer company, and as far as educational matters are concerned, it consists of three groups.

The Chief of this Class is appointed by the Chief of the School from among Officers holding the rank of colonel, who have received a proper military engineering education and who have been in the active service in the engineer troops of the National Revolutionary Army. He is subordinated directly to the Chief of the School with regards to the field service training, and as far as technical matters are concerned, to the Chief of the Technical Section. With regards to special training this Class is also subject to the inspection on the part of the Military Engineering Inspectorate of the General Staff. The duty of the Chief of the Military Engineering Class is to direct the whole military and engineering training and education of students of this Class. A military engineer holding the rank of major, acts as an Assistant to the Chief of the Class and directs the field service training of the students. In addition to him, there are at the disposal of the Chief of the Class three military engineers holding the rank of captain, who during field service exercises act as platoon commanders, and as far as educational matters are concerned, are the Chiefs of Groups. Instructors in special subjects, such as construction of roads and of bridges, laying of mines, construction of fortifications, bivouacs and encampments, are engaged by the Council or Advisory Board of the School.

Students for the Military Engineering Class are selected from among junior officers of various divisions, and their number is fixed by the

Council of the School. It is planned that the first enrollment will comprise 60 students. Prior to their being admitted into this Class, aspirants must undergo additional examinations by a special Examining Commission which is organized for that purpose by the School itself, but in which a representative of the Military Engineering Inspectorate of the General Staff also takes part.

The duration of studies is one year and comprises 8 months of studies in the Fundamental Section and 4 months in the Special Supplementary Section.

During their 8 months' course in the Fundamental Section, besides the general politico-military education, the same as is given cadets of the Infantry Section, students of the Military Engineering Class receive also a general preparatory training in principal special subjects of military engineering. After the completion of their studies, they must undergo examinations. These who pass them successfully, are transferred to the Supplementary Section to complete there their special technical education. Students who fail in these examinations are either appointed to fusilier units as platoon commanders, or sent back to their respective units to be employed in secondary positions.

After the completion of their studies in the Special Supplementary Section, students who pass their examinations successfully are promoted to the rank of 1st lieutenant and are appointed platoon commanders of divisional engineer companies, and those who fail in them, are either detailed for service in the engineer troops retaining their rank of 2nd lieutenant, i.e. without promotion, or sent back to their respective units to be employed in secondary positions.

II. Communication Class. The object of the Communication Class is to train officers for service in communication units of the National Revolutionary Army. It is divided into two sections, i.e. a/ the Telegraph and Telephone Section and b/ the Radio Section, both of which are divided into Groups headed by Instructors, under whose direction students receive their technical training in accordance with the plan and schedules drawn up by the

Chief of the Communication Class. The duration of instructions in both sections is 8 months. A special Show Room or Communication Laboratory is established in the Central Military Political School, in order to facilitate the mastering by students of all special subjects pertaining to the communication.

The Telegraph and Telephone Section forms as a military unit, one telegraph and telephone company which consists of 120 students, and its object is to train officers who must be specialists in telegraphy and telephony, as well as in the organisation of communication between army units generally. After the completion of their instructions in this Section, the more successful graduates may be appointed at once to the posts of Communication company commanders in army corps, and the less successful are appointed as communication company commanders in divisions and regiments, as well as platoon commanders and their assistants.

The Radio Section forms as a military unit, one radio platoon which consists of 25 students, and its object is to train specialists in radio who are appointed either Chiefs of Radio stations or assistants in the various army units.

Results.

One may obtain some idea as to the results which the Central Military-Political School has succeeded in attaining as regards the military training of its cadets, by studying the report by Zigen, the Deputy Senior Adviser of the School (dated October 30th, 1926), particularly its sections dealing with the discipline and manoeuvers:

"Discipline is outwardly kept up among the cadets, though the greater part of officers of the school, with the exception of Gen. Fan, do not strive to keep it up. Outwardly the cadets are behaving very politely towards their officers, but inner discipline is evidently lacking. It happens that cadets expostulate with their officers. A characteristic case of this kind may be cited which happened during the manoeuvers. When an officer blamed a bugler for blowing the wrong signals, the bugler replied that he was

playing correctly, but that the officer himself did not know the signals. The officer became very angry and beat the bugler, attracting thereby many on-lookers from the soldiers and officers. Saluting which is in the Chinese army a sign of discipline, is also not practised by all cadets, especially with respect to junior officers, and those who are guilty in this respect, are repeatedly reprimanded by Gen. Fan.

Maneuvers which were held in connection with the 4th graduation of cadets in October, 1926, were of the nature of bilateral exercises of two armies, i. e. the northern and southern, operating against each other. They were divided into a series of episodic battles as follows: a clash between the northern and southern armies; a withdrawal from the battle and a retreat of the northern army and a pursuit by a southern army; and an advance of both armies against the would-be enemy on the defensive. One of these battles was a night battle.

The plan of consecutive operations had been worked out fairly satisfactorily though all instructions and orders were of a peculiary specific nature which is proper to the Chinese army, and made it difficult to understand the purpose of the respective operation. None of the details were worked out which might have had an influence on the issue of the battle or on the coordination of the movements of the troops, but anyhow no particular misunderstandings occurred.

In spite of the fact that generally scouting is making very slow progress in the Chinese army, during these maneuvers it played in one case a very important role and might even have played a decisive part as regards the issue of the battle, had the vanguard of the southern army been properly organized and sufficiently strong. I failed not to point out to the officers who were present, and particularly to Gen. Fan, the advantage the southern army had gained over the northern owing to the scouting, and Gen. Fan asked me to see that cadets were trained accordingly.

As regards the present order of battle of a Chinese company, it is the same as of our former company deployed in skirmishes with intervals of an arm's length between the soldiers. Only our company had supporting platoons and company's reserve which contributed to the stability of its posi -

tion. In China, however, this is not observed. As soon as the battle begins, all units are drawn up in a line and inundate the battle field with man power. This could be justified, if this man power increased the fire and inflicted losses on the enemy, but as matters stand at present, and taking into consideration their present preparedness, the marksmen can produce only the effect of crackers, but by no means of an effective fire.

As regards the night battle, it can only be said that the southern army advanced in a pitch-dark night like at a parade, without scouts ahead and knowing absolute nothing of what was going on in front of it

Of the commanders it can be said that they act without thinking, and act only in order to do something and not to remain inactive. They are very fond of turning the flank of the enemy without paying any attention to the existing circumstances. This manoeuver predominated in all their actions. They do not know the general plan and aim of the battle, and even when they know them, they do not act in conformity with the general situation. The marksmen almost never conform to the terrain and to the surrounding circumstances. The order of battle too does not conform to the fire. One often sees a company marching quietly in closed ranks under the fire of heavy machine guns. There is nothing to be said of the communication (liaison), as there was practicelly none, except by means of signals, viz. bugles. Only the umpires had telephones. The attack is effected very slowly: the parties lying in front of each other at a distance of about 1,000 meters, continue shooting to the last cartridge. The critique of the manoeuvers took place at a general parade, after the manoeuvers were finished. It was of course impossible to criticize the actions of officers in the presence of soldiers, and the critique was carried out accordingly. Attention was drawn to general defects, mostly secondary ones and chiefly relating to soldiers and not to officers. Thus the activity of officers remained without criticism."

Suggestions.

In the conclusive part of his report Zigen makes the following suggestions: "Since the Chief of the School lends an ear to all our advisers,

it may be expected that the work will go on smoothly. In my opinion, however, it is necessary to carry out as soon as possible the following measures in order to remove very great defects of the School.

1. An inventory of all articles in the School is to be made and all the articles are to be distributed among the respective store houses which must be properly arranged, because at present most of them are unfit, and rifles are kept partly in boxes and partly in stacks.

2. Arms must be properly kept and handled by the men in order to avoid wearing them out too soon.

3. The classes must be supplied as far as possible with text-books and other requisites by the time, when the new school term begins, i. e. November 1st, 1926.

4. The program of the school must be revised and special attention must be paid to instruction in shooting and in training for field service.

5. A shooting gallery and a small target range must be constructed. In addition firing with small calibers must be organized.

6. A Military Scientific Society must be formed at the School."

The 4th Graduation.

The 4th graduation at Whampoa School which took place in October, 1926, gave the following results.

2,500 new troop officers, graduates of the School, joined the National Revolutionary Army. Almost one third of them were Hunanese, and the rest were natives of Kwangtung, Szechuan, the Yangtze Valley etc.

The above-mentioned graduates could be divided into the following categories:

1. According to social position: 1,733 peasants, 350 merchants, 347 students and 63 workmen.

2. According to education: middle school graduates, 80%; high school graduates, 10%; military school graduates, 8%; primary school graduates, 2%.

3. According to age: from 16 to 20, 30%; from 20 to 25, 60%; from 25 to 30, 10%.

4. According to family condition: Single, 55%; married, 45%.

5. According to classes or sections: Officers' class, 800; non-commissioned officers' class, 850; political class, 450; artillery, engineer (technical) and commissariat (supply) classes, about 150 in each.

Generally speaking, the military and political training of the graduates of the 4th term (duration of training: 7 or 8 months) was quite satisfactory, particularly in comparison with the training received by the graduates of the previous terms, i.e. prior to the time when the "Kuomintang Military School at Whampoa" was reorganized as the "Central Military - Political School of the National Revolutionary Army."

As to the further distribution of graduates of the 4th term, Zigon states in the above-quoted report: "150 are to be sent to the 1st army corps, 100 to the training division of Whampoa School, 150 to various provinces, and the rest to be at the disposal of Gen. Chiang Kai-shih."

Kalatcheff, temporarily the Assistant Chief of the South China Group for political matters, in his very secret letter to the Soviet Military Attaché at Peking, comrade Longva, dated November 15th, 1926 dwells inter alia upon the question as to political convictions of Whampoa cadets and says: "Those who belonged to the 4th class, were of a very clearly pronounced left disposition, viz. of the total number of 3,500 almost 500 cadets were communists."

The 5th Enrollment and Graduation.

Information as to the 5th enrollment or class of cadets is contained in a report dated January 8,1927, which states:

"The newly enrolled cadets, 2,650 in all, were distributed as follows: political section, 450 cadets; two infantry Sections, 1,600 cadets; artillery, engineer (technical) and supply Sections, 200 cadets in each.

Moreover, there were: 1/ in the Section for radio instruction, 40 cadets, and 2/ in the Section for officers, one hundred.

Notwithstanding the decrease of the total number of cadets, the

staff of instructors remained as before, i.e. about 1,000.

The political Section was removed to Hankow, and the third political Section was organized by Gen T'ang Sheng-chih at Changsha, with the enrollment of 1,000 cadets.

Besides the cadets, there was also attached to the School the so-called "Field Service Detachment" (the 6th enrollment), under the command of Gen. Fang Ting-shih, numbering 3,750 soldiers and consisting of two regiments, which numbered 2,250 and 1,500 men respectively.

The Students' Detachment consisted of more than 300 students; it was under the command of Gen. T'ang Hsing and had for its aim the training of lower grade officers for the National Revolutionary Army."

As to the political "credo" of the newly enrolled cadets Kalatchoff says in the above-quoted letter: "There were only 100 to 120 communists among them" and continues: "The best officers, graduates of the Whampoa School, have departed from Kwangtung with the Northern Expedition, and the newly arrived are, in the opinion of the Chinese Communists and of the old workers of the School, a very undesirable element. They majority of them come from the most different parts of the country, e.g. from the army of Sun Ch'uan-fang, from Szechuan, even from Yünnan and, however strange it might seem, from the camp of Chang Tso-lin, i.e. from the defeated units of Kuo Sung-ling. These latter are very proud of the fact that they have served in the ranks of Kuo Sung-ling, but do not differ very much from other soldiers of Chang Tso-lin's army."

As has been already mentioned in the Introduction, cadets of the 5th class completed their studies in July, 1927, and were then ordered to report for duty at Nanking.

AMERICAN LEGATION 4-1
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

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June 21, 1927 26 57-9-281

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#7074

Subject: Russian Captured Documents.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. Herewith is a list of Russian documents known as Special List A. These particular documents are translations without photographs of the originals. With a few exceptions they are of especial military value as reports and studies relative to the extraordinary work of the Russians in organizing the Nationalist Army.

2. Documents 1-A to 9-A have been forwarded in quadruplicate. Accompanying this letter are Documents 10-A to 20-A (single copies only). Due to the difficulties of translating and typing one copy only is available. These reports and studies, extracted from a voluminous report, will later be combined, bound and other copies forwarded. This material will be found of great interest and value.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF ARMY STAFFS.

The introduction of the new organization of Army Staffs (in Army Corps, Divisions and Regiments) in the National-Revolutionary Army was started about two months ago (in the 1st Army Corps: since the summer 1925).

There were, of course, staffs in the National-Revolutionary Army even before that time, but they did not carry on staff work in the proper sense of the word. Judging by the character of their work, they were rather the offices of Commanding officers, in which no one (not excluding the Chief of Staff) had specified duties.

In view of the fact that formerly the army consisted actually of mercenary troops, Commanders of military units had more independence and did not execute orders of the high command without reserve; therefore, there could not be any question of centralization or of real staff work. The Chief of Staff merely executed orders and staff-officers were simply given certain work to do or were more or less qualified clerks. There was no control, no guidance. It is clear therefore that there are at present no properly trained Chiefs of Staff or Staff officers.

In view of the afore-mentioned circumstances and the comparative facility of administering military units, which consist almost exclusively of infantry, it was necessary, during the re-organization of the army, to introduce the simplest forms of organization for Army Staffs.

Army Corps Staff.

In the Army Corps Staff a secretary (as required, in accordance with the Chinese custom) and an Adjutant are attached to the Chief of Staff.

The Staff itself consists of four Departments: 1) the operations Department, 2) the Adjutants' Department, 3) the Sanitary

Department and 4) the Communications Department.

The Operations Department is subdivided into three sections: 1) Operations Section, which carries on operations and is in charge of questions relating to military preparation and maps (three officers and two clerks); 2) Intelligence Section, which is in charge of questions relating to intelligence (two officers and two clerks); 3) Section in charge of combat personnel (one officer and one clerk). All the work is coordinated by the Chief of the Operations Department, who also acts as Deputy Chief of Staff.

The Adjutants' Department is the Administrative Department of the Staff (in the 1st Army Corps, however, both Administrative Department and Adjutants' Department exist separately), which through the Section of General Activities, is in charge of the control and the distribution of the personnel and the enlistments. According to Chinese traditions, it also executes various commissions, especially of an economic kind. Attached to this Department are in addition the Headquarters Company and the Company of Musicians. The Adjutants' Department, besides the Chief of the Department, is composed of six Adjutants of various grades and three Clerks.

The Sanitary Department consists of Senior Army Corps Surgeon and his Office and fulfils the functions of the Sanitary Inspector.

The Communications Department is, in fact the Communications Battalion, but the Chief of this Department has the right of technical control over all communication-units in an Army Corps.

Moreover, attached to the Army Corps staff is a reserve-personnel for posts of high command, consisting of ten men.

The Chief of Staff must always receive reports about the progress of work in the Administration of Supplies and in the Engineer and Artillery Battalions (Engineer Regiment).

Division Staff.

The Division Staff consists of the same Departments as the Army Corps Staff, with identical functions.

The Operations Department is composed, in addition to the Chief of the Department, of four officers, who are in charge of: 1) preparation, 2) control, 3) intelligence work and 4) topographical work. The Chief of the Department carries on the operations alone. This Department employs also three clerks.

The Adjutants' Department is composed, in addition to the Chief of the Department, of five Adjutants and two clerks.

Attached to Communications Department is Communications Company.

Sanitary Department consists of Senior Division Surgeon and his office.

The relation between the Chief of Staff, on one hand, and the Administration of Supplies and the Engineers on the other, is the same, as in the Army Corps Staff.-

Regimental Staff.

Attached to the Chief of Staff is a very small apparatus, only two officers: one of them is Chief of the Operations Department, who is in charge of operations; the other is the Adjutant, who is in charge of the administration; there are, in addition, three clerks.

Directly subordinated to the Chief of Staff are the Communications Company, the Headquarters Company, the Sanitary Detachment and the Scouts Company. The Chief of Staff also supervises the Machine-gun Company.-

From the above, it may be seen that the organization of Army staffs is very simple and their duties are also small. The following duties are the most important ones: to check up the fighting personnel and the army personnel generally, according to the simplest forms; to introduce some plan and system into the work of military preparations; to systematize and prepare

intelligence data (the Army Corps carry on intelligence work in neighbouring provinces, but the information acquired is not being utilized to the full extent); to be able to utilise properly auxiliary troops. But the most important duty of Army Staffs is to direct as fully as possible the lower units and to maintain the most intimate liaison with the staff of the higher unit.-

Even these most simple duties, however, so far could not be done properly, because (as has been already pointed out above) this work is quite new; there is no trained personnel nor is there the habit of executing orders exactly and of making reports.

Provided, however, that the work of the General Staff is carried on properly and the support of the advisers is given, this work must in the near future yield results.-

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Canton Arsenals

(Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 March, 1926, Canton).

Sources and means of Supplying the Army with Arms and Munitions.

(Arsenals. Purchases abroad.)

The National Government has at present at its disposal two arsenals:

1. The Big Arsenal: situated on the West River at 16 kilometres' distance from the city of Canton. By its size it is considered as occupying the third place in China. It was built thirty years ago by the German firm Kalovitz. The cost of machinery and other equipment - two million Canton dollars.

The arsenal is divided into five sections, in charge of which are engineer specialists.

(1) Section for Rifles: Manufactures rifles and carbines of the German system, calibre: 7.9.

20 rifles or carbines are manufactured daily, if work is done during daytime only, or 33, when night work is also done.

742 rifles or carbines are manufactured monthly. The cost of each rifle is 74.44 Canton dollars(original cost).

(2) Section for Cartridges: Manufactures cartridges, calibre 7.9 and 6.8 for rifles of the old Mauser model; also for machine guns, calibre 7.9 and 6.8.

Manufacturing capacity - 800 thousand cartridges per month. Cost of one cartridge: 11 cents.

(3) Machine Gun Section: Manufactures heavy machine guns, "Maxim" model; also light machine guns of the American model "Thompson".

Manufacturing capacity: three machine guns of Maxim make and one light machine gun per month. Cost of one heavy machine gun: 3,215 Canton dollars, of one light machine gun: 650 Canton dollars.

(4) Repair Section: Repairs rifles, machine guns and artillery guns; also has presses for manufacturing shells for mountain guns of the Krupp model, calibre 75 mm. At present 15 shells are manufactured daily (shrapnel is not manufactured for want of time fuses, which the arsenal cannot manufacture). As soon as the new machinery is installed it will be possible to manufacture 20-40 H. E. shells per day. The arsenal itself is manufacturing fuses and percussion primers.

(5) Powder Section: Manufactures 200 to 230 pounds of pyroxylin powder per day. The original cost of one pound of powder is nine Canton dollars.

There is also a black powder factory. This factory is not operating just now but there is a project to reopen it in the near future.

Working System: In all these sections the work is being done in two shifts - eight hours in the daytime and four hours during the night. During a month there are 14 days on which the work is done in the daytime only, and 14 days when both day and night work are done. The first and the fifteenth of each month are two days of rest. Night work is done every two days, in order to give the workmen rest.

The monthly budget of the arsenal is 194,444 Canton dollars.

The director of the arsenal is an engineer who has received his technical education in Germany and who has had two years practical experience in the Krupp factory. He is of too weak a character to manage successfully such a big arsenal. Attached to the director of the arsenal is a commissary, who is in charge of the political work in the arsenal.

The personnel of the arsenal:

Administration	165
Workmen	1,800
Soldiers and coolies	214

Workmen's wages fluctuate between12 and 50 Canton dollars per month. On the average, a qualified workman gets 30-35 Canton dollars per month for day and night work; considering the conditions of life in China such a sum is quite sufficient, even for those who have families to support.

In view of the fact that the arsenal is situated outside the city in an area infested by bandits, it is guarded by a battalion of soldiers from the 2nd Division. The communication with the city is kept by river and railway.

Arsenal Workmen. According to their political convictions the workmen of the arsenal may be divided into three groups: left Kuomintang - 500 workmen; right Kuomintang - 300 workmen; the remainder are non-party men who may be enlisted as left Kuomintang if the political work among them is carried on properly. The nucleus of the left Kuomintang is directed by the Commissary of the arsenal according to the directives of G.U.R. (Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army) and the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party. Attached to the arsenal is a school for adults and children. This school is under the supervision of the left elements of the Kuomintang Party. The nucleus of the right Kuomintang is guided by their leaders from the Mechanics Union. The political work in the arsenal has not as yet reached the proper development, which circumstance may be partly explained by the long distance separating the arsenal from the city, and also by the absence of suitable political workers of Chinese origin. At present, however, the political work is carried on with more intensiveness. Recently the relations between the government and the workmen of the arsenal have improved considerably, and no hostile moves on the part of the right elements have taken place.

Generally speaking, the work in the big arsenal is now proceeding satisfactorily. It is intended to install there during the month of April for the manufacturing of cartridges, calibre 7.9 and 6.8, some additional machinery from the former arsenal at Swabua (Swatow?). This arsenal

belonged to General Ch'en Chün-ming but after his defeat fell into the hands of the Nationalist Government. With the aid of this additional machinery, the big arsenal will increase its manufacturing capacity up to 1,500,000 cartridges, calibre 7.9 and 6.8, per month.

In the future it is intended to put into effect in the big arsenal some technical improvements which will make it possible to improve the tempering of steel; to remodel machine guns (the tripods are too heavy now); to manufacture powder for shells, which must now be purchased somewhere else, etc. Two engineer specialists in mechanics and chemistry must be engaged in order to carry through the abovementioned program.

2. The Small Arsenal: Situated in the northern part of the city of Canton in a large temple. Formerly it belonged to the Yunnanese Army and during the last year's fighting for the mastery of Canton was destroyed but was re-established in October of last year when the big arsenal, on account of the general disorder, reduced its manufacturing capacity to a minimum, whereas on the other hand the expenditure of cartridges in the army was very great.

The small arsenal is divided into two sections:

(1) Section for Cartridges: Manufactures 300,000 cartridges per month, calibre 7.9 and 6.8. Cost of one cartridge is 11.9 cents.

(2) Powder Section: Manufactures 70 to 80 pounds of pyroxylin powder per day.

The monthly budget of the arsenal - 42,000 Canton dollars. - The director of the arsenal is an engineer who has received his technical education at Tientsin.

The personnel of the arsenal:

Administration	22
Workmen	327

The working system is the same as in the big arsenal. Workmen's wages are also comparatively identical. As soon as the manufacturing capacity of the big arsenal is increased, it is intended to

close the small arsenal and to use part of the funds that are being spent on the latter for the enlargement of the big arsenal.

Such is the source from which the National Revolutionary Government gets arms and munitions.

The monthly budget of both arsenals: 236,444 Canton dollars.

The monthly manufacturing capacity of both arsenals is as follows:

Cartridges	1,100,000
Rifles	800
Machine guns	4
Shells	400

<u>Capacity for making repairs</u>:

Rifles	300
Machine Guns	6
Artillery Guns	2

<u>Purchases abroad</u>: Formerly purchases of arms were sometimes made abroad. Individual generals could obtain arms from Germany and Japan even as late as1924. But now, in connection with the change in the political situation, one cannot rely upon the possibility of making purchases abroad. Quite recently we received an offer to purchase powder from Germany and even the possibility of delivering arms was hinted at. At present the arsenal purchases some powder for artillery shells at Hongkong through Japanese firms, and purchases of other materials are being made at Hongkong and Shanghai.

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Arms (Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 III.1926, Canton).

THE ARMS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

Arms (Kinds of Arms). The present day arms and munitions of the National-Revolutionary Army do not answer even the most elementary requirements of a regular army. The presence of arms of various models and makes is one of its main defects in this respect. This variety of models and makes is an inheritance of many years. It's characteristic feature was the lack of system that reigned formerly in the armies of individual Generals. The sole aim of the separate military units was to provide themselves as quickly as possible with anything that could be obtained, paying special attention to the quantity and not to the quality of arms. Obliging foreigners most willingly delivered to China antiquated arms, which they could not use themselves. Finally there was a total absence of any definite plan for supplying military units with arms and munitions. All such circumstances caused the actual conditions, with which the National-Revolutionary Army is confronted now.-

Turning now to the question of the detailed examination of arms, available in the National-Revolutionary Army, one must point out that there are not at our disposal full data and exact figures; we have to confine ourselves to information supplied by various military units during the period of Febr. 1st, 1926 and the present time and supplement them with information which is at the disposal of the Staff of the(South China) Group. (of Soviet advisers.)

At the present moment the National-Revolutionary Army is equipped with the following arms: rifles, carbines, machine-guns, revolvers, hand-grenades and artillery-guns.-

1. **Rifles.** Total number of rifles: 65,000.

Models: 1) Japanese "Arisaka", calibre: 6,5; 2) old Japanese model of the same calibre; 3) German, calibre: 6,8; 4) Ger-

man, calibre : 7,9; 5) "Mauser"; 6) "Berdan"; 7) "Mannlicher"; there are in addition rifles of other models, quite antiquated and of no value at all.

There are also now in the National-Revolutionary Army "Arisaka" rifles, as well as antiquated heavy carbines, which must be carried by two persons (the third Army Corps is equipped with them).

The percentage of the above mentioned models, in proportion to the total number, is as follows: German rifles calibre 7,9 - manufactured by the Kwangtung Arsenal - about 50%; Japanese "Arisaka" rifles, calibre: 6,5 - about 17%; German rifles calibre: 6,8 - 11%; "Mauser" rifles - 4%; Carbines - 2%; rifles of various antiquated models - about 16%.

Out of the above-mentioned models of rifles the following are the best: Japanese "Arisaka" rifles, calibre: 6,5 and German rifles calibre: 7,9 - manufactured by the Kwangtung Arsenal; as regards the manufacturing of rifles of the last category, a steel of higher quality must be used and the workmanship improved.

Out of the total number of rifles those of antiquated models, i.e. 16%, must be considered as having almost no value for fighting; moreover, according to reports of various military units and the inspection of rifles, no less than 20% of them have lost their ballistic qualities to such a degree as to require replacing; it is necessary to replace 36% of rifles with new ones - a total of about 33,000. In some units of the National-Revolutionary Army there is lack of rifles; to make up the deficiency in this respect 20,000 rifles are required.

The supply of cartridges on hand for rifles varies. For "Arisaka" rifles there are an average of 250 cartridges for each and in addition, a reserve of 450 in supply depots. For German rifles, calibre: 7,9 there are 200 cartridges for each and in addition a reserve of 60 in supply depots. Rifles of

other models are provided with no less than 100 cartridges each, with only an insignificant reserve in supply depots.

In no less than 50% of the cases bayonets are lacking.

Carbines of German model, calibre: 7,9 were being manufactured by the local arsenal and used for the equipment of infantry, but now manufacturing of them has been stopped.-

B. Machine-guns.

Total number of machine-guns, including heavy and light machine-guns and automatic rifles: 360.

Models: "Maxim" machine-guns, calibre: 7,9 - manufactured by the Kwangtung Arsenal; 3-line "Maxim" machine-guns of Russian model; French machine-guns of "St.-Etienne" model; machine-guns of "Hotchkiss", "Schwarzlose", "Hogg", "Madsen" and "Hocse" models; automatic rifles of "Bergman" model; there are also machine-guns of other models, but their number is very small.

The percentage of the above-mentioned models is in proportion to the total number of machine-guns as follows: heavy "Maxim" machine-guns, manufactured by the Kwangtung Arsenal,- 40%; 3-line Russian Machine-guns - 15%; "St.-Etienne" machine-guns - 7%; machine-guns of other models - about 38%.

Of all these models the first-mentioned two are the best and the most suitable ones, on one hand - on account of their ballistic qualities and on the other - owing to the possibility of additionally equipping the army with machine-guns of these models: heavy "Maxim" machine-guns can be manufactured by the local arsenal, and 3-line Russian machine-guns may be purchased from outside.

Of the total number no more than 30%, i.e. about 110 machine-guns, may be considered as serviceable, suitable for fighting purposes; therefore, no less than 350 machine-guns are required for the army before it can be considered as sufficiently equipped with them; this calculation is made on the following basis: at least 18 machine-guns are required for each division

(including the Central Military-Political School); in addition, 10% must be in store as reserve-stock.

Spare-parts for machine-guns of all models are totally lacking except those for machine-guns of Russian make.

On an average, there are 2,000 cartridges for each machine-gun, manufactured by the Kwangtung Arsenal, and 10,000 for each Russian machine-gun.

C. Revolvers. Total number of revolvers: about 200,000.

Models: "Mauser" - 60%, mixed - 40%.

Pistols of "Mauser" model are mostly used by the so-called "Body Guard" (there is still such a unit in the National-Revolutionary Army) and, also by officers, but the majority of the latter have their own arms, the number of which has not been checked up.

On an average, there are 20 cartridges for each revolver.-

D. Hand-grenades. Total number of hand-grenades: 5,500.

Hand-grenades of the "Mills" model have been delivered by Russia. Besides the above-mentioned number, 8000 are stored as a reserve-stock.- 5500 13500

E. Artillery-guns. Total number of Artillery-guns: 92.

Models: "Arisaka" 75 m/m. field-gun; "Arisaka" 75 m/m. mountain-gun; "Krupp" 75 m/m. mountain-gun; mountain-guns, calibre: 57 m/m., 47 m/m. and 37 m/m., are only partially used for the equipment of military units.

All the guns of the above-mentioned models are without exception absolutely antiquated and have been withdrawn long ago from other armies and are at present of no value whatever. The equipment of the infantry can be considered as satisfactory up to 60%, but the artillery equipment bears an exceptionally abnormal character.

Of the above-mentioned models the "Arisaka" 75 m/m. field-

guns are most valuable, because they can be used for the defense of Canton, but only in rare cases (as during the second Eastern campaign) can they be used for special purposes (such as the occupation of the fortress of Waichow), because on account of the total absence of road it is almost impossible to move them.

The "Krupp" 75 m/m. mountain-gun can be considered as second best, as it is the most adaptable to local conditions and is light enough for transportation by man-power. This gun, however, requires remodelling.

During the civil war in the South of Kwangtung, when the enemy had the same kind of technical equipment the artillery or the National-Revolutionary Army was still effective; but as soon as it begins its northern advance, this artillery will be inadequate, even if the struggle continues to be against Chinese militarists exclusively. Therefore in order to increase the power of the National-Revolutionary Army, it is most necessary to provide its artillery with new guns.

There are 30 to 50 shells for each mountain-gun and 250 shells for each "Arisaka" field-gun. There is no shrapnel for mountain-guns. "Krupp" 75 m/m. mountain-guns can be supplied with munitions locally by the Canton Arsenal, which is manufacturing H.E. shells, charged with black powder of very low explosive power.

The re-equipment of the artillery can be effected only through purchases made abroad. 84 mountain-guns, suitable for transportation, are required for the artillery units before it can be considered as fully equipped in this respect.

The maintenance of arms in the units of the National-Revolutionary Army cannot be regarded as quite up to standard. There are serious defects both in the maintenance and the use of them. The repairs of arms have not been organized in a sufficient measure and, therefore, are not being made to the full

extent.

Defects. The following are the principal defects, in connection with the arms:

1) the absence of definite models and the existence of the great variety of makes, which complicates and, with regard to several models, renders even impossible proper ammunition supply.

2) the existence of various models makes instructions difficult, as a result, arms are not used properly and, therefore, become unserviceable sooner than they should.

3) Even in battalions and companies are arms of all kinds of makes and models used. (as in the case of the 3rd Army Corps).

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WAR DEPARTMENT

[illegible] Organs of the Army Administration.

(Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 III. 1926, Canton).

ORGANIZATION OF THE HIGHEST ORGANS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY.

Political Bureau

I. The Political Bureau of the Kuomintang Party.

1. The Political Bureau of the Kuomintang Party is the supreme organ of the National-Revolutionary Army.-
2. The Political Bureau determines the political character of the army.-
3. The Political Bureau fixes the budget and the numerical strength of the Army.-
4. The Political Bureau decides questions of peace and war.-
5. The President of the Military Council, the Chief Inspector and the Minister of War are appointed by the Political Bureau.-
6. The Political Bureau confirms the appointment of the members of the Military Council.-
7. The Political Bureau confirms the program of work, which is prepared by the Military Council.-
8. The Political Bureau confirms the important decisions of the Military Council on principal questions.-
9. The Political Bureau confirms the appointments of the following offcials: Army Corps Commanders, Chiefs of the Central Administration, the Chief of the Naval Bureau, the Chief of the Administration of the Army Air-service and the Chief of the Central Military-Political School.-
10. The Political Bureau supervises the work of the Military Council and of the National-Revolutionary Army. It receives regularly from the President of the Military Council reports, relating to these questions.-

II. The Military Council.

1. The Military Council is the highest military organ of the National-Revolutionary Army.-

2. The Military Council is subordinated to the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang.

3. The Military Council consists of the following officials: President, Chief Inspector, Minister of War, Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the Political Department (P.U.R.), Chief of the Administration of Supplies, Army Corps Commanders, Chief of the Naval Bureau, Chief of the Administration of the Army Air-service, Chief of the Central Military-Political School, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Commissioner of Home Affairs and Commissioner of Finances.-

4. The Military Council examines and approves: 1) the plans for military campaigns, 2) the plans for the organization of the army, 3) the plans for bringing the army up to full strength, 4) the plans for the supplies of the army, 5) the plans of training of the officer personnel, 6) the plans of political and military training of the army in general, 7) the plans for military service of officers and soldiers.

Army Corps Commanders, Chiefs of the Central Administrations, the Chief of the Naval Bureau, the Chief of the Administration of the Military Air-service and the Chief of the Central Military-Political School are appointed by the Military Council.

The Military Council confirms the appointment of Divisional Commanders and Chiefs of units and institutions, holding corresponding rank.-

5. The Military Council carries on its work in accordance with the plan, which is prepared by the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) and confirmed by the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang.

6. In order to put into effect the plans confirmed by the Mil-

itary Council, and to direct the routine work of the Central Administrative Departments of the Army Corps Commander, of the Chief of the Naval Bureau, of the Chief of the Administration of the Military Air-service and of the Chief of the Central Military-Political School, - the following members of the Military Council constitute a Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council): The President of the Military Council, the Chief Inspector and the Minister of War.

7. As regards the routine work, the President of the Military Council is in charge of questions relating to the political character of the army; the Chief Inspector is in charge of questions pertaining to organization and training; and the Minister of War is in charge of questions relating to supplies and the bringing up of the Army to full strength.

8. All questions of principle, as well as questions concerning the whole army in general, are decided according to the resolutions of the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) in corpore.-

9. The meetings of the Military Council are called no less than once a week.-

10. The meetings of the Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council) are called as often as necessary, but no less than twice a week.-

Central Administration of the N.R. Army

III. The Central Administration of the National Revolutionary Army.

1. The Central Administration of the National-Revolutionary Army, consisting of: 1) the General Staff, 2) the Political Department and 3) the Administration of Supplies, is the working apparatus of the Military Council and its Presidium (Permanent Commission of the Military Council).-

2. The General Staff works out, and is in charge of problems,

relating to operations, field-service and organization, and also of problems pertaining to training and to bringing the army up to its full strength.

3. The Political Department (P.U.R.) is in charge of questions, relating to political training of the army and is in charge of providing it with political personnel.-

4. The Administration of Supplies prepares the plans and is in charge of the Supplying of the army.-

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ADMINISTRATION OF THE KUOMINTANG ARMY.



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WAR DEPARTMENT

P.U.R.

A-14

REGULATIONS, GOVERNING THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

I.General Articles.

I. General Articles.

1) The Political Directorate has for its aim the guidance of the party and the political and cultural work in the National Revolutionary Army.-

2) The Political Directorate is subordinated to the Military Council and carries on its work in accordance with the plans approved by the said Council.-

3) In its routine work, the Political Directorate is guided by instructions of the President of the Military Council.-

4) As regards questions relating to party work in the army (organization of nuclei, admission and expulsion of members, education of members of the Party along party lines), the Political Directorate is guided by resolutions of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang Party.-

5) At the head of P.U.R. is a Chief who is at the same time member of the Military Council.-

6) The P.U.R. carries on its work in the Army through Commissaries and Political Sections.-

7) The following are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.:

a) Commissaries of Army Corps' and Separate Divisions;

b) Commissaries of the Navy and the Air-service;

c) Commissary of the Central Military-Political School;

d) Commissaries of the General Staff and the Central Administration of Supplies.

Note. At present the President of the Military Council is concurrently Commissary of several Army Corps' and of the Central School. In these Army Corps' and in the Central School permanent Deputy-Commissaries are appointed, who are subordinated to the P.U.R., in accordance with the general regulations.

8) All party, political and cultural work in the Army is or-

carried on in accordance with the plans and directions of the P.U.R.-

9) All social-political organizations in the Army (such as "Society for the Study of Sunyatsenism", "Young Military Men Association", etc.) carry on their work under the guidance of the P.U.R. and of the respective Commissaries and Political Sections. The existence of organizations outside of the control and guidance of P.U.R. is not permitted.-

10) All party and political workers in the Army are at the exclusive disposal of the P.U.R. and its subordinated political organs. Without the knowledge and consent of the P.U.R., they cannot be appointed, dismissed or transferred to other work.-

11) The P.U.R. is in charge of control, replacemnt and appointment of political workers in the army. The procedure of appointing Commissaries is fixed by the special Regulations governing Political Commissaries.-

II.Organisation of P.U.R.

II. Organisation of P.U.R.

12) The Political Directorate consists of:

1. Administrative Department:
   - a) Secretariat,
   - b) Section for Economic Affairs,
   - c) Despatching office;
2. Propaganda Department:
   - a) Propaganda Section,
   - b) Cultural and Educational Section,
   - c) Information Section,
   - d) Publishing Section.
3. Department of Party Affairs:
   - a) Party Section,
   - b) Organizing Section.-

III.Aims of the Departments of P.U.R.

III. Aims of the Departments of the P.U.R.

13) The Administrative Department acts as the organ of the

Administrative Department.

P.U.R. in charge of Administrative affairs and Supplies.-

14) The Secretariat is in charge of the compilation of papers going out and the registration of all papers issued and received by the P.U.R.-

15) The Section of Economic Affairs is in charge of the supplying of the P.U.R. with necessary articles and funds; it prepares the budget of P.U.R. and checks up the budgets of the Political Sections, which are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.-

16) The Despatching Office is in charge of the despatching of all literature, materials and documents issued by the P.U.R.-

Propaganda Department.

17) The Propaganda Department works out materials of ideal and directive character for the whole party and political personnel of the Army in the sphere of cultural and political education and instuction of soldiers, students and officers; it arranges conferences and meetings on questions relating to political work in the Army.-

18) The Propaganda Section is in charge of the preparation of plans, instructions, theses, programs and other materials relating to political education and to the conduct of various political campaigns and gives instructions to the political personnel of army units in the sphere of political work.-

19) The Cultural and Educational Section is in charge of the preparation of all materials relating to the organisation of cultural and educational work and of the teaching in schools, clubs and other cultural and educational organs of self-activity; organizes libraries, sporting and other competitions and contests and gives instructions as to how this work is to be carried on in army units.-

20) The Information Section is in charge of the control of the whole political and party personnel of the Army and studies materials relating to the political work and condition of army units.-

21) The Publishing Section is in charge of the compilation and publication of all materials issued by the P.U.R., such as: newspapers, books, placards, leaflets, etc. The distribution of all published materials is done by the Chief of the Propaganda Department.-

Department of Party Affairs.

22) The Department of Party Affairs is in charge of the organization and guidance of all party work in the army; directs "the Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" and all party organizations and convokes party conferences and meetings.-

23) The Party Section is in charge of the compilation of all programs, theses and other materials relating to party work and education and to the conduct of various party campaigns etc.-

24) The Organization Section is in charge of the preparation of all regulations in connection with the military-politacal, party and cultural-educational work in the army and compiles regulations and instructions.-

IV. Military Tribunal.

IV. Military Tribunal.

The Military Tribunal is attached to P.U.R. Its organization and personnel are fixed by special Regulations.-

V. Personnel of P.U.R.

V. Personnel of P.U.R.

Chief of the P.U.R.:	1
Assistant of the Chief of the P.U.R.:	1
Secretary to the Chief of the P.U.R.:	1
1. Administrative Department:	
Chief of the Department:	1
a) Secretariat:	
Chief of the Secretariat:	1
Secretary:	1
Clerks:	2
b) Section of Economic Affairs:	
Chief of the Section:	1

Treasurer:	1
Clerk :	1
c) Despatching office:	
Chief of the Office:	1
Despatchers:	2
Messengers, coolies:	7

2. Propaganda Department:

Chief of the Department:	1
a) Propaganda Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Instructors-propagandists:	2
b) Cultural and Educational Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Instructors in the work of schools and clubs:	2
c) Information Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Secretary in charge of the political personnel:	1
Secretary in charge of the information affairs:	1
Clerks:	2
d) Publishing Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Editors:	2
Editorial Staff	
Printing office	

3. Department of Party Affairs:

Chief of the Department:	1
a) Party Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Instructors:	2
b) Organization Section:	
Chief of the Section:	1
Instructors:	2

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTELLIGENCE
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Organization of an Army Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY CORPS AND ITS COMPONENT UNITS.

Corps.

A. An Army Corps is the largest tactical unit in the National Revolutionary Army. According to the original idea, a Corps must be sufficiently independent, in order to be able to carry separate fighting missions. Tactically a Corps carries out a definite fighting mission in a section of the front or on the whole front; it therefore, must be an independent unit. It is a Chinese custom to call a Corps "Army"; this designation has some ground, because Army Corps' are entirely independent units, have nothing common such as enlisted personnel and arms with other Army Corps.- Transfers from one to another Corps is unknown.

B. Even now there is in the National-Revolutionary Army no uniform organisation of Army Corps. There is no such uniformity not only in the details of the internal organization, but also in the number and numerical strength of units, which compose an Army Corps. Some Army Corps are made up of two Divisions; and there are Army Corps, which, according to the Regulations, are composed of three Devision and finally some Army Corps consist of four Divisions. In some Army Corps there is an Artillery Regiment, in others - only an Artillery Battalion. In view of such differences in the organization of the units, which compose an Army Corps, it is impossible to give a comprehensive account of the organization of an Army Corps.

The reasons of such differences lie for instance in the fact that it is still impossible to make Army Corps of equal strength as regards the artillery, because, it would be necessary to withdraw artillery guns from one Army Corps and to pass them on to another. There are, however, some common features of the organization, e.g., infantry units, which compose Regiments and smaller units, are organized, approximatively, accord-

ing to the same scheme, with slight exceptions.-

C. As a rule, an Army Corps is composed of the following units, which are subordinated directly to the Corps Commander: Divisions (from two to four), Army Corps Staff, Political Section and Gendarmerie Battalion. They are subordinated directly to the Chief of Staff: the Administration of Supplies, the Engineer Section, the Sanitary Section and the Artillery Battalion. The Commander of the Artillery Battalion is also the Commander of the Corps Artillery. It can be seen from the above that subordinated to the Corps Commander are 5-7 officers and also four officers whom he may transfer to the Chief of Staff. The artillery is concentrated in the Army Corps: as there is a limited quantity of artillery in the whole army, it is necessary to secure its proper distribution and direction during the time of war.

In view of the fact that (as has been mentioned, before) the composition of Army Corps differs, their numerical strength is fluctuating from 12,000 to 23,000 dependent upon the number of divisions.

As the Army Corps is a complete unit, the Administration of supplies gets everything necessary from the Central Administration and then makes the distribution to the various units independently.-

Division. D. The organization of a Division is more exact and definite. A Division is made up of three regiments. As a unit, a Division is composed almost exclusively of infantry; it is provided with no technical equipment, except machine-guns and has only small engineer and communication sections.

Regiment E. The organization of a Regiment is even more definite. Although an attempt has been made in some Divisions of organizing Regiments consisting of 4 Battalions, as a rule, there are no

Regiments, which are composed of 18 Companies. A Regiment is made up of three Battalions or nine Companies. Each Regiment must have a Machine-gun Company, but the number of machine-guns varies, and is dependant upon the total number of machine-guns available in the Army-corps. Machine-guns are at the disposal of the Regimental Commander; in war-time they are distributed to the platoons of the Battalions.

According to its nature, a Regiment is a fundamental unit, which can fulfil an independent fighting mission.

In addition to three Infantry Battalions, the Regimental Commander has at his disposal: a machine-gun Company, a Scout Company, a Headquarters Company and a Sanitary Detachment.-

Battalions, Companies, Platoons.

I. A Regiment is made up of three Battalions, each of which consists of three Companies, each Company is divided into three Platoons.

A Company has no arms, except rifles.-

(Tables showing numerical strength of military units: S.S. p.p. 6-9).-

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Complements of

A. Companies.

A. Company	Infantry	Gendarmerie
Officers	5	9
Non-commissioned officers	11	11
Combat soldiers	90	95
Non combat soldiers	19	14
Total	125	129

B. Battalion	Infantry			Gendarmerie		
	Staff	Companies	Total	Staff	Companies	Total
Officers	4	15	19	14	27	41
Non-commissioned officers	4	33	37	5	33	38
Combat soldiers	4	270	274		285	285
Non combatants	10	57	67	20	42	62
Grand Total	22	375	397	39	387	426

Complement of a Regiment.

Regimental / Personnel	Staff	Political Section	Machine-gun Company	Scout Company	Headquarters Company	Sanitary Detachment	Battalions	Total
Officers	19	5	5	4	3	9	57	102
Non-Commissioned officers	19		19	8	5	9	111	171
Combatant soldiers			54	60	45		822	981
Non-combatants	77	3	16	12	9	94	201	412
Grand Total	115	8	94	84	62	112	1191	1666

Complement of a Division.

	Staff	Supplies Section	Communications Company	Headquarters Company	Sappers' Company	Regiments	Political Section Artillery	Total
Generals	2							2
Officers	21	19	5	5	13	306	4	373
Non-Comm. officers		1	7	11	23	513		555
Combat. Soldiers			44	90	121	2943		3198
Noncombatant		49	11	19	101	1236	3	1419
Grand Total	23	69	67	125	258	4998	7	5547

Note. In time of war only 75 coolies are hired to perform the work of noncombatant soldiers.

Complement

I Army Corps exclusive Divisions.

	Staff	Supplies Administration	Sanitary Section	Communications	Engineer Section	Political Section	Headquarters Company	Artillery Battalion	Pontoonmen's Battalion	Total
Generals	4									4
Officers	47	20	31	22	4	19	9	11	41	204
Non-Comm. officers	71	2	5	11		2	11	35	38	175
Combat soldiers				48			95	94	385	622
Noncombatants	207		96			16	14	95	62	496
Grand Total	328	22	142	81	4	38	129	285	426	1401

II Army Corps Complement (Divisions included)

If an Army Corps is composed of:	Generals	Officers	Non-commissioned officers	Soldiers serving at the front	Soldiers non serving at the front	Total
two Divisions	8	950	1285	6981	2334	11,558
three "	10	1323	1840	10178	3753	17,105
four "	12	1696	2395	13377	5172	22,652

Cavalry. There is no Cavalry, as a special branch of the service, in the National-Revolutionary Army. The total absense of Cavalry in the whole of South China can be considered as an established fact. The following are the principal reasons: 1) the lack of horses, especially in the Kwangtung province, 2) the character of terrain: mountainous, with marshy paddy-fields, which renders the use of the cavalry impossible. Mounted courier service is also very much hindered by the character of terrain and roads, which are simply footpaths. But mounted men can be used to maintain communication with the rear of the army.- There is not the least doubt that the probable enemies (Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan and the other provinces in the Yang-tze river valley) are also lacking cavalry.-

Artillery. The use of the artillery is very limited, on account of the absence of roads and the lack of horse or mechanical traction. As the roads are simply footpaths and the traction - power is provided by men, it is possible to use only light mountain-guns of small calibre (45, 57, 75 m/m.), suitable for transportation, but even these only in limited numbers. Therefore, the Army Corps have only one Artillery-regiment or even only one Artillery-Battalion.-

Engineer Units. Great distances, mountainous terrain, the mobile warfare, short duration of battles, absence of heavy artillery and heavy loads - all these circumstances render the use of engineer units and particularly of sappers' units very limited. It is considered sufficient to have one sappers' Company (for the construction of roads and bridges) in the Division without a corresponding unit in the regiment. - In fact, however, engineer units are almost totally lacking in the National-Revolutionary Army.-

Communications. The importance of Communication is increasing. The radio

can be very widely used. Communication between various army Corps and between an Army Corps and the high command can be maintained only by radio and, occasionally, by permanent telegraph lines. The field-telegraph must be widely used.

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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

In the process of the struggle with individual militarists for its existence and subsequently in the struggle for the unification of Kuangtung the national-liberating movement has hammered out an army whose character as well as the ways and methods of its organization are quite different from those of the armed forces of the rest of China. The experiments in creating military forces which would consciously defend the young national liberating movement and be free of the features of the present Chinese militarism proved a great success. Under very complicated and unstable conditions of continual struggle between various militaristic groups, under the active opposition of the imperialism (Hongkong), in the presence of a great diversity of interests in the forces, which constitute the national-liberating movement, under many very serious material and technical difficulties, it has proved possible to create on absolutely new principles an armed force which was able to defend the national-liberating movement during the most trying period.

The experiment of creating the Whampoa military forces has an enormous political significance for the national-liberating movement not only in China, but also in other oriental countries as it exactly indicates to them the path to follow.

A decisive part was played in the victories of the National Government by the Whampoa troops. All that was best in the armed forces of Kwangtung was rallied around them, and after their pattern the whole army of the National Government is now being organised.

The chief weapon of the National-Revolutionary Army is its political consciousness and political enlightening. Owing to this weapon, of which the National Government is the only possessor, it will always surpass its opponents even if all other

conditions are quite equal.

The second feature which shows the National-Revolutionary Army to the best advantage is that all its elements are pursuing one aim through one will. Through the centralization which is now being put in practice, it will be possible to extend throughout the whole army all necessary measures in connection with its administration, organization and preparation which if duly carried out will guarantee the power of the army.

Unification of the command may to no little extent insure success in the armed struggle to come.

At present the amalgamation of the armed forces of Kwangtung and Kuanghsi is proceeding; the military apparatus is being centralised; the military economy and military industry are being reorganised; technical means of fighting are being created and developed; expansion of the political work throughout the whole mass of the army is taking place, - all of which testifies to the vitality of the National Revolutionary Army and shows the enormous work which is going within it.

The transition from militarism to the centralized National Revolutionary Army has not happened at one stroke. This process cannot as yet be considered as completed. But the fundamental thing is attained, namely,- conditions are created under which the ideas of centralization more and more are being recognized by all classes and social groups. These ideas are considered now as necessary conditions for the further consolidatim of the power of the National-Revolutionary Government and its army.

There are inevitably many obstacles in this respect. Taking into account the nature of the national-liberating movement, defects in the organization of the Kuomintang, scarcity of human revolutionary resources, etc., a great deal of time and effort must necessarily be used for campaigning. However, there is no doubt that the coming period will pass under the motto of the concentration of all efforts in creating the Na-

tional-Revolutionary Army and in the further development of the idea of centralization.

The firm course for centralization puts as a basis of the whole work the question of the higher administration of the National Revolutionary Army. Before this question is satisfactorily settled, no work in connection with the centralisation of the Army will be possible. If the Military Council of the National Revolutionary Army enjoys a sufficient authority within and without of the Army, the same cannot be said of the General Staff, the organ on which properly speaking the whole burden of work in connection with carrying out the idea of centralization is resting. So far, the General Staff with its departments of inspectors has not yet won popularity in the army, nor could it get in touch with military units; still less has it been able to direct the work in connection with administration, preparedness, etc.

The problem of the present moment is to carry out a series of measures in order to enable the influence of the General Staff to penetrate into the army and to intensify its work in connection with the preparation of necessary plans for operations and mobilisation and to take other measures in connection with preparedness for war as well as to solve a series of questions relating to the centralization of the army. For all that, the mere fact of existence of the General Staff, the Political Department, the Department of Supplying, etc. shows that in the question of high military command the National-Revolutionary Army is ahead of any army in China.

Worthy of being mentioned is the fact of adoption by the whole army of a plan of regular supply of finances, artillery material, etc., through the central military organs. Day by day one observes a gradual departure from the most characteristic features of the Chinese militarism. The National Revolutionary Army acquires step by step all qualities of a regularly admin-

istered army. All its large units (corps, division) as well as tactical units (regiment, company) are formed on the basis of a united organization and distributed in accordance with a definite plan of distribution of troops. In 20 divisions of the National Revolutionary Army (6 Corps and 2 separate divisions, of 3 regiments each) stationed now in various places of the territory of Kwangtung there are 65.000 rifles (100.000 men), 370 machine-guns, 70 Artillery guns.

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The complement, political trustiness and fighting preparadness in the various army corps differ. The 1st, 2nd and 4th corps are to some extent better than the rest.

The bringing up to full strength of the National Revolutionary Army is being carried out through recruiting, which is not yet centralized and is in hands of the army corps commanders. The enlisted personnel is in general homogeneous, a difference is noticeable only in the degree of the political training in various units. The soldier is extremely unpretentious and most enduring. He yields to discipline and political training and in general is splendid fighting material. The least attention shown to him will be returned a hundredfold.

The commissioned personnel as a whole is unsatisfactory. The majority of them are devoid of strong will and firmness of character. They are very irresolute in their actions, prefer to avoid fighting, and their tactical training is most insufficient. Young officers, graduates of the Whampoa School, possess resolution, energy and impulse (impetus), but have no service and fighting experience. Still, the National Revolutionary Army possesses in them the best younger commanding personnel in China.

The material equipment of the Army is in a lamentable state. 20.000 rifles are needed. 36 percent of all existing rifles need to be replaced. Not less than 50 per cent of rifles have no bayonets. The stock of cartridges is insufficient, -

250 - 600 per rifle. Not more than 30 per cent of machine-guns can be considered in good condition. Artillery consists only of mountain guns of small caliber (75 m/m. 57 m/m, 47 m/m and 37 m/m.) of obsolete models, which had long ago come into disuse in other armies. Only about 50 per cent of those guns still possess more or less passable ballistic qualities, the rest being completely worn out and having no value. Firing is only possible with direct aiming from open positions. There are only 30 - 60 shells (very old) per gun.

The most important arm of the National Revolutionary Army is the infantry. Here it is in a very real sense the "queen of the campaigns." But the equipment of the infantry with artillery and other technical equipment is in some cases less than that during the epoch of Napoleon. Roughly speaking, we have in the National Revolutionary Army 1 gun for every 1000 men, 1 machine-gun for every 250 men, 1 heavy machine-gun for every 750 men.

Aviation and communications (technical) are in an embryonic state. Cavalry and armoured forces are not of much use on the local theatre of military operations. The sea-fleet, on account of its condition, is able to carry out only missions of strictly local character. Service of sanitation is of the lowest grade. Supply service and General Staff work are just being arranged.

The fighting preparadness of the National Revolutionary Army is not of a high standard and cannot be even critically discussed from the European point of view. Still, it is higher than that of its probable nearest enemy (at least up to the Yangtze river). Field training and firing exercises are being carried out on approximately the same principles as in the Russian Army before the great war. Preparation of auxiliary kinds of troops (except artillery) is being taught, with a few exceptions, only to the commissioned personnel and non-commissioned officers.

The military education is now centralized. Army corps schools are being closed, and the Central Military-Political School will

be the only service school.

Fighting experience and certain traditions of the National Revolutionary Army have been acquired in the last three or four campaigns. The Army has now a great confidence in its strength. The idea of the inevitableness of liberation of all China from militarism and imperialism (northern expedition) is entering gradually its thoughts.

Existence of the National Revolutionary Army and its future activity are not separated now from the destinies of the National-liberating movement. In this respect we are able to say that we have an army which recognizes that it exists only for the people and not against the people./

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WAR DEPARTMENT

Navy. (Extract from the Report of L. Grey, dated 15 III 1926, Canton).

THE HIGH-SEA AND RIVER PATROL FLEET OF THE KUOMINTANG GOVERNMENT.

The Navy Department is subordinated to the Military Council and has the following organization:

1) the Staff of the Navy which consists of the Operations section, the Command section, the combat section, the engineering section, Juristic section, the sections for supplies and the Secretariat of the Staff;
2) The Educational and Political Departments;
3) The Bureaux of Shipbuilding, Inspection and Control.

The active and the subsidiary units of the fleet.

The ships are divided into three fundamental groups:

1) First Group:
   a) Seagoing warships of different kinds - 7;
   b) Armed troopships - 4 (seagoing);
2) Second group:
   a) River gunboats of different kinds - 15;
   b) Armed troopships - 12;
3) Third group:
   Patrol boats (river torpedo-boats of a very obsolete type) - 6;
4) Fourth group which does not belong to the active fleet:
   Old worthless launches which are to be transferred to the Ministry of Finance - 13.

The personnel of the high-sea Fleet:

Officers - 431, enlisted men - 1742

The personnel for service on shore:

In the Staff and the Departments: officers - 153, en-

listed men - 1852.

The Landing forces (marines) consist of 82 officers, 750 enlisted men, (650 rifles, 39,000 cartridges).

The conditions in the different departments of the Navy.

The Navy Department (including the Staff).- The Navy Department was organized in August 1925, but owing to the lack of suitable personnel and owing to the fact that those who were at hand lacked experience, it was wrongly organised into three independent sections: 1) the Staff 2) the Educational Section and 3) the Port-Administration(which includes the Section of Supplies) - all of which are directly subordinated to the Chief of the Department. As stated above, the functions of the Staff are mixed up with those of the Sections of repairs, supplies and economic matters of the navy in general. Owing to this organisation the operations problems of the fleet are intermixed with questions of supplies, of instruction etc. and are therefore often solved in a wrong way. The work of the Navy Department as a whole is still far from being properly arranged. The chiefs of the sections do not as yet know their business and continue to muddle along. During the past period the chiefs of the Sections have only learned to record the work, which helps to control the latter and to have the work properly arranged in future. The cause of all these defects is that the Navy Department is undermanned and that its funds are 50-60% below the sum which ought to be spent for the fleet in order to have it put in proper condition. Another cause is the ignorance and incompetence in staff-work of the higher officers of the navy, including admirals, which prevents the quick and proper reorganisation of the Department according to European standards. They are absolutely ignorant in matters of their profession. At present some steps have been taken to prepare the reorganisa-

tion of the Navy Department: the personnel is being trained and the method of working is being changed in some Sections of the Staff, viz: a military staff with special regulations and under discipline is being used instead of compradors. The regulations and the budget of the Department and instructions for all chiefs of Sections are being prepared in conformity with European systems. There will be three fundamental Sections (organisations) - the Staff, the Educational section and the section of Supplies.

The tasks which the national-revolutionary movement imposes on the fleet are divided into the local task and the task of an all-national nature. The local task consists in the safeguarding and patrolling of the rivers and the coast; the tasks of an all-national nature are 1) the defense of Kwang-tung which, as experience has shown, cannot be effected without a fleet; 2) the supporting of the northward movement of the National-Revolutionary army, especially as there are two bases of the enemy - at Makao and Hongkong.

The chief difficulty in carrying out these tasks is the lack of funds and of technical means. This makes it necessary to create as soon as possible a small but strong mobile nucleus of a fleet using local resources.

<u>The high sea fleet.</u>

The fleet is at present carrying out operations in the service of the Government, of four fundamental kinds: 1) Gunboats which are on duty in distant provinces and which are subordinated, as regards their operations, to Corps Commanders of the National-Revolutionary army; 2) Gunboats which are under orders of the Military Council and are engaged in the suppression of piracy in the delta and on the high seas; 3) Gunboats which in conjunction with the Strike Committee are blockading Hongkong and guarding the mouth of the river as well as the approaches by sea to Canton; 4) the rest of the ships are at Canton, either being under repairs or awaiting repairs. The state of repairs

of the active fleet which is operating at present is extremely unsatisfactory. Not to speak of the armament, the bodies of the ships, which have not been docked for 10-13 years, as well as the parts below the water-line are mostly holding together only by means of cement. However, gradually and as far as means permit, the ships are patched before going into action. Should all the repairs of the fleet as needed be carried out at once, The Government would remain a long time with its boundaries open to pirates. The repairs therefore are carried out according to the means at hand and according to the (inner) political conditions which require the use of the fleet. Thus at present there are 13 gunboats of different types docked and their bodies and machinery are being overhauled; others have already undergone the necessary repairs and others have had no repairs at all and are unable to move.

The Armament of the fleet.

The condition of the artillery, the rifles and the machine-guns is such that with a few exceptions all of them must be replaced; on 59 ships there are 18 different types of guns and machine-guns; these obsolete arms are no more "effective" and must be replaced by arms of one type; only the ages of the guns vary from 98 to 23 years. At present there are altogether in the fleet 97 guns of various makes and of calibres from 10.5 to 2.5 cm., with about 7000 shells of various kinds of which some 3500 are good for firing. There are 393 machine-guns (mitrailleuses?), from 7 to 20 years old, with about 48.275 cartridges of which about 3o.ooo are good for firing.

The Machinery.

The machinery and bodies of the ships which have had no proper repairs since they were built, are falling into complete decay and only if a monthly sum of 20.000 Canton dollars is allotted for this purpose, it will be possible in the course of a year to have the river-flotilla thoroughly repaired. Anyhow it

is necessary, first of all, to repair the gunboats with small draught of the type of the "Kiang". One boat of that type can be repaired each month and at the same time the current repairs on other ships can be made. Major repairs of sea-going ships can be made only at Shanghai or at Vladivostok.

The Supplies.

The section of supplies is very bulky and inflexible. It bears more the character of supplying through compradores than by means of a military establishment working in conformity with a plan. There are several reasons for it: all technical as well as other supplies necessary for the fleet are purchased by compradores through market-brokers, who cannot be controlled and it is impossible to fix the prices or to purchase the supplies necessary for the fleet by competition bids. Besides it is impossible to purchase everything necessary for the Navy from only one firm as in the other ports of China or in Japan. In Canton there are no special firms or contractors for navy supplies and the navy itself has no depots or stores. Thus all the necessary equipment, the tackle, the navigation instruments and all that is required for the machinery of the fleet is being procured as occasion arises, and the quality and the price of these goods depend entirely on the compradores, who take advantage of the political situation in Canton and the boycott of British goods and charge triple prices. As a whole it may be said that the supplying is being done without any plan and at random. At present the question of supplies is to be solved by finding a "general compradore" for the navy, with a "bond" and with a proper contract, who will supply all sections of the navy according to a prearranged plan and at prices as fixed in the price-lists of the firms, with a moderate commission.

The Fuel.

The Navy Department has a contract with the compradore of the Coal Company "Missiu" for the regular supply of coal for the

navy at the rate of 14 dollars per ton. The quality, and the delivery of the coal are stipulated in the contract. So far the Company has been carrying out the contract properly (according to the Chinese law the contract has been made for an indefinite time) and supplies the fleet with coal in proper time; it even allows some indebtedness in excess of the one fixed in the contract, which is at times 30 to 40 thousand dollars.

<u>The principal monthly expenditures</u>: Canton dollars.

1) Salaries of the whole Department, including the Political Section,.....21.000
2) Salaries of the sea fleet.....52.000
3) Monthly expenditure for coal and lubricating oils.....30.000
4) Current repairs of the ships.....32.000
5) Equipment..... 5.000
6) Supplies for the fleet.....10.000

(In Canton dollars) Total.... 150.000

The sum of 150.000 Canton dollars monthly is at present received from the Government according to the semi-annual budget which does not include the expenditures for extensive repairs of the ships or the greater part of the expenses for the current repairs which cost much more than the monthly allowance. The repairs in the Navy have so far been paid for principally with the money realized by the sale of contraband seized by the fleet. According to a (verbal)agreement with the Minister of Finances Sung the fleet receives 80% of the seized contraband and the Ministry of Finances 20%. With this money the seagoing part of the fleet is being put into seaworthy condition. Thus the gunboats "Chung-Shan" and "Kuang-Yin" and 3 torpedo-boats were repaired.

<u>Schedule of repairs in the Navy during the current year.</u>

1) The gunboat "Chung Shan". To be rebuilt and re-armed with

130 m/m artillery guns, central fire control apparatus; 2 range finders, 2 search lights, one 75m/m. anti-air-craft gun, four 47m/m. guns, two 37m/m. guns on the bridge, 2 machine-guns, one steel mast with a machine-gun platform and one torpedo-tube are to be installed.

2) The gunboat "Fei-Ying". To be rebuilt and re-armed with three 130 m/m. guns, one 75 m/m. and four 47 m/m. Central fire control apparatus, 2 projectors, 2 range-finders and a steal mast with a machine-gun platform are to be installed. Construction of a catapult for a light seaplane or, if this is impossible, of a platform for seaplane and changing of torpedo-tubes are also planned.

3) Construction, using local facilities, of two torpedo-boats, not over 500 tons; the machinery of scrapped old Russian torpedo-boats to be bought.

4) Purchase of two submarines from the U.S.S.R. (scrapped from the U.S.S.R. fleet).

5) Repairing of 5 torpedo-boats of the type Liu-chin and changing of the torpedo-tubes.

6) Construction of 5 fast seagoing torpedo-launches, with a speed of 30 knots and a 10 hours cruising radius; armament: 1 torpedo-tube and 1 machine-gun.

7) The troopship "Wo-Shan" to be changed into a mine-layer.

8) Repairing of the two gunboats "Hai-Fong" and "Ping Nan" and changing them into mine-sweepers. Construction of 2 new mine-sweepers.

9) Purchase of 2 troopships from 2,500 to 3,000 tons dead-weight and remodeling of one of them into an seroplane carrier for 4 or 6 seaplanes.

10) Repairing of the troopship "Woo An", as an auxiliary and training-ship.

11) Reconstruction of the "Kwong Pek" and the "Lü-Lüng"(former

river boats) into repair boats (water pumpers?)

12) Repairing and re-arming of the "Wo Fong", "Wen-Ping", "Kwang Ken" and "Pao Pei" and the construction of new patrol and despatch boats with a maximum speed of 16 knots and a cruising radius of 2500 miles at a speed of 10 knots, with two 100 m/m. guns and one 75 m/m. anti-air-craft-gun.

13) Purchase of 6 scout seaplane and organisation of an air service detachment.

14) Repairing of 3 gunboats with small draught and the construction of 4 new gunboats with a draught of 2 to 3 feet.

15) Re-arming of all boats of the river flotilla with guns of one type.

<u>The Bases of the Fleet</u>.

16) Repairing of the "Whampoa" dock and organisation of all kinds of workshops necessary for the fleet.

17) Repairing of the Kwang Nan yard at Canton.

18) Outfitting of a torpedo-station and providing the fleet with torpedos of a more modern type.

19) Organisation of a mine-planting station at Whampoa.

20) Installation of a station for mines and purchase of mines for blocking the access to Canton from the sea.

21) Arming the port Swatow with four 6" guns and organisation of a base.

<u>The Means for Repairs.</u>

All current repairs and the partial re-armament of the fleet are at present carried out by private contractors, because there are no government factories; all repairs are therefore in the hands of compradores, of various "Union" workshops and small factories which have concluded contracts with the fleet and are liable for default if urgent repairs are not finished in the time specified.

The repairs from a technical standpoint are made very poor-

ly, especially the riveting of the bodies and the repairing of the heavy machinery, as there are no qualified riveters, blacksmiths and boiler-makers at Canton. The reason is that previous to the blockade of HongKong the repairs were mostly made at the dock-yards and workshops of HongKong. If really good work in the rebuilding of the fleet is to be done at Canton, it will be necessary to have skilled workmen come from HongKong or Shanghai.

The Personnel.

The Ships Officers: On the boats of the 1st group (sea-going) and on the troopships there are 8 officers on each: a Commander, a Senior officer, a Second and a Third officer, a Senior engineer, a second and a third engineers and an artillery officer (there are no physicians, not even medical enlisted men in the whole fleet). On the boats of the 2nd group (river-boats) there are a Commander, a Senior Officer, a Second officer, an Artillery officer, a Senior engineer and a second engineer. On the gunboats of the 3rd group (patrol-boats) there are a Commander, a Senior officer, an Engineer and an Artillery officer.

The efficiency of the officers in military matters.

Up to this month the controlling commission of the navy has succeded in examining as to efficiency about 300 officers. The results were as follows: 65 men have finished a course in military naval schools, 14 - in schools for radio-telegraphy, 8 - in Army-Military schools, 1 - in a police-juristic school, 1 - in an engineering school, and 111 are primary school graduates, 2 - in the school for commercial navigation, 2 - are high-school graduates. In general it may be said none of the officers knows his business theoretically or practically and, as a matter of fact, none of them deserves to be called a naval

officer, not only in regard to ability, but also with respect to his moral character. Some of them have been in the service from 5 to 30 years and yet they often know less than non-commissioned officers. In the Naval Department and in the Staff the officers are paid as follows: the Chief of the fleet (Commander in Chief?) - 450 dollars, the Chiefs of Departments - 400 dol., the Chiefs of Sections - 350 dollars, the Assistant-Chiefs and the Staff-officers in general, beginning with the rank of 1st Captain down to midshipman - from 240 to 100 dollars with board, but no equipment is furnished.

In general the officers of the navy do in no wise differ from the army officers as concerns their intellect, their manners, their speculativeness, their tendency to avail themselves of their offices for making profit. Moreover, they smoke opium, play cards, take bribes wherever it is possible, not disdaining even trifles, such as cheating their subordinates out of their food and equipment. As regards politics they are, even judging from the stand-point of Chinese, little conscious of them; they take an interest in political lessons only as a matter of duty, outwardly following the precepts of Dr. Sun-yat-sen; their counter-revolutionism mostly rests not on political, but on material reasons.

Such as they are the officers must be replaced by new ones as soon as the first contingent of new officers finishes the course at the school and has had sufficient practical experience on sea and on rivers.

As regards naval experience the officers are absolutely useless, not only as (military) administrators, but also as specialists. They know absolutely nothing of tactics, astronomy, navigation, artillery, mines, ship-building, mechanics and other naval sciences. The special functions are mostly done by senior non-commissioned officers who have served some 10 years in hand-

ling guns or machinery. Peculiar to say, there is in the whole fleet only one man, who knows how to handle mines, a former non-commissioned officer; he is now 72 years old, and when he dies, there won't be anyone in the whole navy who knows how to assemble and to take to pieces a mine, in spite of the fact that there are officers in the fleet who are supposed to be specialists in mine planting. As for navigation and sailing in general, each gunboat has two pilots who have the rank of non-commissioned officers and who get comparatively low pay. They steer the gunboats and are actually in command of them when they are at sea. As regards military service the officers are good from a Chinese stand-point; but the Chinese military drill regulations are appropriate only for ceremonies and of no use for military operations.

The pay of the officers. The Commanders of gunboats, are paid according to their rank, from 180 to 240 dollars, with board, but without equipment. The senior officers get 100 to 180 dollars; junior officers, artillery officers and engineers get from 60 to 100 dollars with board but without equipment.

The enlisted personnel.

The land-contingent in the service of the Navy Department, a total of 110 men, consists of clerks, messengers, chauffeurs and coolies. Each seagoing gunboat of the 1st group has a crew of 89 to 109 men - artillery-men, helmsmen, engineers, stokers and deck-hands. There are very few men trained for special duties, as for instance there are only 4 signalmen in the whole Navy and they are very poor. On each gunboat of the II group (river-gunboats) are from 47 to 67 men; on those of the III group - from 20 to 40 men. The recruiting of the ship crews is very poorly done. It must be improved and men must be recruited who are specialists and who have a better moral character (most of the crews at present consist of former pirates and bandits who have had plenty of experience in these matters on

sea and on rivers).

The general military efficiency.

40% of the sailors have been formerly trained in some special duties in the northern Chinese fleet. The abler men have the rank of non-commissioned officers and know from a practical standpoint more about naval service than the officers. The other 60% are former soldiers and artisans. As regards their military ability the sailors are fairly good in the Chinese way, but certainly not in the European; everything is meant only for parade, not for military actions.

The pay.

The sailors of all groups are paid the same. Each one gets monthly 15 dollars of which 6 are deducted for the food. 45 dollars are set aside annually for equipment, but the latter is supplied irregularly and only as far as the means permit it. Only about 10% are properly equipped. Bedding and other things the sailors must purchase themselves.

The non-commissioned officers receive 36 dollars monthly, less 10 dollars for their food; they are better equipped than the sailors. 60 dollars are allotted annually for their equipment.

Generally speaking the material conditions of the enlisted men are far from satisfactory as regards their pay, their food, their equipment and their housing.

The bodily constitution.

As stated above, the men of the navy are in the majority former pirates or bandits or soldiers who have been well schooled in all sorts of civil wars and adventures of Chinese generals. The men are therefore physically rather worn out. Their age is from 25 to 30 years. The physical defects are approximately as follows: 15% have tuberculosis; about 27% have dysentery, malaria, veneral diseases etc. The diseases are mostly chronical. In the whole fleet there is not a single ship surgeon or other

medical man and no trace of a dispensary; there are not even bandages or no iodine. There is one sugeon for the whole fleet and this one is of questionable ability; his work consists mostly in registering and burying the dead. The mortality in the fleet is from 5 to 7% yearly.

The conditions of the service in the Navy.

A particular body of men for military service has been developed in the course of histbry in China without any compulsion on the part of the Government, partly owing to the Character of these men and partly because for a Chinese pauper - whether an honest man or a"rag proletarian"- the navy was formerly a good job, because there he could always get clothed and fed. He had moreover a few dollars in his pocket which was a boon in the great chronical unemployment prevailing in China. It may be added that formerly the fleet belonged to several admirals, who carried contraband and at the same time were watching for contraband and confiscating it. In consequence of the aforesaid the service in the Navy has become voluntary, without contracts and terms; the men are even afraid of being turned out.

The officers, like the sailors are serving voluntarily, without contracts and stick to the Navy like a louse to the skin. It is not easy to dismiss an officer from the navy, for the navy has its traditions of which the Europeans are unaware, and the mass of officers cling to the navy, because they know that owing to their ignorance they cannot find employment in the commercial fleet.

The Educational Work.

There were no schools up to this time. Now a class for 100 signalmen is being organised and will be opened on the 25th of March; the course will last 6 months. The organisation of the school and its program have been worked out and approved. At present sailors are recruited for the school, partly from

the fleet and partly from the Union of commercial seamen. The recruiting is being controlled by the party and by Trade Unions. A program is also being prepared for two other classes- an artillery and an egineering class for sailors; it is intended to open them at the end of June. It is all right as far as the engineering class is concerned, because the old machinery will be in use for a long time and because it is all of one type. But as regards the artillery class this is very difficult, as practical and theoretical instruction are impossible with the existing 18 models of guns which have to be replaced. The results to be obtained from the artillery class depend therefore on the re-armament of the fleet in general.

The educational work in the Navy is a very serious matter and it will take a long time, because heretofore nobody was interested in such work in the Navy and there are therefore no books and text-books on special naval subjects in the Chinese language. Some people have English and Japanese textbooks, but they are not adapted to the Chinese conditions and to the elements of which the Chinese Navy is composed. The intended teachers are themselves very little prepared and have hitherto had no practice in instructing. Most of them have studied at the Naval Academies in Japan, England, America and France. Nevertheless there is hope that some results will be achieved which will form the base of the educational work in the future Navy.

The Landing Troops (Marines).

8 months ago, during the civil war, a detachment of landing troops, consisting of 750 men and 82 officers, was formed. The armament consists of 650 rifles of different patterns with 39.000 cartridges. Besides tents it has no other equipment.

Organization.

The detachment is divided into three battalions of 200 men each. 50 men are distributed among the three battalions as

"ecelion". Each battalion has 27 officers and there is one Commander of the whole detachment.

Military efficiency.

The Commander has completed a course in a Military School in America. He has served in the Chinese army 9 years and in the American 8 years and has been in some battles during the civil war.

The Officers do in no wise differ, as regards their efficiency, from those of the National -Revolutionary Army.

The soldiers are well trained, have participated in battles with the fleet; they desire to be a special military unit and in general they do not differ from the soldiers of the National-Revolutionary Army.

The pay.

A soldier receives monthly 7 dollars from which 6 are deducted for his food; 1 dollar is his pocket-money. From time to time he gets some equipment, but it is rather poor. In accordance with his service he lives in old harbour-buildings or in the temporary barracks near the naval dock-yard. An officer gets 30 or 20 dollars a month and has to provide himself with food and equipment; he lives with the soldiers. The Commander gets 150 dollars monthly without food.

The physical condition of the men.

The majority of the men are healthy and carefully picked: the percentage of sickness is very low; their age is from 25 to 27 years.

The purpose of the detachment.

The detachment has been formed as naval infantry for landing operations on rivers. A program to this purpose has been worked out but it has not yet been approved by the Military Council. The detachment is at present guarding the ships under repairs and is keeping up the communications with the forts which are taking now an active part in operations on the river against bandits and smuggling.

Conclusion.

First of all the work in the Navy cannot be considered only from the standpoint of current requirements in connection with the conditions in Canton. The prospects of the development of the national movement, of which little is written and spoken, require the creation of a strong nucleus of a navy in the South. A nucleus which should be able not only to satisfy the present local requirements, but would also become the embryon of a future Navy, around which, as around a new creation, the rest of the Chinese fleet could be formed. As it is at present, with its worthless ships, its rotten machinery and its incompetent personnel, the whole Chinese fleet is an obsolete thing, capable only of political blackmailing, of opium traffic and of extorting money by all means from the population and the merchants. It is unable to give battle not only in the European, but even in the Chinese sense of the word, because of the condition of its armament and the moral character of its personnel. Nevertheless Chang-tso-lin strives to scrape up a kind of fleet in the north using the old rotten elements.

The question of the future of the Chinese Navy can be solved only in two ways: 1) either a nucleus of a fleet, superior in technical equipment and with a new personnel must be created in the South and, consequently, schools for officers and training courses for sailors must be arranged at Canton and Whampoa, or 2) considering that the principal bases of the fleet are in North China, where the ports are well provided with ship-yards and docks, the schools should be opened there when these bases will have been taken by land.

The above summary of a plan for the re-construction and re-armament of the fleet cannot be carried out without the support of the U.S.S.R., and this problem must be solved as soon as possible (the decision not to do anything would be a great mistake).

A Short Summary.

A Short Summary

1. The fleet which not so long ago consisted of 7 groups under seven commanders is now united.

2. Commissars have been appointed to the principal ships.

3. Everything has been prepared to have strikers and communists appointed to take the place of a part of the sailors (so far there is not a single communist in the fleet, except the Chief of the Political Bureau.)

4. The Staff has to be organised according to European standards. Now the higher commanding officers are being prepared for that. (From the Chinese standpoint the work is well organised; from our standpoint it is far from perfect).

5. An inventory has been made of the property of the fleet and lists have been made of lacking articles.

6. Budgets and plans of schools and training courses have been prepared.

7. A schedule has been made for the repairs of seagoing ships, and lists of defects of the river-boats are being made.

8. A special Commission has been formed to examine the enlisted personnel. So far about 75% of them have been examined with good results.

9. A vigorous campaign is being conducted by means of control and strict orders against bribes and theft. In some cases the culprits were arrested and tried which put quite a damper on the appetites of the other corrupted officials, who were taking bribes.

10. A plan of having the fleet supplied and repaired according to a fixed budget is being worked out.

11. It is possible now to keep the work of some Sections of the Staff secret, especially the work concerning military operations, because so far nothing has been kept secret in the Naval Department and the Chiefs of the Section could not even understand the necessity of secrecy. Everything was done in the compradore

fashion based on word of honour and friendship.

12. A Political Section has been organised, and 60% of it's work is being done on the gunboats.

13. A Naval Club managed by the Political Section has been organised for officers.

14. A pilot-station has been established at the mouth of the Perl river.

15. The regulations relating to the service in the Navy are being worked out.

16. Guard-ships have been stationed in places indicated by the Military Council.

17. A seagoing destroyer with a 10 hours' cruising radius, a speed of 30 miles an hour and one mine-tube is being constructed. It will be ready at the end of July 1926.

This report is not exhaustive and does not give all details concerning the fleet and its future. It is an attempt to give an account of what I could find out and improve during my 48 days' work in the Navy. There will be certainly a lot of difficulties in the future as regards the carrying out of a series of measures to revive the fleet and its efficiency. The difficulties are not only of a financial character but they result also from the incompetence of the staff and of the Government as a whole in naval matters, and I will have to work with them for a long time.

In this report no light has been thrown on the political life and organisation of the Navy and on other questions connected with the work of Kuomintang party, the Commissars and the Political Section. The reason is that the political life of the Navy will form the subject of a separate report.

(signed) L. Grey.

March 15th, 1926.

Canton.

1927
2057-9-281

LIST OF SEA-GOING WARSHIPS, RIVER GUNBOATS, PATROLLING BOATS AND THEIR ADDRESSES OF THE NAVAL DEPARTMENT MILITARY COMMISSION.

(軍事委員會海軍局外海內河軍艦一覽表)

SEA-GOING WARSHIP SQUADRON
(外海艦隊)

WARSHIPS (戰鬬艦)

Name of Ships	Name of Captains	Name of Executive Commissaries
Chung Shan (中山)	Ao Yang Lin (歐陽琳)	Hu Liang Sze (胡良恕)
Fei Ying (飛鷹)	Wong Chin (黃振)	Shiu Foo Sze (蕭復之)
Wo Fong (舞鳳)	Lee Kwong Yeh (李光鄴)	Yung Kan (容幹)
Liberty (自由)	Tse Shung Kin (謝崇堅)	Tan Shih Yung (田錫永)
Kwong Chin (廣金)	Chang Han (張漢)	Chang Han Liang (張漢良)
An Pie (安北)	Tong Chee (湯熙)	Shing Yee Tung (邢詒棟)
Ping Nan (平南)	Lee Tah Yen (李達賢)	Chi Shih Kung (祈協恭)

TRANSPORTS 運輸艦

Foo An (福安)	Woo Lo Fong (於魯峰)	Kuo Yee Yu (郭一予)
Pao Pek (寶壁)	Wong Fong Fan (黃芳芬)	Tang Chun Mou (譚君牧)
Man Shang (民生)	Sha Chung Law (舒宗鏊)	Foo Ming Cheang (符明昌)
Kwong Pek (廣北)	Law Shing King (劉純涇)	Shing Ting Ah (邢鼎亞)

PATROLLING BOATS 游擊艦隊

Lui Tsun (雷震)	Wong Ching Po (黃澄甫)	Mon Dau Nan (蒙島南)
Kwong Wah (光華)	Kwong Kuo Ling (江國棟)	Tsai Ching Chuen (蔡勁軍)
Hu Shan (湖山)	Tse Shung Hang (謝松年)	
Lui Chin (雷乾)	Tsen Kee Tong (曾紀堂)	
Lui Diu (雷兌)	Tang Kwong Wu (鄧光武)	
Lui Lee (劉離)	Kung Fan Lin (孔繁霖)	

RIVER GUNBOAT SQUADRON
(內河艦隊)

GUNBOATS 砲艇

Kiang Han (江漢)	Wu Tse Lee (伍自立)	Lee Chuen Wai (李均煒)
Kiang Tah (江大)	Shiu Han Shing (蕭衍成)	Ling Kwon Nau (梁冠那)
Kiang Kwon (江鞏)	Law Yung Kwong (柳榮光)	Yoa Chung Ying (姚中英)
Kiang Koo (江固)		Chang Yen Yuen (張炎元)

Name of Ships	Name of Captains	Name of Kuomintang Commissaries
	(Gunboats, continued)	
Lung Shang (龍驤)	Chen Wai Kee (陳渭祺)	Shing Chow Chee (邢角志)
Tung Yie (東彝)	Tang Chieng Yeen (鄧陳賢)	Kwan Kwon (關鞏)
Kwang An (廣安)	Pan Wan Poo (潘文譜)	
Fei Pan (飛鵬)	Ta Ping Wan (戴炳文)	Ho Yu Chee (何燿基)
Tung Kiang (東江)	Hu Sham Shih (吳高實)	Ho Yih Shan (何益善)
King Ma (金馬)		
An Shun (安順)	Chow Chuen Yung (周春榮)	
An Sun (安新)	Wan Wah Kai (文華階)	
Cheun Chet (準捷)	Mok Tau Nan (莫斗南)	
Chik Lee (智利)	Tan Sham Yung (譚向榮)	
Chuen Chei (存濟)		
	TRANSPORTS 運輸艦	
Ye Han (宜漢)	Chow Shih Ling (周燮鈴)	
Sei Hing (西興)	Chang Shing Yun (張承恩)	
Pun Chue (鵬舉)	Hu Ying Chau (胡應球)	
Yeu Hing (粵興)	Wong Min Po (黃文溥)	
Lee Shin (利琛)	Chow Tang Wan (周彬元)	
Pao Tah (寶大)	Tang Yung Chee (鄧榮鋕)	
Poo An (普安)	Yu Wan Kwang (余垣璜)	
Yeun Ho (元和)	Pang Yum Chei (潘榮貴)	
Cheu An (巨安)	Mar Ting Yau (馬廷祐)	
Ming Fat (明發)	Pan Chee Yee (彭濟義)	
Shea Kiang (綏江)	Liu Shu Tong (劉樹棠)	
An Nan (安南)	Yeh Kit (葉杰)	
	AUXILIARY VESSELS 輔助艦	
Lui Kan (雷坎)	Wang Ching Fan (黃清芬)	
Hai Fong (海防)	Liu Luan Shun (劉聯順)	
Fei Tang (飛騰)	Chin Ying Shun (錢應宣)	
Kwang Ken (廣乾)	Tai Kuo Liang (戴國良)	
Ying Chit (應捷)	Lin Yu (連茹)	
Chao Hing (僑興)	Chu Min Shao (朱文詔)	
Kiang Ping (江平)	Loo Buo (羅標)	

Name of Ships	Name of Captains	Name of Kuomintang Commissaries
Foo Hai (福海)	La Tah (賴達)	
Kiang Shun (江順)	Koo Shing Hai (顧勝凱)	
Cho Kiang (操江)	Chang Chu Hung (張兆鴻)	
Kiang Ching (江澄)	Wong Chei Wai (王志偉)	
Kiang Do (江都)	Kao Hung Fan (高鴻藩)	
Fei Shun (飛順)	Law Chang Shen (劉長生)	

REMARKS

Sea-going warships.

Ships of good sea-going quality, powerful armament, good fighting. Power and high speed.

Sea-going transports.

Ships of good sea-going quality and great churrying capacity.

River gunboats.

Ships of high speed and good fighting power.

River transports.

Ships of great towing power.

Auxiliary vessels.

Ships of poor fighting power, low speed, and poor hull condition.

Patrolling vessels.

Ships of high speed and always ready in action.

Number of sea-going warships.....7.

Number of sea-going transports.....4.

Number of river gunboats.....15.

Number of river transports.....12.

Number of river patrolling boats.....6.

Number of river auxiliary vessels.....13.

TOTAL NUMBER OF SHIPS.....57.

MADE BY THE BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, NAVY DEPARTMENT.

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1927 AUG

[redacted]

Extract (Page 29-30) from the Report "[redacted] in October, 1926" by A. [redacted], who as a member of the Soviet Embassy in Peking was sent to South China on a trip of inspection.

During Gen. Galen's stay at Canton, especially when he was in charge of both the political and military work, all guidance in connection with this work was concentrated in his hands. Upon the arrival of Gen. Borodin, however, an attempt was made of dividing the work between him and Gen.Galen, but this attempt did not yield any positive results. Frictions were constantly taking place between Gen. Borodin and Gen. Galen and, as a consequence, the latter was compelled to leave Canton. In connection with the departure of Gen. Galen, a question arose of finding a substitute for him; as, however, no suitable person could be found on the spot for such a purpose, it was suggested as a compromise that a Military Council should be established consisting of the following men: Borodin, Bogatcheff, Stepanoff I, Siffert, Tchorupanoff, Wiloff and Rosi; the remaining military advisers had only a consultative voice. Gen. Galen was present at the first meetings of this Council, when such questions as the handing over of the records by Gen. Galen to Gen. Bogatcheff, the amelioration of the living conditions of the military collaborators, the distribution of workers and such, were being discussed. At the first meeting, however, following the departure of Gen. Galen, "the i's were dotted" and it was bluntly stated that the new institution was not a Military Council but a consultative organ attached to Gen. Borodin. It appears that all present at this meeting made no objection to such a statement and after two more meetings the Military Council ceased to exist.

A project was then put forth of establishing a Revolutionary Military Council (Revvoensoviet), which was to consist of the Political Director of the Chief of the Military Department and of a third member by special appointment, about whom Peking was to be consulted before hand, but nothing occurred beyond mere talk. There now exists neither the Military Council nor the Revolutionary Military Council. There is only a

dictatorship of one single person - Gen. Borodin - in political as well as military questions. In conversation with me on this subject, he stated quite definitely "that he did not consider it to be possible to divide the power into the military power, directly subordinated to the Peking center, and into the political power. He even put this question in the following way: Were he to leave Canton, he admitted the possibility of appointing a man who would direct both the political as well as the military work, but that he considered it to be quite impossible to put a man in charge of the military work only". In accordance with this idea Gen. Borodin begun to keep a tight grip on the Military Department and to control every step of it, even to the extent of going into the most minute details. The military workers are not permitted to have any initiative and regard the settlement of any question without Borodin's knowledge as the greatest breach of discipline. Even the Chief of the Group, Gen. Rogatcheff, makes no exception in this respect and in some cases learns of the measures undertaken by Borodin after these measures already have been put into effect. The following fact may be quoted as an instance: When it had been decided to disarm the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih just before his deportation, Gen. Rogatcheff learned of this matter only a few minutes before the time when this question was brought before the Military Council for discussion and consequently only some hours before the time when the disarming actually took place (see conversation between Gen. Rogatcheff and Gen. Chiang Kai-shih on 18th Sept, 1925). Gen. Toreshateff also mentioned this fact to me and pointed out that Rogatcheff had not been sufficiently informed by the government concerning its intentions with regard to the disarming of the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih. In this connection there is one more fact worth mentioning: the part which Gen. Chiang Kai-shih played in this question of the disarming of the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih is not clear enough. As far as can be ascertained from the available data, Chiang Kai-shih knew perfectly well of the intentions of the government to disarm the troops of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih,

but did not tell Com. Rogatchoff anything about it until the last moment, whereas at the same time he was moving the "Chungon" troops for the purpose of disarming. In any case this matter requires a more thorough investigation.

Under the existing conditions, the military workers have not even the right of holding direct telegraphic communications with Peking. All such correspondence goes in the name of Boroudin only. Com. Boroudin reserves for himself even the right to decide the question concerning documents to be mailed to Peking; there was a case when such documents had been carefully examined by him, according to the lists, before they were handed over to me for perusal. Questions pertaining to appointments, financial measures, dismissals, leaves, etc., have also to be decided by Com. Boroudin for instance, the increase of salaries by 0.5 of the coefficient for Canton collaborators was approved by Com. Boroudin. This situation is quite abnormal. If not in questions of political character at least in those pertaining to field-service and having a purely military character - the independence of military workers must be maintained.

Com. Galen.

During the stay of Com. Galen at Canton there was much talk among our workers about Galen to the effect that in some respects he was treating them in an off-hand manner, did not afford them the possibility to work quietly, etc., but after his departure Com. Boroudin's dictatorship proved to be much worse for them than that of Com. Galen and, as a consequence, many of those who formerly stood in opposition to Galen would like now to have him return to Canton.

While at Canton Com. Galen has acquired for himself an incredibly high prestige. Our advisers assert that hardly a single day passes without somebody of the Chinese here asking such questions as "Where is Galen now", "How soon will he come back", and the like. Some of them belonging to the military class, are even following his movements and know that he has been to Peking, has gone to Kalgan, etc. The Chinese had absolute confidence in Com. Galen, so that his every statement on questions pertaining to military

operations was considered to be a law. It is a curious fact that during the military the military operations Gen. Sulan always succeeded in sending to the front line such generals who during the previous period of their life had never left their offices. Gen. T'an Yu-hsi, for instance, had never been with his units at the front, but immediately went to the front line as soon as Gen. Sulan had said that it was absolutely necessary for him to be there.

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INTRODUCTION.

During the summer of 1925 Gen. Galen, as Chief of the Military Group of Soviet Advisers in South-China, had a disagreement with Borodin, the political adviser. As a consequence the military work was turned over to a newly constituted Military Council of Soviet advisers, which was actually controlled by Borodin and nominally headed by Regacheff, who later in October 1926 was Assistant Military Attache in Peking, and Gen. Gallen came to Peking to complain to the Soviet Ambassador. A member of the Soviet Military Attache's Office, Khmeleff, was sent by the Embassy to South-China to investigate the matter and Galen went to Kalgan to await the settlement of the dispute. In Kalgan Galen wrote a number of voluminous reports on the political and military situation in the Kuomintang and prepared plans for future action in the South of China. The report attached hereto was dated September 20, 1925.

J.P. Ratay.

THE PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER WORK IN THE SOUTH OR THE GREAT PLAN FOR MILITARY WORK OF THE KUOMINTANG DURING THE YEAR 1926.

The struggle of the left wing of the Kuomintang with the counter-revolutionary groups at Canton last June went on largely supported by all revolutionary elements of the population. The Kuomintangowes its victory to the workmen and peasants. The left wing of the Kuomintang, having fortified its position with the support of the revolutionary masses and having become connected with them, will in future also be compelled to seek their support, and this will lead the Kuomintang to a more revolutionary policy, will push it still more to the left and to a still greater development of the national-revolutionary movement in the South. At the same time an inverse process will take place - the process of consolidation of the counter-revolutionary groups and of their further secession from the national-revolutionary movement and from the Kuomintang. This process will doubtless lead those groups to a rapprochement with the compradores and the bourgeoisie in the towns and with the feudal element of landowners in the country and through them to a closer connection with imperialism, as represented by Hongkong. As a consequence of this process, besides the complete breaking off of the right wing of the Kuomintang, a considerable part of the centre will also secede from the left wing.

This process will inevitably affect also the army and will throw into the camp of the counter-revolution the generals who, owing to the present reorganisation of the civil and military administration, have been deprived of their independence and of their privilege of robbing the population.

The opposition group which is now forming around the generals Wei Fang-p'ing and Li Fu-lin will probably be reinforced by the 3rd Canton division.

If the opposition group is not very strong, General Hsu-ch'ung-chih will side with the party and the government, striving to profit by the situation, to strengthen his influence in the Military Council and in the Government and to oust from the Canton army the men whom he does not like, thus increasing his influence in the army and through it also his influence on the policy of the Government and on the work of the Military Council. (Note: It must not be thought that the Military Council is a perfect form of a central military apparatus able to bring about a complete centralisation and unification of the military administration. The author of the report considers the creation of the Military Council as a temporary and transitory measure which in the present situation answers the purpose better than anything else. The Kuomintang, as a party which lacks inner unanimity, is full of contradictions which it cannot prevent from arising in the organisations created by it. For this reason another form of central organisation of the military administration may be established if the situation changes.)

The strengthening of Gen. Hsu Ch'ung-chih's position in the Military Council will enable him to give vent to his dislike of Liao Hung-k'ai and his troops. This may induce Liao Hung-k'ai to try to retain in his hands the revenues he is collecting in the western part of the province (the region of Kongmoon) and to maintain the independence of his troops, which may lead him to an alliance with the opposition. Hongkong, communication of which with Canton and Kiangsi by way of the Perl river, through the western arm, is interrupted by the strike and by the economic blockade established by the strike committee (with the help of the Government), will seek to reach Kiangsi by water, through Kongmoon (the region of Liao-Hung-K'ai). Therefore the British, in their struggle with the Canton Government, will use Liao Hung-k'ai and will bring him into still closer contact with the opposition group.

Moreover, in the natural course of events, such men as Liao Hung-k'ai will inevitably be thrown into the arms of the counter-revolutionary block.

The reactionary group, which is gradually getting stronger, will make a new political and military conflict in Kwang-tung unavoidable. In such case the group will dispose of the following forces: the III corps of Li-fu-lin - 4000, the 2nd Canton division (probably without the 8th brigade of Gen. Ho Shun) - 2000, the I corps of Gen. Liao Hung-K'ai - 6000, in all 12.000 of inefficient and very scattered troups. The Kuomintang and the Government will firmly rely upon "Whampoa", upon the Hunan army, upon Chu P'ei-teh and Cheng ch'ien and upon a corps organized from the 1st Canton division, i.e. upon a group of troops about 40000 men strong.

With such a correlation of forces Gen. Hsu will remain with the Kuomintang and this will define the position of the other Canton troops which will either openly support the government, or will take up position of expectation. If we assume the worst case and admit that the troops of the 2nd Canton corps will also join the anti-government group, which can be hardly expected, even then the forces of the enemy will not exceed 20000 men scattered partly over the eastern and partly over the south-western regions of the province and to deal with them the troops of "Whampoa" alone will be sufficient.

Will the majority of the merchants actively support the opposition? This can hardly be expected, and not only because their economic interests are incompatible with those of Hong-kong, but also because they expect more order and peace in the province and the revival of its economic life from the reforms of the government (the centralisation of the financial matters of the military administration and the improvement of the governmental administrative apparatus). The unification of the finances, the radical reform of the taxation (even if the masses

are freed from a series of heavy taxes) and the introduction of a preferential (income?) tax will hardly increase the taxation of the merchants who at present have to pay arbitrary and huge sums to various generals. Most probably the merchants will support the Government in all its measures to improve the administration of the province.

Thus there is no reason to fear any serious complications for the Kuomintang on the part of the inner counter-revolution. The above-mentioned military group of the enemies of the Kuomintang will be easily crushed by the latter with the support of the whole revolutionary mass of the Kwangtung intelligensia and owing to the sympathetic attitude towards its reforms on the part of the merchant class.

It is even doubtful that the opposition would risk an open action; it will rather use threats and terror against the leaders which will only lead to an early liquidation of its forces.

The only redoubtable force, with which the Kuomintang will have to deal in Kwangtung, will be imperialism and a possible intervention by the British in Canton.

But the mirage of a general revolution in Central and North China and the discord among the imperialists themselves will not permit to destroy openly, by armed force, the southern hearth of the national-revolutionary movement in China. This however does not exclude the possibility that Hongkong, whose interests will suffer increasingly, will not try to destroy the power of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung; and if the British are unable to put an end to the Canton Government by armed force, they may take every measure to isolate it from the national-revolutionary movement in the rest of the country. The experience of the recent events shows that by cutting the communication between Canton and Central China they shut the Kuomintang up in Kwangtung at decisive moments of the national-revolutionary movement and deprived thereby the Kuomintang of the

influence it might have exerted, had it been in close contact with Central and North-China.

Thus, the political and military position of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung does not cause at present any apprehension and the question of the liquidation of Teng Pen-yin or of the south western front and of the annihilation of the remnants of Ch'en Chun-ming or of the eastern front does not present great difficulties (this question will be more minutely examined at the end of this sketch). It is therefore time to raise the question of the extension of the influence of the Kuomintang towards the North and of its appearance on the stage of Central China, i.e. of the shifting of the centre of the political work from Kwangtung to the Yang-tse with Hankow as its centre. Now it is not only possible, but even necessary, in the interest of the national-revolutionary movement, to take up again the idea of a northern expedition and of debouching into the Yang-tse valley. I think that the political conditions in Central China will be favorable to this purpose.

In order to retain Kwang-tung and to reach the Yang-tse the Kuomintang will need an army of 80,000, of which 30-35,000 will remain in Kwang-tung and 45-50,000 will be moved northward. This northern expedition may be effected in the beginning of the second half of 1926.

Will the Kuomintang be able to produce such a force? I consider it feasible and I affirm that the Kuomintang will be able to do it. The necessary funds will be supplied by Kwang-tung, but it will be more difficult to get the necessary armament. 20,000 rifles will be needed and cadres of military, political and administrative workers will have to be prepared in order to bring the army to full strength and in order to establish an administration in the regions which will be occupied by the Kuomintang.

THE FINANCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF KWANGTUNG AND THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE UPKEEP OF THE TROOPS.

Let us consider if it is possible to create the necessary forces and if the necessary funds for it can be obtained.

In former days, at the time of the Empire, the annual revenue from Kwang-tung amounted to about 50 million dollars. During the last years the revenue from the province has decreased and now it is only 35 millions. The Cantonese assert that if the taxation is improved, it will be possible to collect up to 40 millions from the whole province.

To be on the safe side, let us take the more certain figure of 30 millions, or 2½ millions monthly. From this sum 22 millions a year may be assigned for the upkeep of the army and for military supplies. If we deduct from it 2 millions for unforeseen minor military operations, we shall have 1,166,000 a month. Estimating the upkeep of a division of 5500 men at 85,000 dollars(according to the cost of Whampoa), the upkeep of an army of 80,000 will cost 1,275,000; 391 thousand will then remain for the other needs of the military apparatus - such as schools, the air-force, the navy etc. This latter sum of 1,275,000 will be wanted only at the end of the first half of the year 1926, up to which time a considerably smaller sum will be needed. With this surplus some air-craft may be purchased, the manufacture of arms at the arsenal increased and a sum may be set aside for the recruiting of new troops and the preparation of cadres. The cost of the additional arms that will be required is not included, as they may be purchased on credit and paid for in 1927.

(Note: These budget figures are rather low, but I think that it will be possible to have them increased out of the general income of the Government, as most probably this income will exceed the above-mentioned 30 millions.)

The funds necessary for the opening of the campaign (the great northern campaign) may be obtained by means of a loan from the merchants.

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

The reorganisation of the army and the subsequent formation of the corps were effected in the following manner.

The Hunan army had in July of this year 8 regiments (8000 men) and using the arms taken in battles was organizing the 9th regiment (9000). The nine regiments form 3 divisions which make up the Vth Corps. The commander of this corps is T'an Yen-k'ai. Towards the end of 1925 the strength of the corps will be brought up to 12000 and in 1926 it will be brought up to the normal strength of 15.900 men.

The Yünnan army of Gen. Chu P'ei-teh consisted in July of 6500 rifles which formed 2 divisions, 3 separate brigades and 2 regiments. It is being reorganised now into one division and one separate brigade and will form the VII Corps. The Commander of the corps is Chu' P'ei-teh. If he remains loyal to the party, his corps in 1926 will be brought to the strength of 2 divisions with a normal effective force of 10,000 men.

The troops "Whampoa" consisted in July, besides the school with 2000 cadets, of 3 regiments and a 4th regiment was being formed. There were a total of 6,000 men in the four regiments. Stored in the depots were over 5,000 rifles (the last consignement from Russia included). It was intended to start soon the formation of a 3rd division. In the beginning of 1926 the strength of the "Whampoa" troops will be brought to 15,900 men and they will form the IVth corps. The commander of the corps is Chiang Kai-shih.

The Canton army. The 1st corps of Gen. Liao Hung-K'ai consisted of 6,000 rifles and was organised into three separate brigades and several separate regiments. If Liao Hung-K'ai and his

troops remain loyal to the party these troops will be reorganised into a division and a separate brigade, or they will remain, as at present, divided into three separate brigades. The strength of the corps will not be increased. In case these troops are disarmed, their armament will be handed over to the IV and VI corps and some of it to the Vth corps.

The III corps of Gen. Li Fu-lin consisted of 4,000 rifles and was divided into several separate brigades. It had to be disarmed at the first favorable occasion and the arms handed over to the IV,V and VIth corps.

The 1st division of Li Ti-hsing consisted in July of about 6,000 rifles which were divided into two brigades consisting of 5 regiments. This division is being organized into a corps of two divisions, the strength of which will be brought to 10,000 men at the end of 1925. The commander of the corps will be either Li-Ti-hsing or Ch'en Ming-Hsin (the latter is more desirable).

The 3 and 4th divisions, the brigade Mo and a number of separate brigades and regiments, 4,000 men strong, are being reorganised into two divisions and will form the II corps. The commander of the corps will be Hsü Ch'ung-chih. Its effective force will not be increased.

The separate brigade of Gen. Wu Ti-ch'ien consisted in July of 2,000 rifles and was about to form a third regiment. This force will be organised into a division and will be attached to the corps of Chiang K'ai-Shih, or it will exist as a separate division, directly subordinated to the Military Council. In 1926 it will be brought up to the normal strength of 5,300 men.

The 5th Kuang-si division consisted in July of about 1,000 men. It is being disbanded and will be used to reinforce the IV,V and VI corps.

The detachment of Gen. Cheng Ch'ien consisted of 1,500

rifles and the small detachments of other provinces, which were counted among the troops of the northern expeditionary force, had 2,000 men. They are being organised into a division under Gen. Cheng Ch'ien and in 1926 this division will be brought to the normal strength of 5,300 men. It will then be either attached to one of the corps or remain separate.

The garrison of the fortress Huichow (Waichow) under Gen. Shih Kung Yu consisted in July of 4,000 men who formed four brigades. These troops are being disbanded and used for the strengthening of corps loyal to the party.

Thus in July 1925 the troops of Kwangtung consisted of 59,000 rifles.

At the end of 1925 will be dissolved and in case of resistance also disarmed - the III corps of Gen LiFulin, the 5th Kiangsi division, the garrison of Huichow, the 3rd division(with the exception of the brigade of Huo Shun) and probably the 1st corps of Liao Hun K'ai. In all 17,000 men will be disarmed. With their arms other units will be strengthened in the above-mentioned order, and at the end of 1925 the strength of the troops will be, as before, of 59 to 60,000.

In the first half of 1926 the corps of Chiang K'ai Shih, Cheng Ming-Hsiu, T'an Yen-K'ai and Chu P'ei-teh and the divisions of Cheng Ch'ien and Wu Ti-chien will be increased in conformity with the above scheme, which will give a total of 72,000 rifles, i.e. 12 divisions forming corps and 2 separate divisions.

At the same time a new division will be formed and towards the end of the first half of 1926 there will have to be 78 - 80,000 in five corps and three separate divisions. Depending on the military operations the three divisions may either be combined and made into a sixth corps or they will be attached to the IV or VI corps or will remain separate.

All troops will be organised in the same manner as those of "Whampoa". Political education will be obligatory in the

units. The troops will be surrounded by political organisations and commissars will be assigned to them.

It must be noted that the proposed scheme of increasing the numerical strength of the troops may undergo some changes in consequence of the political situation in Kwangtung. It is possible that it will be necessary to disarm also a part of the troops of the II corps or that, instead of increasing the forces of Chu P'ei-teh, it will be necessary to have his units also disarmed. This, however, will not change the total numerical strength of the troops of the Government because new divisions can be formed in their place.

For the same political reasons it may happen that the idea of strengthening the forces of Chiang K'ai Shih or of some other general will have to be given up and that other units will be formed which can be kept with greater certainty subordinated and obedient to the party.

For the organization of units in the near future, especially for the units of "Whampoa", the striking workmen may be enlisted and thus the army will be still more revolutionised.

THE PREPARATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL COMMANDERS AND OF THE CADRES OF ADMINISTRATORS.

The preparation of military-political cadres and the raising of the tactical and political standard of education of the officers in the army must begin at once. The following schools will be opened during the coming months for this purpose:

a) normal officers' school for preparing commanders of platoons and companies (to be formed out of the "Whampoa" School.

b) courses for middle and higher officers;

c) a school for Staff duty;

d) a non-commissioned officers' school for the more intelligent and capable soldiers;

e) a school for military-political workers;

f) a number of schools and courses for special and technical services, such as: artillery, machine-gunnery, communications, engineering, sanitary, supplies and navy.

The schools for a uniform tactical and political education will be supervised by the Military Council.

A great number of natives of the provinces Hunan and Kiangsi must be procured for the officers and non-commissioned officers' schools. The march to the north will be effected through these provinces and such men will be of the greatest use from the political standpoint as well as on account of their knowledge of the country and of the local dialects which will be of great assistance to the Army in its dealings with the population.

For the organisation of the civil administration and of peasants' and other political organisations in the regions that will be occupied by the expedition, cadres of administrators, of organisers of peasants' unions and of agitators must at once be prepared. To this end the Canton university will be changed into a school for civil service, the existing peasants' school will be enlarged as much as necessary and a series of new courses for the preparation of agitators will be organised. Into these schools and courses a great many of natives of Hunan and Kiangsi must be enlisted, in order that a cadre of workers who know these provinces, their customs and their dialects can be formed which will help to get easier in touch with the population and to get firm political footing in these provinces.

There is enough time to prepare these cadres. If the schools and courses are opened in December with a course of 4 to 6 months we shall have the cadres ready for June or July 1926.

THE PROBABLE CONDITIONS IN THE NEIGHBOURING PROVINCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE EXPEDITION.

The relations which exist at present between the Canton

Government and the neighbouring provinces can hardly change much until the middle of 1926.

Fukien though being hostile to the Canton government owing to the complicated condition among its generals, expecially in the southern part of the province, will not be able to undertake any serious military operation, and if it should decide to impede our advance to the north, it will be unable to put in the field any considerable force. Two or three of our divisions left in the region Ch'ao-chow (Swatow) will certainly be able to protect the eastern border of Kwang-tung.

Kweichow, owing to conditions similar to Fukien among its military groups will by no means be able to impede our movement and will remain indifferent.

Szechuan which is rent by inner economic troubles has been striving for a long time to get an outlet in the region of Wu-ch'ang and has already repeatedly clashed with the Tuchun of Hunan, Gen. Chao Heng-Ti. It may be supposed therefore that our movement will bring about also one from Szechuan towards Wu-ch'ang, which will only facilitate our success.

Kuangsi is always being friendly towards the Canton Government and seems outwardly to submit to it, but in connection with the new political and military situation which will arise in consequence of the struggle with Fan Sen San and Tang Chi-yao, it may change to a certain degree its former attitude, but not to such an extent as to become a source of serious menace to Canton.

(Note. I avoid purposely here the question of the part that may be played by Yünnan, because at the time when I left it was difficult to foresee what turn the struggle between Fan Sen San and Tang Chi yao would take in connection with the movement of Fan Sen San into Yünnan, but I suppose that it can hardly prevent the northward expedition.)

THE FORCES OF HUNAN AND KIANGSI.

I do not possess exact data as to the forces of Chao Heng-ti and Fan Pen-jen, but I suppose that they will not differ much from my estimates. When Fan Pen-jen began the struggle for power in the province against the former Tuchun, he had not over 15,000 men. It may be assumed that this force has now been doubled. But having taken into his army the remnants of the troops of the former Tuchun, Fan Pen-jen hardly possesses an army which is uniformly loyal to him. When we start our movement he will not be able to oppose the Canton troops with more than 20-25,000 men, because the rest will have to watch the northern part of the province, where some of the former troops are still hiding and robbing. Of the Hunan forces still less is known, but it may be assumed that Chao Heng-ti has about 50,000 men and may oppose the Cantonese with 35-40,000. The forces of both of these provinces that we might encounter will thus consist of 55-65,000.

The Wu-Pei-fu group and his adherants will no doubt support them, but being tied up to the north-east of Yangtse by the group of Chang-tso-lin and in the north by the Kuominchün they will hardly be able to support them with more than 20-25,000. It may be expected then that the forces of the enemy will not exceed 75,000 men or at the most - 85-90,000 men.

But this superiority of force will be only an apparent one. The support of the Wu Pei-fu Group may come too late or may not even come at all.

All this will depend on the attitude of Chang-tso-lin. Lastly, the forces of the Wu Pei-fu group may be also tied up by the Kuominchün. If in the Chinese armies, on account of their inner dissensions, we see very little harmony even among the troops of one general, it will be still less possible to combine the activities of the armies of Fan Peng-jen and Chao Heng-ti.

Thus the plus in the numerical strength of the enemy is

outweighed by such a quantity of minuses that it may be supposed that at the moment of the decisive clash the enemy will not have the necessary superiority of forces on the spot and that his numerical strength will be equal or even inferior to that of the Kuomintang.

But, generally speaking, a superiority of the enemy of one and one half to one is not dangerous for the Kuomintang. Even if the enemy is numerically twice as strong, the success of the war will be on the side of those who have better tactics, and it may be supposed that this latter advantage is on the side of the Kuomintang army where all operations will be actually directed by our advisers.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCES OF THE KUOMINTANG FOR THE PROTECTION OF KWANGTUNG AND FOR THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION.

Of the fifteen division formed by the Kuomintang five or six will be reserved to safeguard Kwang-tung and to maintain the authority of the Kuomintang, i.e. three divisions in the eastern part, one in the south-west, one in the west and one at Canton, altogether 33,000 men.

The other nine divisions - 47,000 - will be thrown against the north. If in the beginning the situation in Kwangsi is reassuringly peaceful, there will be no necessity of having a division in the west and it can be attached to the active army which will then be brought to a strength of 52 - 53,000. The active army will consist of the VII corps of Ch'u P'ei Teh, the corps of T'an Yen-K'ai and the II corps of the Canton army (if it is in existence.). The "Whampoa" corps will be also put into the active army and will lend it a political character and raise its fighting capacity in general.

The VI corps of Ch'en Ming-Hsiu and the separate divisions will remain for the defence of Kwangtung or, as has been said above, one of the divisions might join the active army.

The army will advance as a whole. in one block. through

one of the provinces, either Kiangsi or Hunan and, having finished with one, will quickly enter the other.

The concentrated movement guarantees the first successes, which without doubt will lead to the final victory of the Kuomintang. The first successes of the Government's troops will demoralize the ranks of the enemy and cause the inner discord among their generals, in consequence of which some of them may join the forces of the Kuomintang. This will doubtless contribute to the reinforcement of the Kuomintang army.

The advance of Gen. Fan, in January 1925, from Kwang-tung into Honan(?) began with 4,000 men and his forces were over 20,000 men when he entered Honan(?). This incident confirms my supposition.

When Hunan and Kiangsi will have been occupied and new temporary units will have been formed for the protection of the occupied provinces, Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang will be occupied without delay by the whole mass of the active army.

After the defeat of the enemy in Hunan and Kiangsi it will not be difficult to defeat the force which marshal Hsiao will have concentrated at Hankow. Carrying with it liberty for the Trade Unions, and the peasants' organisations and the reform of the administrative departments, the army of the Kuomintang will doubtless meet with the full support of all revolutionary masses, and if, after having reached the Yang-tze, it proclaims the slogan of the convoking of a National Assembly and of a Revolutionary Government, the Kuomintang will obtain in this fight the greatest support on the part of the whole national-revolutionary movement of the country.

All this makes the final success of the expedition incontestable.

The debouchment of the Kuomintang into the valley of the Yangtze-river and the occupation of Hankow will bring the Kuomintang to an industrial centre of the country. This will give

an impulse to the national-revolutionary movement and may change the whole political situation to such a degree, that it is even difficult to foresee at present all the favorable consequences of this expedition with regard to the national-revolutionary movement in China. It may be only said that the prospects of the revolution will grow immensely and will lead in the future to the extension of the power of the Kuomintang as far as Shanghai in the east.

The success of this operation must be made secure by a favorable attitude of the People's armies towards it. In order to get a firm footing in Central China and to transform Hankow into the centre of the national-revolutionary movement, by making it the revolutionary capital, Kwangtung might even be sacrificed and the Kuomintang army reinforced by withdrawing from there the troops that will have been left behind.

With this shifting of the political and financial base of the party one of the largest arsenals of China, the Han-yang arsenal, will not only not become smaller , but it will become still larger and will contribute to the further growth of the armed forces. Finally the proximity of "Whampoa" (Corps) to the Kuomintang armies will contribute to the further revolutionising of the latter.

All these speculations were called by me "<u>THE GREAT MILITARY PLAN OF THE KUOMINTANG</u>". The first time this plan was exposed by me in the presence of a group of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, of the responsible leaders of the local Committee of the Chinese Communist party and of Chinese generals after the capture of Swatow in March 1925. A second time the plan was submitted to the Military Conference on the 15th of June and the third time - to the officers and generals of the Hunan army on the twentieth of June. Now I submit it for your consideration.

I consider this plan as practicable and I think that <u>it</u>

ought to be carried out and that the necessary support in armament ought to be granted.

(signed) Galen.

Note: Lest I should be accused of attempting to militarise the Kuomintang, I deem it necessary to say that the political side of this plan has not been minutely examined because it must be worked out by the political representatives. The military plan must be only a complement to it.

Besides, this is only a rough outline of the military plan and it needs further and more detailed preparation.

(signed) Galen.

Kalgan,

September 20th, 1925.

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INSTRUCTIONS TO THE COMMISSIONS FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

(Approved by the Canton Military Council).

1. For the reorganisation of the National-Revolutionary Army on the basis of the budget for the months of December and January as established by the Government and in accordance with the approved list of the personnel, commissions are formed for each corps and for all separate divisions. This commissions consist of: the Chief of the General Staff, the Commander of the corps or of the separate division, which is being reorganised, and the Russian Adviser.

2. The chief task of the commission is to make a minute study of the corps or the separate division and then to find means to carry out the necessary measures to have its upkeep arranged according to the budget and to reorganise it strictly adhering to the approved list of the personnel.

3. Considering that it is necessary to have the numerical strength of the national-revolutionary army brought up to 5 corps and 2 separate divisions, the Commission is instructed to abolish all units which do not enter into the corps and divisions as parts of them. Such units are either incorporated into the corps or divisions or disbanded.

4. The Chief of the General Staff submits to the Military Council for approval a plan for the disbandment of the units which do not enter into the corps and separate divisions.

5. The Commissions must pay special attention to the immediate organization of Sections of the supply service in the corps and divisions, and they must insist that these offices keep exact accounts of all army supplies.

6. The Commissions are instructed to supervise the proper organisation of the Staffs of corps and divisions and to make it the duty of these Staffs the regular reporting of the actual effective force of the units.

7. Having finished the reorganisation of the corps and the separate divisions and having reported the results to the Military Council, the Commissions shall submit to the Military Council plans for the formations of new units in the corps in order to bring their effective force up to the necessary numerical strength. In accordance with these plans the Government will in the future establish a new budget for the corps.

8. The order in which the work of the Commissions is done.

1) The Commissions start working as soon as these instructions will have been approved by the Military Council.

2) The Commissions can obtain results only if they are thorough in their work and well familiar with the condition of the unit and with its peculiarities. The responsibility for keeping the Commissions informed is imposed by the Military Council on the Commanders of the respective corps and separate divisions.

3) Having become thoroughly familiar with the condition of the corps or of the separate division the Commissions work out a plan for its reorganisation and carry it out immediately through the Commanders of the corps or the divisions.

4) In case of disagreement among the members of the Commissions on the measures for the reorganisation of some unit, the disputed question is submitted to the decision of the Military Council. However the disputed question must never be the cause of a delay in the rest of the whole work of the reorganisation of the corps or the division.

5) The 30th of January is fixed as the final date on which the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army must be accomplished. The Commissions shall take all possible measures to have this time shortened as much as possible.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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Chapter III.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY OF CANTON.

Introduction: Even by the end of 1923, when our first instructors arrived at Canton, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and his Government had already realized the necessity of reorganizing the army and centralizing the administration of it. Under the acrual conditions, existing in China and, particularly, in Kwangtung, this problem proved to be not an easy one, because individual militaristic generals, supported by groups of their adherents by no means acquiesced in the loss of their independence with regard to the collection of taxes or simply "squeezing" the population of the region, occupied by them. But the centralization of the administration of the army meant exactly the unification of finances and taxation. In spite, however, of logical arguments, proving the advantages of such centralization (the generals themselves acknowledged these advantages), the pecuniary interests of the Generals and their satellites always prevailed. Therefore, the Government had to start with the creation of a military force of its own, entirely devoted to it, which, in future, could unify the military groups, which were dissatisfied with the policies of the big militarists. The first nucleus of such an army, afterwards called "The Revolutionary Party Army", was made by establishing on 10 June 1924 a Military School of the Kuo-min-tang and of Whangpoa. Within a year this nucleus grew into the famous Whangpoa Corps, which succeeded in unifying almost all military groups which were loyal to the Revolutionary Government, - for the struggle against the "invincible" Yunnanese and their allies, the Kuangsi troops. On June 12-13 1925 these unified forces of the Revolutionary Government defeated

the united forces of Yünnan and Kuangsi round Canton and at Canton itself. Such military defeat has never been seen in the South of China. before. They surrounded and disarmed more than 20.000 troops, which enjoyed the reputation of being the "best" in the South of China. At the outset this nucleus was in most difficult financial straits because the funds of the Government were not sufficient even for the maintenance of the school which was originally intended for 600 cadets, not to speak of the enlargement of the School and the simultaneous formation of regular troops. Nevertheless owing to the curtailment of all other expenses and with our support, it has been possible, by end of 1924, to increase the number of School's cadets up to 1.000, to create two new regiments of regular troops and to organize the staff of the 3rd regiment.

The program of the School and regiments had for its aim the training of officers personel and soldiers, politically conscious and having military knowledge; also short term Courses were organized (in the School) as early as July, for the training of Commissaries (Party Representatives.)

As regards the military affairs, special attention was being paid to the preparation of troops for field-service. The results of such training became manifest in March and April 1925 during the first campaign(for Whangpoa) against Ch'en Chün-Ming, when, before the sudden onslaught of Whangpoa troops and their Cantonese allies (the attitude of Yünnanese and Kuangsi troops was almost entirely indifferent and, partly, even hostile), Ch'en Chün-Ming's superior forces were dispersed. One can realize the suddeness of the attack when one considers the length of marches - often 40-50 versts per day. The following typical episode of this campaign gives an idea as to the fighting capacity of Whangpoa troops. The first Whangpoa regiment, about 1000 bayonets strong, having advanced too far forward, sustained one whole day the onslaught of a detachment of the enemy, 7.000 bayonets strong, and having made several counter-attacks, held its

positions, until the main forces arrived. The relief of the locality played, of course a great part in that case because it did not give the enemy the possibility to turn by a short movement the flank, but if one takes into consideration the usual Chinese tactics of numbers, i.e. the obligatory retreat before the superior forces, - this episode shows that the training of Whangpoa troops was

properly organized and gave certain positive results. About that time the Hongkong newspapers made a noise, calling Whangpoa "Bolshevic Cadets" and Whangpoa troops - "Red Army". By the end of April Swatow - a stronghold of Gen. Ch'en Chün-Ming - was taken, but a considerable part of his forces succeeded to retreat from the Kuangtung province into the provinces of Fuchien and Kiangsi. Government's troops were not sufficiently strong to pursue the enemy, the more so, because, towards the beginning of May, it was established by documents that the Yünnanese and Kuangsi troops were preparing a blow in the rear, as they wanted to overthrow Canton's "Bolshevist" Government and to disarm Whangpoa troops. Negotiations with the Yünnanese were started, in order to gain time; at the same time secret measures were being taken to prepare the campaign against them. Towards the beginning of June the preparations for this campaign were completed, negotiations with the Yünnanese broken off, and Government authorities and institutions left Canton. Open rupture took place in June 1925, and on 12 June the troops, loyal to the Government approached from all directions. On 13 June the Yünnanese and Kuangsi troops were defeated in a decisive battle and, during the following two days, disarmed. A portion of these troops dispersed in the mountains and turned bandits, but the majority were taken prisoners and afterwards filled up the ranks of troops, loyal to the Government, but, of course, only after receiving a proper political instructions. Whangpoa troops admitted into their ranks about 3000-4000 Yünnanese. At that time Whangpoa troops had only one main division, the other one was in the state of being formed; two other divisions, however, in which intensive political work was being carried on, joined them. After the defeat of the Yünnanese prestige of Whampoa troops grew far beyond their real strength. Our instructors, who were placed in all large units of troops, loyal to the Government, and who, in fact, played a leading part in the campaign, contributed much to this enhancement of the prestige of Whangpoa troops; at every opportunity they cited instances of fighting capacity and political consciousness of Whangpoa troops.

During the next three months, following the defeat of Yünnanese, the Government had also to put down several other counter-revolutionary movements and to disarm the rebellious generals, chiefly with the aid of Whangpoa troops.- The Whangpoa troops, the name of which at that time had already been changed to that of "the 1st Army Corps", transformed these disarmed troops into its own 3rd Division. While the Whangpoa troops and their allies - forces loyal to the Government - were busy with the campaign against the Yünnanese and with the suppression of other rebellious movements in the vicinity of Canton and in the Canton city itself, - the Eastern part of the province was again occupied by the troops of Ch'en Chün-Ming who had received financial support from Hongkong and Peking and promised to clear the province of "Bolsheviks". The question of Ch'en Chün-Ming's suppression - final for this time - became again the order of the day. But to the danger from the East was also added the danger from the North-West, in the shape of Gen. Hsiung Ke-Wu's detachment, comprising 10.000 men. Gen. Hsiung Ke-Wu came from Szechuan province, as "a friend" of the Canton Government, but proved to be in league with Ch'en Chün-Ming. Another danger came from the South, from Gen. Feng Pen-yin, who, for the last five years, dominated in the South of Kuangtung province, and whom the Canton Government was not able, during all this period of time, to suppress, owing to the fact that the locality was inaccessable and more important and pressing problems, with which this Government was kept busy at that time. One of the Divisions, which had revolted against the Canton Government, joined Gen.Feng Pen-yin, who started the campaign against this Government at Hongkong's insistence. At the same time bandits and pirates, also supported by Hongkong, started a movement in the immediate neighbourhood of Canton, taking villages and small towns and looting the whole population. Therefore, it was necessary to take urgent measures against all these hostile movements.

The Whampoa Army corps (the First), Divisions of the IV Army Corps and one separate Division were despatched against Ch'en Chun-

Ming, as the most dangerous enemy, moreover, several small detachments, not yet reorganized into large units, also took part in the campaign. The second campaign against

Ch'en Chün-Ming started in the beginning of October and in the first part of November Swatow was already taken and the majority of Ch'en Chun-Ming's forces disarmed. A portion of these forces left again the territory of Kwangtung province, but for this once the revolutionary troops pursued them and, even requested the Governors of Fuchien and Kiangsi provinces to take measures for their disarmament. By end of November these units were also suppressed, except several small detachments, which were enlisted to serve in the army of the said two provinces.

The Second Army Corps was entrusted with the suppression of Hsiung Ke-wu. By end of October the 2nd Corps succeeded in accomplishing this task and then moved one part of its forces to the South.

Only one Division of the IV Army Corps was left in the South, by end of September for action against Teng Pen-Yin. This Division delayed the advance of the enemy and retreated slowly. The III rd Army Corps was intended for the support of this Division and for counter-attacks; but as it had to be moved from afar and as there were no good means of communication, this corps, with its two Divisions, succeeded to arrive at the battle-field only about the 20th of October and then stopped the enemy's offensive. But these forces were not able to assume the decisive counter-offensive: they had to wait for the arrival of more reinforcements; still they were strong enough to drive slowly back the enemy. In the middle of November four Regiments of the III Army Corps came to the South and in the beginning of December, in connection with Ch'en Chun-Ming's suppression, the IV Army Corps (two Divisions) was also moved to the South. With the aid of these forces it was, of course, possible not only to assume the decisive counter-offensive, but also finally to defeat Teng Pen-Yin, who, for so long a time, remained invulnerable for the Canton Government. Besides the Canton Government's forces, several Regiments, belonging to the forces of the allied province - Kuangsi, were also called forth to take part in the suppression of Teng Pen-Yin because from the

Southern part of this province the most convenient roads were leading towards the rear and the main base of Gen, Teng Pen-Yin. Towards the middle of January 1926 all the detachments of Gen. Teng Pen-Yin on the main-land were defeated (they either were disarmed or went over to the side of the Canton and Kuangsi Covernment). Only the island of Hainan remained in his hands, but, by the end of

January 1926, one Division of the IV Army Corps was transported there with the aid of the Cantonese navy, and Teng Pen-Yin's power was finally crushed. After this defeat, the province of Kwangtung became clear of all open enemies of the Revolutionary Government. The task of suppressing banditry and the activities of pirates was given to the Vth Army Corps. This corps succeeded to fulfil the task of suppressing open activities of the Bandits but of course, the task of fighting banditry in the South of China generally proved to be beyond the power of one army corps: the whole army and the whole population must take part in such fighting.

It was necessary to give this short history of the growth of the revolutionary army and the struggle undertaken by it as an Introduction to the chapter, devoted to the Army, in order to make clear why so far the reorganization and the new system of political and military training had not been extended to the whole army, and why even the best unit of the Revolutionary Army, i.e. the Whangpoa Corps, still has its defects.-

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY.

By the end of 1925 the army of the Revolutionary Canton was in the period of reorganization, which probably is not finished even now. All the same, fundamental features of army administration are outlined and put into effect; the army lists have been drafted and partly put in force or are being put in force in army units. Statutes and Regulations are being prepared and some already have been prepared, but are being put into effect very slowly, on account of almost uninterrupted military campaigns. For the time being, the majority of the army is using old Japanese and Chinese regulations.

A. ADMINISTRATION.

Military Council. Since June 1925, a Military Council has been put at the head of the Army. The Military Council consists of several members of the Central Committee of Kuomintang. The President of Political Bureau (corresponds to our Revcom- Revolutionary Committee) acts as President of the Military Council, in view of the close connection between the Political Bureau and Military Council. The Military Council consists also of all Army Corps Commanders (there are six of them now) and of the chief of the General Staff, also of our military director (chief of the group). Although the Military Council is vested with extensive rights, nevertheless all questions of principles, of a military character, are first discussed by Political Bureau (till the end of 1925 even technical questions of army administration were first discussed by the Political Bureau; this was called for by the necessity to preserve the Government from too large demands of Generals, who did not want to give up so easily their former positions of absolute independence). The Military Council discusses all questions, pertaining to the army administration, both of administrative and operative character; examines and confirms army lists, Regulations and Statutes prepared by the General Staff. The Military Council holds its regular meetings once every week, but, in case of

necessity, these meetings may be called more frequently by the President of the Council.-

GENERAL STAFF.

The General Staff is a technical organ of the Military Council. Our military director (Assistant of the Chief of the Group) acts, in reality, as Chief of the General Staff, but his official position is that of the Adviser to the Chief of the General Staff. By 8 December 1925 there were as yet no strict Regulations, governing the General Staff, i.e. the Regulations were being prepares simultaneously with the organization of the General Staff - in June 1925 -, but were subject to continual alterations, in connection with the every-day work. By that time there were the following Departments in the General Staff: Operations and Intelligence Divisions(including "liaison" service) Administration and Inspection; of Supplies; of Navy. The last two Departments were considered as independent and were subordinated directly to the Military Coundil. Apart from the General Staff there was an Aviation Bureau, which claimed to be subordinated directly to the Political Bureau. Our instructors were, in fact, at the head of all these Departments, but officially they were called advisers to the Chiefs of Department. By end of December our instructors held even officially the posts of Commander of the Navy and Chief of the Aviation Bureau, but, at the first opportunity, they had to become Advisers again, because it is politically inconvenient for our instructors to hold official posts, whereas our influence will not suffer in the least from their transformation into advisers again.-

B. ARMY'S SUBDIVISION AND ORGANIZATION.

By June 1925 there were as yet no definite forms of organization in the army of the Southern-Chinese Republic. Each military group was called differently; their names were based principally upon provincial designations. There were armies of

Yünnan, Kuangsi, Hunan, Canton, Honan, Shensi detachment etc., besides, there were many separate Divisions, Brigades, Regiments and even, Battalions. The most conspicuous among

them was the so-called "Party-Army", better known under the name of "Whangpoa troops". The strict system of army organization and subdivision - into Corps, Division, Regiment etc.,- according to fixed lists, was introduced for the first time in the "Whangpoa troops", but in other units the name very often did not correspond to their numerical strength. After the defeat of Yünnanese and Kuangsi troops, the name of the whole army was changed into that of "People's Revolutionary Army", and it was divided into Army Corps, as follows:

Whangpoa troops:	1st Army Corps
Canton Army:	4th. " "
Hunan Army:	2nd " "
Yünnanese (loyal to Canton Government):	3rd " "
Li Fu-lin's Cantonese:	5th " "

Several separate detachments, regiments and divisions were not transformed into larger units, as they were stationed far away on the frontier or werehostile to the project of reorganization. Several months more were required to suppress the troops who had a hostile attitude and to introduce into the newly-named Army Corps' a proper organization and subdivision according to the army-lists, already prepared and tested by the experience of the Whangpoa troops. In the middle of November after the defeat of Ch'en Chün-Ming, the VIth Army Corps was formed from Honan and Shensi detachments and several separate regiments. Officially one division only remained in existence as a separate unit, but as its military and political training was done after Whangpoa standards and as it gravitated to the Ist Corps, it was permitted to remain as a separate unit, in order to increase the importance of the 1st Army Corps (Whangpoa). Unofficially several more regiments and small detachments existed (they exist, probably, even now), but after being informed of their existence, the Government either suggested to them that they incorporate

into some existing unit, or, in case of refusal, took measures for their disarmament.-

Each Army Corps consists of three Divisions; each Division - of three Regiments, each Regiment - of three Battalions and each

Battalion - of four Companies. A Company must be 100-120 bayonets strong. Each Regiment must have a machine-gun detachment, but the number of machine-guns depends on how many there are at hand. In the Ist Army Corps machine-gun detachments have about 12 machine-guns and in the IInd Corps - not more than six. Each Division must have an artillery-division, but the number of guns also depends upon the artillery at hand. Some divisions have no artillery at all; in this connection a question was raised of organizing artillery-regiments to be attached to Army Corps, but how this question will be solved,- by the end of December 1925 - there was as yet no information available. It is important to point out here that on account of previous practice of Generals being independent, neither their Army Corps nor Divisions ever give up their artillery or machine-guns to other units; therefore, the question of redistribution of these equipment remains till now at a deadlock. But in time, when the habit of centralization and subordination of command will penetrate more deeply into the life of the army, it will probably be possible to make a proportionate distribution of all equipment in all units of the army.

As regards technical means of "Communications" they are almost totally lacking; therefore, they are not included for the time being, into the organization tables of the Army. If the Staff of an Army Corps has some, even primitive communication by telephone with its own Divisions, it may consider itself fortunate but, for the most part, there is only personal communication, provided by the units themselves, most often - on foot, sometimes - on bicycle (this is being introduced in Whangpoa); mounted communication is absolutely lacking, not to mention the army, there are no more than 500 horses in the whole province. The Staffs of the Army Corps are using either local telegraph lines, in order to establish communication with the General Staff, or the city telephone lines at Canton itself (where the staffs of the Army Corps are most often quartered). Nevertheless, there is a

special course, a part of the Whangpoa School, for the training of specialists in communications. It is also necessary to mention that there are in the Ist Army Corps (Whangpoa) some technical means of communications, even field radio-stations (of the regimental type.)

The same must be said about the engineering materials. Courses for engineers and sappers have been opened at the Whangpoa School; upon completion of the course there, the specialists have

to be, in future, the instructors for the organizations of sappers in the army units.-

C. QUESTION OF FURNISHING SUPPLIES.

The question of issuing army supplies,in the sense as we understand it, is not centralized. Each unit is providing food, as well as clothing for itself independently. The fact is that every soldier gets a fixed pay - 10 to 12 Canton dollars per month and provides himself with food and clothing. This is usually done by cooperative system and every soldier's share of expenses is then deducted from his pay. Sometimes regiments and Divisions are purchasing provisions or ordering soldiers' equipment on a large scale, but even then the Companies get all that is necessary, for cash payments. During the campaign the units are usually living on local resources, by buying provisions from the population.(formerly they simply looted, but this is severly persecuted now, and the guilty ones are executed by shooting). Only in case that it is known, that provisions cannot be procured locally, they are brought from the rear. As regards the supplying of munitions for the army-units, this is, of course, the duty of the high command, but their expenditure is not large, owing to the fact that both adversaries are equally short of them. During all previous campaigns 200-300 cartridges per rifle were regarded by the high command as a good supply; those who had 500 and more, considered themselves as sufficiently provided for all emergencies. During the campaign the soldier had to carry 150-200 cartridges; the lesser quantity among the soldiers provoked discontent and even, refusal to take the field. The remainder of the cartridges was carried in the rear of the units by "coolies" on their shoulders. The supply of cartridges for machine-guns did not exceed 1000-1500. The artillery munitions (shells etc.) were almost absolutely lacking; seldom a gun had 30-3- shells; moreover, the artillery almost never took part in the battles.

Only for the sieges of some places was the artillery used at all and even in that case more for the enemy's intimidation than for destruction. It is clear that, the issue of supplies being organized in such a manner, there are neither supply-sections, nor army-service corps; moreover, there is not and there cannot be an army service corps, as we understand it, because there are no roads at all in the Kwangtung province, with the exception of areas of big cities and even then within the radius of 10-15 kilometres only. Instead of roads there are only narrow footpaths, along which the troops are moving mostly in an Indian file. All small supplies, which it is necessary to carry in the rear of the units, are carried by specially hired men - "coolies" - on their shoulders. These coolies are hired for the march only; when quartered at some place, the troops do not require them. The only supply-service which is now more or less centralized, is that of finances. Formerly the Generals themselves, through their own men, were collecting taxes from the population and so were not in need of Government's funds. Now such a system is in force only in the frontier regions, where the Government had as yet no time to establish its own organs for the collection of taxes. At present the funds for the army-units are allotted by the Central Government, according to the estimates presented, which are checked up and confirmed by the Government, and the army units (Army Corps) must present a report, concerning the expenditure of allotted sums. All units (Army Corps) must present such estimates. As mentioned above, in some areas the military authorities themselves are collecting taxes, through their own men, but they must make a report concerning the sums, collected by them; these sums are then put on account of their estimates. As far as possible, the Government sends its officials to check up the collection of taxes and the expenditure of sums, thus collected. It is necessary to point out here that, till the end of 1925, the Government was spending about 70% of its revenues for the army.-

D. EFFECTIVE FORCE OF THE ARMY AND THE HIGH COMMAND.

Until the end of 1925, the effective force of the army was not fixed definitely, the more so as it was frequently changing, especially in connection with the defeat of Yünnanese and the subsequent disarmaments of some units and the corresponding reinforcement, at their expense, of other units. Besides, after the formation of Army Corps and centralization of finances, the Army Corps Commanders, in order to receive more money from the Government, were giving considerably exaggerated information concerning the numerical strength of their units. To check up these figures was difficult, because the units were either scattered, or taking the field. It was necessary to curtail the figures thus given, but only approximatively, so as not to give offense to the Generals. For instance, it may be mentioned that even Gen. Chiang Kai-shih (Commander of the 1st Army Corps) informed the Government that the numerical strength of his corps was 40.000 men, whereas we knew very well (because there were more of our instructors in the 1st Whangpoa Corps, than in all other units; moreover, this corps had been organized by us) that there were not more than 20.000 men in it and among them 12.000 combatants.

According to our approximated data, there were in the whole army (in December 1925) about 65.000 combatants, distributed as follows:

Ist Army Corps (Whangpoa) - - -	about	12.000
IVth " "	"	11.000
IIIrd " "	"	10.000
IInd " "	"	10.000
Vth " "	"	8.000
VIth " "	"	9.000
Separate Division	"	3.500
Schools	"	3.500
Several small units	"	2.000

To these must be added (about 50%) various officials, clerks, workmen etc., serving in the army.

After the defeat of the enemies of the Government in the South, the numerical strength of those Army Corps, which were at the front, probably increased, owing to the fact that some units of the enemy

went over to the above-mentioned Army Corps.

On 8 December 1925 the following Generals were Commanders of Army Corps:

1st Army Corps:	Gen. Chiang Kai-shih
3rd " "	" Ch'u Pei-teh
2nd " "	" T'an Yen-k'ai
(actually: Gen Liu T'i-p'ing)	
4th Army Corps:	Gen. Li T'-kan
5th " "	" Li Fu-lin
6th " "	" (Ch'en Chim) Cheng Ch'ien

Gen. Wu T'i-ch'ien (Commissioner of Public Safety and Chief of the Police and Gendarmerie of Kwangtung) was officially Commander of the (Separate) Division, but, it was actually commanded by his Chief of the Staff; during the campaigns this Division was usually attached to the 1st Army Corps.-

E. POLITICAL WORK IN THE ARMY.

The systematic political work was and is being carried on among the Whangpoa troops or the 1st Army Corps ever since their organization and until the present time, according to the Red Army's standard. Not only political sections and party cells are in existence, but the system of Commissaries has been also introduced, although not with such great authority, as in the Red Army during the period of the civil war. As for the other units of the Canton Army, almost no political work was being conducted until June 1925, or, if conducted, then only in the form of occasional lectures and contrary to regulations. First of all it was necessary to shape the minds of Generals, to prove to them that the political work did not threaten them with diminution of their authority, but, on the contrary, would increase it; that, in connection with the growth of political consciousness, the fighting capacity of their units was growing also.(Our leaders wanted, of course, quite the contrary, i.e. to undermine the authority of several independent Generals and to disorganize their

units. The subsequent events confirmed the soundness of our line of conduct - the destruction of Yünnanese and other troops, the dismissal of counter-revolutionary generals). The instance of Whangpoa troops, the rapid growth of their strenth and fighting capacity, was always cited, in favor of the carrying on political work.

The Generals hesitated: they were afraid of possible loss of their independence, but dared not openly to refuse us and the Government. Actually some political work was being carried on in all units, but not officially, although the Generals were compelled to permit this work. The destruction of Yünnanese troops in June 1925 and the subsequent events forced the hesitating Generals to acknowledge openly the principle of the necessity of political work and they began persistently to request us and the Government that instructors and political workers should be sent at once into their units, in order to organize the political work, according to the Whangpoa standard. This change in the minds of the Generals took place in the end of 1925, but for want of sufficient number of necessary workers, also in connection with military events (described in the introduction), it was impossible to meet all the requests entirely and at once. The organization of Political Sections in the Army Corps was started, and the Political Directorate for the Army was also organized. This work is continued now and is extended to divisions, regiments etc.

The organization of political work in the 1st Army Corps (Whangpoa) is as follows:

Political Section of the Army Corps; the Chief of the Section is also Representative of the Party (Commissary),

Political Sections in Divisions and Regiments; the Chiefs of these Sections are also Representatives of the Party (Commissaries);

Representatives of the Party (Commissaries) in Battalions and Companies; they are also political guides.

Moreover, there are everywhere cells of the Kuomintang Party, which are carrying on work in close connection with political guides.

The influence of the communistic party over the 1st Army Corps is quite considerable, because most of the Party-Representatives (Commissaries) are members of the Communistic party or

Comsomol (Communistic Youth Union), but the pure communistic work is carried on secretly, in order not to give the reactionaries reason to raise a cry about forceful communistic influence.

ARMY'S CONDITION.

The condition of the Army of Revolutionary Canton cannot be called splendid, not only with regard to the technical equipment, but, even, in the sense of being equipped with the most necessary articles. The 1st Army Corps (Whangpoa) is, of course, the best equipped because the Government is sparing no efforts and means, in order to provide this Army Corps with all, that is necessary, especially with money. Moreover, our support was almost exclusively given to this Army Corps. The food of the soldiers, with small exceptions, is generally insufficient; the equipment in the greater portion of the army is poor. In future, with the improvement of Government's finances, the condition (standard of life) of the army, will probably improve also, in the sense that they will be provided with all necessities. But the same cannot be said about the improvement of accoutrement and technical equipment, because, even if the Government has some ready-money, it will be difficult to obtain these articles as they can be imported only as contraband. And, in order to manufacture them on the spot, it is necessary to create a military industry, for which time and big capital are required, and the Revolutionary Government lacks both of them. The equipment of the Army is, in general, very poor. There are rifles and machine-guns of most various makes, from quite obsolete to most modern ones (there are, however, very few of the latter kind). The greater part of the army is armed with Mannlicher rifles (German), because they were easiest to obtain, and because the Canton Arsenal is manufacturing them (about 70 rifles per day, but of poor quality). Then there are Arisaka rifles (Japanese). The 1st Army Corps is mostly armed with them. Moreover, there are French rifles, "Berdan" rifles etc., but their quantity is small.

As for the machine-guns those of the "Schwarzloz" make were used in great numbers (the Canton Arsenal was also manufacturing them, to the number of six per week); then there were French

machine-guns of "Leblanc" make, Russian - of "Maxim" make; besides, there happened to be other machine-guns of various makes.

There is, generally speaking, a very small quantity of artillery; it is of the lightest

type, easy for transportation, mostly of 1½ -,2 inch.-

The supplying with ammunitions, on account of the fact that it was lacking, was also poor enough. The Canton Arsenal is a sole source for the regular supplying the whole army with ammunitions; it had the capacity of manufacturing about 50.000 cartridges per day, but was actually manufacturing only 15-20 thousand for want of materials and pecuniary means. Besides, several Generals had their own Arsenals, of primitive type, for manufacturing cartridges.

I have no information concerning the supplying with artillery munitions. It is necessary to point out that the artillery took part in the battles in only rare cases. There was also along the river at Humen and Whangpoa forts, fortress-artillery, in order to guard the approaches to Canton from the sea.

There were no other technical means of warfare, except four aeroplanes, of which two only could ascend into the air, but could not leave their base more than 10 - 15 kilometres.

Technical means of communications are almost totally lacking. Only by the end of 1925 the 1st Corps succeeded in buying several field radio-apparatus (of regimental type), but it will be possible to use them only after the training of specialists. The 1st Army Corps had also several commutators and about 20 telephones of field-type, but other Army Corps had no such technical means of communications at all.

With reference to the army's training, particular attention has till now been paid to the training of soldiers according to a drill-system, suited for parades and marching. But the Whangpoa troops were an exception to this rule, because, during the course of their training special attention was always being paid to their preparation, by means of manoeuvres, for field-service. This explains their successes during military operations, in comparison with other units of the army. In order to introduce such a training, it was necessary, first of all, to train the officers

of the lower and middle grades, including Company and Battalion Commanders. In the middle of 1924 the Whangpoa School was established for this purpose;also Practical Courses (refresher courses).

for commanding officers. But as the course of training in the School covered six months only and in the practical courses even less, and as there was no sufficient time for the preparation of troops, in connection with continuous campaigns, - neither the commanding officers, nor the soldiers of Whangpoa Army Corps can, of course, be considered as thoroughly trained and prepared. But, judging from their knowledge, they are still superior to other units of the Army, because there the commanding officers of lower and middle grades are almost totally lacking military instruction and have worked themselves up from rank and file through practical work.

From the beginning of 1926 the question of supplementary training of the 1st Army Corps and new training of other units became the order of the day. This question requires much intensive work, but without its solution, the army cannot become the instrument of spreading the influence of the Revolutionary Government, especially in the northern direction.-

CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITS AND COMMANDERS.

As regards fighting capacity and political stability, the 1st Army Corps (Whangpoa) is the best one, expecially its 1st Division: the 2nd and the 3rd Divisions are next (according to the time of their organization and the length of political work and military training). This Army Corps may be considered as a loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government and in case of the anti-north expedition as "Shock troops", provided it is properly supplied with technical equipment. This Army Corps has a peculiar feature, which makes it conspicuous among others (perhaps, in the whole of China) i.e., it carries on, during the campaign, a political work on a most extensive scale among the population; it follows, as a matter of course, that the troops of the 1st Corps never indulge in looting of the population. As the rumor about such a conduct on the part of soldiers spreads very widely and

quickly all over China, it is very probable that, during the campaign, the Whangpoa troops will be

welcomed by the population, as such was the case during the expedition against Ch'en Chün-Ming. Enough has been already said in the preceding chapters about the fighting qualities of this corps.

Our influence over this Army Corps is very great, because it has been organized and trained by us. The majority of our instructors are working in this Corps.

General Chiang Kai-Shih Commander (until January 1926) of the 1st Army Corps, is regarded as one of the most loyal followers of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and one of the best revolutionaries; according to his speeches, he might be regarded as communist, but looking more deeply at his convictions, one sees that he belongs to typical "intelligentsia" of the radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins. By character he is irresolute, but stubborn; his stubbornness being of a special Chinese type, as when persons, holding some post (it happens so especially among military men), in case all does not go according to their wishes, immediately resign or simply leave, but come back again, after long negatiations and entreaties. He received his military education first in the Pei-yang Military Academy and then in Japan; besides, he reads much. Theoretically he is strong enough in military science, but, on account of his irresoluteness, could not have obtained much success, as leader of troops on the battlefield, without the aid of our instructors. The same, however, may be said with reference to almost all other Chinese Generals in the South. He is comparatively young - about 35 years old now. In the second middle of 1923 he went to U.S.S.R. at the head of the Delegation, sent by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. After his return he was appointed Chief of the Kuomintang Military School (Whangpoa), which it was intended to establish at that time, but it became possible to open this School only in June 1924. His rapid advancement, with our aid, began since that time. He is so connected with us that the possibility of the rupture on his part can hardly be admitted.

It is more difficult to characterize the IVth Army Corps, because our work in it begins just now. Only the First Division of this Army Corps is better known to us, because our Adviser was working there as early as during

the first expedition of this Army Corps against Ch'en Chün-Ming, and the Yünnanese. This Division was subordinated at that period of time to the Whangpoa Army Corps, and the political work in it was carried on according to Whangpoa's standard. It is the opinion of our instructors that this Division can be considered as loyal to the Government and gravitating to the Whangpoa Army Corps. The other two Divisions are unknown to us (by the end of 1925). As regards fighting qualities, this Army Corps is considered to be next best to Whangpoa Corps. Until the political work takes more solid roots in this Army Corps, politically much will depend upon its Commander, to whom the soldiers got accustomed and whom the commanding officers are obeying.

General Li Ti-kan, Commander of the IVth Army Corps, received his military instruction in Peiyang Military Academy (Chinese), but he knows military art more by practice, than theoretically. He is considered as a good enough General. Politically the Revolutionary Government has not much confidence in him. Till now he was active in assisting the Government with the suppression of counter-revolutionary Generals: Ch'en Chün-Ming and Teng Pen-Yin. But it is rumoured that he is dissatisfied with the Government's policy-it being too radical in his opinion - and, at the first opportunity, may try to exercise his influence, in order to change the course of this policy.

Until the end of 1925 no Divisions were as yet organized in the 2nd Army Corps, and the Regiments were directly subordinated to the staff of this Corps. At that time there were eight Regiments in it, and, at the Military Council's recommendation the formation of the 9th Regiment was started. The question of organizing Divisions became then order of the day. The Military Council insisted on this measure, but the high commanding officers in every way evaded the giving of a direct answer; besides, it was difficult to carry through this organization at that time, because the units were taking the field. This Army Corps (i.e. its 8 Regiments) was considered as good one and having fighting

capacity. The troops were properly trained and sufficiently supplied. There was even a separate Artillery Regiment, but it was equipped with 10-12 obsolete guns and had only a small supply of shells. The high commanding officers insisted, in the second half

of 1925, upon the introduction of political work into this Army Corps. The political work was then actually started, but did not yield as yet big results, on account of the want of a sufficient number of workers.

Gen. T'an Yen-kai, Commander of this Army Corps, is an old member of Kuo-min-tang Party and is regarded as a revolutionary, though of not very radical type. He was Governor of Hunan province, but was driven away by Chao Heng-ti (Wu Pei-fu's creature) in 1923. He is not a military man; therefore, his assistant Gen. Liu Ti-pin, of whose personal devotion he did not doubt, was actually in command of this Army Corps. The Revolutionary Government and our leaders regarded Gen. Tan Yen-kai as trustworthy and as a loyal partisan of the Government.

The IIIrd Army Corps consisted of the Yünnanese, loyal to the Government (the so called Gen. Ch'u Pei-teh's troops). After the defeat of Yünnanese and Kuangsi troops in June 1925, about 5.000 defeated and disarmed Yünnanese were incorporated into this Corps. Its troops, i.e. the Yünnanese, were considered to be the best in the south of China as having fighting capacity and being reliable. Their stability will increase after proper political work. The main defect of this Army Corps was the poor equipment of its units with arms (about 20% have no arms at all, the other 20% are provided with obsolete arms: "Berdan" rifles, match-locks etc.) and the poor supply service. Before the organization of the Corps was completed, the detachment (or the so-called Gen. Ch'u Pei-teh's Army) was constantly stationed along the border of the province and occupied the poorest area; the funds there collected were barely sufficient for its existence. The Revolutionary Government, for want of financial means, also could not give the Corps any considerable support, although in Governmental circles and among our leaders an opinion was expressed that this Army Corps, after a proper political and military work, and provided its equipment and supplies are improved, could become a trustworthy and loyal bulwark of the Revolutionary Government

(second to Whangpoa troops), the more so, because the high commanding officers of the corps were always ready to cooperate with the Government in all its undertakings.

Gen. Ch'u Pei-teh, Commander of this Corps, was always a loyal adherent of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and of the Revolutionary Government. He executed all the orders of the Government without reserve; the same, however, cannot be said with reference to other Generals (except Chiang Kai-shih), whom it was always necessary to persuade for quite a long time. He does not take an active part in politics; he just executes orders, referring to military matters. He did not receive high military instruction, but acquired by practice a good knowledge of the military art.

The Vth Army Corps - formerly Gen. Li Fu-lin's Army - does not enjoy the reputation of having fighting capacity. These troops were exclusively busy with fighting bandits and pirates in the delta of the Canton river; these troops themselves are for the most part, former bandits. Their military training is very slight; till the end of 1925 no political work was carried on among them. Still, in the beginning of 1926 the organization of this kind of work was actually started. In June 1925 a portion of these troops took part in the defeating of Yünnanese and Kuang-si troops.

The equipment of this Army Corps was of medium quality; only artillery was almost totally lacking; but the Corps had a river flotilla, consisting of about 30 small vessels, one half of them - steam-vessels, the others - for the most part - junks. The vessels were provided with artillery - guns from the most obsolete type to the most modern models; there were, however, very few of the last class. This flotilla was necessary for fighting river pirates. During all the period of their existence, these troops had a continual regular revenue from the population of the area, occupied by them, and also from the merchants and ship-owners, for protecting their ships from attacks of the pirates; therefore, the supplying of these troops (afterwards reorganized into an Army Corps) was comparatively good.

Gen. Li Fu-lin, Commander of this Army Corps, did not receive any military instruction. He is a former bandit; has distinguished himself, owing to his cunningness and to the support of a part of Cantonese merchants. He disliked the Revolutionary Government, but was clever enough not to give his opinion openly, and not to speak of his moving against it. As a contrast to other Generals,

he was supported by (to say more correctly, was relying upon) the merchants, who were carrying on a trade in the delta of rivers and in the areas menaced by bandits, also the wealthy peasants and land-owners of those areas. On this account, the Government (and our leaders) also dared not make an open move against him, in order to disarm and to disband his Army Corps, although it knew of his hostile attitude towards itself, because he himself did not give cause for such a move against him. By the end of 1925 the Government prevailed on him to give assent to the organization of political work in his Army Corps.

The VIth Army Corps was organized, as late as November 1925, from several separate detachments and regiments. In December it had not yeat the full complement, but was in the stage of organization. These separate detachments were always very badly equipped and supplied, their fighting capacity was very small, but the value of these troops rests on the fact that, the majority of the soldiers being emigrants from the Northern provinces - Shansi, Hupei, Anhui, Kiangsi, they can be very useful in the future, during the Anti-North expedition. But it is necessary to improve their equipment and supplies, also to give them a thorough military training and to carry on among them an intensive political work.

Gen. (Ch'en Chim) Cheng Ch'ien, Commander of this Corps, was considered a loyal follower of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and a good member of the Kuomintang Party, but, according to his convictions, he is nearer to the right, than to the left elements. He received a high military instruction in the Japanese Military Academy. Till 1925 he was a member of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Government, as Minister of War, and took part in all the Anti-north expeditions, organized by Dr. Sun. He did not play an active part in politics and considers himself a military man and not a politician, but the Government and our leaders always thought and think now that he will accomplish all the tasks, given him by the Revolutionary Govern-

ment, and will not play traitor.

Gen. (Wu Ti-hsin's) Wu Ti-ch'ien's Separate Division gravitates towards the Ist (Whangpoa) Army Corps, because, during 1925, it took part in the campaigns together with the Whangpoa Corps and was subordinated to the latter's headquarter. Political work was carried on in it, according to the Whangpoa's standards, but not so intensively.

The equipment and supplies of this Division are good enough. Its fighting capacity is of a middle quality, but will, of course, increase, after a proper military training and after the appointment of Whangpoa School graduates to its commanding posts. This Division was considered a trustworthy and loyal to the Revolutionary Government.

Gen. Wu Ti-ch'ien, Commander of this Division, has no military training, but got the possibility of organizing his Division, owing to his holding permanently, from 1923 till now, a post of Commissioner for Public Safety of the Kwangtung province and Chief of Police of Canton city. Actually, however, not he himself, but his Chief of Staff, who had received good military instruction in Japan, was in command of this Division.

The Military School of the Kuomintang (Whangpoa - now Central) was and is the best military unit of the Revolutionary Government. This School was a nucleus, from which the revolutionary army (the Ist Army Corps) grew into a formidable force and around which were grouped all military forces, now supporting the Revolutionary Government. The School has been established, at the insistence of our directors, in the beginning of 1924 and was given our special attention. As long as the Revolutionary Government was not set on a firm footing, the School was also taking advantage of our material support. Instruction and education in the School were conducted, under the supervision and with the closest participation of our instructors, according to the Red Army's standard, but in conformity with Chinese conditions. The School was principally concerned with the training of officer-personel infantry, but had also separate classes for artillery, military engineering and communications work. Moreover, there have been organized at the same School: special courses for political workers and commissaries (party representatives), and also Practical Courses for Commanding staff of the middle grade. The number of Cadets of the School fluctuated from 1000 to 2000.

10 to 20% of the cadets belonged to the Communistic Party and Comsomol (Communistic Youth Union), depending on the proportional number of men who were sent to the School by the Central Committee or the local Committee of the Communistic Party.

Gen. Chiang Kai-shih was appointed President of the School at the time of its establishment and still holds this post; he has been devoting to the School as much of his time, as he could spare. During his absence Gen. Hu, his assistant, was put in charge of the School. Gen. Hu is a graduate of Japanese Military Academy and a well-read man.

PLANS AND PROJECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY COUNCIL.

After the Kwangtung province had been cleared of counter-revolutionary military forces (by the end of January 1926), the Government and the High Command drafted a new plan for the military training of the units and for extensive political work among them. Moreover, it is considered necessary to increase the numerical strength of units; to complete, as far as possible, the equipment and other supplies; and to accumulate a stock of provisions of all kinds and also special funds. All these measures are called forth by the necessity of starting an anti-north expedition, in order to extend the influence and the authority of the Revolutionary Government, in the interests of the Chinese Revolution. Much time is required to carry through all these proparatory measures, but our leaders consider that it is necessary to organize now the anti-north expedition as best as possible, in order that this expedition should not meet with the same failure, as did all the previous ones, organized by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. It is also necessary to make Canton and the Kwangtung province secure from unexpected dangers from within, as well as from without, but for this purpose it is necessary to create a Central Military School and a specially trustworthy division, upon which the Government can rely, in case of necessity. For the purpose of securing the frontiers of the province and fighting bandits and pirates, a certain part of military forces of the Government

will not take the field. The units, which it is intended to leave in the province, are just the most untrustworthy ones, as regards their commanding officers. Therefore, the Government pays particular attention to the political work among these units, in order to diminish the influence of their commanding officers.

MILITARY INDUSTRY.

There are two Arsenals and one powder factory in the Kwangtung province. Besides, at the disposal of some Generals there were workshops

of primitive type for manufacturing cartridges; also, as everywhere in China, there are several workshops of primitive type, making powder for fireworks and rockets.

The arsenal near Canton was the most important source for the supply of munitions. In 1925 the number of workmen was estimated to be about 1500, but, for want of money, and materials, the work was going very slowly. Actually about 500 wormen only were working. On an average, the Arsenal was manufacturing daily 15-20 thousand cartridges, 50-60 rifles and one machine-gun. If capital were available, and if there was the possibility of getting good materials, (especially steel), the Arsenal could do full work and would become a main source of war materials for the revolutionary army. The arsenal was equipped with German machinery and, till the middle of 1925, the work was going on under the direction of a German engineer. At present the Arsenal is under the diraction of a Chinese engineer. A supplementary equipment for the Arsenal (machines and stands) for 1.500.000 Chinese Dollars had been ordered as early as 1923. This equipment was shipped to Canton by the end of 1924, but, as the Government had no funds to pay for it, remained in the godown till the end of 1925. The Government had the intention to pay for this equipment in the beginning of 1926 and to enlarge the Arsenal (to enable it to make small guns and artillery munitions).

The Second Arsenal was at Swapua(Swatow) and was a source of supplies for the troops of Ch'en Chün-Ming. After his defeat, the Arsenal stopped work, because a part of its machinery and equipment was removed. This arsenal is of a considerably smaller size and is less fully equipped. It was manufacturing mostly cartridges and a certain quantity of rifles. Ch'en Chün-Ming intended to enlarge and equip it more fully, in order to enable it to manufacture machine-guns and, even small guns, but had no time to do it. By the end of 1925 there was no exact information concerning manufacturing possibilities of this arsenal. In any

case, the Government had the intention either to utilize this Arsenal, in case a sufficient quantity of its equipment was still available, or to merge it into the Canton Arsenal, by removing to that place

all remaining equipment and materials.

The powder factory is near Canton. It was manufacturing especially black powder in a quantity sufficient for use of the Arsenal. The Government and our leaders intended to enlarge and to equip this factory more fully, in order to be able to obtain from it smokeless powder, as well as some chemical products.-

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CONCLUSION.

At present the Revolutionary Government of the Kuomintang at Canton is more stable, than at any previous period of time. The Kuomintang Party, which is the basis of this Government, gathered strength and grew into a considerable revolutionary force not only in the Southern China, but also over the whole of China. The masses of the people, particularly the organized peasants and workmen, are supporting the Party and, at the same time the Government of Kuomintang.

Owing to the skillful political guidance, even the middle class and small bourgeoisie, especially the merchants who represent a considerable social force in China, are supporting the Revolutionary Government in the South of China. This support is, of course, conditional, and if the economic interests of this part of the population are affected by the Government, they will turn against the latter.

The army has been transformed from several independent groups into a more or less centralized whole. During the process of unification, these groups were compelled to waive the privilege of collecting taxes and to consent to the introduction of a political organization. This circumstance alone renders the reverting of the army back into separate groups difficult enough, provided the Government does not fall down.

Owing to the consolidation of finances and monopolization of taxation by the Government, the economical and financial basis of the latter was strengthened, which is one of the most impor-

tant achievements of the Revolutionary Government, even as compared with the Central Government at Peking, as the latter cannot by any means

prevail on individual Generals to put at its disposal the sources of local revenues.

The following are the weak points of the Revolutionary Government: insufficient unity and insufficient stability of the centre of the Kuomintang Party, which consists of quite diverse elements of the population and, by its nature, is subject to constant vacillations. For the time being the overwhelming majority of the party-centre is under the influence of and in alliance with the left wing, i.e. with the Communistic Party and Comsomol (Communistic Youth Union) and under our political leadership. But in case that we make mistakes in our guidance and the left wing becomes too enthusiastic about plans, which are too radical for the present time, then the possibility is not excluded that a split will occur in the center and a considerable part will go over to the side of the right elements, who, notwithstanding a series of defeats, do not cease the struggle against the radical policy of the Kuomitang and the Revolutionary Government at Canton.

Sometime ago the better class bourgeoisie was able to draw over to its side the middle and the small bourgeoisie especially the merchants' guilds and to organize at Canton itself its own military force - "Merchants' Militia" or "Paper Tigers", who turned against the Revolutionary Government, but were suppressed and destroyed by this Government. Now these classes of population, except the better class bourgeoisie, are supporting the Government, but, in case of too radical a policy and mistakes on the part of our political leadership, they might again turn against the Revolutionary Government.

The army also is not yet wholly fashioned in a political sense; individual Generals are still enjoying considerable influence and, under favorable circumstances, some of them may make a revolt against the Revolutionary Government and unite the malcontent elements of the population under the political slogans

of the right the Kuomintang. On the other hand the technical equipment of the army is considerably worse, than that of the Northern Armies, and when the collision with the latter occurs, which will inevitably take place, when the influence of the Revolutionary Government spreads to the neighboring provinces,- it is difficult to say, whether the revolutionary ardor and the political

consciousness of the Revolutionary Army will successfully hold out against the technical superiority of the enemy; and, of course, the defeat of the Revolutionary Army will give the counter-revolutionaries a favorable opportunity inside Canton itself.

In order that these weak points be not changed into fatal ones, our skillful guidance is necessary at the first of all because this guidance plays a great part at Canton. The least mistakes painfully affect the left wing and still more painfully the centre and the Revolutionary Government. If our leaders become enthused for measures, too radical for China's real conditions, the Government will begin to carry them through and provoke the discontent of a part of the population, the discontent of which will be immediately made use of by the opponents of the Government among the right Kuomintang, in order to draw over to their side the majority of those elements of the Party, who belong to the small bourgeoisie, under the slogan of "struggle against bolshevism". That our leadership plays an exceptional part there, can be seen from the fact that the Kuo-min-tang Party, such as it exists now, has been created by us, i.e. the program, the regulations and the forms of constructive work of the Party have been worked out under our political leadership, according to the R. C. P. (Russian Communistic Party's) standards but in conformity with the conditions prevailing in China. All guidance with regard to the Party and the Government has been carried on until recently with the closest participation of our political director, and there has not yet been a case, when any measures, proposed by us, were not accepted and put into effect by the Government.

For the very short period of existence (two years only) of the Party in its organized form, a stable and skillful nucleus to guide the Party and the Government has not yet been worked out. Therefore, our political leadership has to take into consideration all the elements of social changes, in order to pursue

a correct policy.

The left wing of the Kuomitang in the future will have to proceed with great care as regards an extensive communistic work, but, on the other hand, it must concentrate on the work of organizing peasantry and workmen, under the revolutionary slogans

of the left Kuomintang. These organizations, under the guidance of the left wing, will counter-balance to a considerable extent the right elements and the vacillating centre and, moreover will give the possibility to keep in future under the influence of our leadership and of the left centre the Government, consisting of the elements of the center.

It is necessary to carry on the political work in the army on a most extensive scale and to try to introduce into the political organs of the army as many workers from the left wing, as possible (this is already being done). One must train the army up to the new methods of warfare, i.e. to increase the tactical preparedness of the army. It is necessary to take all measures to improve the outfitting and supplying and the technical equipment of the army generally. In this respect our material aid is necessary.

The Government already has a definite financial basis and, at the same time, it is working out plans of the economic development of the Kwangtung province, such as: construction of the Whangpoa port, roads of communication etc. But as yet the Government has no proper organ of audit and control; no such organ, however, is in existence elsewhere in China. The embryons of these organs have been already created, but the development of their activity is proceeding very slowly. It is necessary to intensify, through our guidance, the work in this direction, but care should be taken that the Revolutionary Government does not undertake entreprises, the execution of which would be beyond its powers, because in that case it would uselessly waste its small means, which could be utilized for other more easy, but also more pressing undertakings.-

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WAR DEPARTMENT

REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE SOUTH-CHINA GROUP OF MILITARY-POLITICAL WORKERS.

Section I

TASK OF THE GROUP.

1. To organize and instruct a National-Revolutionary army in the south of China for national liberation from the yoke of Imperialism and for unification into one independent democratic republic.
2. To give every assistance to the Government by working in the army and among the population in order to promote its democratic principles.
3. To make popular the doctrine of communism and of Sovietism and to work towards bringing about a complete rapprochement and (mutual) support between (China and) the U.S.S.R.

   and to create in the army, in the labour organizations and in the peasantry the desire (pledge) for a further revolutionary movement.
4. To keep informed about the counter-revolutionary forces, of China and the people oppressed by them or about the people of adjacent countries.
5. To make an exhaustive study of China and, chiefly, of its southern part.

Section II.

ORGANIZATION OF THE GROUP.

In order to carry out the task indicated in Section I the Group is organized as follows.

1. A Chief Military Adviser is attached to the National-

Revolutionary government and to the Commander in Chief of the National-Revolutionary army. He is at the same time the Chief of the South-China Group - - -

China Group who directes the whole work of the group and is responsible for it.

2. The Chief of the Group has two assistants. The first ofthem is the permanent Deputy-Chief of the Group and at the same time the Senior Adviser of the General Staff; the second is the Assistant for political matters in the office of the Chief of the Group and the Senior Adviser of the Political Department of the National-Revolutionary army.

3. In each Inspectorate and Department of the General-Staff, such as: the Operative and Intelligence Department, the administrative Department, the inspectorates of infantry, artillery, communications, engineering and sanitation, there are Advisers who direct the work of the respective departments or inspectorates and who at the same time direct the work of their respective branches in the army.

4. The advisers of the Inspectorates and Departments of the General Staff are working under the direct supervision of the Senior Adviser of the General Staff.

5. The Naval Bureau, the Department of Aviation, the Department of Supplies and the Military-Political school of the Communist-political party of the National-Revolutionary army have each a separate Senior Adviser who carry out the instructions of the Supreme-Adviser.

6. Each corps has a Senior Adviser who functions in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Adviser and who directs the work of his subordinate Advisers for the special branches of the service, and of the junior general Army Advisers and the Political Advisers.

7. In questions of political work the Senior Advisers of the corps receive instructions from the Senior Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department and carry them out

through their subordinate political workers.

8. The Advisers for special branches of the service attached to corps, who direct the work in the respective units, are subordinated in general military matters to the Senior Adviser of the corps and in special matters - to the Adviser of the respective Inspectorate of the General Staff.

9. Divisions belonging to a corps have advisers directly subordinated to the Senior Adviser of the corps, and they carry out the latter's instructions in their units.

10. The Adviser of a division has under him an assistant and an adviser for political matters.

11. The apparatus for the work of the Chief of the Group is the Staff of the Group. The Staff collects and digests the information about the conditions in the National-Revolutionary army and in the armies of the neighbouring provinces, arranges the information of the Advisers and of the Military Attache in China, and works out the plans of the current work of the group, attends to the personal affairs of all co-workers and their pay as well as to the economic affairs of the group.

12. At the head of the Staff of the group stands its Chief who is directly subordinated to the Chief of the Group.

Section III.

THE CHIEF OF THE GROUP.

1. The Chief of the Group is responsible for the whole military-political work of the Russian advisers in the National-Revolutionary army.

2. Exerting the maximum of his influence he directs the work of the Commander in Chief in conformity with the aims of the Group.

3. Through the Russian advisers in military units he carries out measures corresponding to the aims of the Group.

4. The Chief of the Group receives all his instructions from the Military Attache in Peking. As regards questions of a political character, he coordinates his decisions with (those of) the Chief Political Adviser of the Canton Government.

Section IV.

THE DEPUTY-CHIEF OF THE GROUP.

1. The Deputy-Chief of the Group assists the Chief of the Group in all matters relating to military operations, administration and training of the army.

2. He is wholly responsible for the work of the General Staff, its departments and inspectorates and works daily at the Staff.

Section V.

THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF THE GROUP FOR POLITICAL MATTERS.

1. The Assistant for political matters, as the senior adviser of the Political Intelligence Department, directs the whole political work in the units of the National-Revolutionary army.

2. He keeps in close contact with all party organizations (Kuomintang as well as Communist) and with the civil political organizations, being the link between the Chief of the Group and these organizations.

3. The Assistant for political matters is subordinated only to the Chief of the Group. With the latter's knowledge he corresponds with the Chief Political Adviser of the National Revolutionary Government on questions of a general political character.

4. To the Assistant for political matters are subordinated: a) the Deputy-Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department, b) the advisers of the sections of the Political Intelligence Department, c) all senior political advisers in the army, d) all political advisers in the units of the National Revolutionary Army.

Section VI
THE ADVISERS OF THE INSPECTORATES AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

1. The advisers of the Inspectorates and Departments of the General Staff of the National Revolutionary Army work under the direct supervision of the Senior Adviser of the General Staff; they watch the work of the Inspectorates and Departments and assist the respective Inspectors or Chiefs with their advice; they look after the respective work in the army and take a part, together with the chiefs, in the inspections and instructions of the units.
2. The advisers of the Inspectorates and Departments give account of their work to the Senior Adviser of the General Staff.

Section VII.

THE SENIOR ADVISER OF THE NAVAL BUREAU OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

1. The Senior Adviser of the Naval Bureau of the National Revolutionary Army works hand in hand with the Chief of the Bureau and must:
   a) handle the questions relating to the organization of the fleet;
   b) see that the fleet carries out the tasks imposed upon it by the government or the Commander in Chief;
   c) be informed of the condition of the fleet (its preparadness for the war, its armament, its morale etc.);
   d) watch the manner in which the political work is being conducted on ships and among the crews.
2. The Senior Adviser of the Naval Bureau has under him the political advisers and the specialist-instructors who work in the navy.
3. The Senior Adviser of the Naval Bureau is subordinated to the Chief of the South-China Group.

to whom he gives an account of his work.

Section VIII.

THE SENIOR ADVISER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION.

1. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Aviation works together with the Chief of this Department and looks after the organization of the Air Service in the National-Revolutionary Army, assisting the Chief in solving the questions he has to decide.

2. He sees that the Air service carries out the tasks imposed upon it by the government and the Commander in Chief of the National-Revolutionary Army.

3. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Aviation must be informed of the condition of the Air service and see that the latter is used properly. He is responsible for the manner in which the political work is carried on in the units of the Air Service.

4. The Senior Adviser of the Air service has under him the specialist-instructors who work in the units of the Air service.

5. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Aviation is directly subordinated to the Chief of the South-China Group and gives to the latter an account of his work.

Section IX.

THE SENIOR ADVISER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SUPPLIES.

1. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Supplies works side by side with the Chief of this Department, assisting him with his advice. He looks after the proper organization of the work of supplying the National Revolutionary Army.

2. He sees that the money and materials are properly distributed among the units and properly spent by the latter and that

proper accounts are kept in the units.

3. He gives directions to the advisers of Corps and separate divisions in matters relating to supplies.

4. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Supplies has under him the advisers of sections for financial matters, for equipment and artillery supplies.

5. The Senior Adviser of the Department of Supplies is directly subordinated to the Chief of the South-China Group and gives an account to the latter of his work.

Section X.

THE SENIOR ADVISER OF THE COMMUNIST MILITARY-POLITICAL SCHOOL.

1. The Senior Adviser of the Communist Military-Political School works under the direct supervision of the Chief of the South-China Group.

2. He directs the school and sees that the military and educational as well as the political work in the school is properly done.

3. The Adviser of the Military-Political school has under him the political adviser and the advisers of different branches of the service who are working in the school.

4. The Adviser of the school gives an account of his work to the Chief of the South-China Group.

Section XI.

THE SENIOR ADVISERS OF CORPS.

1. The Senior advisers of corps in doing their every-day work in the units must the same as the chief of the latter,

a) be fully informed of the condition of the units (their commanders, their preparedness, armament, morale, political work etc.);

b) take an active part in solving the questions which the chief of the unit has to decide;

c) see that all orders of the Commander in Chief are carried out;

d) inform the Chief of the Group of all that is going on in the unit, throwing light on all phases of its life in monthly reports and in cases when urgent instructions are needed - by special reports;

e) using the intelligence apparatus, they must gather information about possible enemies, about the situation in the neighbouring provinces and nearest colonies and submit this information to the Staff of the Group.

2. The Senior Advisers of corps and separate divisions are responsible for the manner in which the political work is done in the units and they direct the work of the Russian political advisers in the units.

3. The Senior Advisers of corps direct the work of the specialists-advisers in the corps and of the advisers of the divisions of which the corps in composed, according to the instructions they receive from the Chief of the Group.

4. Not less than once a month they assemble all military, political and special advisers who are subordinated to them in order to exchange information to sum up the results of the work and to exchange opinions.

Section XII.

THE ADVISERS OF DIVISIONS BELONGING TO A CORPS.

1. The Advisers of Divisions work hand in hand with the commanders and must

a) be thoroughly informed of the condition of the division
b) in time of peace they must see that the units are trained according to the plans and programs worked out by the General Staff;
c) in time of war they must see that the instructions and orders of the commander of the corps are carried out and assist the commander of the division in making decisions;
d) watch the manner in which the political work is being done and direct the work of the political workers of the division according to the instructions received from the senior military-political Adviser of the corps.

2. The Adviser of a Division directs the work of his assistant.

3. The Adviser of a Division regularly informs the Senior Adviser of the corps of everything that is going on and of the work done in the division.

Section XIII.

THE SPECIALIST-ADVISERS WORKING IN THE CORPS.

1. The Specialist-Advisers, such as: artillery-men, communications-men, experts for the supply service and engineers look after the work in their respective branches of their corps and see that all instructions and orders of the respective Inspectorates of the General Staff of the National*Revolutionary army and of the respective Advisers of the Inspectorates and of the Senior Advisers of the corps are carried out.

Section XIV.

THE POLITICAL ADVISERS IN THE CORPS.

1. The Political Adviser of the corps works in close contact with the Chief of the Political Department of the Corps and directs the political work.
2. He sees that all instructions of the Political Intelligence Department are carried out;
3. Using his experience he assists with his advice the political workers and keeps up their prestige in the eyes of the commanding staff.
4. He is subordinated to the Senior Adviser of the corps and the Senior Adviser of the Political Intelligence Department.

Section XV.

THE ASSISTANT ADVISERS OF DIVISIONS.

1. The Assistant Adviser of a Division looks after the work of the Staff of the division.
2. He sees that the program for training and preparedness of the units is carried out.
3. During military operations he is with one of the regiments in accordance with division orders.
4. The Assistant Adviser of a Division is in all respects subordinated to the Adviser of the Division.

Section XVI.

THE POLITICAL ADVISERS OF DIVISIONS.

1. The Political Adviser of a Division directs the work of the Political Department of the Division according to the instructions he receives from the Senior Military Adviser of the Division.
2. He delivers occasional or scheduled lectures on political

subjects; he speaks at meetings and sittings, looks after the work of the nucleus of the Kuomintang and the Club and directs their work.

3. The Political Adviser of a Division gives an account of his work to the Adviser of the Division.

Section XVII.

THE GROUP FOR THE PREPARATION OF WORK IN NEIGHBOURING PROVINCES.

1. In proportion to the expansion of the influence of the Kuomintang in the South of China, in the neighbouring provinces of Kwangtung a cadre of military-political workers is appointed for work in the armies of these provinces.

2. For the first period two such groups are to be organized.

a) The group for work in the province of Kinagsi, as being already connected with the Kuomintang, and

b) a reserve group for the other provinces.

3. These groups consist of a Senior Adviser, a Deputy Senior Adviser and a Political Adviser.

4. The Senior Adviser of such a group must get acquainted with the armed forces of the respective province and make popular among the commanding staff of the respective army the idea of the necessity of creating a united National-Revolutionary Army.

5. He must acquaint the higher commanding staff with the principles on which a National-Revolutionary Army must be built up.

6. Further on he has to do the usual work in the army of the respective province.

7. The Senior Adviser of such a group has under him the Political Adviser and the Deputy Adviser.

8. The Adviser of such a provincial group is directly subordinated to the Chief of the South-China Group.

Section XVIII.

THE STAFF OF THE SOUTH-CHINA GROUP OF MILITARY-POLITICAL WORKERS.

1. The Staff of the South-China Group is the working apparatus of the Chief of the South-China Group.

2. The Staff of the Group fulfills the following duties:

a) It collects all kinds of information, from the communications of the advisers as well as by means of secret agents, about the condition of the National Revolutionary Army and the armies of neighbouring provinces;

b) It arranges the materials relating to the study of the National-Revolutionary Army and the South of China;

c) It organizes the means by which the Advisers and the Military Attache in China are supplied with information;

d) By means of studying the materials and examining the situation it works out the plan for the current work of the Group;

e) It attends to the personal affairs of the co-workers of the Group;

f) It attends to the financial and economic affairs of the Group.

3. Conforming to the duties which are incumbent on it, the Staff of the South-China Group is divided into the following departments:

a) the Information and Intelligence Department;

b) the Administrative Department;

4. At the head of the Staff stands the Chief of the Staff to whom the Chiefs of the Departments are directly subordinated.

5. The Chief of the Staff directs the work of the departments of the Staff and issues instructions to them. He works out the plan for the current work of the Group and gives

instructions and orders to the Advisers who work in the National Revolutionary Army.

6. The Chief of the Staff disposes of the sums for "economic and office expenses" and "the expenses for transportation" according to the budget

of the Group.

7. The Information and Intelligence Department has at its head the Chief of the Department who is directly subordinated to the Chief of the Staff.

8. The Information and Intelligence Department does the following work: 1) it gathers all kinds of informations from Chinese and English news-papers about the situation in China and particularly in South-China; 2) it arranges the information received from the Advisers as to the condition of the National Revolutionary Army and of the armies of the neighbouring provinces; 3) it organizes the work of the secret agents in the units of the National-Revolutionary Army, of the provinces adjacent to Kwangtung and the neighbouring colonies and systematizes their reports; 4) it prepares the maps for military operations; 5) it studies the statistics and economic conditions of South-China; 6) it informs regularly the Advisers of the Group and the Military Attache in China.

9. The Information and Intelligence Department is divided into two sections: the Section for information and the Intelligence-section.

10. To the Information and Intelligence Department a staff of interpretors and draftsmen is attached.

11. The Administrative and Economic Department of the Staff copies and translates the materials supplied by the Advisers and Instructors; it attends to the personal affairs of all co-workers of the Group, pays the co-workers, keeps an account of all public property in the Staff and its Departments, supplies the Advisers with conveyances and looks after the guard of the Staff of the Group.

12. Conforming to the tasks imposed upon the Administrative and Economic Department it is divided into

1) a general office

2) a financial section

3) office of the commandant (to which the platoon of guards is attached)

13. To provide for the needs of the co-workers the following institutions are attached to the Administrative and Economic Department of the Staff of the Group:

1) a dispensary with a dental office and consultation office for children

2) a club with dining rooms for adults and children and a kindergarten.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

POLITICAL WORK
IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

Introduction. Even the late Dr. Sun Yat-Sen was long ago conscious of the necessity to give political instruction to the troops of the National Revolutionary Army. The "Whampoa" School was established with the aim to give the army an officers personnel well educated in the revolutionary spirit. In this School (which was established in May, 1924), in addition to the usual military subjects, sufficient attention was also being paid to the political instruction. The members of the Chinese Communist Party took an especially active part in directing the political instruction, and it is only owing to the fact that the School was sufficiently permeated with communists that it succeeded in reaching, politically a very eminent place. In the course of time a special apparatus was established at the School to serve exclusively political needs, and in such manner the first nucleus of the political department of the army was created. Simultaneously with the gradual growth and development of the School and its development first into the Division and afterwards into the Army Corps, the development of the political apparatus kept pace with it. Now lectures are being given to cadets and soldiers; a Club is being organised; leaflets, proclamations and placards are being issued. The work of political sections makes its influence felt during campaigns. Political workers establish contact with the local population and with peasant organizations, and explain the problems of the national-revolutionary movement; and for the first time in the history of Chinese wars the population begins to regard the troops not as robbers, but as a force, which serves the interests of the people. A system of political commissaries has been introduced into the companies and higher army units; these commissaries fulfil the functions of control on be-

half of the Party. At first the appointment of political commissaries was made directly by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, without previous agreement with the Political Department. On account of that, frictions occurred between the Political Department and political commissaries. In spite of this, however, officers began soon to acknowledge the great importance of the political work in the army and in every way to give assistance to the Political Department. As early as the autumn of 1925, during the Eastern campaign, the Political Department of the Eastern Front (actually: the Political section of the 1st Army Corps) directed all political work of the whole front, established contact with the population and continued to carry on an enormous work in all army units. Seeing the success of the troops of the 1st Army Corps, other Army Corps also began to establish their own political organs. This work, however, was not coordinated. Therefore, the National Revolutionary Government, seeing the gradual growth of its influence and power, proceeded to the centralization of the military administration, and as the consequence thereof, almost simultaneously with the establishment of the Military Council, the Political Directorate (P U R) was created. Originally this P U R was considered a semi-military, semi-party organization, directly subordinated to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and working as one of its Departments. At first the Political Directorate, as well as other Central Administrations of the Ministry of War, had only a very slight contact with local organs; moreover, almost all Army Corps (with the exception of the 1st Army Corps) did not have a clear and exact understanding as to the problems and functions of the P U R ; and the fact that almost all political workers were appointed by the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, without the knowledge of the Political Directorate, lead to an almost complete absence of ~~the~~ guidance on the part of the P U R with regard to army units. The absence of well defined regulations relating to the P U R and the shortage of funds for the upkeep of all the

political organs in the Army Corps greatly contributed to the above-mentioned state of affairs.-

P U R and its Organisation.

At present the P U R has a new personnel and is organized, in accordance with special regulations, which have been approved by the Military Council (see: Annex No.1). According to these regulations, the P U R consists of three Departments: 1) the Department of General Affairs, 2) the Department of Agitation and Propaganda and 3) the Department of Party Affairs.-

Agitation and Propaganda.

The P U R paid special attention to the regulating of problems relating to political instruction. Various army units have gradually made it a practice of devoting one hour daily to political instruction. In order to spend this "political hour" in accordance with some definite plan, the P U R compiled a three month program of Political instructions to be given to soldiers (see: Annex No.2). A peculiar feature of this program is the fact that in addition to giving a list of questions, an attempt is also made to facilitate and guide the work of the political instructor by giving him directions as to the manner in which methodical instruction should be conducted. According to the program, the duration of the political instruction is calculated on the basis of three hours per week. This is done, because in many army units the number of political workers is not sufficient to carry out a program based on six hours a week. In army units which have a sufficient number of political instructors (as, for instance the 1st Army Corps), political sections of Army Corps may use their own discretion and utilize these extra hours for club-work and for teaching of reading and writing.- As regards political instruction of officers, none was given until now. Only recently such instructions were started in the units of the 3rd Army Corps, where a "Society for the Discussion of Political Questions" has been organized. The P U R

worked out a program of political instruction for officers (see Annex No.3), which is to be given under the guidance of the political commissaries of the respective army units.-

Theses for Agitation.

Recently the newspaper published under the title "The Political Work", began to feature articles about the present political situation in China. These articles are written by the local committee of the Chinese Communist Party and are one of the means of the P U R of instructing the political personnel and throughit the officers and soldiers.

Cultural and Educational Work.

Until now the P U R did not pay any serious attention to educational work. Practically nothing was done in this respect and there was no section organized for that purpose. The only fact worth noting is the compilation of a textbook for reading and writing.

The work of compiling the textbook for reading and writing was started as early as October last year. For this purpose a special commission was formed, which consisted of several teachers. At the present moment the compilation of this textbook is finished and it is in print now. Everybody concerned is looking forward to the publication of this textbook with great impatience and interest, because in all units of the National Revolutionary Army more or less instruction is given to the illiterate, but (as it was to be expected, however,) the political workers, in their quest of textbooks, found on the local market only books filled with "divine stuff". The textbook, which will be published shortly, will play an important part in the life of the soldier because it is not only a textbook for reading and writing, but also the only book within the reach of soldiers' understanding, as everything else that is published, is written in a lofty style with a complete disregard for the state of the mental development of the soldiers. For that reason, the publication of this textbook will create "an epoch" of its kind ("Sui generis") in the domain of the

political instruction of soldier masses.

As regards clubs, their number is very limited. Clubs have been organized in schools and in some army units. In other units there are only the so-called "Dr. Sun's corners" (nooks). This state of affairs may be explained by the fact that until quite recently funds were lacking and troops were not assigned to permanent stations. Military campaigns ended only recently, and army units are still being shifted from one place to another, which circumstance does not give the political workers the possibility of paying the necessary attention to club work. The P U R is now busy with drafting well-defined by-laws for clubs, and it may be expected that in a short time the "net" of clubs will be extended. Under the conditions now prevailing in the National Revolutionary Army these clubs will play an important part in the matter of raising the general political standard of soldier masses.-

The Department of Party Affairs.

Until quite recently there were in the army units no "nuclei" in the strict sense of this word. If the commander of some unit was a member of the Kuomintang, the whole unit under his command was considered as belonging to the Party and by his orders all soldiers and officers were enlisted into the Party. The P U R took into account this state of affairs, which was evidently quite abnormal, and the organization of Kuomintang nuclei in the army units has already been started. The aim of these nuclei is to create a party organ, around which soldier masses could be grouped. Regulations governing party organizations in the units of the National Revolutionary Army have been already drawn up (see: Annex No. 4).-

Publishing Activity.

The Publishing Section occupies the principal place in the work of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda, because, under the conditions existing in China, the publishing is almost the sole

means of agitation and propaganda among the masses. Principal attention is now being paid to the newspaper "The Political Work". The fundamental aim of this newspaper is to reflect the life and the constructive work of the National Revolutionary Army and to give reading material, principally, to the officers and the political personnel of the army. Taking into consideration the existing conditions and that the political work is just beginning to penetrate into the masses of the army, and that the P U R cannot spare good newspaper workers, on account of shortage of them, one can say that this newspaper, under the above-mentioned conditions and on the Chinese scale, fulfils its alloted task in a satisfactory way. Its experimentary publication during the last three months shows that this newspaper is beginning to attain a more and more stable position in the everyday life of the officers and political workers. In order to put the newspaper on a proper footing, several measures had to be undertaken, which are being now put into effect. First of all, the newspaper is being improved as regards the technical side. Several kinds of type are being used; the editorial office entered into contract with several telegraphic news agencies and publishes telegrams at the proper time (it does not copy them on the following day from other newspapers); the newspaper is issued not later than 10 o'clock in the morning; the publication of weekly illustrated supplements has been started; sufficient attention is now being paid to the proper organization of the business department, etc. All these are the elementary conditions of putting a newspaper on a proper footing. It required and still requires at present a great amount of attention to make the staff of newspaper workers comprehend the importance of these fundamental principles. No less attention is also being paid to questions of the proper ideological tendency of the newspaper and of its close contact with the readers.

Until recently the newspaper confined itself to publishing in a condensed form materials relating to the political work in

various units of the National Revolutionary Army, as well as programs and instructions for the carrying on of the political work. The conviction (which is spread widely enough among the political workers) that "as we are political workers, everything that lies outside the domain of "politics", such as officers' life, soldiers' living conditions, the organization of the army etc., is beyond the sphere of our interests", was at first reflected in the attitude of the members of the editorial office towards the newspaper generally. This professional narrow-mindedness is now being shaken off among the political workers, and in the editorial office it has been entirely discarded: now in the columns of this newspaper are inserted articles relating to the political work, as well as to the constructive work in the army.

But one of the most considerable (comparatively speaking, of course) achievements of this newspaper is the establishment of a living contact between the editorial office and the reading masses. This contact found its first expression in letters, addressed to the editorial office, which are now being received more and more frequently. These letters serve as a beginning for the organization of a net of military correspondents. It is to be mentioned that usually there is no such section (for correspondence) in the Chinese newspapers. Therefore, those 20 to 30 letters daily, which are being now received by the editorial office, must be considered as proving a certain achievement. It is true, however, that the reading public must be "dragged out" to write such letters. For such purpose a public discussion of some question is usually started. Two "campaigns" in this direction have been already carried through by the editorial office:

1) about the name to be given to the newspaper;

2) "What is discipline?";

3) "Are corporal punishments admissible in the army?".

The Editorial office hopes to educate its readers by this method and thus to establish a constant contact with them.

The Editorial Office is now composed of the following persons: the editor - a communist; two corrspondents and two newspapers workers, who are collecting materials and issuing the paper. 18.000 copies of the newspaper are being printed, which are sent out free of charge. The business department is in direct communication with political sections of the army corps and separate divisions; political sections of the army corps are in charge of the further distribution of the newspaper. The Department of Agitation and Propaganda sets now before itself the task of making this newspaper more accessible for the soldier masses (Annexes : illustrated supplement and several numbers of the newspaper. Translator's note: No such annexes are in the file).

As to the publication of pamphlets and placards, it must be admitted that political sections of the army corps and divisions have displayed a very great activity in this respect. This phenomenon is explained by the fact that being very often out of touch with the P U R (the proper contact with the National Revolutionary Army has not yet been established) and having no experience in political work, the political organs of the Army units used the most common methods of political propaganda,- those of printing pamphlets and placards. In order to coordinate the publishing activities and to exercise a more effective political control over it, a special Publishing Committee has been established in the P U R . This Committee (representatives of political sections of the Army Corps and divisions have been invited to take part in its work) drew up the following plan for publishing, which is to cover three months:

A. Soldier's Series:

a) "The Soldier and the Peasant";

b) "The Soldier and the Workman";

c) "Who are thy Friends?";

d) "Who are thy Enemies?";

e) "What is the Soldier of the National Revolutionary Army?";

f) "The Textbook for Reading and Writing".

B. Series for Political Workers:

a) "Monthly Magazine";

b) "What and how to teach Soldiers?";

c) "How to organize the work in a Club?";

d) "The Methods of Political Work";

e) "The Party and the Army" (resolutions of conferences etc.)

f) "The Vade-Mecum of the Political Worker" (programs, regulations and instructions).

C. General Political Series:

a) "The History of the Kuomintang";

b) "The History of the Revolutionary Movement in China";

c) "Unequal Treaties";

d) "Who are the Imperialists?".

It is also intended to issue a series called "The Officers' Library". The compilation of this series and the management of its publication have been entrusted to an officer of the Infantry Inspectorate who for this purpose has been put on the Publishing Committee.

The following pamphlets (in accordance with the above - mentioned program) are in the press now:

1. "The Textbook for Reading and Writing";
2. "What and how to teach soldiers?";
3. "The History of the Kuomintang";
4. "What are the Unequal Treaties?";
5. "Regulations for Political Commissaries".-

A different sort of publications worth noting are placards (herewith enclosed) which are issued by the P U R. From a technical standpoint the publishing of these placards is far from the perfection which has been attained in the Red Army, but still

it is a great step forward. For the first time these placards are printed on good paper and in many colours, which is a great innovation in the general publishing activity of the National Revolutionary Army. The services of a permanent designer having been now secured, it is possible to carry these placards to perfection both from the ideological and artistic point of view.

As regards the publishing activity of the local organs, the P U R has undertaken the detailed investigation of this question not only from the point of view of making a complete list of pamphlets, leaflets, books, magazines and wall-newspapers, which are being published, but also from the point of view of their accomplishment, contents and general tendency.

The following is a short review of the publishing activity of the political section of the Navy Department, which is given here, as an instance of the publishing activity of local organs.

a) Wall-newspaper. It is called "Wall-Newspaper of the Revolutionary Navy". The principal peculiar feature of the wall-newspapers, which are generally published in the National Revolutionary Army is that they are printed as ordinary newspapers in the printing office, but only on one side of the sheet, in order to make it possible to paste them on walls. The contents of this newspaper ~~is~~ are along the same conventional lines as ~~that~~ those of other newspapers of a similar kind. It is usually subdivided into the following sections: leading article about the general political situation; news, provincial and foreign; labor and peasant movements. As a vary rare exception, information is printed about the inner life of the organization in which the newspaper is published. The newspaper, published by the political section of the Navy Department, is not an exception to this general rule.-

b) Illustrated Newspaper ("Hua-pao") is also a kind of wall-newspaper. This sort of newspaper was originated by the political section of the Navy Department and is not issued by other organs.

As regards techique and for purposes of agitation, this paper is superior to the wall-newspaper. Usually in two or three designs the popular illustration of the principal political slogans of the national revolutionary movement is given, such as: struggle against militarists, their venality and dependence from the imperialists etc. In this respect the authors of these designs sometimes show a great inventive faculty and sharp wit. Here are some examples of designs from this paper: 1) the imperialist handing a Chinese the cross, the pipe, the lamp and all the paraphernalia of opium smoking; 2) the counter-revolutionary is strangling China (represented as a man), near-by is sitting a roaring lion (imperialism) ready to swallow China at any moment:, 3) the imperialist is tightening in a "nice fashion" the rope with which China (represented as a man) is bound; he is aided in this occupation by a bull-dog, with the inscription "Tsou-kou" - "the running dog" (all servants of the imperialists are so called by the Chinese). If one takes into consideration the general illiteracy of the enlisted personnel (and sometimes even of officers) and their low general political standard, one must admit that this illustrated newspaper is doing good work. Until now 25 numbers have been issued. The main defect of this newspaper is the monotony of colors (blue).

Periodical Publications.

A. Placards. We have three placards at our disposal: portraits of Wang Ching-wei, General Chiang K'ai-shih and Dr. Sun Yat-Sen;,these portraits are printed in three colors.-

B. "Piao-yü". It is difficult to find a more or less exact translation for this expression. What is usually called "Piao-Yü", is some sentence of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, printed in large characters and in various colors, or simply the explanation of some idea or slogan.- Below are given some examples of them:

1) "The revolutionary navy is the force of the people".

2) "The revolutionary navy is not afraid of death, does not need any money, is convinced of the necessity of mutual help

in the interests of the protection of the people, and is the van-guard of the people".

3) "The Second Congress is paying great attention to the change of the living conditions of the soldiers, as well as to the change of the manner of treating them etc."-

C. Books:

1) "Collection of Revolutionary Songs", which includes the following:

a) "National Revolutionary Songs". ("Down with the imperialists"; "down with the militarists"; "let us sing together praises in honor of the victory of the National Revolution").

b) "The Song of the "Three Principles"."

c) "Strike down the Robbers!".

d) "Workmen, peasants, soldiers - unite!".

e) "Internationale" (translated from the Russian).

f) "The Young Guard" (translated from the Russian).

2) "Dictionary of Political Terms"; this Dictionary gives soldiers the elucidation of three ideas: "What is Imperialism?" "What is the Militarism?"; "What are the "Three Principles?"."

3) "Maxims (aphorisms) for the Military Revolutionary".

4) "The Revolution and the Revolutionary Military Man"; this book is adapted for the use of soldiers and gives an elementary explanation of causes of the revolution, of the part in it of the workmen and peasants etc.

5) "Political Questions and Answers". This pamphlet is adapted for the use of soldiers.

D. Leaflets. Of all Chinese revolutionary publications, the leaflets occupy perhaps the first place. Every revolutionary event, particularly every demonstration, calls forth a great number of leaflets. All organizations (and it would be impossible to enumerate all of them) make it their duty to react to an event first of all by issuing leaflets. During some demonstrations we

frequently succeeded in collecting more than 50 leaflets of different organisations. The political section of the Navy Department presented us with six copies, but this number by far does not cover all the leaflets, which have been issued by that organ.-

Keeping of Records. The P U R has prepared blank forms for the keeping of records of the political and party personnel of the army and has issued detailed instructions for the use of them. (see: Annex No. 5). In order to strengthen the connection between the P U R and the local organs and to improve information service, political sections in the army corps and divisions, besides making ordinary periodical reports, must also send to the P U R , at least once a month, letters of information. The information relating to the number of political workers, as available now, is not absolutely exact. This is explained by the fact that various army units have only recently begun to use uniform blank forms for keeping records of the political and party personnel and that the idea as to the necessity of sending in regular reports to the P.U R has not yet penetrated into all army corps. According to the information available, the number of the political workers in the National Revolutionary Army is 876 men.-

Characteristics of the Enlisted Personnel. The social status of the soldiers of all army corps is almost identical. The soldiers, for the most part, are enlisted among the landless peasants, whom hunger has driven away from their native villages and who for that reason are compelled to enter the military service. About 90% of the soldiers are peasants and about 40% of them have broken off all relations with their native villages and belong to the "rabble proletariat"; about 10% only are petty traders and town dwellers. Only 20% know how to read and write; the only exception in this respect is the 1st Army Corps, in which the number of literate soldiers is about 75%.

Until quite recently the living conditions of the enlisted

personnel were very hard. They were harshly treated by their officers; in the rare instances in which rations were issued, they were stolen by the officers. The enlisted personnel was paid 8, 10 and 12 dollars, according to the rank of the soldier, but usually the enlisted man did not get this pay in full. The company commander was generally in charge of getting the food, and he deducted for that monthly 5 to 8 dollars from the pay of every man. The rest should have been given to the soldier, but on account of the absence of control the soldier got his due only in very rare cases. Moreover, the army units themselves received the funds for the pay of the soldiers in an irregular manner. Only since the last month they began to receive the allotted sums from the Central Administration of Supplies directly. During peace-times the soldiers get their meals three times a day, during war only twice. The food consists of rice, bacon and vegetables; meat is given 5 to 10 times a month. As regards clothing, the soldier gets an upper garment (shirt), trousers and shoes; there is not a sufficient number of blankets for everybody; usually two soldiers use one blanket. There are no barracks in the ordinary sense of this word. The soldiers are usually quartered in temples and pagodas and sleep on the bare floor, using mats sometimes. Until recently there were no fixed schedules pertaining to the supplying of soldiers with clothing and food, which circumstance also lead to abuses.

The sanitary condition of the troops is characterized by the high percentage of sick men. The first place among diseases occupies beri-beri (up to five percent), the second - malaria (two percent) and the third - dysentery. Then follow other diseases, in the following order: 1) skin-diseases (eczema, rash and leg sores), 2) pulmonary tuberculosis, 3) abdominal and intestinal diseases, 4) trachoma, 5) syphilis and 6) nervous diseases. As regards mortality dysentery takes first and tuberculosis second place.

Officers' Personnel. The officers' personnel may be divided roughly into two groups: Officers who have received military instruction, and those who have been commissioned from the ranks. The second group, however, is not numerous. With few exceptions, all the higher officers have received their military instruction either in Japan or at Pao-ting-fu. According to their social status, they are for the most part sons of officials, merchants and well-to-do peasants. In addition, there is now a cadre of young officers who have completed the course of studies in the "Whampoa" School or in schools attached to various army corps. A kind of antagonism can be observed between the younger and older officers. The older officers are dissatisfied with the rapid advancement of the younger and instinctively see in them their ~~competitors~~ rivals. The majority of the officers are typical professionals. They have no ideal motives, are illiterate in the political sense and indifferent in temperament. The attitude of the enlisted men towards their officers is unfriendly. The officers maintain the discipline often by beating the men with bamboos. This manner of enforcing discipline, however, is gradually falling into desuetude, due to the influence exercised by young officers and to the work of political organs. A great number of officers, as well as soldiers, are addicted to games of chance and opium smoking. The disciplinary rights of the officers of different grades are not regulated exactly enough and generally each commander is a fully independent master of his unit. There are no regulations relating to the infliction of disciplinary punishments (in the ordinary sense of this expression). The so-called "Regulations relating to the infliction of disciplinary punishments", which have been promulgated in 1925, are a Military Penal Code and inflict death-penalty for almost all offenses. The Army Corps Commanders very often inflicted the death penalty on their own authority. Such a practice was in force until recently; now, however, this question is being regulated (see <u>below</u>). All the junior officers now

are members of the Kuomintang party; there is also a certain percentage of communists. Recently the attitude of the officers towards political workers and soldiers began to improve.-

Political Personnel. The political personnel according to its social status belongs to the "intelligentsia". The labor element constitutes not more than 10% of it. The political workers may be divided into four categories: 1) communists; 2) members of the Kuomintang party (those, who belong to the left wing and are working together with the communists); 3) officials devoid of any principles, who are endeavoring to obtain "a position" in the army and are serving for the sake of money and advancement in rank; 4) the right Kuomintang men, whose attitude towards the first two groups is extremely hostile. About 75% are communists and the left Kuomintang men; about 20% are "officials without principles" and about 5% are right Kuomintang men. The majority of the political workers have had little experience in political work and need a strong guidance. Nevertheless, the political personnel enjoys a great prestige among the enlisted men, because the soldiers see in them their defenders. A certain part of the older officers is very hostile towards the political workers. They see in them their enemies and the men, who are undermining the army. Recently, however, this antagonism between the officers and the political personnel began to be somewhat allayed. Now the political staff begins also to take an active part in the work among the population and to establish contact with various public organizations, especially with peasant unions. Both on the Eastern and the Southern fronts the political workers played an important part in the matter of the organization of new local authorities.

Political Commissaries. The system of political commissaries of the National Revolutionary Army has been introduced only recently and has not yet been extended to all units of the army corps. In introducing this sys-

tem, the P U R had to take into consideration, on the one hand, the necessity for the party to have control over the army and, on the other hand, the opposition with which this new system naturally met on the part of the senior officers and higher command.

In accordance with the Regulations (see: Annex No.6), which have been drawn up by the P U R, political commissaries in the units of the line fulfil principally the functions of political guides and are the assistants of the commander in political matters. Political commissaries in the staffs (headquarters), Administrations and other organs of the army fully enjoy the same power as the commanders and chiefs to whom they are attached.

The question relating to the appointment of political commissaries and their mutual relations with political and party organs has been also regulated (see: Annex No. 7)-

Communists.

There is no need to dwell on the importance of communists and the part they played in the National Revolutionary Army. All the previous military campaigns have fully justified their work and activity. The communists are not evenly distributed in the Army Corps (see: Annex No.8). The 1st army corps is considerably more permeated with them than the others. This fact explains its greater political stability. Most of the communists are of the "intelligentsia" and former students. They are distinguished by their devotion to the revolutionary cause. Their political training, however, is rather poor.

With the increase and development of the activity of the communists in the army, frictions naturally began to arise between them and the right Kuomintang. There was a time, when these frictions assumed such an acute form that our Chief Political Adviser at Canton raised the question of the exclusion of communists from the army. But besides the fact that all the previous work of the members of the Chinese Communist Party confirmed the

necessity of their further work in the army, one must also take into consideration that the communists and the army must have relations, because the communists, in so far as they enter into the Kuomintang, cannot avoid taking part in the constructive work of the National Revolutionary Army. All these considerations were enunciated in a letter from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and a copy of this letter was sent to the representative of the Comintern at Peking (see: Annex No.9). (Translator's note: there is no such letter in the file). This question has been definetely settled now.-

Military Question.

In order to direct the work of the communists in the army, a special Military Section has been organized at Canton by the Provisional Commission attached to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (for the aims and functions of this section : see Annex No.10).

The Military Section began its activity only quite recently and, at first, set before itself the following tasks:

1. to ascertain the exact number of the communists, who are working in the National Revolutionary Army;

2. to verify their qualifications;

3. to organize a Party-School for those whose previous training has been insufficient;

4. to fix a definite method of work for military nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party;

5. to put in practice a real guidance for the communists, who are working in the army.

In addition to the tasks, which have been enumerated above, the Military Section has also for its aim the organization of peasants' and workmen' armed detachments and work pertaining to the destruction of morale of army units of the enemy.

In connection with the intended plan, the following results have been already achieved:

1. The exact number of the communists in the army corps and divisions has already been ascertained.

2. The checking up on the qualifications has been also finished. The Military Section appointed for each army corps a special Commission of Control (for the examination of qualifications), consisting of three members: the representative of the Military Section, the Chief of the political Section of the army corps and our adviser. A list of questions was specially drawn up for the guidance of this Commission (see: Annex No.11). All communists who were examined are divided in four groups. To the first group belong all those communists, who are holding in the army posts of commanders and political posts; they are allowed to carry on communist propaganda in the army units. To the second group belong those communists, who retain their posts they were previously holding, but who are forbidden to carry on propaganda work. To the third group belong those communists, who are to be sent to the Party-School. To the fourth group belong those communists, who are to be permanently excluded from the National Revolutionary Army.- This work has now been completed.

3. Two Party-Schools have been organized, one at Swatow for the 1st army corps, and one at Canton for other army units.

4. and 5. The following measures have been undertaken in connection with these two paragraphs. The Military Section has one representative in each army corps and in each division. The nuclei of the Chinese Communist Party are working without ~~the~~ legal authorization. Meetings of the communist nucleus in the regiment may be held only with the sanction of the representative of the Military Section, attached to the division. Instructions were issued to the nuclei to the effect that at the present moment the further "deepening" of their training along Marxian lines is required from the members of the party and that the new members must be enlisted with great caution. All communists received directives to penetrate into the Kuomintang organizations and to gain influence

therein. The present day slogan for the communists is the following: "A good communist is a good member of the Kuomintang nucleus". It may be expected that, owing to the measures which have been already undertaken, the Military Section will finally succeed in taking into its own hands the real guidance of the communists.-

Society for the Study of Sunyat-senism.

The following is the history of the origin of this Society. After the death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in order to make his ideas popular and to work up his basic principles and the methods of their adaptation to the existing conditions of the national revolutionary movement, a "Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" was organized, at the initiative of some members of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, including the late Liao Chung K'ai. Branches of this society began to penetrate into the army, especially into Military Schools. For the members of the Chinese Communist Party, who were working in the army, it was not sufficiently clear, what their attitude towards this Society was to be. Instead of taking an active part in its work and attaining thereby some influence in it, the communists declared the activity of this Society to be harmful and counter-revolutionary and stood in open opposition to it. For that reason, the right Kuomintang and certain counter-revolutionary elements acquired a strong influence in the "Society for the study of Sunyatsenism". The right elements of the Kuomintang convert even this Society into the tool of their struggle against the left wing of the said Party and are carrying on this struggle under the slogan of "struggle against communism". This conflict gradually assumed a more and more acute form and there was a time, when it reached such proportions that some comrades even raised the question of the total elimination of communists from the army. The real cause of this conflict can, however, be detected in the tendency of the right elements of the Kuomintang to crush the left wing and to take hold thereby of the

preponderant influence in the party. The state of mind of the compradore elements of the Chinese bourgeoisie was reflected in this struggle against the communists as clearly "as in a drop of water". These elements begin now to see in the awakening and the political activity of large masses of the people the growing threat to their economic interests, and the "Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" had to play the part of a "fig leaf" for the national counter revolution. The communists began to carry on an open struggle, but on account of the absence of regular methods in this struggle and the lack of proper leadership, the influence of the right Kuomintang began to be felt even more and, as a result, the Society fell definitely under their influence. They put forward the slogan: "The communists must be excluded from the Kuomintang." Recently, however, several measures of a decisive character have been undertaken in order to put an end to such a state of affairs. The leaders of this Society after undergoing individually a proper "schooling", made public denial of their program, acknowledged their activity to be erroneous and accepted the platform of the left. They made public their declaration to the effect that they considered it to be necessary to carry on the struggle against the imperialism to the end, to work jointly with the communists, to organize peasants, workmen and students and to tighten the party discipline in the Kuomintang. Now the Military Section issues instructions to the communists to take an active part in the work of this Society. Its activity in the army is now under the direct control and guidance of the P U R . A tendency, however, can now be discerned to make this Society to proceed to its own liquidation and it may be expected that in the near future this question will totally dwindle away from the army.

Young Military Men Association.

This Association has been organized only recently and its activity is not yet extended to all army corps. Its aim is to unite officers and cadets of various Military Schools on the common

ground of carrying on the struggle for the new methods of constructive work in the army and gradually to get rid of these militaristic habits and customs, which still exist in the army. The Association is under the influence of the Communists and the left Kuomintang (see: Annex No.12).-

The politico-moral condition of the army.

The politico-moral condition depends upon the number of communists in the army unit, the duration of the political work and the condition of the political apparatus.

The 1st army corps occupies the first place in this respect. Political organs and political commissaries are in all its units. The relations between the officers, the political staff and the enlisted personnel are good. The attitude towards the population and vice versa is also good. The Chief of the political section takes an active part in the organization of local authorities, peasant unions etc. The army corps possesses a great offensive spirit. The whole officers' and enlisted personnel has been "inoculated " with the idea of the Northern Expedition.

The 4th Army Corps occupies the second place in this respect. The morale is good. The relations between the officers, the political staff and the enlisted personnel are also good. The 11th division makes the only exception, because its political personnel does not possess the required qualifications. This army corps also takes an active part in the work of the civil authorities and in the political work among the peasantry. Those elements (from other army units) which have been merged into this army corps after the "liquidation" of the Southern front, will need a thorough political training, but the work in this direction has been delayed for want of trained political workers. The fighting quality of this army corps is quite good.

The 2nd army corps occupies the third place, as regards the politico-moral condition, then follow the 3rd, the 5th and the 6th army corps respectively.

The political condition of the 2nd army corps of the Na-

tional Revolutionary Army presents some peculiar features, which are worth noting. The Chief of the political section and the communists, who are working in this army corps, enjoy a great prestige among the enlisted men. This is explained by the fact that the commanders were pitilessly robbing the soldiers and that the soldiers saw in the political workers their only defenders. There was a time, when the communists tried to make the soldier masses the object of their work and to carry on communistic propaganda among these masses. As a result, a state of mind was created in some units of this army corps, which reminded one of that of the Tsarist Army in Russia during Kerensky's administration. There were cases, when officers were beaten and orders remained unexecuted. The soldiers' masses turned left too prematurely.

Cases of desertion take place in some army units. This is explained by the expiration (in many cases) of the term of enlistment, by hard material conditions and by the harsh treatment on the part of officers. Now, however, since the material conditions of the enlisted personnel have began to improve, cases of desertion are becoming less.

The Navy. The politico-moral condition of the navy leaves very much to be desired. The officers personnel of the navy is not up to the standard. The officers are embezzlers of public funds and typical "compradores" of the military class. They are quite ignorant, as regards the profession of naval officers. Several measures are being undertaken now, in order to instruct the commanding personnel. A club has been organized, in which courses in politics are given. Political commissaries have been appointed to warships, but their political training is unsatisfactory.

The Arsenal. 1800 workmen are employed by the Arsenal. There was a time, when they all were under the influence of the counter-revolution-

ary mechanics' Union. All this, however, is being changed. There is a Kuomintang nucleus now, which numbers 300 members. A representative of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang is attached to the Arsenal and is carrying on his work, jointly with the political Commissary. A Club has been organized and a School is attached to this club for workmen's children and for those workmen, who are illiterate. 15 communists carry on their work in the Arsenal. The Arsenal now may be considered as being entirely devoted to the National Revolutionary Government.-

The Central Military Administration.

The Central Military Administration consists of three organs: the General Staff, the P U R and the Central Administration of Supplies. With the exception of those, who are holding the highest administrative posts, the staff of all these organs consists, for the most part, of non-party men, who are doing their work just as ordinary officials. There are very few among them who work "for the idea". Recently, however, some men of the staffs of these organs have been replaced by new men and, due to the influence of the Military Council, the quality of the work is beginning to improve. The greatest evil of all these organs is nepotism. All those who are holding the higher posts strive by all means to find positions for their relatives and friends. This is the greatest evil of the Chinese Army and it will take a long and persistent struggle to eradicate it. Some steps in this direction have been already taken. For instance, all appointments must now be confirmed by the Military Council; for that reason, it is now, of course much more difficult to place "one's own men". Recently the work in the above-mentioned organs began to improve, and it is to be hoped that gradually they will become the real central organs of the army. It is intended to appoint in the near future political commissaries to the General Staff and the Central Administration of Supplies. A political commissary has been already appointed to the Sanitary Inspectorate.-

Character-istics of the political personnel.

(Translator's Note:(This report on Characteristics being rather lengthy, only a short resume is given here.) The characteristics of the higher political personnel, i.e. chiefs of the political sections of the army corps and of the navy and directors of the departments in the P U R, show that, for the most part, communists are appointed to these posts of responsibility and, only in comparatively rare cases, the more prominent members of the Kuomintang. Almost all of them are devoted to the revolutionary cause, have received a thorough political training, fulfil their duties very energetically and enjoy a great prestige among their subordinates. In two or three cases only the choice proved to be rather unfortunate, but these men will be replaced soon. Below the characteristics of the Chief of the P U R are given because he plays now a prominent part in the Wuhan Government. He took the place of the notorious communist Teng Yen ta in the Political Bureau.)

Characteristics of Ch'en Kung-p'o.

The Chief of the P U R Ch'en Kung-p'o is a member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and a candidate for membership in the Political Bureau. Ch'en received his education in England. He is young, very ambitious and well-developed in the political sense. Formerly he was member of the Chinese Communist Party. He has no fixed political convictions, only a mixture (melange) of anarchism, sunyatsenism and socialism. As he was concurrently holding several other posts (Minister of Labor, Minister of Agriculture, Chancellor of the Canton University), he was until recently unable to devote much time to his work in the P U R. His prestige among the chiefs of political sections of the army corps is not very high; for that reason, he is to be replaced.-

The Military Tribunal.

In order to carry on the fight against criminality in the army and to centralize this effort, a special Military Tribunal

has been organised and is attached to the P U R. The regulations governing the Military Tribunal have been approved by the Military Council (see: Annex No.13 A.).

Li Ch'ang-ta, the old member of the Kuomintang and "companion in arms" of the late Dr. Sun, has been appointed President of the Military Tribunal. Yang Pao-an, a Communist and member of the Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang, has been appointed Deputy-President. The Senior Examining Magistrate and the Governor of the Prison are also communists.

The Military Tribunal has not as yet started its activities, because just now the personnel is being selected. It has been also decided for the time being not to establish Tribunals in the Army Corps as no fully-qualified men are available. Besides the College of this Tribunal jointly with the P U R is busy with the drawing up of the regulations governing military criminal cases, which are conformable to the present day aims of the National Revolutionary Army. Provisional instructions to the Military Tribunal (see: Annex No.13 B.) have been already approved by the Military Council. Penalties for the more grave military offences are provided for in these instructions.-

Conclusion. During recent times the political work began to penetrate more and more deeply into the masses of the army. Both the higher command and the senior officers have come to the conclusion that the political instruction is absolutely necessary for the troops. The P U R is being gradually converted into the organ, to which the real guidance of the political work in the army belongs. The political workers succeeded in attaining a great prestige among the officers and enlisted men. With regard to the extension of the political work to the whole army, the lack of trained political workers is a serious handicap. In order to create a cadre of such workers, a special political class has been started at the Central Military-Political School. The number

of students in this class is 430. Moreover, much attention is also given to the political instruction in other classes of this school. Under such conditions only, it is possible to count upon creating at some future date a politically educated army. The new system of political commissaries affords even now the possibility of having some control over army units, which renders of course the carrying on of the political work much easier The carrying on of such work would be impossible without some form of control over the economic life of army units and without combatting the stealing of provisions of the soldiers and the beating (slapping on the face) of the men, by their officers. The political commissaries are making great effort in combatting these evils. The National Revolutionary Army enters now a new phase of its development. Instead of relying upon the General as the "master" of the unit, the army must henceforth rely upon the officers and enlisted men. The P U R has already taken into account this circumstance and chooses the officers in command and the cadets of Military Schools as the first objects for its political work. As to soldiers, it has been decided to carry on cultural and educational work among them; this work is to be concentrated in clubs. At present all units of the National Revolutionary Army are devoted to the Revolutionary Government. As to the negative traits of the army, such as nepotism, provincialism, stealing, beating on the face etc., they can be gotten rid by measures of persuasion, as well as by measures of coercion. This is being done now by the P U R and the Military Tribunal respectively. The National Revolutionary Army must be given litarate officers,(in the political sense) political workers and honest supply officers, in order to be able to carry out successfully the missions which have been assigned to it.-

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List of Annexes.

1. Regulations governing the Political Directorate (P U R).

2. Program of Political Lessons for the enlisted personnel.

3. A. How to carry on the Political Education of officers.

B. Program of the Political Instruction of officers.

4. Regulations relating to Party Organizations in the units of the National Revolutionary Army. (omitted)

5. Instructions relating to the keeping of records of the Political and Party Personnel in the National Revolutionary Army. (omitted)

6. Regulations governing Political Commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army.

7. Letter of the Political Directorate to all Political Commissaries of the National Revolutionary Army.

8. Number of Members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army.

9. Letter of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. (missing).

10. A. The Military Section attached to the Provisional Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: I. Theses relating to its aims and function. II. Organization.

B. Statutes of the Military Section of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ("Woenka").

11. List of Questions for the guidance of Commissions of Control in charge of the checking up on qualifications of the members of the Chinese Communist Party.

12. Young Military Men Association: A. Introduction. B. Organization. C. Duties of the Members.

13. A. Regulations governing the Military Tribunal of the National Revolutionary Army.

B. Directives to the Military Tribunal relating to penalties.

14. Diagram showing the connection between political and army organs.

15. By-laws of the Central Politico-Military Club.-

Annex No. 1. March 15-1926.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

I. General Articles.

1) The Political Directorate has for its aim the guidance of the party and the political and cultural work in the National Revolutionary Army.

2) The Political Directorate is subordinated to the Military Council and carries on its work in accordance with the plans approved by the said Council.

3) In its routine work, the Political Directorate is guided by instructions of the President of the Military Council.

4) As regards questions relating to party work in the army (organization of nuclei, admission and expulsion of members, education of members of the Party along party lines), the Political Directorate is guided by resolutions of the Central Committee and of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang Party.

5) At the head of the P.U.R. is a Chief who is at the same time member of the Military Council.

6) The P.U.R. carries on its work in the Army through Commissaries and Political Sections.

7) The following are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.:

a) Commissaries of Army Corps' and Separate Divisions;

b) Commissaries of the Navy and the Air Service;

c) Commissary of the Central Military-Political School;

d) Commissaries of the General Staff and the Central Administration of Supplies.

Note. At present the President of the Military Council is concurrently Commissary of several Army Corps' and of the Central School. In these Army Corps' and in the Central School permanent Deputy-Commissaries are appointed, who are subordinated to the P.U.R., in accordance with the general regulations.

8) All party, political and cultural work in the Army is

carried on in accordance with the plans and directions of the P.U.R.

9) All social-political organizations in the Army (such as "Society for the Study of Sunyatsenism", "Young Military Men Association", etc.) carry on their work under the guidance of the P.U.R. and of the respective Commissaries and Political Sections. The existence of organizations outside of the control and guidance of P.U.R. is not permitted.

10) All party and political workers in the Army are at the exclusive disposal of the P.U.R. and its subordinated political organs. Without the knowledge and consent of the P.U.R., they cannot be appointed, dismissed or transferred to other work.

11) The P.U.R. is in charge of control, replacement and appointment of political workers in the army. The procedure of appointing Commissaries is fixed by the special Regulations governing Political Commissaries.

II. Organization of P.U.R.

12) The Political Directorate consists of:

1. Administrative Department
   - a) Secretariat,
   - b) Section for Economic Affairs,
   - c) Despatching office;
2. Propaganda Department:
   - a) Propaganda Section,
   - b) Cultural and Educational Section,
   - c) Information Section,
   - d) Publishing Section.
3. Department of Party Affairs:
   - a) Party Section.
   - b) Organizing Section.

III. Aims of the Departments of the P. U. R.

13) The Administrative Department acts as the organ of the

P. U. R. in charge of Administrative affairs and Supplies.

14) The Secretariat is in charge of the compilation of papers going out and the registration of all papers issued and received by the P.U.R.

15) The Section of Economic Affairs is in charge of the supplying of the P.U.R. with necessary articles and funds: it prepares the budget of P.U.R. and checks up the budgets of the Political Sections, which are directly subordinated to the P.U.R.

16) The Despatching Office is in charge of the despatching of all literature, materials and documents issued by the P.U.R.

17) The Propaganda Department works out materials of ideal and directive character for the whole party and political personnel of the Army in the sphere of cultural and political education and instruction of soldiers, students and officers; it arranges conferences and meetings on questions relating to political work in the Army.

18) The Propaganda Section is in charge of the preparation of plans, instructions, theses, programs and other materials relating to political education and to the conduct of various political campaigns and gives instructions to the political personnel of army units in the sphere of political work.

19) The Cultural and Educational Section is in charge of the preparation of all materials relating to the organisation of cultural and educational work and of the teaching in schools, clubs and other cultural and educational organs of self-activity; organises libraries, sporting and other competitions and contests and gives instructions as to how this work is to be carried on in army units.

20) The Information Section is in charge of the control of the whole political and party personnel of the Army and studies materials relating to the political work and condition of army units.

21) The Publishing Section is in charge of the compilation and publication of all materials issued by the P.U.R., such as: newspapers, books, placards, leaflets, etc. The distribution of all published materials is done by the Chief of the Propaganda Department.

22) The Department of Party Affairs is in charge of the organization and guidance of all party work in the army; directs "the Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" and all party organizations and convoked party conferences and meetings.

23) The Party Section is in charge of the compilation of all programs, theses and other materials relating to party work and education and to the conduct of various party campaigns, etc.

24) The Organization Section is in charge of the preparation of all regulations in connection with the military-political, party and cultural-educational work in the army and compiles regulations and instructions.

IV. Military Tribunal.

The Military Tribunal is attached to P.U.R. Its organization and personnel are fixed by special Regulations.

V. Personnel of P.U.R.

Chief of the P.U.R.:	1
Assistant of the Chief of the P.U.R.:	1
Secretary to the Chief of the P.U.R.:	1

1. Administrative Department:

Chief of the Department:	1
a) Secretariat:	
Chief of the Secretariat:	1
Secretary:	1
Clerks:	2
b) Section of Economic Affairs:	
Chief of the Section:	1

Treasurer: 1

Clerk: 1

c) Expatching office:

Chief of the Office: 1

Expatchers: 2

Messengers, coolies: 7

2. Propaganda Department:

Chief of the Department: 1

a) Propaganda Section:

Chief of the Section: 1

Instructors-propagandists: 2

b) Cultural and Educational Section:

C hief of the Section: 1

Instructors in the work of schools and clubs: 2

c) Information Section:

Chief of the Section: 1

Secretary in charge of the political personnel: 1

Secretary in charge of the information affairs: 1

Clerks: 2

d) Publishing Section:

Chief of the Section: 1

Editors: 2

Editorial Staff

Printing office

3. Department of Party Affairs:

Chief of the Department: 1

a) Party Section:

Chief of the Section: 1

Instructors: 2

b) Organization Section:

Chief of the Section: 1

Instructors: 2

Annex No.2.

Program of Political Lessons for the enlisted personnel.

(three hours a week).

The 1st hour. Why hast thou become a soldier?

Note. In the village he had no land to cultivate; he is not admitted into artisans' guilds, because there are too many workmen there; in the cities there are few factories, where a job can be found; no warships, steam-vessels, railways or paved roads are being constructed; nowhere is it possible to find work.

The political instructor must know every soldier's name, native province and district and family condition; he must learn the real reasons, why the soldier entered the military service, and by means of concrete examples describe general conditions, under which the toiling masses of China are living.-

2. Who are the landowners, and why have they so much land?

The political instructor, besides giving the general characteristics, must explain the part the big landowners are playing in the village: enslavement of peasants by means of usury, farming on onerous terms etc.-

3. Why couldst thou not find work in the city?

The political instructor must illustrate the life and general conditions of artisans, their struggle against imported goods, their powerlessness to compete with foreign goods etc.; he must also explain the same in connection with the slow development of factories.-

4. Who is guilty of thy misfortunes?

The imperialists. Why? They have built at home many factories, which are manufacturing all sort of goods. All these goods cannot be sold at home, not because everybody has them, but because the workmen and peasants there are so poor that they cannot afford to buy them. For that reason the capitalists are importing these goods into other countries, where these goods can be sold. Besides, they need cotton for their textile factories,

iron for their machines, coal for fuel etc. Where can they find all that? In the Far East, where there is such a plenty of these natural riches that they can obtain them almost for nothing. And that is not all! The capitalists possess much money which is lying "idle": factories and railways are not worth building, because there are too many of them and they yield such small profit; in the East, however, they can use the very cheap labor ("yellow" or "black", as they call it). This is the reason, why the imperialists rush with such avidity upon Eastern countries, in ordrer to subjugate them. They do not simply come to us: they strive to conquer and to enslave us.-

5. 6. 7. The political instructor must devote four hours to this theme, in order to elucidate fully the character of imperialism. All these colloquies must be based on materials and notions, which are adapted to the understanding of the soldier. Mere reasonings will be of no use. What kind of materials must and can be used by the political instructor? It would be useful to obtain some statistical data. For instance, ask the soldier, whether he has been at Shameen, Shanghai, Hongkong and other places where many foreigners are? Ask, whether the soldiers know the name of some foreign bank or firm? Or by whom and with whose money the railways to Shaokwan and to Hongmoon have been built? Having these data as a starting point, the political instructor whose mind is capable of deep reflection will be able to give the proper explanation of the substance of imperialism.-

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. What are the Unequal Treaties? What is Extraterritoriality? What are Concessions? What is Tariff Autonomy?

Colloquies 8 to 15 (inclusive) must be devoted to dwelling on above-mentioned questions. Least of all recourse is to be made to theoretical reasonings and definitions, while dwelling on these subjects. In connection with each of these questions it would be quite possible to find appropriate instances, which are known to

soldiers. One must train the soldiers so as to make their minds work in the direction of conscious understanding of the life, which surrounds them. It would be much better, if the soldiers succeeded in finding such examples by themselves. By what instances can these questions be illustrated? Here are some specimens.

a) England imports opium into China. The British know that this is contrary to law, that the Government of China promises to inflict penalties for that, but still they continue to import opium. In 1839 China enforced its laws and burned the opium. Who was right? The Chinese of course, but the British bombarded Canton, demanded indemnity and, moreover, occupied and are still occupying the island of Hongkong. Is this <u>an equal treaty</u>?

b) On May 30 the imperialistic police at Shanghai shot dead Chinese students and workmen. The persons guilty of shooting must be handed over to the Court for trial. What Court? The Chinese Court, of course, because the crime was committed on Chinese territory. The trial of the offenders, however, is taken up by the foreigners themselves. There you have <u>the substance of extraterritoriality</u>. Judge for yourselves, what comes out of this practice? The imperialists sent the police to shoot down the workmen, but the police, is tried by these very imperialists!

c) Shameen - this is what is called a <u>Concession</u>. The foreigners came to China, seized an island and declared that here was England, not China! Is this not an impudence?

d) Has China the right to say: "Import more machinery, but do not import chocolate: we do not want it"? Not only has the right to say, but also has the right to forbid importation. Such a practice is being observed in all countries, but not in China: China is deprived of this right. (Say something on the subject of the Tariff Conference, which has been called for October 26 and which is now sitting at Peking).

With the 15th colloquy the political instructor finishes the first part of the elucidation of reasons, why the soldier has become a soldier, why he was suffering from hunger, why he was not able to find work and he has been enlisted into the army.-

As soon as you see that the soldiers have mastered the subject matter of all these colloquies, you must pass to the second part of the same theme and explain that the imperialists are not the only persons, who are guilty of the oppression of China, and that not the whole population of the country is suffering from the oppression by the imperialists: there are small groups of the Chinese, who not only do not suffer from this oppression, but are even quite content and enrich themselves. Who are these Chinese?

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. Why are the landowners acting in concert with the imperialists? Who are Compradores and why are they also acting in concert with the imperialists? Who are "Shen-shih" (Gentry)? "T'u hao" (local rowdies) and why are they acting in concert with the landowners and imperialists? Why are some merchants, students and capitalists acting in concert with the imperialists?

You must devote 8 colloquies to the elucidation of these six questions, applying the same methods, which have been indicated before, i.e. you must try to elucidate these questions by means of examples, which are known to the soldier from the village or town-life and from his own experience.-

As soon as you are convinced that these questions have been made sufficiently clear to the soldier, it will be not difficult for you to make him understand,

22. What and who are the imperialists?

It will be not difficult for you to prove that the militarists are armed at the expense of the imperialists and the landowners,

who are sympathizing with them. They are armed, in order to oppress the people and to make the robbing of the people easy for the landowners, the compradores and their masters who are the imperialists.-

23. 24. Invite the soldiers' attention to some militarists: Yang Hsi-min, Lou Ch'eu-wang, Wu P'ei fu, Chang Tso-lin, Sun Ch'uan-fang.

Make a brief examination of wars between them in 1920, 1924 and 1925. Call to their mind, how we have defeated Yang Hsi-min and Lou Ch'eu-wang, and what came of it, and what the result is of the struggle between the militarists in the North?

After you have finished this part of your colloquies, you will be able to elucidate fully to the soldier all the causes of his miserable state, which compels him to buy his soldier's pay of 10 to 12 dollars at the price of his own life.-

After fulfilling this task, you must pass to the cycle of of questions to the effect that, having entered the National Revolutionary Army, which is defending the interests of the mother country from the oppression on the part of all the parasites (foreign and domestic), he has become not the mercenary, who is fighting to get a piece of bread, but does not know for what and for whom, but the conscious citizen, the honourable citizen (because the calling of the soldier in the National Revolutionary Army is honourable), who is fighting honorably for the welfare of his country.-

25. 26. 27. What is the National Revolutionary Army? How is the National Revolutionary Army organized? What aims does it set before itself?

While discussing these questions, the political instructor must give a brief outline of the history of the creation of the National Revolutionary Army during the last two years and its ex-

ploits in two wars against Ch'en Chün-ming and in the wars against Teng Pen-Yin, Lou Ch'eu-wang, Yang Hsi-min and Hsiung K'e-wu. He must show the National Revolutionary Army in contrast to the armies of the militarists, and explain the part which the soldier has to play in the armies of the militarists and in the National Revolutionary army.-

28. Who are the enemies of the National Revolutionary Army?

The previous colloquies give answer to this question. The enemies of the National Revolutionary Army are: the imperialistic countries (first of all: Japan, England, America, France), the militarists (you must dwell on the treacherous part, which is played by Ch'en Chün-ming, Teng Pen-yin, Fang Pen-jen, Wu P'ei-fu, Chang Tso-lin etc.), the big landowners, the compradores etc.

Of other foreign countries you must dwell on the part which Russia is playing and explain that Soviet Russia was carrying on and is still now carrying on a struggle against imperialism, and that the power there belongs to the toiling masses, which are struggling not only for their own liberation, but also for the liberation of the toiling masses of the whole world.- You must devote one colloquy to this topic.-

30. You must then tell the soldiers that the toiling masses of other oppressed countries: India, Egypt, Philippines, Indo-China, Korea, Birmah, Siam etc., are also friends of the National Revolutionary Army, i.e. of the national liberation of China. Try to get a geographical map and show on it the imperialistic countries and the oppressed countries. Take some daily newspapers and read them aloud, in order to show, how the toiling masses in these countries are carrying on our common struggle against the imperialists.-

31. You must tell during this colloquy that when we are speaking about imperialistic England or Japan etc., we always have in

mind the dominating class of capitalists; that in all these countries there are also workmen and peasants, who are as much oppressed, as we are, and who are sympathizing with us. Take any newspaper and you will obtain sufficient material there, in order to prove it (rebellions, strikes, work of trade unions, fascists, shootings etc.).-

32. During this colloquy you must tell about the revolutionary struggle in China of the workmen and peasants, who are doing the same work as the National Revolutionary Army. Sufficient materials are available to prove it. Call to their minds the Taiping rebellion of peasants, the Boxer uprising, the shooting of workmen of the Peking-Hankow Railway in 1924, the shooting affair of May 30, at Shanghai, the shooting at Hankow, Canton etc. Tell them about the struggle of peasants in Kwang-ning and other districts of the Kwangtung province. Show on the basis of these instances that the workmen and peasants are the friends of the soldiers.-

33. 34. 35. 36. These hours are to be kept in reserve, in case it proves to be impossible for the political instructor to carry through all the previous colloquies; otherwise, he must devote them to the reading of newspapers, to the exchange of opinions etc.-

If all the above-mentioned topics are thoroughly mastered by the soldiers, it will not be difficult for the political instructor to pass to the next cycle of colloquies relating to the methods of the revolutionary struggle, the parties, the part of the Kuomintang, the teaching of Sun Yat-sen etc.- The program relating to all these topics will be presented in due time.-

The P U R invites the attention of all political instructors to the organization of the "political hour" and to the proper

methods of the work, because the proper organization of the "political hour" and the right methods of the work are the basic guarantees of success.

1. Three hours per week must be devoted to the political instruction, i.e. three days, one hour a day.-

2. The schedule of political lessons must be made in agreement with the regimental commander.-

3. All officers and soldiers must know exactly at what time and where these colloquies will take place.-

4. The political instructor must come to these colloquies on time, in order to be an example of military exactness and punctuality.-

5. All officers of the company concerned must attend these colloquies.-

6. The political instructor must see to it that no one fails to attend these colloquies.-

7. The place for holding the political colloquy must be chosen beforehand; if it is to be held in the open air, the place must be situated far enough from any noise; if the colloquy is to take place in some building, it must be light, spacious and warm, in order that the soldiers may be comfortable.-

8. Before proceeding to his work, the political instructor must get thoroughly acquainted with this program, think it over and collect the necessary material.-

9. The political instructor must prepare himself for each colloquy, devoting no less than one hour for this purpose. Before going to the colloquy, the political instructor must carefully think over the subject on which he is to speak; he must consider the instances which he wants to cite etc.-

10. The political instructor must keep in mind that to give the soldiers "lectures" is the worst method of this work. If he uses the whole hour to deliver a lecture and then goes away, he may be sure that he will not obtain any results whatever. To listen to lectures and to understand them is a difficult matter

even for the educated persons, the more so for the soldiers, among whom there are many who are illiterate, i.e. those who are unaccustomed to mental work.-

11. The best method of work is the method of questions and answers, i.e. you ask the soldier some question which he answers; but this method is very difficult. The political instructor, having in view the carrying through of a colloquy on some theme, must think it over, carefully what questions to ask. It is not enough to ask a question; it is necessary that the question be understood by the soldiers, i.e. the questions must be simple, practical, adapted to the soldier's experience. If you cannot get an answer, try to lead the soldier's mind up to the desired answer, help him with the answer. Ask two, three or four soldiers; ask the whole audience; perhaps you will find some man, who is able to give you an answer. If you are unable to carry through the whole colloquy in questions and answers, you may summarize it at the end, make some generalizations, but devote not more than 5 or 10 minutes to it.-

12. If you are not able to organize your colloquies on the basis of this method, try to apply a mixed method, i.e. a lecture and then questions and answers.-

13. You must be well acquainted with your soldiers. You must know their names, ages, their native provinces and districts, their family conditions, their professions before entering the military service, whether they know how to read and write, etc. Only such detailed knowledge of each soldier will give you in their eyes the great authority, which is based not on the rank you are holding, but on their confidence in you and respect. Thereby your task in connection with their political education will be greatly facilitated.-

14. You will find among your audience men of different abilities; some are more active, than others; some are older men with experience, others are young; some know how to read and write, others are illiterate; for some it is quite easy to understand

questions you ask them; for others, on the contrary, it is rather difficult etc. It may happen that only 3 to 5 soldiers will be able to answer your questions, the others will be silent. Try to avoid such a situation.

Be able to study the character and abilities of every man and try to induce to work not only the able and active soldiers, but also those who are less able and less active.-

15. Try to ask as frequently as possible the question, whether you have been understood, and find out whether you have been understood properly.-

16. Do not get angry, if you are not understood. In 99% of such cases it is your own fault and not the fault of your audience. Try to explain patiently everything that is difficult to understand, using various ways and methods.-

17. Pay attention to the language you use, when speaking to soldiers. If you use words, terms, philosophic expressions which are unknown to the men, nobody will understand you. Keep in mind that different people use different languages. When speaking to soldiers, use one language and cite corresponding instances; when speaking to officers or students, use another language and cite other instances. The experience of our political work shows that the political workers frequently forget this important circumstance.-

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ANNEX No.3.

A. INSTRUCTION HOW TO CARRY ON THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS.

1. It is the duty of every regimental commander to organise every week political lessons for officers of his regiment.

2. Not less than one hour a week must be devoted to these political lessons.

3. The schedule of political lessons for officers must be prepared by the political commissary of the regiment in agreement with the regimental commander.

4. All officers and political workers of the regiment must attend these political lessons for officers.

5. In case some officer or political worker neglects these political lessons, a penalty is inflicted on him by the political commissary of the regiment and the regimental commander.

6. The political commissary of the regiment organizes these lessons by distributing several themes among the officers, who study these themes and prepare a thesis.-

7. In case these theses cannot be read (by the officers), the political commissary of the regiment reads them himself.

8. Quite independently of the fact, by whom the thesis is being read, the political commissary of the regiment must hold himself prepared for each thesis.

9. After the thesis has been read, the political commissary organises discussion in the form of a colloquy and tries to draw into this discussion the whole audience.

10. The political commissary of the regiment must keep in mind that to draw all the officers into the political self-activity is the best method of their political education.

11. In carrying out the program of the political instruction of officers, the political commissary of the regiment must rely upon the sympathy and the support of the Kuomintang nucleus and of the "Young Military Men Association".

12. It is likewise the duty of the Kuomintang nucleus and of

the "Young Military Men Association" to give the political commissary of the regiment full support in his work in connection with the political instruction of officers.-

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B. PROGRAM OF THE POLITICAL INSTRUCTION OF OFFICERS.

1. What is imperialism?

2. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the 19th century.

3. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the 20th century.

4. What are Extraterritoriality, Concessions and the Mixed Court?

5. What is Tariff Autonomy?

6. Upon whom does Chang Tso-lin rely? His power. The history of his rise.

7. Wu P'ei-fu. The history of his rise.

8. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in 1922.

9. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in 1924.

10. The military-political sketch of the war between Sun Ch'uan-fang and Chang Tso-lin in 1925.

11. The coalition between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.

12. The first war against Ch'en Chün-ming in 1925.

13. The second war against Ch'en Chün-ming in 1925.

14. The rebellion of Yang Hsi-min and Lou Ch'ou-wang.

15. The defeat of Teng Pen-yin.

16. The organization of the National Revolutionary Army.

17. The importance of the political work in the army.

18. The military-political problems of the National Revolutionary Army.

19. How is the National Revolutionary Government organized?

20. How is the Provincial Government organized?-

ANNEX No.3.

A. INSTRUCTION HOW TO CARRY ON THE POLITICAL EDUCATION OF OFFICERS.

1. It is the duty of every regimental commander to organise every week political lessons for officers of his regiment.

2. Not less than one hour a week must be devoted to these political lessons.

3. The schedule of political lessons for officers must be prepared by the political commissary of the regiment in agreement with the regimental commander.

4. All officers and political workers of the regiment must attend these political lessons for officers.

5. In case some officer or political worker neglects these political lessons, a penalty is inflicted on him by the political commissary of the regiment and the regimental commander.

6. The political commissary of the regiment organizes these lessons by distributing several themes among the officers, who study these themes and prepare a thesis.-

7. In case these theses cannot be read (by the officers), the political commissary of the regiment reads them himself.

8. Quite independently of the fact, by whom the thesis is being read, the political commissary of the regiment must hold himself prepared for each thesis.

9. After the thesis has been read, the political commissary organizes discussion in the form of a colloquy and tries to draw into this discussion the whole audience.

10. The political commissary of the regiment must keep in mind that to draw all the officers into the political self-activity is the best method of their political education.

11. In carrying out the program of the political instruction of officers, the political commissary of the regiment must rely upon the sympathy and the support of the Kuomintang nucleus and of the "Young Military Men Association".

12. It is likewise the duty of the Kuomintang nucleus and of

the "Young Military Men Association" to give the political commissary of the regiment full support in his work in connection with the political instruction of officers.-

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B. PROGRAM OF THE POLITICAL INSTRUCTION OF OFFICERS.

1. What is imperialism?

2. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the 19th century.

3. History of the penetration of the imperialists into China in the 20th century.

4. What are Extraterritoriality, Concessions and the Mixed Court?

5. What is Tariff Autonomy?

6. Upon whom does Chang Tso-lin rely? His power. The history of his rise.

7. Wu P'ei-fu. The history of his rise.

8. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in 1922.

9. The military-political sketch of the war between Chang Tso-lin and Wu P'ei-fu in 1924.

10. The military-political sketch of the war between Sun Ch'uan-fang and Chang Tso-lin in 1925.

11. The coalition between Wu P'ei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.

12. The first war against Ch'en Chün-ming in 1925.

13. The second war against Ch'en Chün-ming in 1925.

14. The rebellion of Yang Hsi-min and Lou Ch'ou-wang.

15. The defeat of Teng Pen-yin.

16. The organization of the National Revolutionary Army.

17. The importance of the political work in the army.

18. The military-political problems of the National Revolutionary Army.

19. How is the National Revolutionary Government organized?

20. How is the Provincial Government organized?-

Annex No.6.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING POLITICAL COMMISSARIES IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

Section A. : Commissaries in the units of the line.

1. The system of Political Commissaries is introduced for the purpose of political education of the army in the national revolutionary spirit and in order to increase its fighting value, to strengthen discipline and to inculcate in the mass of the army the fundamental principles of Sunyatsenism.-

2. The Commissary is the representative of the Kuomintang Party and is responsible to the latter for the political and moral condition of the military unit: he sees to the proper execution of instructions of the Party and of the superior military organs and assists the Commander of the unit in strengthening the foundations of the national revolutionary discipline.-

3. The Commissary is the guide of the party nucleus in the military unit and carries on all political and cultural work in it; under his guidance are also working all social organizations of the military unit, such as: the Club "Young Military Men Association", "Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" etc. He also directs all the Commissaries subordinated to him and the Political section.-

4. The Commissary must be acquainted with all officers of his unit and with the living conditions in this unit. He must also make a thorough study of the state of mind of soldiers and officers.-

5. The Commissary must remedy all defects discovered by him and remove all obstacles in the work and, in case it is impossible to do so, make a report to the higher Commissary.-

6. The Commissary exercises the party and political influence in his unit and directs the work in accordance with the

instructions of the higher Commissary.

The Commissary coordinates this work with the program of instructions of the commander of the unit.-

7. The Commissary is the authority for all military men of his unit and his orders must be obeyed and executed the same as those of the commander of the unit.-

8. The Commissary has the authority to impose penalties through the commander of the unit.-

9. The Commissary does not interfere with administrative orders of the commander of the unit.-

10. Should the Commissary consider the orders of the Commander as prejudicial to the national revolution, he makes a report to the higher Commissary.-

In cases of obvious treason or perfidy, however, he takes measures that the orders given are not executed and acts independently at his own discretion; at the same time he reports to the higher Commissary, to the Political Directorate (P U R) and to the President of the Military Tribunal.-

11. During battle the Commissary must set an example to all soldiers and officers and encourage them by his bravery.-

12. The Commissary must investigate the economic life of the unit, see that the soldiers get their food on time, and that the food is of good quality. He must insist that soldiers handle all government property carefully. It is also his duty to see that newspapers and magazines reach the units in good time and are distributed properly.-

13. The Commissary must take great care that during campaigns the peaceful population does not suffer, and explains to the soldiers their role as liberators of the people from foreign imperialism.-

14. The Commissary must establish connections with the population and with peasants' and worken's organizations of the region, in which his unit is quartered and try to bring them and the army together.-

15. The Commissary relies in his work upon the Kuomintang nucleus in his unit, directs it and through it puts into effect all measures, necessary for the strengthening of the unit.-

16. In case of a disagreement with the party-nucleus, the Commissary has the right to suspend its decisions. He then makes a report to the higher party organization and to the respective Political section.+

17. The Commissary must be acquainted with all the regulations which are in force in the National Revolutionary Army, and with all orders and circulars pertaining to his unit.-

18. The Commissary must present to the higher Commissary a monthly report concerning his work.

Moreover, it is desirable that the Commissary should make reports, which contain information concerning his work and the condition of his unit, at the conferences of officers and political workers.-

19. Section A. of these Regulations refers only to Commissaries in the units of the line (Regiment, Company, Battalion, detachment, ship, etc.).

The rights and duties of the Commissaries in the Staffs, Administrative and other organs of the National Revolutionary Army (Army Corps, Divisional and Navy Staffs, General Staff, Sanitary Sections, Sections of Supplies, Arsenals etc.) are enumerated in Section B.-

Section B.: Commissaries in the staffs and other organs.

1. The Commissaries in the Staffs, Administrations and oth-

er organs of the army fully enjoy the same power, as the Commanders and Chiefs to whom they are attached.-

2. They have the power of control in military-political and economic affairs.-

3. Jointly with the Commanders, they consider all reports which are presented by officers of lower rank and make decisions. Jointly with the Commanders, they sign all orders, instructions and documents, all of which are invalid without their signatures.

4. In cases, when the Commissaries disagree with the Commanders, they must sign the order, but make a report to the higher Commissary.

If Commissaries discover a criminal design in the actions of the Commanders, they act in accordance with article 10 of Section A.-

Section C. : Appointment of Political Commissaries.

1. Those members of the Kuomintang Party who have shown their devotion to the national revolution and are well-developed in the political sense and well-disciplined, may be appointed to the posts of Political Commissaries.-

2. The appointments of Political Commissaries for regiments and smaller military units and for other corresponding organs are made by the Political Directorate (P U R).-

3. Political Commissaries for Divisions and higher units are recommended by the Political Directorate (P U R), in agreement with the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, and their appointments are confirmed by the Military Council.-

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Annex No.7.

LETTER OF THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE (THE P U R) TO ALL POLITICAL COMMISSARIES OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

Dear comrades!

A. The Regulations governing the Political Commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army are herewith enclosed (see: Annex No.6).

These regulations are the principal document by which are defined the rights and duties of political commissaries in the army; their mutual relations with the officers (those officers who are holding equal posts, as well as those occupying inferior positions); and their mutual relations with party organs.

The Political Directorate does not consider it to be necessary to elucidate these regulations in extenso, but invites your attention to the following articles only:

Art.3. This article must be interpreted in the following sense: the political commissary is the chief for all those political workers, who are placed under him; at the same time, as regards the party nucleus, "the Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" and "the Young Military Men Association" (these being party and social organizations), he is their senior comrade, guide and tutor who is educating the members of the party and the revolutionary youth in the spirit of Dr. Sun's principles, as well as in the spirit of the regulations and the program of the party, and in accordance with the instructions of the superior Commissaries.

The character of mutual relations between the political commissary and the party nucleus is explained in articles 15 and 16.

Art.15. This article states that the political commissary relies in his work upon the party nucleus; that he derives his strength from the members of the party; and that through them or with their aid he carries through his measures.

The political commissary is the representative of party in the eyes of all, including members of the party, and all his activities in the military, as well as in the party-political do-

main are based upon his close connection with the party nucleus, the general guidance of which he holds in his hands.

The prestige and authority of the political commissary must stand very high in the eyes of every military man and most of all his prestige and authority must be upheld by the members of the party.

The political commissary must attend all meetings and conferences of the party nucleus, "the Society for the study of Sunyatsenism" and "the Young Men Military Association" and guide all members of the party along proper party "channels" (lines).

At these meetings the political commissary is just like the ordinary member of the party, equal to everybody present there; he controls all members of the party by his prestige and authority and influences all resolutions which are passed at the meeting by clear reasoning, convincing arguments and definite suggestions.

In cases, however, when the political commissary considers that the organization concerned (be it the party nucleus, "the Society for the Study of Sunyatsenism" or "the Young Military Men Association") goes the wrong way, he has the right to suspend the decision of this organization and to order that it should not be put into execution. He must at the same time make a report to the superior commissary.

Not a single member of the party has the right to speak at non-party meetings or conferences against the political commissary. Should the party nucleus consider that the political commissary has taken a wrong line of conduct, it has not the right to discuss this question at the meetings of the party; in such cases the party committee must collect all materials and send them to the superior commissary who takes all measures necessary.

Art.18. This article recommends to the commissary "to make reports at the conferences of officers and political workers." The political commissary must make the same reports at party

meetings also, in order that the whole nucleus of party should be kept informed about the work of the political commissary and the condition of his unit. It is desirable that the political commissary should also make reports containing such information at the meeting of the whole unit.-

Art.7,8,9 and 10. These articles are about the question of mutual relations between political commissaries and officers.

According to articles 7 and 8, the political commissary is an authority to all officers, who are inferior to him in rank, and has the same right to give them orders as their commander.

It is necessary to establish a procedure in the work of the commander and the political commissary according to which all orders are given in the joint name of the commander and the political commissary. Doing it in such manner, it will be possible to prevent misunderstandings.

Moreover in this way it will be possible to induce the officers to take part in the political work, and the political commissary will be kept informed about the life of his unit, as regards military operations, garrison service and economic affairs.

According to article 9, the political commissary has not the right to countermand the order given by the commander, provided that this order is not contrary to law.

According to article 10, however, when the political commissary considers that the commander has made a serious mistake he must send immediately a report to the superior commissary who will take the necessary action after consultation with the higher commander concerned.

Should the political commissary discern in the action of the military commander not a mistake, but an intentional desire to do harm to the revolutionary cause, or to assist the enemy or any evil design generally, he must, relying upon the support of the party nucleus and of the politically conscious soldiers and officers, make use of all the power which is put at his disposal by

the party,and take all necessary measures, according to his own judgement; simultaneously the political commissary must report to the superior commissary, to the Chief of the P U R and to the President of the Military Tribunal.

The party nucleus must show in such cases an absolute obedience to all orders of the political commissary and do, whatever he orders.-

The rights and duties, as defined above, apply to all political commissaries in the National Revolutionary Army without exception.-

B. The work of political commissaries in army units differs to a considerable degree from the work in the staffs and other organs of the National Revolutionary Army (such as: the General Staff; army corps, divisional and naval staffs; the sanitary detachment, the detachment of supplies etc.).

For that reason Section B. of the regulations defines the rights and duties of political commissaries in staffs and other organs of the army.

According to articles 1 and 2, the political commissary has the same power as the chief of staff or the chief of the organ to whom he is attached; and moreover he has the right of control over the activity of all officers of the staff or organ concerned as regards military-political and economic affairs and operations.-

According to article 3, the political commissary must, jointly with the commander or with the chief, receive all reports, examine all materials, read carefully all documents, reports and demands before they are forwarded; and, also jointly with the commander or with the chief, he gives all orders and signs all documents and other papers.

Neither the political commissary without the chief, nor the chief without the political commissary has the right to give any orders whatsoever independently: they must do it jointly after joint deliberation.

In case the political commissary disagrees for some reason

with the chief, he must sign the order (provided it will do no harm), in order to avoid the delay, but at the same time send a report to the superior commissary, enclosing the copy of the order.

There may be different opinions and views about all work (especially in regards to military work); in order that this difference of views between the chief and the political commissary should not affect unfavorably the work, the political commissary must in some cases yield to the chief and sign the order which is produced by the latter. Endless altercations between the chief and the political commissary cannot always be of use; but the political commissary, after signing the order of the chief, sends at once a report to the superior commissary who has to decide, which party is right (see: Article 4).

Should, however, the political commissary discover that the order may do harm, or that the chief pursues a criminal policy, he takes measures, according to his own judgment, in accordance with article 10, Section A., of these regulations.-

C. The P U R advises all political commissaries to establish the closest official and personal relations with the commanders and chiefs.

It is necessary that the commander and the political commissary, being one and a undivisible whole, should always and everywhere work together trying to attain one common aim: the unification of China under the banner of the Kuomintang party.

The Political Directorate is of the opinion that in the matter of establishing good official relations political commissaries must take the initiative, as the establishment of such relations depends entirely upon their ability and desire.

The Political Directorate advises the political commissaries of the army corps to call together all commanders and commissaries and to explain to them in detail the regulations governing Political Commissaries.

Reports relating to all obscure points, difficulties and mutual relations between the officers and political workers must be sent to the P U R before April 15, 1925.-

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Annex No.8.

NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

Units.	Political workers	Officers	Students	Enlisted personnel	Officials	Other employment	Total
1st Army Corps	69	37	27	21	2	71	227
2nd " "	23	2	15	-	1	-	41
3rd " "	14	-	-	-	-	-	14
4th " "	16	28	-	30	3	-	77
6th " "	11	-	-	-	-	-	11
Navy	17	-	-	-	-	-	17
2nd Sep.Division	34	11	-	2	-	6	53
20th " "	15	-	-	-	-	-	15
Central Military Political School	30	20	200	-	-	-	250
Polit. School attached to the 2nd Corps		-	80	-	-	-	80
Students'Regiment at Waichow	-	-	81	-	-	-	81
P U R	6	-	-	-	-	-	6
Young Military Men Association	4(6?)	-	-	-	-	-	6
Aviation	-	-	9	-	-	-	9

No.10. A.

THE MILITARY SECTION ATTACHED TO THE PROVISIONAL COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.

I. Theses relating to its aims and functions.

1. The present day military-political situation and the necessity of creating a strong, well disciplined National Revolutionary Army of great fighting value require unity of views and actions on the part of the members of the Chinese Communist Party who are working in the army.-

2. A special Military Section is established at the Provisional Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in order to exercise a proper guidance of all the military political work.

3. The military-political work is divided into two parts:

a) the strengthening of our forces and

b) the destruction of enemy forces.-

4. The revolutionary forces must be strengthened:

a) by the increase of the communist influence in the army and

b) by all peasants' and workmen's armed detachments.

The nuclei of the Communist Party which exist in the army as illegal (unauthorized) organizations, must be guided by the directives of the Military Section which is carrying on its work in the most secret manner.

5. The Military Section organizes detachments of workmen and peasants and establishes connection with those armed detachments of workmen and peasants which exist now; it must try to secure for the Communist Party the guidance of the latter in order to preserve them thereby from degenerating counter-revolutionary bands of bandits.-

6. The communists who penetrate, under the guise of members of the Kuomintang into all the army organizations, such as clubs, Cultural and Educational Societies, "the Young Men Military Association", "the Society for the Study of Sunyatsenism", military scientific organizations etc., must carry on their work in them in accordance with the directives of the Military Section.-

7. In order to destroy the rear of the enemy and to put down quickly all possible counter-revolutionary risings, the Military Section organizes its nuclei on trunk railways and main water-ways.-

8. The Military Section establishes , through its agents, connections with various secret societies, detachments of landowners and other armed organizations and creates in them its illegal nuclei.-

9. The Military Section carries out its policy in the army in the P U R, in the political sections of Divisions and in other army units. through its representatives. The party apparatus in the army requires the strictest centralization, in order to preserve its secret character; for that reason the Military Section is in charge of all appointments and transfers of communists in the army.-

II. Organization.

1. The Military Section is attached to the Provisional Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and consists of three comrades who enjoy the absolute confidence of the Party.-

2. One of these comrades acts as Secretary of the section. He is a member of the Provisional Commission of the Central Committee and is responsible for the work of the whole Military Section.-

3. Similar sections are also organized in the lower party organizations. Local Military Sections receive directives from the Secretary of the higher Military Section.-

4. In order to preserve its secret character, the workers of the Military Section must be unknown to the general mass of party comrades; they carry on their work quite independently and do not keep the Party Committee "in corpore" informed about it.-

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Very secret.

Annex No.10. B.

STATUTES OF THE "VOENKA"(THE MILITARY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY).

I. Structure of the Military Section.

1. The Military Section is composed of three members who must be selected only from the members of the Central Committee.

2. The Military Section carries out instructions of the Central Committee and reports to the latter as to its activity.

3. In large provincial centers as well as in places where the Military Section considers it necessary, delegates of the Military Section may be appointed.

4. The delegates in all respects are subordinated to the Military Section.

5. The technical apparatus of the Military Section is divided into the organizing department and the intelligence department.

II. Functions of the Military Section.

1. The functions of the Military Section are organization and guidance of the military work and informing of the Central Committee as to military affairs.

2. The moment an armed revolt is started, the Military Section turns into the General Staff of the revolt and directs the struggle.

3. The Military Section coordinates and regulates all military work among military units, workmen and peasants, with the object of getting their full cooperation at the moment of a revolt.

4. The Military Section exercises control over the the distribution of arms among the militarists cooperating with the Party.

III. Work in the military forces.

Taking into account that an armed revolt, not supported by regular troops, but, on the contrary, opposed by strong and disciplined military forces is beforehand doomed to failure, the Military Section pays special attention to the work in the regular troops of the Chinese army, namely:

1. through its intelligence department it acquaints itself with the armies of Chinese militarists, establishes connections therein, and organizes military work in military units;

2. it establishes cells inside military units, through which it carries out the preparatory work for the disorganization of those units at the moment of revolt, or for their turning over to the side of the revolting people;

Note: Special attention must be paid to the technical troops (artillery, armored car detachments, etc.)

3. through those military cells it prepares the ground for seizing military depots, arms and munition stores;

4. it supervises closely all military communists working in the troops of individual militarists and controls their distribution;

5. it prepares new contingents of military workers by despatching workmen and students, devoted to the revolutionary cause to military schools.

6. it makes preparations for armed revolts, at the same time takes steps to weaken the strength of the adversary by means of destruction of his rear (blowing up of munition stores, bridges, steamers bringing arms, etc.)

IV. Military work among workmen.

1. The Military Section takes into account possibilities of establishing military cells and fighting squads among the masses of the revolutionary workmen of China.

2. After establishing those cells and fighting squads the Military Section regulates their preparatory work and military training.

3. The Military Section organizes the issuing of arms and munitions to the fighting squads.

4. The Military Section directs the training of the fighting squads with a view of turning these contingents into a workmen's army in time of armed revolt. To that end it leads propaganda among the workmen who are not as yet enlisted into the fighting squads.

V. Military work among peasants.

1. Through its intelligence apparatus the Central Committee investigates the conditions of the peasantry, their needs, problems which trouble them, etc., with the object of utilizing the state of mind of the peasants for the organization of peasants military cells, partisan bands, etc.

2. Through its intelligence apparatus the Military Section investigates the hunghutze movement with the object of utilizing it during the revolutionary struggle.

3. The Military Section organizes the issue of arms and munitions to armed bands of the peasants.

No.11.

LIST OF QUESTIONS FOR THE GUIDANCE OF COMMISSIONS OF CONTROL, IN CHARGE OF THE CHECKING UP ON QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY.

1. The part played by the communist party and its importance in the national revolutionary movement.

2. The class struggle and the national struggle.

3. The classes now existing in China.

4. The economic resources of militarism and imperialism.

5. The history of the revolutionary movement in China.

6. The problem of the proletariat in colonial countries.

7. The part played by the National Revolutionary Army and its problems.

8. The duties of the officer and of the soldier.

9. The problem of communists in the army. The Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang.

10. The federative and autonomic principles of the political organization of China.

11. The part played by the national intelligentsia and its problems in the national revolutionary movement.

12. The social base and the associates of the Chinese Communist Party.

13. The part played by the peasantry in the revolution of China; the future problems of the peasantry.

14. The organization of the army; its fundamental statutes.-

Annex No.12.

YOUNG MILITARY MEN ASSOCIATION.

A. Introduction.

The Young Military Men Association has for its aim the bringing together of all officers, cadets of military schools and soldiers of the Chinese National Revolutionary Army on the common ground of putting into effect, in connection with the constructive work in the army, the latest principles of the science of war and the turning of the army into a force capable of serving the interests of the masses of the Chinese people.

Taking into consideration all negative traits of mercenary militaristic armies (aloofness from the population; looting;, ignorance of the troops of the aims, for the sake of which they are compelled to fight; the tendency to serve and to sell themselves to any master whatever), the Young Military Men Association unites only those military men, who have decided definitely to break off the past and who understand the inevitability and the necessity for the Chinese people to possess an army, educated in the spirit of revolutionary discipline and possessed of a good knowledge of military art.

The Young Military Men Association is a voluntary organization and all its members enjoy equal rights; they have the right to elect their own organs and to be elected as members of them.-

B. Organization of the Association.

It is necessary to start at once the organization of Branches of the Association in all units of the National Revolutionary Army. For that purpose special "Initiative Groups" are created in all divisions (it is desirable that these groups should be composed as follows: the divisional commander, the chief of the divisional political section and the Adviser). Such a group calls a general meeting of commanding officers and the political personnel, explains the aims of the Association and enrolls all those who desire to join it. The president, secretary and treas-

urer are then elected for the divisional branch of the Association. These three officers call periodical meetings of members of the Association for the discussion of various politico-military questions. The Association takes upon itself the initiative in organising "circles of military science" and schools for illiterate soldiers, and carries on the oral and printed propaganda relating to the aims and problems of the Association.

The general conference of divisional branches and all separate units of which the divisions and the army corps are composed, elects the Army Corps Executive Board. The General Conference of all Army Corps Executive Boards elects the Executive Board of the Association for the whole army.-

C. Duties of Members of the Association.

The members of the Association must set other military men of the National Revolutionary Army an example in matters of discipline, consciousness and in conscientious fulfilment of their duties.

The members of the Association are forbidden to play games of chance, to smoke opium, to visit gambling houses and similar public haunts.

The members of the Association are forbidden to beat soldiers and in addressing their subordinates must be polite, but persevering.

The members of the Association during campaigns or manoeuvres must see that the soldiers do not oppress the population. They must also explain the aims and problems of the National Revolutionary Army to the population.

The members of the Association must be constantly improving their politico-military knowledge; for that purpose each member of the Association must read newspapers and books on military subjects.

The members of the Association must be most careful in handling government property; they must keep their arms clean and in

good order, and preserve arms and other property of their units from damage and stealing. The members of the Association do not enjoy special rights in the army.

Each member of the Association wears on his breast a special badge with the following inscription: "The Young Military Men Association. I am the friend of the people, but the enemy of militarists".

Each member of the Association contributes one percent of his pay as members' fee; the money thus contributed by the members as fees, are handed over to the Central Treasury of the Association and are spent at the discretion of the Central Executive Board.-

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No.13.A.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

A. General Principles.

1. In order: a) to maintain the revolutionary lawfulness, discipline and order in the ranks of the National Revolutionary Army, b) to carry on the fight against crimes of economic character, against espionage and treason and c) to prevent possible crimes against the Government and the Army command, a Military Tribunal is established and is subordinated to the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army (the P U R).-

2. The Military Tribunal has for its aim the raising of the general political standard of the army masses; in addition it is the organ which inflicts unmerciful penalties on all enemies of the National Revolution, of the Government and of the Chinese Army. For that purpose its activity must be as clear and open to all as possible.-

3. The Military Tribunal must be guided in its activity by governmental regulations and by the directives of the Chief of the P U R .-

B. Composition of the Military Tribunal.

4. The Military Tribunal consists of the president of the Tribunal, his deputy, three members of the Tribunal and two deputy members, one secretary and his deputy. Suitable candidates are recommended by the Political Directorate and appointed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang.-

5. The president of the Military Tribunal is the spiritual guide and administrative chief for all officials and organs of the Tribunal.-

6. All Members of the Tribunal and their Deputies constitute the College of the Military Tribunal, which decides such questions, as the bringing up for trial of the accused, the dismissal of prosecution or the additional examination of the case.-

C. Court-Martial.

7. The court martial is constituted, under the chairmanship of the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy, of two members of the Military Tribunal or, in case of their absence, of their deputies and of the secretary who is in charge of the records of the court. The members who constitute the court martial must be confirmed in their office by the president of the Tribunal.

8. The court martial in pronouncing its judgments shall be guided solely by the considerations of the revolutionary expediency, taking into consideration the interests of the National Revolution.-

9. The question relating to the punishment is to be decided by the voting of the members of the court martial (The chairman and two members).-

D. Investigation Section.

10. An Investigation Section is attached to the Military Tribunal, and consists of one senior and four junior examining magistrates who are appointed to these posts in accordance with the same procedure, as the members of the Military Tribunal.-

11. The examination of a case is instituted by the senior examining Magistrate, in accordance with the order issued by the President of the Military Tribunal or his Deputy.-

12. When it is proved that the act of the accused constitutes no offence, the case may be dismissed only after the College of the Military Tribunal has rendered such a decision. The

same procedure is followed, when the case which has not been fully investigated, is sent back for additional investigation.-

13. The senior examining Magistrate assigns to the junior examining Magistrates the work in connection with the investigation of cases and, as soon as the investigation is completed, transmits the case to the College of the Military Tribunal for consideration.

The deputy-president of the Military Tribunal is in charge of the general supervision over the examining section.-

E. Administrative Section.

14. The Administrative Section is in charge of the administrative and economic affairs pertaining to all organs and officials of the Military Tribunal, of the Investigation Section and of the Commandant's office which is subordinated to the Chief of the Administrative Section.-

15. The Commandant's office is in charge of the property, buildings and of the guarding of the members of the Tribunal. He is responsible for the maintenance of order and for the condition of units which are guarding the Tribunal. The Commandant shall attend all sittings of the Tribunal in order to maintain order.-

F. Jail for Preliminary Detention.

16. A Jail for Preliminary Detention is attached to the Military Tribunal for the confinement of persons accused of crime.-

17. The governor of this jail, his deputy or the commandant shall admit any person who has been arrested by order of the Government, of the Chief of the P U R or of the president or members of the Military Tribunal.-

18. The release from this jail of prisoners can be authorized only by the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy who issue a special written order for that purpose. After receipt of the order the release can be effected only by the governor or his deputy.-

19. The governor of the jail is subordinated only to the president of the Military Tribunal or his deputy.-

Remarks. 1. A member of the Military Tribunal or of the court martial or an examining magistrate, who is a relative, direct or indirect, of the accused, or who is otherwise concerned with the case, shall withdraw from the examination and the trial.

2. The commandant's office functions in accordance with special instructions.

3. The internal arrangement of the jail for the preliminary detention, the duties of the officials and the guarding are provided for in special instructions.-

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OFFICIALS OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

A.	President of the Tribunal	1
	Deputy President of the Tribunal	1
	Members of the Tribunal (Judges)	3
	Deputy Members of the Tribunal	2
	Senior Secretary of the Tribunal	1
	Junior Secretary of the Tribunal	1
B.	Investigation Section:	
	Senior Examining Magistrate	1
	Junior Examining Migistrates	4
	Secretary	1

C. Administrative Section:

Chief of the Section	1
Treasurer in charge of Economic Affairs	1
Clerks	2
Servants, official messengers	

D. Commandant's Office:

Commandant of the Tribunal A	1
Adjutants	2
Guard of the Tribunal	1 Platoon.

OFFICIALS OF THE JAIL FOR PRELIMINARY DETENTION.

1.	Governor of the jail	1
2.	Deputy Governor of the jail	1
3.	Commandants on duty	3
4.	Official in charge of Economic Affairs	1
5.	Chief of the Chancellery	1
6.	Clerks	2
7.	Servants, official messengers, coolies	
8.	SeniorWardens	4
9.	Junior Wardens	16
10.	Physician of the Prison	1
11.	Brothers of mercy	3
12.	Guard Special Detachment.	

Annex No.13. B.

DIRECTIVES TO THE MILITARY TRIBULAL RELATING TO PENALTIES.

I. The continual struggle which has been going on during the last fifteen years for the national liberation of the masses of the people of China and the creation of an independent Chinese Government require the establishment of a strong punitive organ. The aim of such an organ should be the combatting of crimes against the Government and against the discipline in the army, as well as the fight against attempts to demoralize the army.

During the period, when the struggle against the enemies of the National Revolution assumes a more and more acute form, the old laws of the pre-republic time or even those laws which have been promulgated after the establishment of the Republic, cannot be applied now for many reasons. The main reason is that they are absolutely inadequate under the present conditions of life and of the struggle for national liberation.

Taking the foregoing into consideration, the Government decrees:

a) that the Military Tribunal should be guided in its activity, first of all, by the considerations of the revolutionary expediency and by the necessity of defending the National Revolution, the Government and the foundations of the National Revolutionary Army; and

b) that the Tribunal, as the organ of the people, should mercilessly punish all crimes which, directly or indirectly, are committed against the people and the National Revolution. At the same time it must take measures for the most careful study of the causes of these crimes, because one of the aims of this Tribunal consists also in the prevention of possible crimes.-

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II. The Revolutionary (Military) Tribunal shall be guided by the following norms of punishment which are approximative only and

may be increased or reduced in accordance with the decision of the Tribunal.

A. Counter-revolutionary offences (crimes).

1. Attempts on the life of or plots against the Government, the Army Command and its organs and the revolutionary organisations which aim at the suppression of militarism and imperialism, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years or death by shooting.

2. Destruction, blowing up of arsenals and other factories, store-houses, bridges, railways etc. which have state or strategic importance, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years or death by shooting.

3. Formation of counter-revolutionary groups and of organizations, the activity of which is directed against the National Government and the army, the participation in these organisations or connnection with them shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than five years or death by shooting.

4. The open or secret struggle against the Government, the Army and the National Revolution with arms in hand or through other methods, such as service in the counter revolutionary armies, defending of interests of the enemies of the National Revolution etc., shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than five years or death by shooting.

5. Treason to the cause of the National Revolution by deserting to the enemy, the delivery or sale of documents which have strategic or state importance, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than four years or death by shooting.-

B. Offences committed by officials in connection with the performance of their official duties (Malfeasance in office).

1. Intentional or unintentional "sabotage", the negligent

performance of official duties, as well as the failure to carry out the instructions and orders issued by the Government and the Army command, shall be punished, dependent upon the damage which has been caused or may ensue, with imprisonment for a period of not less than two years or death by shooting.

2. The appropriation or embezzlement of Government property (arms, equipment etc.) or of money and other valuable articles, the negligent handling of them, the sale or cession of property or valuable articles which bears an unlawful character, and the conducting of commercial and other operations from which a damage may ensue for the Government and the army, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than three years or death by shooting.

3. Unlawful extortions, requisitions or confiscations and unlawful exactions of all kinds, occupation of houses and other buildings without the permission of competent authorities etc. shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of not less than three years or death by shooting.-

C. Various offences.

1. The insult by word or deed of members of the Government or army command, the insult of military men (both enlisted and officers' personnel), of officials and of political workers who are performing their official duties or are off duty, the undermining of authority of the Government, of the army command or of governmental organs and the causing of disorganization by one's actions or other means shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of four months to five years.

2. The abuse by a public officer of his authority or the assumption of authority which does not belong to him by right, as well as the non-execution of the authority (inaction) done with intent to benefit one's self or in consequence of which a damage

ensues to the Government or the army, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period of six months to five years.

3. The failure to inform the authorities of offences already committed or to be committed, as well as the concealment of offenders shall be punished in cases bearing a malicious character, as the offences themselves; in other cases with imprisonment for a period of three months to three years.-

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III. A. The Above mentioned norms of punishment apply without exception to all citizens of the Chinese Republic, as well as to foreigners.-

B. For the soldiers, workmen and peasants who have been involved into committing an offence against the National Revolution on account of their ignorance, these norms of punishments must be considerably reduced; they are not, however, to be relieved of any punishment.-

C. The maximum term of imprisonment shall be 15 years.-

D. All cases of death sentence shall be immediately reported to the President of the Political Bureau who has the right to suspend within 24 hours the execution of the sentence.-

E. The escape from the jail of detention, the illness and the absence of the accused generally do not stop the pronouncement of judgment, provided all the materials relating to his case have been collected.-

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Annex No.14.



Diagram showing the connection between political and army organs.

Annex No.15.

BY-LAWS OF THE CENTRAL POLITICO-MILITARY CLUB.

1. A Central Politico-Military Club is established in the Military Council of the National Revolutionary Army

in order

a) to work out a unity of points of view on all questions relating to the politico-military constructive work of the army, its supply, technical improvement and utilization,

b) to establish the unity of the politico-military thought, in order to facilitate for the Party and the Government the solution of problems with which the National Revolution in China is now confronted;

c) to study the present situation in China; and

d) to study the contemporary armies, the economics, politics and the general situation in other countries.

2. This Club must serve as a place of meeting for all officers and the political personnel of the army; as a place for the rational utilization of the leisure; as a place for healthy recreation and amusement; and as a place where the military and political education of the officers and political workers is concentrated.-

3. The membership in the Club is open to every officer and political worker, as well as to responsible members of the Party and of the Government, who are interested in the national revolutionary constructive work, both of military and civilian character.-

4. The candidate for membership must be proposed by two members. The general meeting then decides whether he is to be admitted.-

5. Those who desire to be members of the Club must know and observe the stipulations of these by-laws, abide by the decisions of the Executive Committee and of the General meeting, pay their

monthly subscription fees and take part in one of the Committees of the Club.-

6. The finances of the Club are derived from the following sources:

a) fixed contributions of the P U R ;

b) receipts of the Club and voluntary contributions,

c) entrance and subscription fees.-

7. The entrance fee is fixed at 3% and monthly subscription fees at 1% of the monthly salary of the member of the Club.-

8. The general meeting of the members is the highest organ of the Club.-

9. In order to direct the work of the Club, the Executive Committee is elected by the General meeting. The Executive Committee consists of the president of the Club, his deputy, secretary-treasurer, four members and five candidates and is elected for the period of 6 months.-

10. All members have the right to elect officers for all organs of the Club and to be elected as such.-

11. At the Club are established: a) library and reading-room, b) cafe and restaurant, c) theatre and cinema, d) bookstore.-

12. In order to make the study of politico-military questions or doctrines more easy the members of the Club divide themselves into sections according to their own desires.

No member of the Club can participate in the work of more than two sections.

13. The Executive Committee of the Club:

a) appoints an Editorial Body which publishes the wall-newspaper ("The Club Magazine"), compiles and publishes materials and books on questions which have already been discussed or are to be discussed (in Chinese or translations into Chinese from foreign languages);

b) appoints one secretary and two assistants for each section, in order to direct the work there;

c) appoints the manager to carry on the routine work in all the organs of the Club and engages servants;

d) examines and approves plans and programs of Club work, calls general meetings and sends out notices for them;

e) submits to the general meeting reports relating to its activity and also financial accounts.-

14. In order to draw up plans, programs and various arrangements for the work in sections, a conference of secretaries of all sections and of the Executive Committee is called. The Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Club acts as chairman at this conference of secretaries.-

15. All questions which have been elaborated or discussed in sections, are either brought up for further discussion at the general meeting of the Club or sent directly to the press, depending upon the degree of their importance.-

16. The P U R may organize, when deemed necessary, extraordinary or periodical lectures or the reading of reports for the members of the Club.-

17. The Club may be closed by the order of the Chief of the P U R.-

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THE MILITARY ENGINEER ORGANIZATION IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

I. The Military Engineer Organization in the Past.

A. Occasional Tasks and their Execution.

The creation of the Canton fortified region - an idea which had been approved by Dr. Sun as early as in the summer of 1924 - was the largest occasional task. The work was carried on during the summer and autumn of 1924 and up to February of 1925, and was done by hired coolies, under occasional supervision; only towards the end of 1924 a military road, within the bounds of the fortified region, was constructed by the troops of the 2nd Canton Division, under the direction of the divisional engineer company and the civilian supervision.

As another instance of this kind may be cited the formation and preparatory training of an engineer group for the attack and siege of the fortress of Waichow during the 1st Eastern Campaign (February - March, 1925). This group was not utilized for fighting purposes, but during its enforced inactivity received a good training in sapping, mining and similar kind of work. The group, which numbered about 120 men, consisted of cadets and soldiers of the "Whampoa" troops and was guided almost exclusively by Russian Advisers, owing to the lack of engineer officers.

The next case was a group of "Whampoa" students, under the leadership of a Russian adviser, which was sent on 25 June, 1925 to a station of the Canton - Kowloon railway, with the mission of taking preparatory measures for the eventual blowing up of the railway bridge, in case that British intervention should take place, but in their work they met with almost unsurmountable obstacles, owing to the lack of engineering equipment.

The above-cited instances are quite sufficient to establish the fact of the complete absence of a military engineer organization in the army of South China during the afore-mentioned period

of time.-

B. The Work in the "Whampoa" School.

The Military Engineer Class, which was organized in the "Whampoa" School in the fall of 1924, was facing difficulties, on account of the lack of engineer equipment, manuals and instructors. Later studies were interrupted in connection with several military operations, in which the "Whampoa" School was taking an active part. The teaching of special subjects was being organized with greatest difficulties through the efforts of Russian advisers, who were working in the school all the time. In June 1925 preparatory measures were taken for the coming graduation ceremony, which actually was held in August 1925. Altogether thirty young military engineer officers graduated, but only five of them succeeded in putting their special knowledge into practice in the Divisional Sappers' Company, which was organized, in September 1925 in the 1st Division of the "Whampoa" troops; the rest were sent temporarily into various units of the "Whampoa" troops.-

C. Establishment of the Military Engineer Inspectorate of the General Staff.

In connection with the establishment of the General Staff, provisional regulations were prepared on 18 - 19 June, 1925, with regard to the personnel and the organization of the Military Engineer Inspectorate of the General Staff; actually, however, the organization of the Military Engineer Inspectorate was put into effect on 8 - 9 August.

The Military Engineer Inspectorate, with a personnel consisting of ten persons, was subdivided into two sections: a) Military-Educational and b) Technical. In the beginning of October, 1925, in connection with the general reduction of the General Staff, the number of workers in the Military Engineer Inspectorate was reduced to 8 persons.

The following work was done by the Military-Educational Sec-

tion: the military engineer organization of a Division (Divisional Sappers' Company) and Army Corps (Army Corps Engineer) was finally worked out; training programs and engineer manuals for engineer non-commissioned officers were prepared.

The following work of a general technical character was done by the Technical Section: plans of roads and various communications were worked out; fortresses (Humen, Whampoa) were inspected.

By the end of 1925 the work of the Inspectorate was interrupted to a certain extent, because the Inspector General, together with two workers, went to take part in the military operations in connection with the capture of the fortress of Waichow; afterwards he retired from service, on account of illness, and left for Yünnan. The new Inspector General was appointed only on January 14, 1926.

D. The Organization of Military-Engineer Units.

As has been already mentioned before military engineer organizations were totally lacking in the South China Army (excluding, of ocurse, the Engineer class of the "Whampoa" School).

The only exception in this respect was the Hunan Army (now the 2nd Army Corps); there was in this Army an Engineer Detachment, which consisted of three Companies (one of them - "Communication" Company) and numbered (according to the informations furnished by the Inspectorate in the end of July, 1925) 289 enlisted men and 12 line-officers, with the following main specialities: a) sappers' work, b) roads and bridges and c) telephones. The engineering equipment available was very limited and was acquired, for the most part, through the efforts and at the expense of the Detachment. This Detachment was reorganized afterwards in accordance with the standard scheme, which was approved (in the Chinese version) on July 20, 1925 and put into effect. (The description of this new organization is given below).

After the first graduates had left the "Whampoa" School, new formations of military engineer units were started. In accordance with an order to the 1st "Whampoa" Division, issued on Sep-

tember 14, 1925, a Divisional Sappers' Company was organized for the said Division and a Divisional Engineer appointed (in accordance with the new scheme of organization). This Sappers' Company, although its organization was still quite unfinished, took part (together with its division) in the latest Eastern Campaign. - Afterwards the Eastern and Southern Campaigns and the reorganization of Army Corps, in accordance with the new scheme (which is still going on) delayed and put into a background the question of further formations of engineer units.-

E. The Supplying of Engineer Equipment.

The problem of supplying engineer equipment is most acute and is not solved even now. To say nothing of the chronical lack of funds for such expenditures in the past, there was not even a possibility of finding the necessary equipment on the spot or in the near neighborhood. Occasional attempts to order or to purchase something in this line from foreigners (Japan) proved to be unsuccessful. Almost nothing was available for the army. As a lucky chance, there happened to be in the godowns of the former naval base on the "Whampoa" island considerable supplies of explosive materials (pyroxylene, powder) and safety-fuses, but no percussion-caps or primers. About July 15, 1925 a detailed report was presented concerning the necessity of ordering, on a quite modest scale, the required equipment from the U S S R (the nearest store-houses at Vladivostok).

Independently of this, we succeeded in manufactuing primers and fulminating mercury caps, but that was done quite occasionally, because the Chinese are not inclined to display such an initiative.

As a general conclusion about the military engineer organization in the National Revolutionary Army in the past, one can only state that this problem has been finally moved from the dead-point in any case, some change has been effected in the psychology of Chinese Generals; but even now they very willingly form machine-gun units and very reluctantly engineer units.-

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II. THE MILITARY ENGINEER ORGANIZATION AT PRESENT.

A. The Military Engineer Inspectorate.

The personnel of the Military Engineer Inspectorate of the General Staff consists of eight workers, including the Inspector General; his Assistants, Senior and Junior; the Adjutant and Clerks. Monthly expenses for its upkeep are fixed at 1700 Cantonese dollars.

The Inspector General has received his education in America; he is sufficiently educated and energetic. Of the workers four have completed their studies in the Engineer Class in the Military School at Paotingfu and one in the Engineer class in the Yunnan officers' School.

In connection with the new plan of the Inspectorate, which has been already approved and will be put into operation during February - April of the current year (1926), the personnel will be increased by one Assistant on technical matters and one draughtsman.

The projected budget of the Inspectorate for three months is fixed at 70.000 dollars, including considerable expenses for the inspection by engineers of roads and forts and for the Officers' Provisional Courses.

Recently the routine work of the Inspectorate consisted, in general outlines, of the following measures:

1. To work out, pass through the Military Council and promulgate the procedure and program of making inspections of engineer units.

2. To fix qualifications for responsible offices of engineers and the procedure of appointment to these offices.

3. To compile and publish (for the Army Corps' information) lists showing the condition, from the technical point of view, of railways, ~~earth~~ dirt roads, water-ways and transportation material.

4. To work out a program of military engineering for the "Whampoa" School and the organization of the Military Engineer Class.

5. To organize Military Engineer Conferences of Army Corps' representatives. The 1st Conference took place on March 2, 1926; its program, composition and its general character showed the absolute usefulness of such Conferences.

6. To work out the project of a "Three-Year Engineer School" (classes in the Central Military Political School).-

B. The Military Engineer Organization in an Army Corps.

In accordance with the standard scheme of organization, which is now being put into operation, an office of the Army Corps Engineer is to be established in each Army Corps. The Army Corps Engineer (holding the rank of Colonel) is directly subordinated to the Army Corps Commander and directs, from the technical point of view, the training and utilization of Divisional Sappers' Companies of the Army Corps. To the Army Corps Engineer are subordinated his Adjutant and Secretary. At the insistence of the Chinese, it is anticipated that during war times the apparatus of the Army Corps Engineer may be extended by the additional establishment of provisional organizations, in order to carry on special work.

Besides Divisional Sappers' Companies there are no other engineer units in the corps. To date only in the 2nd Army Corps (Hunanese) the Army Corps Engineer Officer is functioning in accordance with the tables of organization. According to informations given at the last Military Engineer Conference (held on March 2, 1926), an Army Corps Engineer was also appointed for the 5th Army Corps. But quite independently of the formal course of affairs, it can be foreseen that the establishment of the Army Corps Engineers will hardly prove to be successful owing to the lack of suitable candidates for these offices.-

C. The Military Engineer Organization in a Division.

In accordance with the tables of organization each Division must have a Divisional Engineer Sappers Company; the Commander of

this Company is the Divisional Engineer, holding the rank of major, and the Adviser of the Divisional Commander on matters pertaining to engineering.

The following organization is provided for the Divisional Sappers' Company.

1. the Company has three identical Engineer platoons (one platoon for each Regiment of the Division) and one Platoon of Engineer equipment (coolies in charge of the engineer equipment);

2. each platoon consists of two squads (during war-times there may be three of them); each squad numbers: two N.C.O.'s and thirteen privates (specialists: eight sappers, three for the construction of roads and bridges and two - for work in connection with blowing up);

3. coolies are enlisted during war times only, according as follows: for general economic needs 15, for the transportation of Company's equipment 20, and for the transportation of Divisional technical equipment 40; total - 75 coolies;

4. the numerical strength of a Company:

Officers (including subaltern officers)	11
Political staff	3
N.C.O.	29
Soldiers who serve in the front line	117
	160
Soldiers who do not serve in the front line	29
Total	189
Coolies	75;

5. the following supplies and equipment must be provided, in accordance with the standard scheme of organization:

a) compasses, field bags and binoculars - for the commanding officers;

b) portable entrenching and other tools, according to a special table - for noncommissioned officers and soldiers;

c) portable supplies of engineer equipment - in Company and Division depots;

6. it is provided that the officers and N.C.O.'s are to be armed with carbines and pistols.-

At the present time the (Divisional) military engineer organizations are in the following state:

the 1st Army Corps: a Divisional Sappers' Company has been organized in the 1st Division in accordance with the standard tables of organization; but in view of the shortage of engineer equipment, no Divisional Sappers' Companies will be formed in other Divisions of this Army Corps, until the required technical equipment is obtained;

the 2nd Army Corps: the former Army Corps Engineer Detachment is being reorganized, in accordance with the tables of organization, into Divisional Sappers' Companies. In order to procure for them the necessary technical personnel, officers have been selected from the school; they are now taking a special three months course of training. The equipment is poor; explosive (for blowing up purposes) and other materials are lacking.-

The 3rd Army Corps: has no military engineer organization and no engineer equipment;

The 4th Army Corps: there is an Engineer Company in the 10th Division only.

The 5th Army Corps: the Divisional organization, in accordance with the standard scheme, has not been started yet. A training engineer company is being organized: there are only three engineer officers and no engineer equipment.

The 6th Army Corps: being newly organized, this Army Corps has so far no engineer organization.-

D. The Engineer Class in the Central Military Political School.

A special Engineer Class is to be started in the Technical Section, as provided in the scheme of organization of the Central Military Political School, but so far the latter has not yet

[illegible]ded to its establishment. The duration of the course of studies is intended to be one year, but the possibility is provided, in case of necessity, to shorten this period of time and to graduate the class in 8 months' time. The organization of the Class is to be similar to that of an engineer company; the instructions are to be done in three parallel sections. The officer who is to take charge of this class has already been selected.

Recently the Military Engineer Inspectorate of the General Staff has worked out a project for the organization of a 3-year Engineer School (classes in the Central Military Political School), with the aim of training specialists for engineer troops, for troops of communication and for other special needs. This project is now being examined by the Chief of the General Staff.-

E. The Supplying of Engineer Equipment.

As has been already mentioned, the supplying of the engineer equipment is the most acute problem, which remains still unsolved.

The report concerning the necessity of acquiring the necessary engineer equipment was presented at the end of December, 1925, and it is expected that such an equipment will be sent from U.S.S.R.; only an insignificant part of the tools can be made locally or ordered from Shanghai.-

Conclusions:

1. The question of putting into operation in the National Revolutionary Army a military engineer organization on a scale required by existing conditions, has been finally moved from the dead-point, but the progress so far made, is not satisfactory.-

2. Under the existing conditions, when: a) the higher Chinese officers and commanders are unacquainted with military engineering, b) the engineer equipment is ~~absent~~ lacking c) engineer officers are lacking and d) the general reorganization of the National Revolutionary Army is still proceeding, - the putting of the military engineer organization into operation "from above" (i.e. the appointment of Army Corps and Divisional Engineers, however difficult it seems

to be) is to be considered the only proper direction of the work in this respect.-

3. It is absolutely necessary now to start the training of engineer officers not in short term courses, but in a special school (section), with a two to three years' duration of the course of instruction. This is difficult, but must be started right now.-

4. The question of preparing the military engineer organizations should be given the most serious attention, because if due attention is not paid now, it will doubtlessly create many difficulties in the near future.

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THE NATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: SHORT HISTORY OF ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION.

A short history of the origin of the National-Revolutionary Army must be outlined in order to give a clearer idea as to its present day state.

In the winter of 1923 only Dr. Sun Yat-sen's personal body guard (numbering about 150 - 200 bayonets) could be called a unit, which was entirely subordinated to Dr. Sun. The other numerous troops, which were then in the territory of Kwangtung and which constituted the so-called "Allied Army", were nothing else than quite independent armies of individual generals. These generals were, to a greater or lesser degree, subordinated to Dr. Sun. Some of them were Chinese militarists of the common type. Being expelled from their native provinces, they usually entered the territory of Kwangtung, the richest province in South China, in order to improve there their financial condition and then return to their own provinces. Owing to the growing popularity of Dr. Sun, they declared themselves as a matter of form to be his allies, supporters of the Revolution etc.; in fact, however, they were making plans for returning to their own provinces and even for overthrowing the Canton Government (after their own position has been strengthened) and of seizing Kwangtung.

Others were old "companions in arms" of Dr. Sun and actually shared his opinions and views; they went "arm in arm" with him, but still reserved a complete independence in matters of army administration and were also cherishing the hope of returning later to their own provinces and, after consolidating their position there, of forming an "Alliance of Southern Provinces", under the Kuomintang banner.

In addition the Kwangtung province was literally "inundated" by several "petty armies" of individual generals, who often had less than 100 soldiers under their command.

To the <u>first</u> category belonged the Yunnanese Army of General

Yang Sen-min, into which was incorporated as a separate unit the army of Gen. Fang Sen-sun, and the Kwangsi army of Lou Ch'en-wang.

To the second category belonged the Hunanese Army of Gen. T'an Yen-K'ai; the Honanese Army of General Fan Shi-ming; the Hunanese Army of Gen. Ch'eng Ch'ien (Ch'eng Chim) and the Gendarmerie of Gen. Wu T'i-hsing.

Quite apart from the above mentioned stood the Cantonese army of General Hsü Ch'ung-Chih. It alone represented the local Kwangtung Army and for that reason enjoyed among the local population a much greater popularity than the other armies. Its Commander Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih, after several conflicts with Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, finally joined him in March 1924. Being a clever and cunning militarist and taking into account the growth of the revolutionary movement in Kwangtung, he joined the Kuomintang party, and now makes speeches of revolutionary character, shows sympathy to Russian advisers, but actually is becoming more and more closely connected with compradore circles and right elements of the Kuomintang at Canton and is deriving from them direct advantages of material kind. He puts forward the slogan: "Canton for Cantonese", which means the expulsion from Kwangtung of all troops from alien provinces and the maintenance there of the Cantonese army only. This slogan of General Hsü Ch'ung-Chih was directed chiefly against the 1st Division of the Whampoa "Party Troops", which was just then being organized, because in this Division Gen. Hsü discerned already a force, which, in the course of time, might be moved by the Kuomintang Party even against himself. This slogan is also readily accepted by the merchant class of Kwangtung, because this class suffers material losses from the numerous armies, which are extorting taxes from the province.

Of the great number of "petty armies" the following may be regarded as being comparatively large: the Hupei, the Kiangsi, the Fukien and other armies. These armies, however, do not play

any part in the general course of events in Kwangtung and only serve their Generals as the means for deriving revenues.

All these "allies" are ruining the material well being of the Kwangtung province. Having divided the whole territory into regions, each army strives to get out of them as much as possible. The Generals themselves who were allied to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen after enrichment of their armies become gradually more independent and, after establishing civil authorities in the regions, which are directly subordinated to them, they gradually become actual masters of the province. In consequence of their predatory policy towards the population, the latter began to hate the army itself, as well as the Government and the Party, under the banner of which these armies were operating. Although the Generals from other provinces were formally Members of the Kuomintang, even holding responsible posts in this party (Yang Hsi-min belonged to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang and Lou Ch'ou-wang was candidate for membership in the Commission of Control attached to the Central Committee of the Kuomintang), they did nothing to enhance the authority of the Party in the eyes of the population; on the contrary, it seemed, as if they even encouraged arbitrary acts of their subordinates towards the local population. As has been already mentioned, this circumstance may be explained by the fact that the Generals themselves regarded their stay in the province, as temporary. They intended, after having derived from the Kwangtung province as much money as possible, to return to their native provinces, to drive away from there their militaristic rivals and to get hold of the post of Tuchün for themselves. The Kwangtung province was literally inundated by hundreds of small armies under independent Generals, who had been driven away from their native provinces, and who were draining of financial resources the regions in which they happened to be. Being financially independent, they were quite independent of the National-Revolutionary Government, although calling themselves allies of

the latter.

The Government, having no real force at its disposal, was compelled for the time being to sanction such acts of these depredators and thereby was compromising itself more and more in the eyes of merchants, as well as in the eyes of the peasantry and workmen. Grandually all classes of the population began to stand in opposition to the Government.

The aid given by the Government to the workmen of Hongkong and Canton, during the strike in the spring of 1922, and the Congress of the Kuomintang Party, which took place in January 1924, brought a change into the whole political situation in Kwangtung. It created a new grouping of forces, viz. a group of irreconcilables towards the Government of Dr. Sun, and also a group upon which the Government could rely at some future date.

Although the Government, by giving aid to the workmen during the Hongkong strike, did not set before itself the direct task of bringing the Kuomintang Party nearer to the toiling masses, nevertheless, the sympathies of the working classes of the Hongkong and Canton population towards the Kuomintang Party and the Government of Dr. Sun increased to a considerable degree; on the other hand, the aid given by Dr. Sun during this strike drove a wedge between the latter and imperialism, which became since that time irreconcilable towards the Canton Government. Simultaneously with the imperialists, the big merchants of the compradore class at Canton also began to stand in opposition to the Government, because the material prosperity of this class is based upon business connections with Hongkong.

The Congress of the Kuomintang Party (in January) completed the intended separation. The introduction of clearness into Dr. Sun's "three principles" made a breach in the ranks of the Kuomintang Party. The right elements, the merchants of the compradore class and large landowners, went over to the right wing and stood in open opposition to Dr. Sun, whereas the democratic

elements of the Kuomintang created the left wing. The Chinese Communist Party also joined the left wing.

As a result of further anti-imperialistic policy of Dr. Sun (support of the Hongkong seamen's strike, support of the Shamseen strike in 1924 etc.), the relations between Canton and Hongkong became more and more strained. On the other hand, the growing activity of the left wing of the Kuomintang among the democratic elements made the difference between the population in the city and the village more and more evident and drove the representatives of the big bourgeoisie and the landowners into the camp of those actively opposing the Government and its measures.

Hongkong gave active support to this opposition; it approved the strengthening of the merchants' volunteer corps ("Paper Tigers"), which opposed the Government. It gave support to Gen. Ch'en Chün-Ming in his operations against Government troops, when he strove to get hold of the eastern part of the Kwangtung. Hongkong also promised the generals from other provinces assistance in getting hold of their own provinces provided they would fight the Canton Government.

At that time the Government had almost no support in the Kwangtung province. Arbitrary and licentious acts, performed by the so-called "Government troops", undermined the authority of the Government even among those classes of the population, upon which the Government tried to rely.

As each of the Generals, who were on the territory of Kwangtung, was financially quite independent and kept his units with the money derived from the taxes, which he himself was collecting, he became, eo ipso, quite independent from the Government and the high Command. As to orders, issued by the Government, the troops executed them in cases only, when these orders coincided with the interests and wishes of the general concerned.

Each of these generals regarded his troops, as his own personal investment from which he derived his income; therefore, he

strove to pay as little as possible for the upkeep of his unit and at the same time to increase their numerical strength, in order to get hold of larger regions, where he could collect taxes.

All of the numerous "armies", which were stationed on the territory of the Kwangtung province, were kept according to their own budgets (or, which is more true, without any budgets at all) and had their own organizations. The quality of the officers personnel was extremely poor. The higher officers, the majority of whom had had no military training at all, were mostly ex-bandits. They took little interest in the condition of their units and took no direct part in the administration of the army. They did no work at all, but turned everything over to officers of middle or lower rank.

Officers of middle rank were usually engaged because they were friends or relatives of the senior commander; therefore, frequently they were of little use. The majority of them had some military education, but being left without any guidance from the senior officers, they soon deteriorated. There was also a considerable percentage of opiumsmokers among them.

The junior officers were in the majority of cases old soldiers, without any military education at all, who had obtained their commissions after long service in the ranks. The whole burden of the routine work in the units fell to their lot. They were charged with the entire responsibility of the training of soldiers and had to bear the whole burden of actual fighting.

As regards political convictions, the senior officers in command were members of the Kuomintang Party, but only in name; as for their real nature, however, they belonged to the usual type of Chinese militarists, who are always willing to ally themselves with those who can be useful to them in attaining their personal aims.- The majority of the officers of middle rank are non-party men; only the minority of them were touched by the revolutionary movement, but their number was very small, and, therefore,

they could not exercise any considerable influence upon the political condition of army units.- Almost all junior commanders are illiterate.

Taken as a whole the enlisted personnel was extremely poor, as regards quality. A large percentage consisted of soldiers, who had been in the service for ten or more years; there was also a large percentage of sick men and ex-bandits. As a kind of guarantee against possible mass desertions, the soldiers were enlisted mostly in the remote northern provinces. This circumstance, in connection with the great difference in the language of the local population (the Kwangtung dialect) and that of the population of neighbouring provinces, created a complete estrangement between the soldiers and the local population. This fact explains the hostile attitude of the local population towards the army and this feeling is still more aggravated by looting and marauding on the part of the soldiers.

The supplying of army units was carried on in a haphazard way. The commander of each separate unit, who was collecting taxes in the region, where his unit was quartered, regarded the money thus collected from the population as his own and tried to spend as little of it as possible for the maintenance of his "army", reserving the greater part of it for his personal use. As to the monies, allotted for the maintenance of army units, the General distributed them among his subordinated commanders, who in their turn, kept a considerable portion of them for themselves; in such a way only the minimum amount of what ~~is~~ was necessary for the maintenance of soldiers, reached the units. As a result, the soldiers have neither clothing nor footwear; their pay was not given them for years; soldiers provisions were being stolen from them; and the soldier lived, without being able to satisfy his hunger. There was no trace of any organ, which could control the expenditure of funds, allotted for the maintenance of army units. Everybody was stealing, beginning from the Commander of

the Army down to the Company Commander.

There were rifles of most various models and calibres, without any system of providing them with munitions. The Generals made purchases of cartridges from one of the Arsenals and distributed them among the units. No attempt was made to ascertain and to keep record of the exact amount of arms and cartridges available.

The training of soldiers, both for garrison and field service, ~~is~~ was extremely poor because the commanders themselves ~~are~~ were quite unprepared for this task.

As regards the garrison training, the principal attention was being paid to the showy side such as parades. The "goose step" was widely used in all the units. Notwithstanding the fact, however, that much time was used for close order drill, the soldiers could not even keep step.

It was even worse with the field service training which was limited to practicing deployment into skirmishes. When deployed in skirmishes, particular attention was paid to a "straight line" of skirmishes.

As almost no attention was being paid to the rifle practice in the armies, the soldiers did not know how to shoot.- The army units had no idea as to scouting and reconnaissance. There was no communication service in the units. Almost all armies were ignorant of engineering work.

The discipline among the commanders was very slack. It happened quite usually in the armies that the orders given were executed inexactly or not executed at all. There was, however, no punishment for disobedience or failure to carry out orders. With regard to soldiers, the so-called "cudgelling" discipline was in use. The soldier was not allowed to talk much and was beaten very often. His Commander acted quite arbitrarily towards him: At a whim of the commanding officer the soldier was often publicly shot, even for an insignificant offense.

The Staffs in the army units existed "on paper" only. There was never any question about regular staff-work.

On account of all above mentioned defects, the fighting value of the army was almost reduced to nothing. Had a really serious enemy force made an offensive move against Kwangtung, the armies would have been defeated and dispersed in a very short time. Therefore, even if all these armies actually had moved for the defense of the National Revolutionary Government, they could not have accomplished anything. The Government was fully conscious of such a state of affairs, but was powerless to act. Although, on paper, it had at its disposal an army, consisting of 150,000 soldiers, the Government could not carry out a single operation or a single measure, unless the general, commanding this or that army, was interested in it. In short, the Government in view of such a state of affairs was compelled to bring its decisions into accordance with the will of the "independent" Generals. A lot of energy and strength was wasted for diplomatic negotiations with them and persuasions. As a result, however, each of the generals, disregarding the Government's decisions, invariably stuck to his own line of conduct.

Before the beginning of each of the campaigns, which the National-Revolutionary Government had to undertake, the greatest effort usually was spent for persuasions and agitations, in order to induce the Generals to take part in the campaign. During campaigns the high command paid more attention to persuading and to keeping the "good will" of the Generals than to fighting the enemy.

Whenever the Government had to carry out measures contrary to the ideas of these Generals, it was in danger of being destroyed by them. The Government was more and more urgently confronted with the question of the reorganization (even though a partial one) of the troops of these generals, who were most devoted to Dr. Sun, in order to create an armed force, on which it could rely.

The first step in the direction of the army reorganization was the establishment of <u>the Military School of the Kuomintang</u>

(Whampoa), at the head of which was put Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih, who was entirely devoted to Dr. Sun. The mission of this School was the training for the army of junior officers, well educated in the political sense; these officers, being afterwards sent to the units of various generals, were to assist the "army reorganization from below"; on the other hand, should the Government have at its disposal financial means, these same officers were to serve as a cadre for the formation of new units, organized in accordance with new regulations.

This school was organized by us in 1924 and at first, it was maintained at our expense. By October 1924 about 1000 cadets were enrolled into this school. The work of the organization, as well as the instruction therein, was being carried on under the direct guidance of the Russian Instructors. The Political Section was organized in the School, in order to introduce the political work also, and the cadets took a lively part in the political life of the Kwangtung province. This School served as a model for various Schools attached to the armies of Generals from other provinces, and these latter introduced many analogous reforms, pertaining to the training for field service and for political work.

Afterwards at this School were organized the so-called "Party Troops". The history of these "Party Troops" is as follows. In January 1924, after the suppression of the revolt of "Paper-tigers", the Government was most urgently confronted with the question of creating a new, regularly organized and well - disciplined armed force. It was decided to form at first one regiment, and later a Division, which could serve as a basis for the formation of a new National Revolutionary Army and also as a model for those Generals, who would decide definitely to throw their lot in with the Revolutionary Government. Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih was charged with the formation of this division, and as a result of two months' work, towards the beginning of the Eastern

Campaign (Spring 1925), Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih succeeded in bringing to the front two regiments, well supplied, disciplined and so thoroughly trained in the political sense that they could hold firmly enough at the front and did not loot the population. During this campaign, their first one, the "Party Troops" became at once very popular with the local population.

The Cantonese army of Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih and the "Party Troops" acquired during this campaign the fame of being conquerors of Gen Ch'en Chiun-Ming. The National-Revolutionary Government, having become considerably stronger on account of the victories in the Eastern part of the province (Spring, 1925), at last felt itself to be in a strong enough position to enter upon the execution of first measures in connection with the reorganization of the "Allied Armies". It decided to give these armies a uniform organization; to create a supreme command for all armed forces, which were quartered on the territory of the Kwangtung province; to centralize the supplying etc. The final goal of the Government was the creation of a unified National Revolutionary Army.

But soon after first attempts at the reorganization the National Revolutionary Government met with a violent opposition on the part of the Generals, who considered these governmental measures as an attempt to do away with their privileges. This opposition took the form of an open revolt, against the Government, of the two "Allied" Generals Yang Hsi-Min and Lou Ch'ou-wang. In consequence, the Government had to put off for a while all measures of reorganization and to attend to the suppression of the revolt. Thanks to the unusual (in the Chinese troops) resoluteness, shown by the army units, which remained loyal to the Government, the latter succeeded in suppressing this revolt in a very short time.

This victory considerably increased the political power of the Government and afforded it the possibility to raise again

the question of army reorganization.

In the middle of June 1925 the preparatory work pertaining to the army reorganization was taken up again. At that time the Military Council, which has the functions of the supreme-command, was established, with a General Staff, which is directly subordinated to it. Then the first steps relating to the reorganization of the army itself were undertaken.

However, as soon as the reorganization of the army itself was started, the opposition of the Generals increased again. This time they found support in Hongkong and among the members of the right wing of the Kuomintang. By that time, a strike bearing an anti-imperialistic character was declared at Hongkong, and in order to aid the strikers several larger enterprises (such as the construction of a road to the port of Whampoa, the paving of streets, the plaiting of sandals for the army etc.) were undertaken at Canton;public "soup kitchens" were established, etc. All that affected Hongkong and provoked it to take some active measures. Influenced by Hongkong, the anti-government groups were encouraged. The assassination of Liao Chung-k'ai was one of the first acts of these groups; a series of terroristic acts, directed against the members of the Government and prominent members of the left Kuomintang, was to follow this assassination. A muting was instigated in some army units, which were to make a military coup d'état in the Kwangtung province. Also a serious anti-government movement was started in the Kwangtung University under the direction of the president of this University, Tsou Lu. Gen. Ch'en Chün-Ming, supported by Hongkong, again advanced against Canton from the East; and Canton was also threatened by the Szechuan General Hsiung Ke-wu from the North and by Generals Teng Pen-yin and Wei Pang-p'ing from the South. Simultaneously, Gen. Ch'en Chün-Ming made an attempt to blockade Canton with the aid of gunboats, which he had received from Gen. Wu P'ei-fu, and to advance against Canton from the direction of Hongkong.

The Government was again compelled to put off the question of army reorganization and to attend to the disarming of unreliable army units, the arrest of the leaders of the conspiracy etc. With the active support of the "Party Troops" (which, by that time developed into an Army Corps), the Government quickly carried through all these measures. The greater part of the Canton Army (although some units, which were to be disarmed, succeeded in escaping and going over to the side of Gen. Teng Pen-Yin) and several smaller army units were disarmed.

The following measures were taken with regard to external enemies: it was decided, firstly, to put down the rebellion of Gen. Ch'en Chün-ming, as the most serious enemy and the general most closely connected with Hongkong; in case of necessity,- to disarm Hsiung K'e Wu in the North; and, secondly, to suppress the rebellion of other enemies in the South.

Towards the beginning of these campaigns and after the disarmament of unreliable units, the Government, in spite of all the difficulties, succeeded, nevertheless, in forming several Army Corps out of the loyal units, and although these Army Corps were extremely heterogeneous, as regards the numerical strength, organization and armament, still, taking into consideration the conditions which prevailed at that time, their formation must be regarded as a considerable achievement.

By October 1925 the National Revolutionary Army had the following scheme of organization:

1. the 1st Army Corps "Whampoa"(formerly the "Party Troops");
2. the 2nd Army Corps - formerly the Hunanese Army of Gen. Yen-K'ai;
3. the 3rd Army Corps - formerly the Yünnanese detachment of Gen. Chu P'ei-teh;
4. the 4th Army Corps of Gen. Li Chi-Ch'en - the best units of the former Cantonese army;
5. the Separate Division of Gen. Wu T'i-ch'ien;
6. the Separate Division of Gen. Ch'eng Ch'ien;

7. the 2nd Canton Division - of the former Cantonese Army;

8. the Tanshui group - the Cantonese Detachment of Gen. Feng Chiu-p'ei;

9. several small units.

By that time the Military Council held its regular meetings and decided questions pertaining to the administration of troops, their supplies etc. The General Staff as well as the Political Directorate (PUR) began to function. But on account of the above mentioned external events, the further reorganization of army units was postponed, until the end of military operations on all the fronts.

At the first opportunity, however, the work of reorganizing the army units was resumed. After the suppression of the enemy in the east and the north and the first important successes in the south, the Government did not wait for the final suppression of the enemy in the South, but undertook the reorganization of those units, which had been released from the eastern front. Objective conditions favored this reorganization. Formerly the Government was so weak as to be compelled to bring its actions into accord with the will of individual Generals, but by the end of 1925, after the victory in the east, the situation was radically changed.

The victory on the eastern and southern fronts not only proved the strength of the Government to its open enemies, but also enhanced its authority in the eyes of the imperialists. Formerly they defamed in every way the National Revolutionary Army, but after its first victories the English press of Hongkong began to praise the merits of this army.

Owing to the attitude of the National Revolutionary Government towards the Hongkong strike, its popularity in the eyes of the population increased considerably. The Government came out as a protector of national interests and especially of the interests of striking workmen.

Owing to several measures, which the Government had put into

practice, such as putting in order of local government, struggle against abuses on the part of officials, struggle against looting on the part of the army, attempts to reduce taxes etc., the Government gained the confidence of some classes of the population.

By that time the Government became a force, which had to be taken into consideration. The consolidation of the finances of the province, which was also started at that time, gave the Government a real power and made it possible for the Government to assert its will.

The following measures, which were put into practice during the period from December 1925 to March 1926, were the most important:

1. In order to put an end to arbitrary actions on the part of Commanders, which prevailed in the army, and in order to take decisive action against the prevalent disregard of all laws a Military Tribunal was established which began to function at once.

2. The functions of the army administrative organs, of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, of the Military Council and of the General Staff were clearly defined and were put into practice.

3. In order to enhance the authority of the General Staff and its popularity with the army units and also to create a more close connection between the Staff and the army units, one of the influential Generals, the Commander of the 4th Army Corps Li Chi-ch'en, was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff.

4. The Commissions for the reorganization of the army finished their work in two Army Corps. The army units are now being reorganized in accordance with the new consolidated budget of the National Revolutionary Army. Several small detachments are being disarmed. The Commissions for the Army Reorganization continue to carry on their work in accordance with the plan outlined in

the special Instructions, which were approved by the Military Council(see: Annex).

Simultaneously the reorganization of Army Staffs is being carried on, and measures are taken to organise the work in them along regular lines. Blank forms used to ascertain the exact number of the personnel, arms and munitions have been prepared; and the work of checking up on the numerical strength of the army units has been started.

5. A new grouping of army units, undertaken in accordance with the proper distribution of the army, is now drawing to an end.

In order to raise the standard of the officers of the National Revolutionary Army, several measures have been carried out:

a) A consolidated Military Political School was established in the beginning of March and the Schools attached to various Army Corps are being gradually abolished,

b) Courses of instruction for officers have been organised in several army units, although not in all of them, on account of the lack of experienced instructors and Russian advisers, who are able to organize this work;

c) Publishing work has been undertaken; a great number of pamphlets, books, handbills and placards on military and political topics have been already issued;

d) An Army Daily Newspaper is being published and sent to various army units (about 18.000 copies).

6. In order to improve the quality of the enlisted men in the army, the following measures have been undertaken:

a) the work of clearing the enlisted personnel of bandits, opium smokers and old professional men is being carried on and is half finished now;

b) the preparation of programs and methods of training for garrison and field service and for rifle practice has been started.

7. The following results have been reached with reference to the question of improving the supplying of army units: the

Central Administration of Supplies has been definitely established, and the organization of local organs of supply and a system of accountability and control started. A fixed military budget has been prepared and put into effect; budgets for all army units have also been fixed. The work in the Arsenal has been put on a proper footing, and thereby the question of supplying the army with munitions has been solved.

8. The following results have been reached in regard to political work in the army:

a) Political Sections have been established and the system of Political Commissaries instituted in almost all army units;

b) Nuclei of the Kuomintang Party have been organized in almost all army units, and their work is being started;

c) Work of cultural and educational character is being started in all army units etc.-

I will not enumerate here in detail all achievements pertaining to the reorganization of the army, because these will be quite obvious, after the present day condition of the armed forces of the National Revolutionary Government has been reviewed.

It must be recognized that, with regard to the reorganization of the army, its centralization and closer connection with the Kuomintang Party, a great work has been accomplished, in spite of the limited financial resources of the Government and the great difficulties and obstacles, with which it was confronted, when carrying through even minor innovations.

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AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA.

(Extract from D. Posdneyeff's report: "Notes on Manchuria", July 12, 1926. Attached hereto a short biography of Prof. Posdneyeff.)

The United States of America are carrying on a policy in China which is quite distinct from that of other countries. First of all, Americans are silent and observe a certain correctness in their dealings. One may assume that the plans of the United States are very far reaching and comprehensive, and that they are being carried out on a corresponding scale. China is, without doubt, necessary to America; but the United States are not in a hurry to solve the Chinese problem. It may be that their hands are tied now with the mass of interests in Europe. Here, at any rate, the question relating to the Pacific problem has almost abated now. It is evident that only the Ministries at Washington are studying this question; as for the masses of the people, the Pacific problem so far does not interest them.

The present day American Policy in China consists chiefly in the diffusion of knowledge my means of educational institutions. The United States are intensely shaping the public opinion in China and proparing their own partisans. Several hundred Americanized Chinese students are leaving American Universities yearly. Besides, the Young Men Christian Association plays also a very prominent role. These young Christians are scattered everywhere. They apparently have no policy and are certainly not carrying on any propaganda. Their role bears exclusively an educational character. In every branch of this Association there is always an American Secretary, who directs all educational work. Enormous sums of money are spent for this purpose. Meetings, conferences are held; all branches are consolidated into a single organization and have common aims and tasks of an educational character. The United States of America are enjoying a great popularity in China. They do not play now any perceivable role in China, and they are silent. Actually, how-

ever, they are conducting a very deep and far reaching policy. Whereas the Chinese are feeling an ever increasing hatred towards Japan and England, their sympathies towards America, on the contrary, are developing and getting stronger. As History, in general (but particularly in China) is made not in a year, but requires tens, sometimes even hundreds, of years, the results of such a work on the part of America will tell in due course of time. A great deal of American money is spent for the work in China, not by the Government itself, but by those milliardaires, who spend their money everywhere, where that is necessary in their opinion for their personal interests or those of the state.

America's trade returns in China are increasing only slowly, but that is of no importance, because America does not need China at present, nor during the next few years, but in a more or less distant future. When America will need China, the latter will be at its disposal. In any case, American imports into China are increasing by 20.000.000 Gold dollars yearly.

America is taking some part in the disturbances of China. The United States are supporting the leaders of these disturbances in so far as they want it. It is rumored in Manchuria, that Gen. Feng Yü-hsiang has, without doubt, side by side with the Soviet cash box, also an American one, and not without reason it is said about the Christian General, that on one side of him stands an American pastor and on the other, a Red Army soldier. The support, given by Americans to Wu P'ei-fu, hardly leaves room for any doubt; it was said quite openly at Harbin that the Sino-American Bank of Commerce is Wu P'ei-fu's Bank, but this is, of course, a "dark question".-

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Prof. Dmitri Posdneyeff began his scientific career in the Petrograd University as a lecturer on history of the Far East (in 1897), but afterwards, together with other talented young scholars was transferred by the late Count Witte to the Ministry of Finance and took there a leading part in the compilation of the great work "Description of Manchuria" (in two volumes), based on the best Russian, foreign and native sources and on special investigations on the spot. During the Boxer uprising and for some time after that, he was at the head of the Peking Branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway Administration, and took part in the publication of "Yen Tu Pao" - a Chinese newspaper owned by Chinese Eastern Railway. For a short time he was director of the Institute of Oriental Languages at Vladivostok, but after some serious misunderstandings with the students, he was compelled to leave this post. During several years he represented the official Telegraph News Agency in Japan, where he learned the Japanese language and published a very useful (even for the students of present day Chinese) "Japanese-Russian Dictionary" (Tokio, 1908). After his return to Russia, he became professor of Japanese in the Petrograd University; since the Bolshevik Revolution, he ~~is~~ has been occupying the chair of modern history of the Far East in the same University, but chiefly he is busy with writing newspaper articles and pamphlets and giving popular lectures on political and economic questions concerning China. His last journey to China (summer 1926) had an official character and he undoubtedly had some secret mission. In his "Notes on Manchuria" he mentions that he was under close surveillance, when at Dairen, and that his baggage during his stay in the hotel was searched, but nothing was found, because all the important papers were entrusted by him to the custody of the Commercial Agency of the Chinese Eastern Railway. At the same time, with the aid of one Russian (Zaitzeff, employed by the Translation

Department of the South Manchuria Railway), he succeeded in stealing (in capital letters in the original) a valuable map of Mongolia, prepared by the Japanese. When passing through Tsinanfu on his way to Shanghai, he was arrested and detained for a short time by the Chinese authorities at the instigation of White Russians.-

We might refer to this report in our [illegible]
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W.D.

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Communism in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 21 1927

The evaluation of Report No. 7014 describing the raid on the Soviet Embassy on April 6, 1927, concluded with a request for a report covering the following points:

(a) Extent to which Communists control the Kuomintang.

(b) Extent to which Communism as a doctrine has been preached by the Kuomintang Party or by factions of the Party.

(c) Relative strengths of moderates and radicals in the Kuomintang.

(d) Amount of control over either or both groups of Kuomintang by the Soviet Government or the 3rd International. Probable duration of control.

(e) Probability of acceptance of or adherence to Communism by masses under Nationalist control.

The points enumerated might roughly be condensed into the following question:

To what extent and to what degree of permanency has the Soviet Government or the 3rd International succeeded in spreading its communistic doctrines among the Chinese people and impressing its political control over the Kuomintang Party?

Since the request for this information was formulated, many of the points have been touched on in the Comments. Also the huge Russian experiment in China has undergone such vicissitudes and modifications, thanks to fortunate publicity, that time has partially cleared some of the dubious points. One who has followed the steps in the decline and break-up of the Nationalist regime since the violent seizure of the British Concession in Hankow will have formed certain opinions of Soviet successes and failures which prior to February were not possible, in view of lack of precise information. In general, the disintegration of the Nationalist movement was predicted by all calm observers who held rational and experienced views regarding certain unchanging qualities of the Chinese people. Their assurance, however, was subject to moments of faint-heartedness as success after

From M/A, China Report No. 7107 August 14, 1927

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Communism in China.

success came to Nationalist arms. The Russians had entered the movement so covertly and yet so thoroughly that the Nationalist regime was energized beyond anything formerly seen in China. Experienced observers, who at that time were wholly unaware of the stupendous efforts being exerted by Soviet agencies, were frankly confused. Knowing the inherent weakness of the Chinese for accomplishing the cooperation and efficiency displayed in what for a time seemed an irresistible movement, the observers did not know how completely foreigners were the real force dissipating Chinese inertia. While the world heralded the regeneration of China, local observers were confounded but still insisted that the truths they knew of Chinese character were not to be discarded. They continued to feel sure in their hearts, even if they asserted it less boldly, that Nationalism was more form than substance, as are most social, political and military manifestations in China. So efficiently did the Russians conduct a military invasion, so expertly did they employ revolutionary tactics, so effectively did they blind the eyes of Chinese and foreigners to the actualities of the movement, that a certain degree of wavering on the part of close-up observers was inevitable. Considering the admirable propaganda campaign conducted by the Russian revolutionary psychologists, small wonder that people in America were fooled!

It was easier in November 1926, logically to predict possible Kuomintang accomplishments than it was in the trying spring days of this year. When one based his predictions on the ineptitude and weaknesses of the Chinese for political and military organization and development, which they for centuries have demonstrated, he was more accurate than when his ideas became confused by the emotional deceptions current at the time when the Nationalist movement loomed most formidable in that it was about to collapse.

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Without discussing the degree of disintegration which is so well known today one can now coolly return to fundamentals, accept the Chinese as they are instead of as we would have them be, and analyze the question of the extent of the Russian influences in China in the light of history and psychology as we believe it to affect Chinese action. Nobody can say who is and who is not a communist in China. Today one can make only the roughest estimate of military strengths of moderate or radical factions. It would be folly to state whether this afternoon Feng Yu-hsiang will see fit to lop off the heads of a dozen communists or declare that the first-born of all gentry not favoring communism will be thrown to the dogs. The same may be said of all leaders who have sacrificed their freedom of action by having permitted themselves to be the tools of Russian revolutionaries. We can with a great degree of certitude, however, state that any Chinese leader will be a pendulum and swing through a considerable arc from radicalism to extreme reaction as best suits his personal aims and interests at the moment. We can likewise state that any Chinese leader will humor the whims of the people or crush their fondest aims depending upon which course of action contributes to his strength at the time. He will be pro-foreign or anti-foreign as best adds to his prestige. Given reasonable time for necessary face-saving adjustments, any leader then will be pro-Russian and radical or anti-Russian and moderate if he believes that the maintenance of his position permitting him to exert arbitrary power so demands.

This point is important. No Chinese leader conceives it enviable to be a servant of a party, and much less of the "people". There are some Chinese who seek leadership for the purpose of amassing wealth but generally in China, as elsewhere, position is sought for the power it brings. There is this difference, however, that Chinese genuinely think of power and relish it only as exerted arbitrarily. It is this trait of Chinese character

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which perhaps more than any other foredooned the Russian experiment to failure, since the Soviet system is based on rigid party discipline and constant curtailment of the power of the individual. When Chiang Kai-shek attained military supremacy almost entirely due to Russian assistance and found himself a popular figure beyond anything he had ever dreamed, he began to comprehend that the system which elevated him was based upon a limitation of powers of the individual. From the time he first became aware of any limitation upon his exercise of arbitrary power, Chiang Kai-shek began to cover his connection with this foreign and un-Chinese political conception.

It is strongly felt that no understanding of probable developments in China is possible until one accepts the premise that Chinese nature has remained unchanged throughout the recent extraordinary events. Opportunism today among leaders of all groups is neither less potent nor less general than in pre-Nationalist days. Politicians and militarists do have to concern themselves more about the opinion of the people than formerly. The political faiths of leaders is no more of a fixed factor than was the allegiance of Tuchuns in 1922. While Nationalist leaders of whatever hue are toying with Russian terminology, employing foreign technique and enlisting new forces to accomplish their purposes, individualism and personal ambition are still the impelling motives in Chinese politics. A refusal to accept the premise that no abrupt regeneration has taken place in the Chinese nature closes all approaches to an understanding of what is occurring in China.

If this be true, certain traits of the Chinese may be listed which, if accurate, furnish a good index of the probable acceptance and retention of Russian ideas and influences over a long period of time. In addition to certain psychologic traits of the Chinese which are more or less permanent, there are some economic conceptions which may be expected to persist in the minds of the Chinese that will affect their susceptibility to Russian influences. Both internal and international political relations must be

considered. These three factors, namely, psychologic, economic and political, will be discussed in order.

Psychologic.

The Chinese in difficulty will accept aid from any source. Smothering their pride, if not conceit, to an extent which Western people would not consider, the Chinese place themselves in the hands of others until the crisis is passed and then set about to destroy the foreign influence inevitably set up. In destroying the influence, they have no delicacy in charging their benefactors with all the evils which exist. The quality of gratitude among Chinese is almost non-existent. The Russians are the most recent betes noirs and may be expected to be charged with the responsibility for whatever chaos exists.

The Chinese, as much as any other people, like to manage their own affairs in their own way. The Chinese way, in whatever activity we may consider, is the best way, demonstrable proofs to the contrary, and will ultimately persist. Individuals and groups momentarily will accept with enthusiasm a wholly foreign idea or method but the most inevitable reversion to the native conception shortly follows. This generalization holds as to foreign clothes, foreign education, strange political ideas, or the operation of a railway. The Russians brought efficiency into the Kuomintang Party, built up a remarkable fighting machine and governing group. The Chinese accepted it with profound admiration, and immediately set about to destroy the creature which after all was not Chinese.

The Chinese present a confusing melange of the practical and the visionary. They enjoy philosophizing more than doing. They all, especially the Southerners, enjoy toying with ideas. Since the height of enthusiasm for the educational advantages brought by Christian missionaries - novel Western ideas - which enthusiasm gradually has been subsiding, nothing so captivated the speculative Chinese intelligentsia as the utopian dreams so fanatically expounded by the new missionaries from Russia. The stolid

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northern Chinese neither understood the Russian theorists nor were able to dissociate their enthusiasm from a new Czarist scheme of expansion, of which they had experienced many. But socialistic theories captivated the Cantonese and the joys of playing with new ideas swept over the South in a way which dumbfounded Westerners. Christian missionaries found their ideas and their works old-fashioned. In spite of their sympathy for what they naively believed to be the results of their own altruistic efforts, they found their ideas gradually replaced with the newer ones and themselves classified as purveyors of bourgeoisie propaganda and agents of imperialistic designs. The Chinese practical sense was not offended by the Russian intrusion since Russian material assistance dizzily followed their theories. The Boxer indemnity was widely advertised as being deflected to the payment of long overdue salaries in the universities of the North; employment with good pay was given to the new-styled convert; war materials were available to those who were more aggressive by nature.

However, equally true of the Chinese is their enthusiasm for playing with new theories is their tendency to drop them when they are foreign to Chinese nature. Russian ideology, like a popular air, was overdone and is now clearly sickening to a large number of Chinese. This does not mean that the Russian imported ideas have run their full course, but there are many evidences that the intelligentsia who originally popularized them are weary of the dizzy sensations. Plainly, many influential Chinese are fed up with the senseless repetition of meaningless Russian patter.

The Chinese weakness for large-scale cooperation in any cause; their lack of genuine revolutionary spirit in which the individual sacrifices himself for the cause; an inordinate mutual suspicion and jealousy which exists among all classes of Chinese (no Chinese ever speaks approvingly of another unless his interest is tied up with the other or unless the subject has passed

into history); Chinese desire for arbitrary power but difficulty with which they submit to any form of discipline: these traits are well known and frequently have been mentioned by the Russians as obstacles to the accomplishment of their objectives.

Economic.

The Chinese are a nation of traders. All the Russian economic theories regarding the limitation of buying and selling among individuals are offensive to Chinese. If the criterion of the bourgeoisie mentality is the desire to benefit individually from personal efforts, no Chinese can be classed as a proletarian. The desire for private ownership is a pronounced trait. There are Chinese inordinately poor, there are oppressed classes, there are masses on the verge of starvation. These create undoubtedly a huge population ripe for discontent and violence, but these are not proletarians in the Russian sense and never will be. Chinese individuals in the oppressed masses do not by nature conceive of contributing the proceeds of their efforts to the community. Individual effort for personal gain in the long run will be the impelling motive for Chinese action. Hungry coolies have by their efforts risen to be tuchuns, and the generality of Chinese coolies would reserve the system whereby the lucky individuals might enjoy the selfish delights and benefits of a sudden rise to high position. Every number-one houseboy is a petty tyrant and every coolie who suffers under him longs only for the day when he too may be a tyrant. The elimination of tyrants is a fond desire of all Chinese but not the elimination of the system permitting tyrants. Chiang Kai-shek's misuse of power is typical of this trait. The civilian members of the Hankow Government whose careers run to the exerting of power over mild-natured militarists rather than commanding troops themselves, are no exception to this rule. Russian theories are incompatible with Chinese aspirations for individual power and gain.

The agrarian situation in China is not believed to be favorable to the Russian experiment. The Russian economists claim that in the South a great part of the land is held by large landholders. This is not true in the North, and has formerly been held untrue generally over China. The leaders in Hankow who at the moment are denouncing their erstwhile mentors state that China is a country of small landholders and has no agrarian problem crying for solution. This view is probably correct in spite of the widespread peasant brutalities in Hunan which the Russians pictured as a natural expression of the masses against exploitation. It is believed that the excesses in Hunan were the result of a relaxation of all authority which permitted the release of animal passions of very ignorant and incited masses and the free play of some of the Chinese natural traits mentioned above. Hunan is proof of the existence of the more unwholesome traits of the Chinese, traits incidentally incompatible with Communist theories, rather than of a genuine mass demand for needed agrarian reforms. The Hunan developments have damaged the Russian cause all over China.

In spite of the continuing slogans regarding imperialistic countries, there are growing evidences that the destruction of imperialist commerce has brought only hunger and suffering to some millions of people who benefitted from foreign trade. This effect cannot long be hidden from the more practical Chinese people and ultimately the blame for their distress will be shifted to the Russians and the Communist Party in China. This is now being widely done.

Political.

As mentioned before, the Soviet system of party government is based upon the dominance of a small group and implicit obedience of all the rest. The military leaders are nothing; the civilian bosses everything.

In China, power always has resided in the group which controls the troops. In crisis the power ultimately resides in the men who command the troops. Throughout Chinese history commanders of troops have become the emperors and them in turn have been at pains to poison their too successful subordinates in recognition of the principle that the strong man rules. The Chinese soldier will only temporarily subordinate himself to the civilian thinker and soldiers are not the type to accept the unnatural Communist theories of the supremacy of the weklings.

Assuming the Chinese are as subject to regeneration under Communist principles as other people, their inertia is tremendous. The enthusiasm in the South for radical changes was more superficial than it appeared. The great mass of population preferred to be left alone. The energy and perseverance in stirring the population and keeping it incited was a tribute more to Russian propaganda efficiency and fanaticism than an evidence of deep and widespread desire for revolution. The slightest relaxation on the part of propagandists always has been followed by a relapse of the people into apathy. Hunan was so thoroughly uprooted by the revolution that it may seem to be an exception to this statement. Russians got in their best work in Hunan.

In Russia, while the peasants hate bolshevism, they originally were won to the revolution by being given, or promised, the land to divide and the old landlords to tear to pieces. In China there is no land to divide and no royalty to be made the target of hatred. The militarists have been made the objects of attack, quite justly, but militarists offer no wealth or privileged position to be divided; they exist only by their own ability. Destroy the militarists of the North and so long as the Chinese remain as they are, militarists of the South will rise in their places. The Russians have failed to supplant military by civil authority supported by the masses.

The Chinese, unable to compete with the material development of the West, in their conceit fall back on criticism of western materialism as unworthy of a superior people. They are ever conscious of their weakness in this direction but cannot, as did the Japanese, overcome their ineptitude to develop material strength. They do suffer from an inferiority complex. When the more rational attention of the world was drawn to the magnitude of Russia's effort in the so-called Nationalist movement by the seizure of the British concessions and the succeeding violence along the Yangtze, fingers began to be pointed at the Nationalist movement. The disclosures resulting from the raid on the Soviet Embassy aroused further suspicion among Chinese and foreigners as to Russia's role. Russia, whose activities were receiving little attention and whose practices were being condemned by emotional societies all over the world, suddenly was thrown into the most unfavorable limelight. The isolation of Russia became more pronounced and many Chinese became aware they were dealing with the pariah nation of the world. Prominent Chinese are most sensitive to the opinion of the world. Here they were playing with a most unsavory nation, which nation had been "caught with the goods". These Russians too, as was proved by captured documents, had criticized the utter incompetence of the Chinese as roundly as had the die-hards of imperialist nations. Russia, even more than the erstwhile imperialist nations, demonstrated a genuine weakness in Chinese eyes for not punishing the rashness of the Fengtienites in their suppressive measures all over North China. Nobody can estimate the loss of face which Russia suffered in the spring days of 1927.

Japan had out-wested the West in her manifestations of sympathy for the Nationalist movement. The Japanese people assumed the attitude that even a critical analysis of the movement was unjust to the aspirations of the Chinese. Officials publicly declared their sympathy, and lost no opportunity to deny that the Russians were engaged in activities which

ultimately would be harmful to Japanese interests. The Russians fostered this idea in every way. Privately Japanese officials showed great suspicion and concern about Russia's part. By April of this year the Japanese ceased denying that Russian activities were a possible menace to them. The clash of interests could not be glossed over. A change of government occurred and Japan declared the strongest policy vis-a-vis China that any imperialist nation has dared. Today no Japanese influence is inactive in combatting the spread of communism in China and the continuance of Russian influence. Widespread Japanese influence throughout China will create many formidable obstacles to radicalism.

I have not mentioned any military factors which in themselves rarely are decisive in Chinese situations. The effective reactionary struggle being made by Chang Tso-lin perhaps has had only the effect of slowing up the Nationalist movement sufficiently to permit the natural Chinese forces, unfavorable to the spread of Russian ideas and the consummation of Russian policies, to operate. Chang Tso-lin still exists because he and his group are more genuinely Chinese than his enemies rather than because the Fengtien armies have effectively resisted a powerful Chinese movement. Chang Tso-lin has greatly contributed to the welfare of China and has been a most effective bar to communistic success by his bold measures in driving the powerful underground organization from cover, and exposing the whole Russian scheme.

Recent Developments.

Having gone to some length in trying to show theoretically that the huge Russian experiment promises to fail in creating its objective, namely, a socialistic revolution, when all Chinese tendencies strongly indicate reaction or, at most, a bourgeoisie revolution, very recent developments tend to prove the argument. What in brief has actually occurred is the North, while the whole undercurrent of opinion is antagonistic to suppression by militarists, remains so far as can be observed immune to the fundamental

communistic political ideas. The practical effects of the communistic efforts in the South have created considerable mistrust even of the Nationalist movement, and the Russians seem to be popularly accused of having destroyed the revolution, which was universally desired, even if not understood. All factions of the Kuomintang have now publicly denounced communists, suppressed radicalism and have made at least a start in expelling the Russians except the group surrounding Feng Yu-hsiang. His position is ambiguous, but at present he appears to be harboring the Russian emigres, to be clinging to communistic practices and still receiving Russian money and munitions. This last may explain his whole seeming pro-Russian attitude, for Feng has never manifested loyalty to man nor to a cause when his interests were slightly imperilled. If the Russians become a real stench in Chinese nostrils Feng may be expected to deal with them more brutally and arbitrarily than have the other factions.

Chiang Kai-shek in defense of his own action charged the communists with having destroyed the revolution, and proceeded consistently to hound the communists and to denounce those Russians who were not of remaining assistance to him. The Hankow group clung to the Chinese communists and their Russian advisers until very recently. They saw the Kuomintang Party breaking up and the military invasion of the North stopped. A victim had to be found. The denouncing of Chiang Kai-shek had gained them little. In fact it would seem that Chiang Ki-shek had gained more support by attacking communists than Hankow had by denouncing Chiang as the New Militarist. Politically and economically Hankow was visibly weakening. Subordinate military commanders saw the signs of a breakup. The victim had to be found and Hankow suddenly and belatedly discovered "proofs" that the Communists had played falsely by the Kuomintang Party, that by no degree of elasticity could the San Min Principles cover the wreckage of Hunan and the destruction

of all sources of income in the Yangtze Valley. It must have been the Communists. It was the Communists! Not only had the Communists been deceiving the Kuomintang Party and planning its destruction, but it was conveniently discovered (Northerners find documentary proofs more quickly than the Cantonese) that the Third International was actually a party to the scheme to supplant the Kuomintang by the Communists, who would be Chinese no longer but a creditable international, red organization. The Hankow leaders most suddenly found themselves in the hands of unsavory elements and declared against them. I believe Chinese opinion had already denounced communism in no uncertain terms, and Hankow could only follow popular opinion. With the exception of Eugene Chen all important Hankow leaders have taken pains to announce that the revolution has been delayed by false friends - and by innuendo by another group of foreigners.

The Russian organization, without whose directives the Communist Party of China will probably languish or undergo transformation to suit peculiar Chinese characteristics, has been recently disrupted, and the Russian personnel is either departing or finding unwelcome lodging places. The cleavage between the Kuomintang Party and the Communist Party of China today is definite. However, long after the last Russian adviser returns to the west, China will suffer from the unsound ideas which were implanted in Chinese minds with the most consummate revolutionary skill by sincere and energetic fanatics. The Chinese character has a high coefficient of absorption. It embalms moribund ideas like amber does flies and is loath to part from any functions, good or bad, however acquired. In consequence, some theories of radicalism, turned down upon first presentation by innate Chinese inertia, may on the other hand be expected to persist longer than elsewhere.

Conclusions.

Whereas I believe that all natural Chinese influences are operating to enclose the Communist nuclei as tissue surrounds foreign substance in the human body, the distribution and strength of Communist cells cannot

be fully known. Where the infection may spread or break out in violence can only be conjectured. How long Communist influence may work within the Kuomintang and among the people is highly speculative; however, the present tendency of the Chinese undoubtedly is to consider communism foreign and first to encage, then absorb it.

Meanwhile the length of time required and the degree of suffering to be borne by the Chinese people in the process of expelling Communist theories and Soviet influence WILL DEPEND MOST UPON THE UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE ASSUMED BY THE LARGER POWERS TOWARD THE ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS, which attitude rather than sentimentality will best assist the genuine Chinese in restoring normal conditions. Whereas the Russian onslaught is believed to have been doomed to failure, it is even now possible that a recrudescence of communist power accompanied by a reign of terror may arise before the inevitable and, historically speaking, early reaction sets in. The following facts must be considered:

(a) The Chinese leaders most under Russian influence are those who best have conducted propaganda to win American public opinion in their favor.

(b) Russian policy in the Far East depends upon the success of her establishing a revolutionary regime in China, a regime which is Communist and international. In spite of her partial defeats it is not to be expected that she will readily accept final defeat.

(c) A large and active Communist Party exists in China and the intimate relations between this Party and the 3rd International are only temporarily impaired by being forced underground.

(d) A policy of the Kuomintang Party declared by Dr. Sun of maintaining the most friendly and mutual relations with Soviet Russia

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CHINA (Political)

Subject: Communism in China.

has not been denounced by any of the Hankow leaders. On the contrary, several of the most prominent ones mentioned the advisability of maintaining close cooperation with Russia in their common revolutionary aims.

(c) Russian advisers in great numbers are still in China and their activities continue. Nobody can estimate the importance of the role being played in the Kuomintang reorganization now in progress by the hidden hand of the Chinese Communists, still under Russian direction.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff,
Military Attache.

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WAR DEPARTMENTS.

MILITARY TRANSPORTATION IN THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY ARMY.

The National-Revolutionary Army has no specially organized military transportation, therefore, there are no special departments or administrations in charge of questions relating to military transportation. The transportation of troops and individual military men and the shipping of military cargoes are handled by the Inspectorate of Communication attached to the General Staff. Prior to the creation of the National-Revolutionary Army and the establishment of the General Staff no attention was paid to the problem of transportation. The armies of individual militarists usually seized means of transportation, not asking any one's permission, and used them as long as they saw fit. After the creation of the unified National-Revolutionary Army, however, some attention began also to be paid to the problem of transportation.

A. Means of Communication.

The following are the principal means of communication in Kwangtung:

1. Railways:

a) Canton-Kowloon railway (to Hongkong); length: 112 miles;

b) Canton-Shaokwan railway; length: 139 miles;

c) Canton-Samshui railway; length: 32 miles;

d) Sunning railway (to Hongmoon); length: 63½ miles;

e) Swatow-Chaochoufu railway; length: 26½ miles.-

The rolling-stock of all these railways is insufficient; besides, these railways have no connecting lines and have had no repairs for a long time. They are in a most unsatisfactory state of repairs and to transport large bodies of troops on them is always a most difficult problem.

2. Waterways:

Waterways in the Kwangtung province consist of a river system, the traffic on which is carried by merchant ships belonging to privately owned Companies and, by war vessels of the Canton navy.-

B. Highways.

There are very few improved roads in Kwangtung; the majority are narrow roads, often only tracks or footpaths, along which only one man, rarely two abreast, can pass.-

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B. Regulations governing use of railways for the transportation of military units and supplies.

All the railways of Kwangtung are Government-owned; therefore, all troops and military supplies are transported free of charge.

There are special regulations governing the use of railways. No military unit has the right to use railway transportation independently and without control, but must observe these regulations.

Special warrants have been introduced in the army for the transportation of supplies; transportation of individual military men or groups, use of separate cars for men and other purposes etc. are regulated by special rules.

There are no railway troops, Railway transport officers, despatchers etc. on the railways; the work is all done by the administrative authorities of railways. The only exception is the appointment, by the Ministry of War, of military commandants for the more important stations; these commandants are selected for such appointments among the army units, which are operating in the region of those stations.-

C. Regulations governing the use of steamers for the transportation of troops and military supplies on rivers.

In the Kwantung province there are no government owned

steamship Companies; all the existing commercial Companies are privately owned; therefore, transportation of troops and military supplies must be paid for. With regard to the transportation of such cargoes, all privately owned steamship Companies are consolidated into one Steamship Union, with headquarters at Canton. When troops or supplies are to be transported, the army units concerned apply, through the Inspectorate of Communication, which is attached to the General Staff, to the office of this Steamship Union and obtain therefrom requisitions for steamers of the required tonnage. But as the payment charged for the transportation of military cargoes is lower in comparison with the payment for the transportation of privately owned cargoes, the shipowners do not put their steamers at the disposal of the Ministry of War willingly enough; therefore, the office of the Steamship Union usually distributes orders for steamers among all the steamship Companies by turns. As for the use of means of river transportation on the borders of the province, there are no exact regulations in this respect, and the solution of this question is wholly left to the discretion of the army units themselves, which are in need of transportation facilities.-

D. Transportation for army-units during campaigns.

Not a single unit of the National-Revolutionary Army during campaigns has animal or mechanical transportation. The reasons for the above are as follows:

a) the unfitness of roads for animal or mechanical transportation;

b) insufficient number of horses in the Kwangtung province.

Therefore army-units during campaigns transport all their supplies and equipment by coolies. The coolies are not part of the army but when their services are required they are hired among the peasants of those regions, through which the troops are passing. Coolies are usually hired for one march only, very seldom for two;

after the completion of these marches, they are discharged and new coolies are hired. This is done every few days throughout the whole campaign.

Officially, the hiring of coolies is done on the principle of their voluntary consent, but in case such volunteers are not forthcoming, their enlistment is done in a compulsory manner. Coolies are paid for their work 60 cents to 1 dollar, dependent upon the length of the march. For the transportation of specially valuable cargoes (staff documents, money etc.), permanent coolies are sometimes hired and paid about 20 dollars per month.

On the average, during the war, a regiment of the standard numerical strength (1500 to 1700 men) required 250 - 300 coolies for one march (provided the regiment had a certain supply of cartridges, rice etc.); a company usually required 6 - 8 coolies; an artillery - gun (mountain-gun) - 30 coolies.-

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AUG 24 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

THE TRAINING OF THE NATIONAL-REVOLUTIONARY ARMY FOR WAR.

The training of an army for war must be carried out in accordance with its armament and the armament of its probable enemy. The probable theatre of war must be also taken into consideration.

The National-Revolutionary army and its next adversaries are armed with magazine-rifles, a rather small quantity of machine-guns (6 - 10 to a regiment) and artillery guns (from 6 to 24 to a corps, mostly obsolete mountain-guns), very few and often rather useless technical communication equipment. Cavalry is completely absent. The number of other auxiliary and special troops is so insignificant that they are quite unimportant.

For this reason the training of the National-Revolutionary army must be conducted approximately according to the same standards as the training of the European armies before the Great War, adding to it the political instruction. In this stage it will probably have to remain for quite a long time, because while in the West the introduction of powerful technical equipment radically changed the tactics and conformably the training of the troops, in South-China the extensive use of technical means will be hindered, on one hand, by the lack of railways and the poverty of the government, and on the other hand by the special conditions in the theatre of war, by the absence of roads and by the fact that the regions are infested with bandits who make it impossible to supply the army regularly from the rear.

Though the training is done in a comparatively primitive manner the troops are even from this viewpoint by far not sufficiently prepared for war. The reason for it is the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of the old officers personnel and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior officers, who are graduates of the schools of the National-Revolutionary army. Besides, the drill regulations and the text-books on tactics which the army uses are extracts compiled from the

German and Japanese regulations which were used in those armies in the beginning of this century and which do not agree with the methods of modern warfare. There are, moreover, several kinds of military terminologies which the officers use indiscriminately; this also hinders much the training of the troops. It is therefore necessary to revise the old regulations (this work has already been started), to "jack" up the commanding officers and to make exercises more effective.

There is almost no military literature in China and the few books that exist are not used by the majority of the officers.

The training is being done in each corps separately. The General Staff, however, will soon issue a general training program. Each corps has now its own program, but it is carried out inconsistently and there are often no training schedules in the companies. The higher commanders pay little attention to the manner in which the training is done and the junior officers seldom account to their superiors for the work they are doing. This lack of control brings about an incomplete and irrational waste of time which should be used for instructions.

Considered from our standpoint the training is even below any criticism; but it must be considered that the training of the troops which the National-Revolutionary army had to fight, was, in the best case, the same or even worse. The same can be said of the probable next adversaries. But considering that the task of the National-Revolutionary army goes beyond the struggle with neighbours and that it will probably have to do with the better prepared armies of Central and North China, the training must be considerably improved, so much the more as under the present conditions (of which I shall speak further on) this is, if not quite, then at least to a great degree possible.

A critical examination of the training for war will doubtless show that many things must be improved and even changed altogether, but no conclusion should be drawn that the National-Revolutionary army is at present unfit for war (the preparedness of the "Whampoa"

units is a little better than that of the rest of the army).

The method of instruction is absolutely irrational. In the training program prepared by the Chinese too much time is given to drill. About 4½ hours daily are given to instruction in classes where besides the political instruction and the teaching of regulations too much time is spent on the theory of shooting and even of field service. This proves, firstly, that there is a tendency towards training for the parade-ground and, secondly, that the method of lecturing is quite irrationally applied to the illiterate Chinese soldier, instead of the method of practical instruction on the range and in the field. The exercises are carried out indolently according to the old established routine, without any interest on the part of the commanders and the soldiers, both of whom seem to be carrying out a boresome fatigue-duty. It is worth noting that very little attention is being paid by the commanders to faults and very little is being done to correct them, and that the critiques of tactical exercises, though being practised, bear the character of reports of the commanders and not of a discussion.

The present methods of training of the National-Revolutionary army, as far as its principal objects are concerned (political instruction, drill, shooting and athletics) is approximately as follows, being slightly better in the 1st corps.

1. Political instruction (see separate report).

2. <u>Drill</u>. In spite of the fact that much time is being spent on drill, it leaves much to be desired. Its chief defects are: the lack of soldierly bearing and of cleanliness, which also applies to the officers. The commands are not properly executed; after the execution of the command the men ~~are~~ continue moving. When a command is badly executed, the soldiers correct the defects themselves as much as they can. Stopping the drill after a badly executed command, in order to explain it and to have it repeated until it is properly done, is not sufficiently often done. The result is that the soldiers are not accustomed to pay attention

to the exercises and are learning very little by executing them. Such a manner of drilling fails also to accomplish one of the chief aims - the discipline in the ranks and discipline in general. As has been already mentioned, attention is chiefly paid to the showy side, i.e. to marching. The Chinese army marches in a particular manner which is something in between the German and the Japanese parade march, which at first sight looks rather ridiculous. But in spite of the passion for marching, the soldiers in closed ranks are marching badly, without keeping the direction and a straight line. The drill ground formations and marches are also executed badly and without "snap".

The rifle drill is not executed with precision. The manner in which the rifle is made ready for shooting shows lack of knowledge.

Deployment in skirmishes is effected in a routinary manner; intervals are not kept, adapting to the terrain is badly done and, which is very significant, the commanders only strive to keep as much as possible an ideal alignment.

It is necessary to issue a detailed drill schedule, separating the essential from the less important; to improve the bearing and to raise the discipline, by means of correcting the faults, and to obtain a precise execution of the commands by explaining how it should be done.

3. Shooting. The low standard of shooting is clearly shown by the paltry losses which are inflicted. For instance, in a 2 hours' battle in which 10 - 11 thousand cartridges were fired the casualties usually amounted to about 10 or 20 men or even less.

The knowledge of the rifle itself and the cleaning and keeping in order of it is almost satisfactory.

The handling of the rifles when getting ready for shooting is carried out in such a way that it is evident that the soldiers do not understand their proper manipulation. There are no dummy cartridges at all and the men are therefore not taught how to load and do not know how to handle the bolt. The soldiers are

also ignorant as to the proper use of the sight; They cannot estimate the distance to the target and are simply incapable of setting it off in metres (into which the sight is graduated).

Of all preparatory exercises for shooting only aiming from a sand-bay to a point on the controlling triangle is practised and not until lately have the Advisers introduced into some units aiming-stands and controlling mirrors.

The officers pay no attention to the manner in which the trigger is pulled and never control it. Therefore this essential condition of accurate shooting is lacking completely. In general the whole preparatory training for shooting is carried out without proper understanding, and the commanding officers do not recognise its importance. Thus the soldier comes to the range having had no training in all those essentials which would lead to good shooting.

The percentage of hits is very insignificant: at 100 meters 10% hit the target; at 70 meters - 50% are misses. This is partly explained also by the fact that the rifles are mostly in bad condition and have not been tested, so that even naturally good marksmen cannot hit the target. As for the testing of rifles the officers have no idea of it.

Lastly, the shooting exercises are carried out without any system. They are not divided into preparatory, training and combat exercises. The first exercise begins often from a distance of 300 metres and in general all exercises are quite useless. Combat firing is not practised at all.

Before regular shooting-exercises are started, it will be necessary to have the rifles tested. First precision must be attained in handling the rifle and systematic training with aiming stands must be practised. Then shooting must begin in the simplest manner and end in combat firing, at least in squads.

4. Training for field-service. Of all kinds of training the training for field-service is most neglected. It is useless and even impossible to dwell minutely in this report on all defects

of this most important branch of training. I shall speak only of the principal and most typical defects. One of the principal defects is the lack of reconnoitring. In the Chinese army the chief sources of information are the questioning of the local inhabitants and spying, which is also done through local inhabitants. The troops usually send out scouts only a few hundreds meters ahead. Therefore the commander is never exactly informed about the enemy. The communication between units, with neighboring organizations and headquarters is mostly done on foot and is carried out very inefficiently. The sending of written reports from small units to their regiments is almost not practised at all. Mutual support does not exist and moving in the direction where shots are fired, to assist a neighboring unit is never done. Owing to the lack of communications the control is generally wanting, especially in battles; it is done by signals. Probably owing to the lack of reconnaissance and to the fact that night marches are rarely made, outpost duty and advance guards on the march are done very poorly. The soldiers are badly prepared for the field service and do not know the duties relating to this service, as they are taught these duties in the class and very seldom in the field. The chief defect is that the soldiers do not know how to adapt themselves to the terrain. The targets and the necessary sight setting are not indicated exactly, if at all during battles and the commanders have no idea of fire control.

Tactical exercises are arranged unsatisfactorily and are carried out in a routinary manner. The problems have an occasional character and are not carefully prepared. They are carried out in the same routinary and careless manner. The mistakes are overlooked and the critiques are of a purely formal character.

The task of improving the training for war will be the most difficult one, for it will be necessary to replace some of the tactics to which the commanders are accustomed and to have them adopt modern tactics, which comform to modern warfare. It will

be necessary to issue new programs and instructions and to teach the officers to understand correctly and clearly the aims of different exercises and problems and to notice and correct all mistakes. Regular reconnoitring, keeping up communication, sending in of reports and controlling the battle and the fire will have to be introduced.

5. Athletics. Athletics are completely neglected in the Chinese army, although the soldiers are very clumsy (e.g. they do not know at all how to jump). Time allotted to Athletics is seldom to be found in the training schedules and there is only one instructor to a company. It is therefore natural that the movements are made drowsily and incorrectly, and as they are never corrected, they do not develop the muscles and the energy but rather weaken the latter. There is no athletic equipment and no facilities for field sports.

It is necessary to have the athletics before lunch and to divide them into callistenics, gymnastics on apparatus and field-sports. The simplest equipment ought to be procured and facilities for field sports arranged for this purpose.

Conclusion. The present sketch of the training of the National Revolutionary army shows that during the two years' work of the Group (South China Group of Soviet instructors) very little has been accomplished as regards the results which might be expected from the training. This is explained by the fact that the situation prevented the Advisers for a long time from taking up this problem, their attention being drawn to other matters. Only after the last eastern campaign it became possible to take this matter systematically in hand. At present the regulations are being revised and a plan of exercises with necessary instructions is almost completed.

This forms the basis of the further work of the Advisers in in the units.

It must be once more emphasised that in spite of thedefects

in training, the National-Revolutionary army is quite fit for war. As the standard of its possible adversaries is also rather low, each progress made will give it an advantage over the enemy. A maximum of attention must therefore be paid to this work. This work is great and minute and it requires constant watching of the units. It is therefore evident that <u>without having at least one Adviser to a division no substantial results can be expected from this work</u>.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 24
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHARACTERISTICS OF PROMINENT MEN OF THE KUOMINTANG.

(Translated from Soviet Reports, dated May. 1926.)

General Chiang K'ai-shih.

As a personality General Chiang K'ai-shih by his nature, is a self-conceited, self-loving, reserved and ambitious man, with some ideas of European progress who, however, did not altogether break away from his Chinese prejudices. With some knowledge of the General's character, by praising him in a delicate manner and speaking in correct form, much can be obtained from him; only one never must show one's self to be above or beneath him; one must be on the same level with him and never show that one wants to usurp even a particle of his power.

As an organizer, Gen. Chiang is an energetic executor of his plans. His sojourn at Moscow, his knowledge of the order of things in the Red Army and its leaders, has had a salutary effect upon him. In comparison with other officers, he consented more readily to the introduction of reforms in the School, both of military character and in connection with the political training of cadets. In his actions he tries to imitate the leaders of the Red Army. After his election to the membership of the Bureau of the Party, Gen. Chinag K'ai-shih began to take an active part in its meetings, which he attended together with his cadets and junior officers. At the meetings, in fact, he made it to be felt that he was the Principal of the School, but did not protest against the introduction of certain political measures in the School.

He was conscious of weak points inherent in the armies of feudal generals and the absence of a political basis in such armies and, therefore, he agreed to the organization of political sections and the introduction of political commissaries.

He considers the advisers who are attached to his military units as commissaries of a peculiar kind, whose function is to be an organ of control and to weld together the units which are in the process of formation. For that same reason probably he

lets the communists carry on their work and even assists them.

Notwithstanding the acute ambition of the reserved and honest man, who dreams of obtaining a prominent place on the stage of Chinese history, Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih still knows, how to curb his temper and how to feel the pulse of the masses.

As an active worker, he is hardly different from other Chinese military leaders of medium quality. As the overwhelming majority of them, he easily becomes enthusiastic and then, just as easily crest-fallen, not knowing how to take a middle course and lacking the necessary coolness and firmness of character. His timidity in making definite decisions in military operations can perhaps be explained by his fear of making fatal mistakes, which would cause his downfall, before he becomes powerful enough to afford making them. This circumstance compels him to be extremely cautious at present.

Other generals, subordinated to Chiang K'ai-shih, outwardly are friendly to each other, but in fact are hostile to each other and feel a peculiar antipathy towards him; on the other hand, in spite of the small numerical strength of his army, they stand in a kind of awe of him, because they see that the growth of the Whampoa (school and troops) is something entirely different from their own former growth or that of their rivals, and that some other force, incomprehensible to them, is growing here on some other foundations. It is difficult to foretell, whether Chinag K'ai-shih will turn an ordinary Tuchün and cease playing with left principles, or if he will go farther in the same direction.

As a military leader, General Chiang K'ai-shih holds the post of the Commander of the 1st Army Corps. He is more closely connected with us than all other military leaders. He is studying Napoleon (in Japanese, as he does not know any other language). He has received his military instruction in Japan. He is a native of Chekiang, and formerly there were suspicions

that he was always "drifting" in that direction.

When Gen. Hsü Ch'ung-chih was holding the post of the Commander-in-Chief, General Chiang K'ai-shih did not display any special understanding of political problems, but now, when he had actually to occupy the first place, he is already rising above the narrow views of an Army Corps Commander up to the understanding of army problems. After the capture of Waichow, he sent a telegram to the Government, mentioning therein his own merits in connection with the constructive work of military character in Kwangtung, but stating, at the same time, that he was afraid of becoming an ordinary militarist and requested, therefore, to be relieved him of military work. But when it was explained to him that he could not become a militarist, because he had no army and that his Army Corps consisted not of his own troops, but of the Party Troops, he stuck to this idea and put it forward in his speeches. He is quick in taking decisions, but often takes them rashly enough and then has to change them; he is stubborn and likes to have ~~it~~ his own way, against everybody's will. He enjoys prestige in the army and is a strict disciplinarian when on duty, but knows how to establish friendly relations with the officers in command when off duty.

General Chiang K'ai-shih holds in addition the posts of the Inspector General of the National-Revolutionary Army and of the Chief Director of the Military Academy (Whampoa School). He is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang. He was one of the first Chinese Generals, who started to work seriously with the U.S.S.R. He knows how to choose people who show him absolute obedience. He readily agrees to innovations when convinced of their necessity.-

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Wang Ching-wei: President of the National Government, President of the Military Council, President of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang, Chief of the Section of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, etc. - An old revolutionary. During the Imperial period he participated in the revolutionary movement, also took part in the attempt on the Emperor's (Prince Regent's) life; he himself threw the bomb.- He was very intimate with Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and during the last two years has been his right hand man. He is author of many resolutions and declarations of the Kuomintang.- He is one of the most popular men in the Kuomintang and enjoys much prestige among the members of the Party, although he is charged by the right elements with having sold himself to the Russians.- His relations with the Russians are good, and he follows their advices.- He is an ambitious man, capable of resolute and energetic actions, when he is certain of having behind him power and support.-

Ch'en Kung-po: Chief of the Political Directorate of the National-Revolutionary Army; candidate for membership of the Political Bureau of the Kuomintang; concurrently holds several other posts

A former communist; left the Communist Party on his own initiative for reasons unknown; has some tendency for anarchism and does not like to obey orders given by his superiors.

He has received his education in England and is a well-instructed and well-developed man, especially as regards politics; in this last respect he is one of the foremost men in the South.

Formerly he has been doing little work in PUR, because he was concurrently holding many other posts, but recently he has been relieved of some of his duties and, therefore, is now devoting more time and attention to his work in PUR.-

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He Ying-chin: Commander of the 1st Army Corps; has been working in the Whampoa troops since their formation: at first, in the School, then as Regimental and Divisional Commander, now as Army Corps Commander. He is very devoted to Gen. Chiang K'ai-shih and, without the latter's knowledge, does not undertake anything.- He has received his military instruction in a Japanese school; has limited capacity, but is working very hard. As commander, he is good enough, but being young (in 8 months' time he was twice promoted from the post of Regimental Commader to be Divisional and then Army Corps Commander), he does not enjoy much presige among the higher officers, with the exception of the 1st Division, which he formerly commanded.

He is devoted to the revolutionary cause; he is working in complete agreement with Russian advisers and is following their advices.

Ch'en Ming-shai Commander of the 10th Division; his native place is in the region (of the Kwangtung province), in which his division is now quartered.- He has received his military instruction in the Military School at Paotingfu.- He was Regimental Commander in the army of Gen. Chen Chun-ming; after the latter had left the Kuomintang party, he severed relations with him and withdrew from military affairs, but later on came over to the side of the Government.- He is an energetic and ambitious man. He belongs to the extreme left elements, and is almost a communist. At all meetings he makes speeches about the U.S.S.R. and the Kuomintang, about party-discipline and military discipline. Externally he is well-disciplined. He maintains friendly relations with communists and powerful persons. He is clever, reserved by character and well-developed in the political sense. He is a good organizer and easily consents to all kind of innovations, being very persevering in the study of new materials.- He likes to surround himself with relatives and acquaintances,

considers himself to be a superior authority and behaves accordingly. He is one of the best fighting generals.-

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Biography of General T'ang Sheng Chi.

T'ang Sheng-Chih was born in 1891 in the District City of Tung-an, Hunan province. His father was an influential personage during the reign of the Manchu Dynasty and held several times the post of Taotai.

After receiving education at home, T'ang Sheng-chih completed the course of studies in the Military Academy at Paoting and then entered the military service in Hunan, where he was soon promoted to the rank of Colonel, due to the influence of his former private tutor Sui San-hsi, who was a very popular personage. During the 2nd year of the Chinese Republic, he held a prominent post in Ch'ang-sha, the capital of the Hunan province. T'ang was permanently stationed with his troops at Ch'ang-te, but in 1921 he was defeated and driven away from there. Having moved to Heng-chou, he gradually became more powerful and obtained great influence. Having concluded an alliance with Chao Heng-t'i, he aided him during the "coup", and was promoted to the rank of General. In 1924 the relations between T'ang and Chao became strained on account of money matters, because Chao ordered his Generals to remit the moneys, collected by them in different Districts in which their troops were stationed, into the Provincial Treasury. This measure led, in the course of time, to a conflict which ended in the downfall of Chao Heng-ti. T'ang Sheng-chih was very popular in Heng-chou and the population liked him, especially because he did not allow his soldiers to molest them. Politically T'ang is an adherent of Gen. T'an Yen-k'ai, Commander of the 2nd Army Corps of the National-Revolutionary Army. Recently T'ang Sheng-chih became a fanatic (T'ang is a fervent Buddhist) in religious matters, owing to the influence exerted upon him by

Kuo Sou-ch'eng. T'ang is a good military man. When he was in charge of military affairs in Ch'ang-sha, the population spoke in praise of him; when, however, the new Regulations relating to Chinese Customs were put into effect (the twofold increase of Customs duties), the merchants and petty tradesmen became very dissatisfied. T'ang's soldiers are behaving very well. They do not wander about the city and games of chance and opium-smoking are severely persecuted. T'ang Sheng-chih is very much liked by his soldiers (it must be mentioned that the majority of his soldiers are very young: 14 - 18 years old).

Last year a secret agreement was concluded between T'ang Sheng-chih and Fang Pen-jen about going to the aid of T'an Yen k'ai. When T'ang Sheng-chih occupied Ch'ang-sha, he at first fell under the influence of the Reactionary "Cheng-hsüeh" Party (officers, officials), who tried to persuade him to join hands with Wu Pei-fu. But after the arrival at Ch'ang-sha of representatives from Canton and Kwangsi, T'ang Sheng-chih changed his line of conduct, left the "Cheng-hsüeh" Party and declared that he wanted to be a friend of the Kuomintang Party and would not persecute any political movement, provided it did not take a too radical character. He requires, however, registration of all Unions and political Organizations.-

(Note: General T'ang Sheng-chih was Commander of the IV Hunan Division and in autumn 1926 he became Commander of the 8th Army Corps of the National-Revolutionary Army. In the spring of 1927 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Wu-Han Government.)-

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 24 1927
2659-9-28
WAR DEPARTMENT

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SHANSI ARMY.

Characteristics of the officers Personnel.

(From Russian sources, July 1926).

None of the officers of the Shansi Army has any fighting experience. Usually they strive only after pecuniary advantages. They have no knowledge of Army administration and, if placed in a difficult situation, will not be able to keep their ground for a long time. Their usual tactical training consists in the study of the defensive tactics; therefore, they have not developed an offensive spirit. It is doubtful, whether the officers, who insisted upon the war against the Kuominchün Armies, were stimulated by Yen Hsi-shan; in fact, only those elements insisted upon the war who wanted to upset the political situation and for whom therefore victory or defeat were likewise of advantage.-

Cliques in the Higher Command.

Groups in the Higher Command in Shansi are very intricate and various. Generally speaking, however, they can be roughly divided into natives of other provinces and natives of Shansi.

Among the natives of other provinces the following are the leaders: 1) K'ung Fan-wei, 2) Shang Chen and 3) Feng Yü-peng. General Yen Hsi-shan retains the services of these three men not because they have ability, but on account of quite different considerations.-

1) K'ung Fan-wei (Lieutenant General, Divisional Commander and Adviser to the Tupan) is a native of Shantung and a schoolmate of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan (both are graduates of the Japanese school for Military officers). His uncle - K'ung Ch'ing-t'ang - is a sworn brother of Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Ch'i-jui. Therefore, owing to these family connections, he manages all affairs of Yen Hsi-shan. K'ung Fan-~~shin~~ wei is of a mild disposition by character and has no ability; and Yen Hsi-shan likes to urge him on.-

2) Shang chen was made a General, after he had gone over to Yen Hsi-shan from Shensi, but the troops, which came with him, were gradually disbanded and, finally, he had only a Brigade staff left. In 1924 he was promoted to be a Divisional Commander, but had no real authority. He had nothing to do, but to be outwardly loyal; in fact, however, he is always planning some secret schemes. When, during this (1926) year, he had gone with his troops to the province of Chihli to fight against the Kuominchün Armies, he decided not to return to Shansi. However, he was not able to put his plan into execution, for want of a suitable place, where he could hold on. He is a man of expediency and his aim is to upset the present "status quo" in Shansi: victory or defeat do not make any difference for him.-

3) Feng Yü-peng is a native of Kirin province. Formerly he was a man in the confidence of Ch'üan Yung; when the Government appointed Chang Tso-lin to the post of "T'ung-ling" (Commander of Armed Forces), Feng was employed by the latter as an orderly officer. Gen. Yen Hsi-shan for a long time had the intention to get rid of Fen Yü-peng, but on account of his relations with Ch'üan Yung could not make up his mind to take such a measure, being afraid of provoking the resentment of Chang Tso-lin. As a man, Feng Yü-peng is most obstinate and disobedient. Gen. Yen Hsi-shan dismissed him several times and then reinstated him again.-

The local leaders (natives of Shansi) belong to two parties: 1) the old Party, having at its head Chang P'ei-Mei, and 2) the Party of Progressives with Yang Ai-yüan and Jung Hung-Lu as leaders.

1) Chang Pei-Mei (Lieut. General, Defense Commissioner of the Southern Shansi) is a man of capricious and violent character, and although all the other leaders are afraid of him, nobody wants to submit to his rule. Besides, having put to death two

years ago arbitrarily two generals who were devoted to Yen Hsi-shan, his relations with the Tupan are daily becoming more and more strained: Gen. Yen's fear of an internal coup d'etat is the only reason, why so far no open rupture between them has taken place. The troops, which are subordinated to Chang P'ei-~~jung~~ mei are the brigades of Hsieh Lin and Fu Ts'un-huai and his own 7th Brigade. These units are not good enough to fight successfully against the Kuominchün Armies.-

2) Yang Ai-Yüan is a relative of Gen. Yen Hsi-shan and belongs to the Progressive Party. At first he was Regimental Commander, subordinated to Gen. Shang Chen; then he was promoted to be a Brigade Commander; now he is in command of the 2nd Division. By nature, he is a proud and violent man who has big plans but little ability.

Each of the above-mentioned generals strives to cause the others to be dismissed, in order to derive personal advantages from it. This year Yang Ai-Yüan especially insisted upon the war (against the Kuominchün Armies), because he wanted to extend his influence and increase his power.

Generals Fu Ts'un-huai and Feng Yü-hsi (Divisional Commanders), Jung Hung-Lu, Li Te-mao, Lu Tu-pao and others (Brigade Commanders) do not think of anything but promotion to a higher rank.-

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Aviation
By [illegible] Shenko
(Canton, 12 XI 1926).

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MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 24 1927
2657-9-28/110
WAR DEPARTMENT

REPORT

(BUREAU OF AVIATION).

The following report gives a description of the conditions of the Bureau for Aviation for the period September 15th - October 15th of the current year (1926).

Since the Field Department of the Air-service has gone to the front, the Bureau of Aviation is organized as follows:

a) Military Department;

b) Secretariat;

c) Sub-section for translations;

d) Military supplies (technical supplies);

e) Section for economic affairs;

f) School of aviation;

g) Repair shops for aviation;

h) Section of aviation;

i) Civil Department (at present the Society of Friends of Aviation).

The Bureau of Aviation, the school of aviation and the workshops, as regards their structure, are far from representing a congruous system or a regular organisation which fulfills some definite function. Everything is somehow patched up and the work of the sections or officials is not clearly defined. The Bureau of Aviation is divided into sub-sections and sections some of which are not needed and others ought to be attached to the 1st section, while the school of aviation is only a bunch of men of all ranks. The same may be said of the workshops. For instance, even the workmen are not divided according to their special abilities into general sections, not to speak of special sections.

Since the departure to the front of the Field-Section under the Chief of the Air force, Lan Hwei-hsing, the Bureau of Aviation has the following structure and personnel:

The Bureau.

a) The Military Department:

The Chief of the Department Chang Ch'ung-yen (Colonel), who is also acting chief of the Air-force;

The Secretary Wu-Yang ko-tsan (captain);

1 copyist.

b) <u>The Section of translations</u>:

The Chief of the Section Ma Ming Fan (Lieutenant Colonel),

3 translators (Captains).

c) <u>The Section of Military Supplies</u> (Technical Section)

1 Chief of the Section Lien Hsing-t'an (Lieut. Colonel)

1 Secretary Lien Chi-ts'an (Lieutenant)

1 Copyist

d) <u>The Section for Economic Affairs</u>.

1 Chief of the Section T'ang Ch'ung San (Major)

1 Chief of the Accounting Sub-section Hsieh Wen-ch'ang (Captain)

1 Physician Kwo Hsin-ch'ang (Captain)

1 Translator, Chinese-Russian, Fan Mo-yi (Lieut. Colonel)

1 Translator, Chinese-English, Hsieh Ts'ui-ch'eng (Lieut. Colonel)

1 Cashier

2 Messengers

10 Soldiers-workmen

1 Cook.

The period from March 20th to July 20th must be considered as the most difficult time of this year, because the inner frictions and groupings that were then taking place had a very bad effect on the whole mass and on the work in the Aviation.

During the period of the directorship of Lan Hwei Hsing, i.e. since July 20th, this discord has partly abated and had the character of latent inner dissensions and struggle. These dissensions must be taken into consideration. Some interference in the administrative affairs on the part of the former Chief of the Aviation, now Commissar for Aviation, General Chang Hsing-Yi, shows that the struggle has not yet stopped.

There were no strong sallies on the part of the Chief of the school Wang Ping Kung, because at that time the Russian aeroplanes had arrived and the whole Russian personnel was put to work, and Wang P'ing Kung, by his acts and tactlessness had fallen into disgrace with the Commander in Chief Ch'iang-Kai-Shih and was compelled to keep in the background.

Thus at present the inner dissensions seem not to be of an acute character. The reason for this is that the principal and more active mass of the aviation workers have gone to the front.

The latent dissensions among the Chinese workers still exist, but since the Chief of Aviation has returned from the front they have manifested themselves as follows:

The school had two Curtis planes and one Avro in good order. 8 aviation students were left in the school; the other students and the students for aerial observation were sent to the front. 8 aviators are also on duty at the front working with de Havilands which are piloted by Russian aviators. The Chinese aviators do not fly because of the lack of aeroplanes and because they are not well enough instructed to be able to handle modern battle-planes. Besides the whole staff of Chinese aviators is scattered over the whole front, at about 5 places. Under the pretext of having the Chinese aviators trained at the front, the Chief of Aviation took from the school 1Avro-plane and 1 Curtis and sent, them to the front taken to pieces. The school remains now with one Curtis plane, and the scheduled flights of students which they are to do alone have been postponed for a long time. If he were not fighting against the Chief of the school, he would certainly not have disturbed so headlessly and roughly the work of the school, so much the more as all students have had flights of up to 15 hours with the instructor and are prepared to fly alone. He says that his actions have been approved by the Commander in Chief, Ch'iang-Kai-Shih, whose support he has secured, and he referred to it when I explained to him the harmfulness from the standpoint of the school-work. In disturbing

the work of the school he delays its development and does not obtain the necessary results at the front, because the training at the front will hardly be possible, as the aviators are scattered over the front, and the intended sending of the best of them to the U.S.S.R. would leave the planes lying idle. He pursues his ambitious aims and injures the work and does it knowingly, because he agreed with me as to the uselessness of sending the two planes to the front, but he pretends that he has been ordered by the Commander in Chief to do it. Such manifestations of the struggle are exceedingly harmful; because for the sake of personal interests those of the Government are being sacrified, but this may happen also in the future. It is necessary to take in time the necessary measures to forestall this evil. At present the relations are only latent and preparations are being made, but doubtless Lan Hwei-hsing, Chang Hsiung-Yi and Wang P'ing-Kung are three thoroughly hostile camps in the Avaition. With the support of Chiang-Kai-Shih, Wang P'ing-Kung can easily overthrow Lan, because the whole staff of aviators may side with him. Chang Hsiung Yi being at the front and getting thoroughly acquainted with the work of the Air-service will have a great advantage over the other two, owing to his active nature, his cleverness and his political preparedness. Manifestations of this struggle are the more possible as the vacillating policy of Lan Hwei-hsing has not made him popular with the Commander in Chief and the generals.

The work accomplished by the Bureau of Aviation during the said period is insignificant on account of the following reasons:

The acting Chief of Aviation, Chang Ch'ung-Yen, is a novice in aviation. He has no experience in administrative matters, is rather inactive, lacks initiative and has no authority over his co-workers. But Lan Hwei-hsing may be considered as a devoted man. His political credo is not clearly defined; he is a member of the Kuomintang.

I deem it necessary to dwell more minutely on the institution of the <u>Commission for the planning of the organisation</u>, whose func-

tions I consider to be very important, because the rather complicated questions must be thoroughly discussed and require a great deal of initiative on the part of the chiefs of the different sections of Aviation. I succeeded in forming such a Commission which consists of the acting Chief of Aviation, the Chief of the school, the Commissar, the Chief of the workshops and the Chief of the Section of Supplies. The first question solved by the Commission was the working out of a general plan for the creation of an air-force. This work has somewhat stirred up the sleepy heads and some of the details of the plan were rather hotly discussed. The reasons which brought about the creation of the Commission and the working out of the plan are as follows:

1) Ready made plans are usually badly understood and adopted by the Chinese;

2) It is desirable to develop initiative in the Chinese, at least to a certain degree.

3) It is necessary to make the plan conform to the conditions in China;

4) By means of a plan it is possible to avoid confusion and unforeseen incidents, which often happen in China to the prejudice of the work.

The chief idea of the plan is to have an equilibrium established among all sections, for instance, to have the question of purchase of planes coordinated with that of the number of aviators and other specialists; to bring up the problems of repairs and of the aeroplane-industry and to adjust it to the modern requirements, to the state of the (Chinese) aviation and to the financial possibilities; to connect the question of training with the requirements of the military aviation according to the gradual development of the latter. A very difficult question is the one of the staff of aviators, and in this respect the question of instructing and training deserves special attention. In order that the air-service with its poorly trained and inexperienced staff might be able to cope with the problems which will arise

when the next shipment of planes arrives, the whole plan has been divided into periods. Another very difficult and important question is the financial part of the plan. The budget provides only the necessary amounts for the purchase of planes and materials; as for other expenses, such as the pay of the staff, subsistence and other current expenses, they are defrayed from sums paid out monthly according to estimates and in conformity with the requirements and the size of the air service.

In view of the small size of the air service it is stated in the plan that ordnance material will be supplied through the Ordnance Department into the budget of which they are included.

The sum of $2,000,000 provided in the plan is a minimum, in order to avoid dissensions among the Chinese as to the question of markets, because it can be seriously feared that foreign firms will come forward. The Chinese are also anxious about the time of delivery and about the transportation.

There are some very complicated questions in connection with the organisation of the aviation, such as: the question of instruction, the additional Russian specialists, the orders to factories, the purchase of aeroplanes for different purposes, the purchase of books, stationery and equipment; the purchase of various building materials, the amount and time of credit. All these questions are connected with Moscow and it is easier to settle them in Moscow, leaving the whole work and the responsibility to the Chinese. To this end it is intended to create a Chinese purchasing commission which will go to Moscow and will carry out the whole work under the supervision of a Russian adviser. The sending of the Commission will afford the possibility of having the orders given to Russian aeroplane factories, thereby avoiding the competition of foreign firms.

The Commission will also settle the question of instructions, because the sending of different specialists to Russia is unavoidable. The sending of Chinese to Russian schools is necessary for us because we thereby educate sound cadres of future workers and

of adherents to our cause.

I have already mentioned that there is an apprehension that foreign firms might penetrate. A few days ago I was informed that the agent of an American firm had offered aeroplanes for sale at very advantageous conditions. I sent a detailed report on this matter to the Chief of the South-China Group.

According to some unconfirmed reports the firm of Junkers has made an offer to the Government to create a mixed Company for aerial communications. It may be supposed that this matter has been taken up by the German aviators who have been dismissed from the air service and that they are handling the matter very carefully. Such things can of course do a lot of harm to us and it is therefore much more judicious to let Moscow have at once the orders to the full amount of the budget through the Commission.

The plan for the organisation of the Aviation is hereto attached.

ACTIVITY OF THE AIR SERVICE AT THE FRONT.

No detailed news of the work of the air service at the front has been received so far. There are at the front three de Havilands which are being piloted by two Russian aviators. The Chinese aviators do not fly. It appears from the report of the Chief of Aviation that the modest air-craft has played a considerable part in the victory of the National Revolutionary army. The principal achievements were the destrotion of the morale of the enemy and the material loss inflicted on the hostile forces and the moral encouragement afforded to their own troops. The military activity of the aeroplanes consists in scouting, bombing, photographing and in keeping up communication. The drawback he has noted are: the local geographic and climatic conditions and the absence of natural landing places which prevent the activity of the air-craft from being fully developed. The construction of aviation fields and aerodromes requires large sums of money and much time. Owing to the lack of time for the construction of

landing fields, the air-craft is during manoeuvres often a fortnight and more behind the front. Aviation fields made of rice-fields cannot be used at once after a rain; they require about 4 days to dry up. The great humidity of the air and the great heat cause the aeroplanes to deteriorate rapidly. It is therefore advisable to have ~~floating~~ amphibian(?) planes. The local conditions make that feasible.

As at present only Russian aviators are working at the front, while the Chinese are not trained sufficiently to fly modern planes, he thinks that the best Chinese aviators should be relieved from the front and sent to Russia for a short course of instruction and training.

In summing up the activity of the Department of Aviation, it must be said that it leaves much to be desired.

1. It is necessary to reorganise the apparatus of the Department and to give it a better structure.

2. Measures should be taken to separate the contending parties in the Air service in order to prevent the harmful consequences which may result from inner complications.

3. The training and instructing of the other part of the staff should be intensified.

The School of Aviation.

The school of Aviation is in a very bad state. The constant friction between the Chief of the school and the Chief of the Aviation has had a bad influence on the work and on the rest of the staff, especially on the students of the school.

Owing to the struggle between the chiefs, various groups were formed among the students according to their provinces, their political views and personal sympathies for the one or the other Chief. Naturally these groups were hostile to each other and being supported or oppressed by this or that Chief wrangled among themselves. They became demoralised and there were cases

of undesirable excesses. Since some of the students were sent to the front and others to Russia, the rest are divided into two camps - the Koreans and the Chinese. There is no great discord between them, but the Chinese enjoy the protection of the Chief of the school while the Koreans are left to look after themselves.

At present the staff of the school consists of:

The Chief of the school - Wang P'ing Kang (Colonel),

2 Instructors-Aviators - Yang Ch'ung Yu and Wu Ch'ang Ya (Lieut. Colonels),

1 Instructor for radio-telegraphy - Hsi Ying Yen,

1 Photographer - Lo Chi (captain),

1 Aide-de-camp - Liu Yang-ts'an (captain),

1 Cashier,

1 Secretary,

6 Engineers (second lieutenants),

8 pupils (one woman) (Second Lieutenants),

3 workmen,

5 messengers,

4 cooks,

1 fireman.

The school possesses now one Curtis in fairly good condition, one Avro and one Curtis, which at present are being repaired. Each student flies about 15 hours with the instructor and is trained to fly alone on Curtis planes; but the fact that the planes have been taken from the school has delayed for a long time the commissioning of the students. One of the pupils flew alone and was quite satisfactory.

The practice flights were made without any program and very unskilfully, because the instructors themselves were not up to their task. There is no plan of instruction in the school and for some subjects there are no teachers.

The German instructors too could not do much, because there were no books and no proper class-rooms, and now they have been dis-

missed altogether.

In order to improve the work in the school and to inspire more life into the workers, I intend to create an Instructors' Committee, with whom I shall discuss all questions relating to the instructions and the arrangement of the school. I am supplying the classes with books and other equipments. The motor-class and the class for the study of materials, of which the planes are made, are already equipped; the outfitting of the others will be finished in about 10 days.

The outfitting of the classes is done by the students themselves who take a great interest in this work. For the further development of the school it is contemplated to invite teachers and instructors from Russia.

In order to have specialists, i.e. engineers prepared, it is intended to arrange special courses for mechanics which will last 8 months. This is a very important question.

The reasons that the school is badly arranged and does not properly function, are as follows:

a) The inner frictions and demoralisation owing to the struggle between different persons and groups.

b) The unfitness of the Chief of the school whose standard of education does not differ from that of the other officers and who knows absolutely nothing of military science;

c) The indifference, the ignorance and the unwillingness to work of the rest of the staff, especially in recent times.

The Chief of the school gives very little of his time to the school. He comes to the training ground at seven o'clock and leaves at nine and after that he does not appear any more. The students are left to look after themselves, of which they especially complain. The political work in the school is done by a Commissar who gives also very little time and attention to the students and to the school.

The greatest attention should be paid to the school and to the instructing, because on that depends the development of the

aviation. The loss of time in the educational work is very detrimental to the aviation.

The Workshops.

The workshops are in better condition than the school, but it is also easier to reorganize the workshops and to put them in order. So far the whole work has been done in a primitive way. Now there is some improvement: an electro-motor has been installed which is used for two small lathes, one boring machine, one emery wheel, two saws and one wood planing machine.

The staff is as follows:

1 Chief - Yang Ch'ung Yu (Colonel),
1 Engineer - Yang Wing-hua (Lieut. Colonel)
1 Senior mechanic of the workshops - Li Wan (Major),
1 Cashier,
1 Copyist,
6 Mechanics I class,
2 Mechanics II class,
3 Mechanics III class,
1 Upholsterer,
3 Carpenters I class,
2 Carpenters II class,
3 Workmen I class,
4 day-laborers,
10 apprentices,
3 Messengers,
2 Cooks.

The general plan provides for an expansion of the workshops so that they might be able to construct planes. For the supervision of the technical work Russian engineers and specialists will be invited.

The fact that little work has been done by the workshops is explained by the incompetence of the Chief of the workshops and

of his staff. They are willing to work, but the great drowsiness, inertness and the lack of character of the Chief of the workshops account for the fact that nothing is accomplished.

The political life in the workshops is being directed by a nucleus of the Kuomintang which was organised in the beginning of November. It is supervised by a Commissar who has been appointed a few days ago.

The Aircraft Section.

This Section consists of mechanics and workmen, altogether five men, who under the supervision of a Russian mechanic are working on the two de Havilands which remain at Canton.

No.1 R(?)1. has been overhauled and tested and is being used for flying. The motor works satisfactorily, but there is much vibration and it is possible that the plane will shake itself to pieces.

No. 6 R.1. is also ready, but the motor runs very poorly and vibrates also very much. After each flight the motor fittings become loose, the clamps burst and the radiator leaks. At present practice flights are being made with Chinese aviators in order to acquaint them with the planes. The absence of bombs, of cartridges and of an observer makes it impossible to undertake operations against bandits.

The Aerodrome.

The flying field at Tai-sa-to is put out of working order whenever it rains and is also in bad condition when there is a drought. The rubble used for filling up the hollows of the landing field has now gotten mixed with sand and there are consequently places which make taking off and landing very dangerous.

A flying field was to be prepared at Swatow. I went myself there and found a suitable place, but the land costs 90,000 dollars, and as it is contemplated to introduce ~~floating(?)~~ amphibian

planes, the question of the aviation field at Swatow has been temporatily suspended.

The Civil Department.

(S.F.A.F. "The Society of Friends of Aviation").

After the Russian aeroplanes arrived and when the moving to the front was being prepared, the S.F.A.F. was left to look after itself and during that period, up to the 15th of September, nothing has been accomplished by it. The working capacity of this appratus is in general a rather low one and the events at the front have attracted the attention of the public to a stronger and more vital subject. When at the front the aviation proved to be one of the most powerful factors in the military operations the public centered again its attention on aviation. This opportunity was seized to arrange a "week of assistance to the aerial fleet" and to collect contributions. I worked out a plan of this "week of aviation" in Kwangtung. Several meetings of the nuclei took place and, as a result, it was found possible to have the thing done on a larger scale. A "Society for the creation of aviation in order to save the country" was formed. The activity of this Society will extend over all provinces. The plan of this Society (translated from the Chinese) is hereto annexed.

Finally I must say that in order to have the work of the Aviation properly done and to develop the aviation it is necessary to have more Russian workers and specialists in all sections of the Aviation. No time must be lost to carry out the plan; the present conditions are favorable.

The attitude towards the Russians is quite friendly. All their advices are readily accepted, the personal relations are very good and they are trusted. The work is going on somewhat more smoothly.

November 12th, 1926.

Canton.

The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation

(signed) Kostuchenko.

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SUPPLIES.

The organisation of the service of supplies in the National-Revolutionary army is one of the most important factors in the general scheme for the re-organisation of the army, which is necessary in order to enable it to accomplish it's mission in the national-liberating movement. For this reason the National-Revolutionary government instituted in July of last year (1925) the Department of Supplies of the National-Revolutionary army, subordinating it to the Military Council. The work of this Department must be based on the principle of the centralisation of the supply service of the whole army. In order to define the further conditions of the work of the Department of Supplies and the mission it has to accomplish, it is necessary to cast at least an eye-glance on the former ways and means of supplying.

At the time when the Department of Supplies was instituted, i.e. in the middle of last year (1925), proper supplying, consisting of such fundamental elements as an estimate, a plan, the providing of supplies, accounting and control practically did not exist.

The troops supplied themselves without any control by collecting taxes, and thus existed somehow; but they doubtless strived to outdo their "allies" by enriching themselves. There were no rules regulating the supplying. The commander of a unit resembled more a landlord who had hired soldiers as a source of revenue, than a military leader.

Such were the conditions when the Department of Supplies was organized and began to function.

Considering that the staff of the Department was composed of former supply-officers of the army, that there was nobody to advise them and that the former tendency to self-help which existed especially in economic matters of the army was still deeply rooted in their minds, it was natural that the Department could not understand its task and have the work properly organised. It may be therefore considered that in consequence of the aforesaid

the Department of Supplies did not accomplish its task in the first period, i.e. from July 1925 to January 1926, and that it did not establish its authority in the army.

The work of the Department within that period consisted merely in paying money daily to the troops by order of the Military Council and in receiving money from the Ministry of Finance. Thus the Department of Supplies was practically nothing else than the cashier of the Ministry of Finance.

Nevertheless, perhaps quite independently of the Department, the sums paid out by the latter to the troops went on increasing from month to month, which proves that a centralisation of the supplying, even though in an elementary form, is possible and may be realised.

The sums paid out by the Department of Supplies to the troops and the offices of the National Revolutionary army were as follows:

In August (1925).....562,640.42 Cant.dol.
In October .....961,291.06 " "
In December .....2,152,636.96 " "

Nothing had been done as regards other kinds of supplies.

The troops of the National-Revolutionary army received money partly from the Ministry of Finance, and some of them continued to collect taxes. The sums were spent for pay, for provisions, for equipment etc., in a word - they provided all the necessities for their existence.

As regards ordnance supplies they were almost all in the hands of the Military Council and were provided by the latter with the assistance of the arsenals. The 1st and 5th corps had their own small arsenals, one of which still continues to work. The distribution of this kind of supplies was also effected without any plan or regularity.

At the end of December of last year (1925) the Military Council took into consideration the abnormal conditions in the or-

ganisation of the supply service in the National-Revolutionary army and especially the unsatisfactory manner in which the Department of Supplies itself was functioning. Precise and clear instructions then were given to the latter and an adviser was appointed. At that time the Department of Supplies began its work of organization.

As a base for its work the Department of Supplies established for the first time a plan, the chief points of which are as follows: 1) The Department of Supplies must conform to the policy of gradually and firmly carrying out the new organisation of the supply service of the army in accordance with the instructions of the Military Council; 2) the gradual organization is dictated by the fact that this is a transitory period, that it is a new departure and that it is impossible to put into effect at once everything that has been proposed; 3) in gradually carrying out the plan of the organisation, the following supplies should be given the greatest attention: a) the supplying with money b) the supplying with artillery and technical requisites c) the supplying with equipment and d) the supplying with provisions and quarters.

The Department of Supplies has also prepared an exact scheme of supply divisions in the army and this scheme has been accepted and introduced.

As heretofore the (Central) Department of Supplies stands at the head of the whole work of supplying the army.

The duty of the Department is:

a) to keep an account of the material resources of the army, such as: armament, munitions, engineering and technical requisites equipment, food-stuffs, barracks, household utensils, etc.;

b) to keep an account of the men to be fed;

c) to prepare the forms of accounts and the rules for bookkeeping;

d) to work out general, periodical and monthly plans of preparing artillery, engineering-technical, equipment and food sup-

plies and to have these supplies prepared on the spot or prepared abroad;

e) to work out general, periodical and monthly plans of supplying the troops with the above mentioned requisites;

f) to control;

g) to inspect;

The Department of Supplies consists of the following Sections:

1) the Financial Section with a sub-section for appointments and accounting;

2) the Ordnance Section with sub-sections for artillery and for engineering-technical matters;

3) the Military-economic Section, with the sub-sections for equipment, for provisions and quarters;

4) the executive section or secretariat;

5) the Section for economic affairs of the Department of Supplies itself.

In the units of the army the following sections are being gradually organised:

I. The Section of Supplies of a Corps:

a) Sub-section for financial matters and accounting;

b) Sub-section for artillery and technical requisites;

c) Sub-section for equipment, provisions and household requisites;

d) Sub-section for general matters.

2. The Section of Supplies of a division has the same sub-sections

3. The Section of Supplies of a regiment:

a) Sub-section for provisions, equipment and household requisites,

b) The pay-office,

c) Sub-section for arms and technical equipment.

Battalions and companies receive all their necessities directly from the regiment.

Such is the structure of Economic Organisation in the Army.

The Navy and the Air-service Department are independent as regards technical supplies and are directly subordinated to the Military Council.

THE ACTIVITY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SUPPLIES FROM THE 1ST OF JANUARY UP TO PRESENT.

The activity of the Department of Supplies from the 1st of January (1926) up to present was as follows:

A. Amounts paid:

Though cash payments are still the principal manner of supplying, these payments, owing to a series of measures, have taken a more or less definite form. First of all all units and offices of the National-Revolutionary army are now receiving their funds exclusively from the Department of Supplies.

Since the 1st of February of the current year (1926) the sums are being paid according to monthly pay-rolls made out by the Department of Supplies and approved by the Military Council. As a rule the sums are paid out to the units and offices by the cashier of the Department once a week, according to a special weekly schedule which is also approved by the Military Council. If in the beginning untimely payments were still made to the units, such payments have become lately the exception, and from the 15th of March on the money will be paid out only once a week regularly.

In order to receive the money for their upkeep, the units must submit to the Department of Supplies on the 20th of the preceeding month an estimate and on the 20th of the following month - an account of the money received in the preceeding month. This order is already being introduced and for the month of March nine estimates have been sent in.

The budget of the Military Council since the 1st of February of the current year (1926) is 4,000,000 Canton dollars a month.

In February this sum was expended as follows:

1) For the upkeep of units and offices.....3,425,000

2) For the settlement of debts of the units and for extraordinary expenses in connection with military operations..... 405,000

3) For technical equipment (purchase of aeroplanes)..... 170,000

Total: 4,000,000

The estimate of the expenses for March (1926)

1) For the upkeep of units and offices.....3,351,000

2) For the payment of debts of the units..... 330,000

3) For equipment..... 200,000

4) For artillery and technical equipment..... 112,000

5) For unforeseen expenses..... 7,000

Total:4,000,000

The estimate for March will be carried out without any change.

The item "upkeep of units" comprises the following expenses: a) pay, b) food, c) houshold and other expenses, not including equipment.

The forms of accounts are being prepared and after being approved by the Military Council will be introduced in the units.

In March (1926) the first accounts of the expenses made by the units with the money issued to them in February are expected to be submitted. The checking of the accounts will lead to a checking on the spot and this will make it possible to reach the second stage, i.e. to get more exact information and data on the appropriated money.

B. Artillery and Technical Supplies.

At present, after a series of measures, these supplies are almost totally in the hands of the central organ. From the 1st of March the whole production of the arsenals will be at the disposal of the Department of Supplies which is beginning to direct the work of these arsenals and issues to them orders which they must execute.

All arms and munitions taken from the enemy are also handed over to the Department. In the near future 10,000 rifles which were captured by the 4th corps will be received.

At present only one unit - the 5th corps has its own arsenal. The question of transferring this arsenal to the Department of Supplies is to be decided shortly.

The supplying of the units with artillery equipment is not yet being effected according to a plan, as there are no sufficient data for it, i.e. exact data as to the armament of the National Revolutionary army which as yet have not been sent in by some units. It is certain that these data will be received towards the end of March when a general plan for the procurement and issuing of the supplies will be made. At present rifles made at the local arsenal are issued to the 3rd corps, the armament of which has to be completed at once. Munitions are issued only in special cases and only with the permission of the Military Council.

In March the work relating to engineer and technical supplies was started, i.e. the installation of three wireless stations which connect the islands of Hainan and Kwangtung with Canton.

The forms of the accounts of companies and regiments have been prepared.

C. Equipment.

The Department of Supplies will start to prepare clothing, equipment and bedding this month. It could not be done sooner for lack of funds. The plan for the preparation of these supplies has been made 8 months ago and includes 100,000 uniforms, the cost of which will amount to 2,200,000. Considering the quantity of clothing in the units, it may be expected that at the end of the period of preparation, there will be a reserve of 20,000 sets.

The sum of $200,000 assigned as a monthly expenditure for

this purpose is obviously insufficient and will have to be increased.

In March it is intended to prepare 13,000 sets of clothing and equipment, not including winter clothing.

Other things were until the present time supplied by the units themselves.

The quantity of clothing and equipment, which each man is to receive during the period of one year:

Articles.	Yearly quantity	Price in Canton dollars	Total amount
Underwear	2 suits	1.80	$3.60
Blouse and trousers, summer	1 suit	2.30	2.30
" " " winter	1 suit	2.65	2.65
Winter over-coat	½	3.18	1.59
Caps	2	0.25	0.50
Putters	3	0.24	0.72
Shoes made of cloth	1 pair	1.00	1.00
" " " cane(sandals)	24 pairs	0.20	4.80
Leather belt	1	0.50	0.50
Shelter (canvas)	½	4.00	2.00
Blanket	½	2.40	1.20
Cartridge box	½	0.80	0.40
Canteen	½	0.30	0.15
Bag	½	0.45	0.23
Kettle	½	0.40	0.20
Cup	1	0.02	0.02
Oil-can	½	0.04	0.02
	Total		$21.88

Although the units at present possess uniforms, they are not uniformly dressed and have not enough clothing. None of the units of the National-Revolutionary army is fully equipped with clothing in accordance with the above tables.

D. The Food.

The feeding in the Chinese army and particularly in the Na-

tional-Revolutionary army is done quite differently from that in other armies.

Judging by the obstinacy which the Chinese officers and the officials of the Department of Supplies manifest in questions of this kind of supplies and by their frequent referring to Chinese traditions, one may think that the present state of things has existed in the Chinese armies for decades and perhaps even longer. Here one is confronted with a peculiar tradition: the Commander is supposed to have hired the soldiers binding himself to feed and clothe and to pay them. The pay may be considered as something more or less fixed, but the feeding depends upon the financial condition of the unit and there are no established rules for it. The food of the soldier consists usually of rice, vegetables, a little bacon or oil to dress the vegetables.

The feeding in the different units of the National-Revolutionary army is not done in the same manner. Food is usually given 2 or 3 times a day. The cost of the Chinese soldier's ration is 20 cents a day or about 6 dollars 20 cents a month.

In the plan for its work, the Department of Supplies has included regulations for the rationing of the army, which make this matter clear and put it on a business basis. This question, however, must be definitely settled by a Commission consisting of representatives of the Medical Department, the Inspectorate of Infantry, of the General Staff and of members of the Department of Supplies.

The question of supplying the troops with quarters and household requisites is so far only in the preliminary stage of working out tables and rules of accounting.

<u>The defects in the organisation of supplies:</u>

The principal defects in the organisation of supplies consist in

1) the absence of uniformity in the personnel of the units,

2) the complete absence of regulations relating to questions of supplies and the duties of the offices and the staff of the supply service,

3) the absence of forms of accounts and rules of bookkeeping, or rather the absence of simple and clear forms, because the former are obsolete, complicated and inconvenient and must be radically altered,

4) the absence of qualified workers;

5) the fact that not only the commanders for whom it is difficult to give up the part of "landlords", but also the officials of the Sections of Supplies, who are accustomed to carry out the orders of the "Landlords", do not sufficiently understand the importance of the question of the organisation of supplies;

6) the absence of fixed figures and tables for all kinds of supplies;

7) the absence of a control in form of an independent institution.

At present the supplying of the National Revolutionary army is passing through a period of radical breaking down of all former customs and principles which do not correspond with the new departure. The supply service of the army is being built up on perfectly new principles. The defects of the organisation of the Supplies and of the supply apparatus are therefore so great that a most intense and effective work for a long time to come is needed to have them removed.

However, the result of 2½ months' work of organisation begins already to manifest itself in the questions which are being asked by the units, in the reports they are giving and in many other ways which show that the Department of Supplies is beginning to occupy the position it should and it is gradually taking the lead in the economic life of the Army.

A great impulse has doubtless been given in this respect by the advisers who work in the units.

General Plan

for the organisation of the Air-Service in the National-Revolutionary Army.

The question of the creation of a powerful aerial fleet for the National-Revolutionary army has become the most pressing problem of the day. Within a very short time Aviation has grown into a world wide redoubtable force which has brought about a great change in warfare.

A striking example of this fact are the events that took place at the fortress Wuchang. Our very small forces played a decisive part in the capture of this fortress.

The nature of the country, the character of the terrain, the absence of roads, of means of transportation and of communications did not permit us to reinforce the army and to supply it with technical means which are of a vital importance in modern warfare.

Under such circumstances the only way of reinforcing the victorious National-Revolutionary army is to develop the aviation.

Swiftness of movement, skillful manoeuvring, flexibility and tactical manoeuvring coordinated with the requirements of the battle will make aviation exceedingly useful under the present conditions.

The greatest activity must be displayed in the creation of the air-force, as far as the means and the time will permit it. Having experienced the tremendous effect of aviation our foes will doubtless try to ward off the blow of the National-Revolutionary army and its aerial fleet by using also air-craft which they possess and with which the imperialists will abundantly supply them. For any delay, for any loss of time, for the slightest mistake in the creation of an aerial force we may have to pay dearly. The inability of America to create an aerial fleet in 1917-18 may serve as a good example. In spite of her huge financial resources and her highly developed industry America

was unable to carry out her program on time.

In discussing this question, and taking into consideration the present political situation, the financial possibilities and the great extent of the front, the Commission came to the conclusion that the first and foremost task in the creation of an aerial fleet is to form fighting squadrons, like our ones, consisting of 6 planes each. Not less than 8 of such squadrons must be created in two years.

Our young indstry will not be able to carry out in its factories the difficult task of constucting aeroplanes and yet the latter are wanted as soon as possible. They can be gotten from the U.S.S.R on more or less long credit.

This plan proposes to have 8 fighting squadrons formed within 2 years, and to have an adequate number of aviators and other specialists trained (by enlarging the school of Aviation). As for the avio-industry the Commission thinks that by gradually enlarging our workshops we will be able to change them into a factory which will start the construction of our own aeroplanes.

The plan is divided into 4 periods as follows:

1) The first period.

The purchase of two squadrons before the beginning of 1927 is necessary on account of the conditions at the front. Each detachment must consist of 7 planes (one reserve).

The approximate cost of 14 planes will be	280,000
Spare parts, accessories, assembling the planes	12,000
Transportation and incidental expenses	30,000
Total	322,000

As for the manning of the planes with aviators and other specialists, the Commission proposes to man one of the squadrons with our aviators, who by the end of this year will have finished their training in Russia. This is the first group of 6 men who went to Russia in September 1925.

As regards the second squadron we are compelled to ask to have it manned with Russian aviators, because our aviators are unable to fly fighting planes without previous training.

At present our workshops are repairing the school planes in a primitive way and will of course be unable to repair fighting planes without being previously enlarged and properly equipped. The first period provides for the enlargement of the workshops so as to enable them to effect thorough repairs of modern fighting-planes. For this purpose it is necessary to purchase the proper machinery and tools for the equipping of the workshops, as well as an adequate stock of materials and spare parts.

The cost of the equipping of the workshops will be:

Machinery and tools	27,000
Purchase in Russia of the following materials:	
Wood, faneer, alluminum, copper, iron,	20,000
steel, linen (aeroplane) and spare parts	10,000
Repairs of the premises	3,200
Total	40,200

The School of Aviation.

The question of the School of Aviation is the most essential of all questions relating to Aviation. The school is the foundation of the whole structure of the Air service and it is therefore necessary to pay particular attention to it. At present the school has two training-planes "Avro" and one "Curtis". The classes are not equipped and there are no qualified instructors. That is the reason that the school has accomplished so little. It is impossible to improve the school without having it previously reorganised and supplied with training-planes and the necessary equipment.

For the first period it is necessary to purchase for the school:

4 training-planes "Avro costing	40,000
2 "intermediate planes, between battle and	

training-planes"		30,000
Equipment (books etc.)		5,000
2 spare motors POH. 120 HP		10,000
2 spare stationary motors 220 HP.		8,000
	Total	93,000

The reorganized school might solve the question of manning with aviators and specialists our future airservice squadrons.

We have at present 8 aviators at the front who, as has been said above, are unable to fly modern battle-planes without previous training; we have also 8 students in the school of Aviation. If the school is supplied and outfitted we may have for the second period, i.e. in June 1927, 16 aviators to man our future squadrons. At the end of the current year the school will have to enroll not more than 12 aviation students and 6 observation students.

At the end of 1927 twelve aviators will have finished their training course in Russia and will man the squadrons of the 3rd period, and for those of the 4th period, i.e. by the year 1928, the students now enrolled in our school will be graduated.

The question of having the necessary number of observers is also rather acute; but by means of theoretical instruction at the school and practical work at the front we will manage somehow to have this question solved. There are at present 16 student-observers at the front and actual warfare is of course the best school for observers.

A no less difficult problem under the present conditions is to obtain the necessary number of specialists, such as mechanics, assistant-mechanics and engineers. In order to solve this question the Commission finds it necessary to establish at the school of Aviation courses for mechanics, and to prepare, by means of theoretical teaching at the school and practical work in the aerodrome and at the workshops, the necessary number of specialists for the squadrons. For carrying out the above school-program it

is necessary to invite instructors from Russia: 2 aviators, 1 observer and 1 engineer-mechanic.

Without previous preparation of certain accomodations on land, such as a net of flying fields, air-sheds etc., the work of the Aviation cannot be satisfactory, and in some cases it may even become impossible. First of all the Commission deems it necessary to examine and to outfit the aerial routes Can - tion - Swatow and Canton - K'yanin (?) in western Kwangsi. This work cannot be delayed and the Staff of the Aviation will in the near future begin to survey the line Canton - Swatow.

Thus the first period will create two new squadrons for field-service, will have the workshops prepared for making thorough repairs of modern planes, and the reformed school will receive training-planes, equipment and instructors and will be able to supply with aviators the units organized in the subsequent periods.

The amounts required for the first period:

Two detachments for field-service	$ 332,000
Outfitting of the workshops	40,000
The school of Aviation	93,000
Aerodromes and sheds	30,000
Total	$ 485,000

2) The second period.

The second period will last from the beginning of 1927 to middle of July of the same year. 2 squadrons of 7 aeroplanes (one reserve plane) each will be purchased.

The approximate cost will be.....322,000

By the time the planes arrive the School will be able to furnish the necessary number of aviators and specialists for the new squadrons. The personnel of these squadrons will be composed of aviators who are having new training courses and of the present students of the school who were enrolled in 1925.

The workshps will be able to make thorough repairs for the

existing squadrons and will continue to be supplied with machinery. Materials, spare parts and motors will be purchased and specialists enlisted in order that everything may be ready for the construction of training-planes. The necessity of erecting of a building for a factory is evident for two reasons: firstly - because the building in which the workshops are at present located belongs to a private individual who wants it back; secondly - the size of the workshops is not sufficient for the requirements of the growing aviation, and to enlarge the building of a private owner would be senseless.

The amounts necessary for the workshops in the second period of their development are as follows:

Further purchase of machinery	$ 15,000
Materials and spare parts	12,000
6 motors for training planes	12,000
Materials for constructions and the laying of the foundation of a building for the factory	8,000
Total	$47,000

The School of Aviation, during the second period, completes the preparation of the aviators and specialists who will form the 2 squadrons of the second period.

Enlarging its classes and its program the school will enroll new students-aviators and observers.

In the 2nd period it will be necessary to increase the number of training-planes in the school:

2 training "Avro"	$ 20,000
2 motors	5,000
1 "intermediate plane"	15,000
1 spare motor for this plane	4,000
Equipment (books etc.)	5,000
Total	$ 49,000

During the same period the construction of aerodromes in

Kwangsi will be finished. The approximate cost of the line will be $ 20,000

The sums required for the second period are as follows:

2 detachment - 14 aeroplanes	$ 322,000
Workshops	47,000
School	49,000
Aerodromes and sheds	20,000
Total	$ 438,000

3) The third period.

The third period provides the purchase of two detachments of 14 planes of modern systems with powerful motors, costing $ 350,000

These detachments will be manned with the aviators who by that time will have finished their training-course in Russia (12 men have been sent in August of the current year to Aviation Schools in the U.S.S.R.)

The outfitting of the workshops will require great attention and efforts, because simultaneously with the executing of thorough repairs of battle-planes and the constructing of training-planes it will be necessary, in the same period, to have the workshops prepared to begin the construction of fighting planes. To this purpose some additional fittings will be necessary for the workshops:

Machinery and powerplant	$ 22,000
Materials and spare parts which cannot be made on the spot	15,000
Further construction of the factory	12,000
Total	$ 49,000

The school will be supplied with the new planes built at the workshops.

It is necessary to purchase in the 3rd period:

2 training planes "Avro"	$ 20,000
2 "Intermediate planes"	30,000

4 spare motors		$ 15,000
Equipment (books etc.)		5,000
	Total	$ 70,000

The school will graduate the students who were enrolled in the period 1926-27. It is expected that 25 aviators and 15 observers more will have completed the course.

4) The fourth period.

The fourth period comprises the whole year 1928. As in the preceeding periods, the purchase of modern and fast planes with powerful motors is necessary. The Commission finds it necessary to purchase 2 squadrons as samples of planes manufactured in accordance with the latest achievements of avio-technic. The approximate cost of the two squadrons will be 350,000. There will be no difficulty in manning them, because the Aviation will by that time have a sufficiently prepared staff in the units and in the sahools.

The workshops will finish the construction of the factory and will be outfitted with new machinery. They will prepare materials and tools and will enlist new workers who will have studied at the school and will have had practical training. The factory will then be able to start building battle-aeroplanes.

The funds necessary in the 4th period for the outfitting of the workshops:

The outfitting of the workshops		$ 18,000
Materials and spare parts		12,000
The completing of factory and the shifting of the machinery		12,000
	Total	$ 42,000

By that time the factory will be able to carry out the following program for the year:

Repairs of existing planes	20
Construction of training-planes	8

In extending its activity the school will be able to raise the quality and the quantity of the aviators, observers and specialists who will be enough to satisfy the wants of the army.

The whole budget according to the general plan will be as follows:

1)	First period	$ 485,000
2)	Second "	438,000
3)	Third "	469,000
4)	Fourth "	392,000
	Total for a period of 2 years	$1,784,000

Thus, at the end of the 4th period, i.e. in 1928, we shall have a) 8 detachments - 48 battle-planes with a complete staff of aviators and observers; b) workshops able to construct battle-planes; c) a school able to prepare 25 aviators, 16 observers and 30 specialists yearly; d) completely equipped aerial routes connecting distant political and industrial centres of our country. The further prospects are immense.

If it is possible from the financial standpoint and if the circumstances will require a reduction of the time, two periods might be contracted into one.

The present plan covers to a full extent not only the financial problems, but also the ways and means for the further development of the aerial fleet of the National-Revolutionary army of China.

The division of the necessary amounts of money into periods, the gradual preparation during each period and the great activity in the development of the air-forces entitle us to hope that in a short time the difficult task will be accomplished and that the steel birds will stand on the guard of freedom and of the national rights of the Chinese people.

The President: (no signature)

Commission: Hellen. The Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation

(Kostuchenko)

22 IX 1926

Attached to the report "Description of conditions in the Bureau of Aviation for the period September 15th to November 15th 1926" written by the Acting Senior Adviser of Aviation Kostuchenko. Canton, November 12th, 1926.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFICERS PERSONNEL OF THE ARMY.

Procurement: Until recent times the procurement of officers for the National-Revolutionary Army was carried out in the usual Chinese way. Commanders of divisions, brigades or regiments invited for service in their units officers they knew, sometimes from distant provinces. Since 1911 there has been no distribution throughout the country in accordance with a definite scheme of the government of officers who were graduates of military schools. Young officers, graduates of provincial military schools, usually enter the service of the armies of the respective Tuchüns or provincial militarists. The best military school in China which was in Pao-ting-fu (Chihli) and which had a character of a central school does not function any more. During the last few years that school was under Wu-Pei-fu, and many of the graduates of that school served in his army and until the present time remain his adherents. The majority of them are in the northern armies. The officers in the South of China are chiefly natives of the southern provinces and followers of Dr. Sun, who were formerly invited by him or came to him of their own accord, and also others who have been invited during last few years by individual generals. Graduates of the Pao-ting-fu School have much better training than officers with a military education obtained in a provincial school The Pao-ting graduates all know each other and have in Canton their own association and a club. A year ago there were 300 members in that association. Besides graduates of the Pao-ting School, there are in the National-Revolutionary Army graduates of military schools of Yünnan (formerly the best of all provincial military schools) and of Kiangsu. There are also a few higher officers who were educated in Japan (Officers school). Finally there are in the National-Revolutionary Army about 800 officers who are graduates of the "Whampoa" School (now - the Central Military-Political School), who are mostly platoon-, company and battalion commanders. Those officers have played an important part during the period of organization of the fundamental units of the

National-Revolutionary Army, the so-called "Whampoa" troops, and also in the campaigns against Ch'en Chün-ming and the Yünnanese. By having revolutionary spirit, energy and impetus they greatly differ from the rest of the officers' body. There are many communists among them (6 per cent). The chief defect of this class of officers is the lack of service- and fighting experience. However, those young officers must become a foundation of the National-Revolutionary Army. There is no exact information as to the number of officers of various classes in other army corps. The great majority of regimental commanders are graduates of the Pao-ting School. Among generals the percentage of graduates of the Pao-ting School is the greatest. The graduates of the Whampoa School are in the majority in the 1st Army corps and in the 2nd and 20th separate divisions. Before the Central Military-Political School (the former "Whampoa" School) was opened, there were military schools in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th army corps. The terms of instruction in those schools were 6 months, and the graduates were appointed platoon commanders. At the present time all those schools are being liquidated, and the National-Revolutionary Army has established the "Only" Central Military-Political School.

Living conditions of officers: Material conditions of the officers are far from advantageous. Salaries are very seldom paid in full and on time. On an average, an officer receives not more than $30 to 40 dollars per month and that inevitably drives officers to embezzlement of public funds.

The monthly pay of officers (in the 1st army corps) is as follows:

Colonel	$216 to 240
Lieutenant-Colonel	180 to 198
Major	160 to 180
Captain	80 to 100
1st Lieutenant	56 to 72

2nd Lieutenant	$40 to 50
Warrant officer	20 to 35.

There are no prescribed rules or regulations for promotion, for the support of families, pensions, etc. Plans are being drafted now.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL.

Recruiting. The matter of recruiting the enlisted personnel of the army is not as yet centralized, nor is it regulated by legislation of the government. It is completely in the hands of the high commanders of military units. The principal method of procurement is recruiting which is carried out in various ways in the provinces in accordance with personal discretion of respective army corps commanders and sometimes divisional commanders. For instance, the Whampoa units (former party troops, now - the 1st army corps) were usually recruited exclusively from northerners, chiefly from the provinces of Chekiang (the native place of Gen. Chiang-Kai-shih himself), Kiangsu, Anhwei and Shantung. Some Chinese generals explained this by the comparative cheapness of labor in the North, because of the great unemployment in the above provinces. According to the opinion prevailing among the higher and middle ranking officers, the natives of Kwangtung are very poor material for the army and the Cantonese are very bad soldiers. They always were autonomists, have nothing to do with China as a whole and are only able to defend their own province. For that reason, in the opinion of the majority of Chinese generals, for a northern expedition it is better to despatch the units composed of northern soldiers. As regards the former wars in Kwangtung, the majority of militarist generals from other provinces always preferred to recruit soldiers from their native provinces, because a soldier from another province (than Kwangtung) could not desert with his rifle, as he did not know the local dialect and was almost unable to exist outside of his military unit. In such units officers were procured also from the same province, had close contact with the soldiers, and as a whole always followed their "boss", the fellow countryman-general. Such conditions partly still exist in 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th army corps.

The second army corps is wholly composed of the natives of

Hunan (it is the former army of Gen. Tan-Yen-kai) and at present the men are still being recruited from Hunan.

The 3rd army corps consists mostly of Yünnanese (the commander of the corps Gen. Chu Pei-te is a native of Yünnan).

The 4th army corps consists of the natives of Kwangtung and Kuangsi (the commander of the corps Gen. Li Chi-chen is a native of Kuangsi).

The 5th army corps consists of Cantonese (the Commander of the corps Gen. Li-Fu-lin is a Cantonese).

In the 1st army corps the enlisted personnel is mixed: the 1st division is composed of natives of Chekiang and Kiangsu. The 3rd division consists of natives of Hunan, Kwangtung and Anhwei. The 14th division is composed of Cantonese. The 1st army corps usually recruits soldiers in the North, chiefly in Shanghai.

The 6th army corps consists of natives of Hunan, Kwangtung and Hupeh (the Commander of the corps Gen. Cheng-Chien is a native of Hunan).

So far the recruiting in the army corps is carried out by the commanders themselves by enlisting men from their native provinces. However, this system at present is not so strictly followed as formerly. Very often generals incorporate into their units officers and men who have surrendered or have been taken prisoners. Still the principal method of getting replacements is recruiting through special agents who for that purpose are sent with necessary funds to the regions fixed beforehand.

Formerly mostly professional soldiers were recruited. At present, men who never were in military service such as workmen, peasants, unemployed coolies and also brigands are being enlisted.

The soldiers enlist for one or two years, with transportation and food at the expense of the recruiting agent, i.e. at the expense of the respective military unit. To recruit a soldier in the North and to bring him to Canton costs an average of 15 to 20 dollars.

It takes the recruiting agents about two months to bring recruited men from Hunan and Chekiang.

The recruits are brought in parties of 100 to 300 men on small Chinese steamers under very bad conditions. The recruiting in Hunan, Chekiang, Kiangsu and Anhwei as well as the transporting of recruites are being done secretly. Formerly some individual attempts to recruit men were made in the "revolutionary" districts Huaming and Haifen of Kwangtung, but this was not done on a large scale and did not bring any tangible results.

Physical condition: It is quite obvious that with such a system of recruiting any selection of men is out of the question. Those who are first met with are enlisted, and very often sick and physically undeveloped men are recruited. The consequence is that there are many men in the army who are sick, physically weak and unfitted for military service. The absence of no selection at all during the recruiting is also noticed in respect to the moral state of the recruits: that is criminal, depraved elements, professional soldiers, etc. are very often enlisted into the army.

Living conditions of the soldiers: The soldiers on the whole are extremely unpretentious. For many of them two or three bowls of rice a day and clothing is, in comparison with their former conditions of living, a very alluring prospect. Regular pay, satisfactory equipment and tolerable lodging conditions can work miracles. So far we have not attained satisfactory results in that respect in the National Revolutionary Army. Although the food and equipment of the soldiers are comparatively sufficient, the lodging conditions and especially regularity in giving them the pay are far from satisfactory.

At the present time the monthly pay is as follows:

2nd class private	$ 10
1st class private	" 10.50
Corporal	" 11
Junior Non-commissioned Officer	" 12
Senior Non-commissioned Officer	" 14
Sergeant	" 20

The above figures show the pay in the 1st army corps. In several units of other army corps privates of the 2nd class receive $ 8 per month. Of this sum the cost of monthly subsistence i.e. 5 to 6 dollars, must be deducted, so that privates of the 2nd class (who form by far the majority) get $ 4 in Cantonese small money per month. At the time of enlistment the soldier (or his family) receives from the agent a small sum (about ten to fifteen dollars). When, after expiration of his enlistment, the soldier is discharged he receives about the same amount and some money for travelling expenses to his home. However, these conditions are not observed everywhere. Some legislation of the Government in this respect is necessary.

Term of enlistment: There are no fixed regulations for soldiers with respect to serving their terms. Under local conditions, this question is not one of great importance. Promotion of a soldier to the next grade depends exclusively on his nearest commander and is only considered from a material stand point. In the course of time this question will no doubt become of more importance and will need special attention.

G-2 Report

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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Communism in China.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. SEP 21 1927

The evaluation of Report No. 7014 describing the raid on the Soviet Embassy on April 6, 1927, concluded with a request for a report covering the following points:

2657-9-281

(a) Extent to which Communists control the Kuomintang.

(b) Extent to which Communism as a doctrine has been preached by the Kuomintang Party or by factions of the Party.

(c) Relative strengths of moderates and radicals in the Kuomintang.

(d) Amount of control over either or both groups of Kuomintang by the Soviet Government or the 3rd International. Probable duration of control.

(e) Probability of acceptance of or adherence to Communism by masses under Nationalist control.

The points enumerated might roughly be condensed into the following question:

To what extent and to what degree of permanency has the Soviet Government or the 3rd International succeeded in spreading its communistic doctrines among the Chinese people and impressing its political control over the Kuomintang Party?

Since the request for this information was formulated, many of the points have been touched on in the Comments. Also the huge Russian experiment in China has undergone such vicissitudes and modifications, thanks to fortunate publicity, that time has partially cleared some of the dubious points. One who has followed the steps in the decline and break-up of the Nationalist regime since the violent seizure of the British Concession in Hankow will have formed certain opinions of Soviet successes and failures which prior to February were not possible, in view of lack of precise information. In general, the disintegration of the Nationalist movement was predicted by all calm observers who held rational and experienced views regarding certain unchanging qualities of the Chinese people. Their assurance, however, was subject to moments of faint-heartedness as success after

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success came to Nationalist arms. The Russians had entered the movement so covertly and yet so thoroughly that the Nationalist regime was energized beyond anything formerly seen in China. Experienced observers, who at that time were wholly unaware of the stupendous efforts being exerted by Soviet agencies, were frankly confused. Knowing the inherent weakness of the Chinese for accomplishing the cooperation and efficiency displayed in what for a time seemed an irresistible movement, the observers did not know how completely foreigners were the real force dissipating Chinese inertia. While the world heralded the regeneration of China, local observers were confounded but still insisted that the truths they knew of Chinese character were not to be discarded. They continued to feel sure in their hearts, even if they asserted it less boldly, that Nationalism was more form than substance, as are most social, political and military manifestations in China. So efficiently did the Russians conduct a military invasion, so expertly did they employ revolutionary tactics, so effectively did they blind the eyes of Chinese and foreigners to the actualities of the movement, that a certain degree of wavering on the part of close-up observers was inevitable. Considering the admirable propaganda campaign conducted by the Russian revolutionary psychologists, small wonder that people in America were fooled!

It was easier in November 1926, logically to predict possible Kuomintang accomplishments than it was in the trying spring days of this year. When one based his predictions on the ineptitude and weaknesses of the Chinese for political and military organization and development, which they for centuries have demonstrated, he was more accurate than when his ideas became confused by the emotional deceptions current at the time when the Nationalist movement loomed most formidable in that it was about to collapse.

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Without discussing the degree of disintegration which is so well known today one can now coolly return to fundamentals, accept the Chinese as they are instead of as we would have them be, and analyze the question of the extent of the Russian influences in China in the light of history and psychology as we believe it to affect Chinese action. Nobody can say who is and who is not a communist in China. Today one can make only the roughest estimate of military strengths of moderate or radical factions. It would be folly to state whether this afternoon Feng Yu-hsiang will see fit to lop off the heads of a dozen communists or declare that the first-born of all gentry not favoring communism will be thrown to the dogs. The same may be said of all leaders who have sacrificed their freedom of action by having permitted themselves to be the tools of Russian revolutionaries. We can with a great degree of certitude, however, state that any Chinese leader will be a pendulum and swing through a considerable arc from radicalism to extreme reaction as best suits his personal aims and interests at the moment. We can likewise state that any Chinese leader will humor the whims of the people or crush their fondest aims depending upon which course of action contributes to his strength at the time. He will be pro-foreign or anti-foreign as best adds to his prestige. Given reasonable time for necessary face-saving adjustments, any leader then will be pro-Russian and radical or anti-Russian and moderate if he believes that the maintenance of his position permitting him to exert arbitrary power so demands.

This point is important. No Chinese leader conceives it enviable to be a servant of a party, and much less of the "people". There are some Chinese who seek leadership for the purpose of amassing wealth but generally in China, as elsewhere, position is sought for the power it brings. There is this difference, however, that Chinese genuinely think of power and relish it only as exerted arbitrarily. It is this trait of Chinese character

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which perhaps more than any other foredoomed the Russian experiment to failure, since the Soviet system is based on rigid party discipline and constant curtailment of the power of the individual. When Chiang Kai-shek attained military supremacy almost entirely due to Russian assistance and found himself a popular figure beyond anything he had ever dreamed, he began to comprehend that the system which elevated him was based upon a limitation of powers of the individual. From the time he first became aware of any limitation upon his exercise of arbitrary power, Chiang Kai-shek began to sever his connection with this foreign and un-Chinese political conception.

It is strongly felt that no understanding of probable developments in China is possible until one accepts the premise that Chinese nature has remained unchanged throughout the recent extraordinary events. Opportunism today among leaders of all groups is neither less potent nor less general than in pre-Nationalist days. Politicians and militarists do have to concern themselves more about the opinion of the people than formerly. The political faiths of leaders is no more of a fixed factor than was the allegiance of Tuchuns in 1922. While Nationalist leaders of whatever hue are toying with Russian terminology, employing foreign technique and enlisting new forces to accomplish their purposes, individualism and personal ambition are still the impelling motives in Chinese politics. A refusal to accept the premise that no abrupt regeneration has taken place in the Chinese nature closes all approaches to an understanding of what is occurring in China.

If this be true, certain traits of the Chinese may be listed which, if accurate, furnish a good index of the probable acceptance and retention of Russian ideas and influences over a long period of time. In addition to certain psychologic traits of the Chinese which are more or less permanent, there are some economic conceptions which may be expected to persist in the minds of the Chinese that will affect their susceptibility to Russian influences. Both internal and international political relations must be

considered. These three factors, namely, psychologic, economic and political, will be discussed in order.

Psychologic.

The Chinese in difficulty will accept aid from any source. Smothering their pride, if not conceit, to an extent which Western people would not consider, the Chinese place themselves in the hands of others until the crisis is passed and then set about to destroy the foreign influence inevitably set up. In destroying the influence, they have no delicacy in charging their benefactors with all the evils which exist. The quality of gratitude among Chinese is almost non-existent. The Russians are the most recent betes noirs and may be expected to be charged with the responsibility for whatever chaos exists.

The Chinese, as much as any other people, like to manage their own affairs in their own way. The Chinese way, in whatever activity we may consider, is the best way, demonstrable proofs to the contrary, and will ultimately persist. Individuals and groups momentarily will accept with enthusiasm a wholly foreign idea or method but the most inevitable reversion to the native conception shortly follows. This generalization holds as to foreign clothes, foreign education, strange political ideas, or the operation of a railway. The Russians brought efficiency into the Kuomintang Party, built up a remarkable fighting machine and governing group. The Chinese accepted it with profound admiration, and immediately set about to destroy the creature which after all was not Chinese.

The Chinese present a confusing melange of the practical and the visionary. They enjoy philosophizing more than doing. They all, especially the Southerners, enjoy toying with ideas. Since the height of enthusiasm for the educational advantages brought by Christian missionaries - novel Western ideas - which enthusiasm gradually has been subsiding, nothing so captivated the speculative Chinese intelligentsia as the utopian dreams so fanatically expounded by the new missionaries from Russia. The stolid

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northern Chinese neither understood the Russian theorists nor were able to disassociate their enthusiasm from a new Czarist scheme of expansion, of which they had experienced many. But socialistic theories captivated the Cantonese and the joys of playing with new ideas swept over the South in a way which dumbfounded Westerners. Christian missionaries found their ideas and their works old fashioned. In spite of their sympathy for what they naively believed to be the results of their own altruistic efforts, they found their ideas gradually replaced with the newer ones and themselves classified as purveyors of bourgeoisie propaganda and agents of imperialistic designs. The Chinese practical sense was not offended by the Russian intrusion since Russian material assistance closely followed their theories. The Boxer indemnity was widely advertised as being deflected to the payment of long overdue salaries in the universities of the North; employment with good pay was given to the new-styled convert; war materials were available to those who were more aggressive by nature.

However, equally true of the Chinese in their enthusiasm for playing with new theories is their tendency to drop them when they are foreign to Chinese nature. Russian ideology, like a popular air, was overdone and is now clearly sickening to a large number of Chinese. This does not mean that the Russian imported ideas have run their full course, but there are many evidences that the intelligentsia who originally popularized them are nowweary of the dizzy sensations. Plainly, many influential Chinese are fed up with the senseless repetition of meaningless Russian patter.

The Chinese weakness for large-scale cooperation in any cause; their lack of genuine revolutionary spirit in which the individual sacrifices himself for the cause; an inordinate mutual suspicion and jealousy which exists among all classes of Chinese (no Chinese ever speaks approvingly of another unless his interest is tied up with the other or unless the subject has passed

into history); Chinese desire for arbitrary power but difficulty with which they submit to any form of discipline: these traits are well known and frequently have been mentioned by the Russians as obstacles to the accomplishment of their objectives.

Economic.

The Chinese are a nation of traders. All the Russian economic theories regarding the limitation of buying and selling among individuals are offensive to Chinese. If the criterion of the bourgeoisie mentality is the desire to benefit individually from personal efforts, no Chinese can be classed as a proletarian. The desire for private ownership is a pronounced trait. There are Chinese inordinately poor, there are oppressed classes, there are masses on the verge of starvation. These create undoubtedly a huge population ripe for discontent and violence, but these are not proletarians in the Russian sense and never will be. Chinese individuals in the oppressed masses do not by nature conceive of contributing the proceeds of their efforts to the community. Individual effort for personal gain in the long run will be the impelling motive for Chinese action. Hungry coolies have by their efforts risen to be tuchuns, and the generality of Chinese coolies would reserve the system whereby the lucky individuals might enjoy the selfish delights and benefits of a sudden rise to high position. Every number-one houseboy is a petty tyrant and every coolie who suffers under him longs only for the day when he too may be a tyrant. The elimination of tyrants is a fond desire of all Chinese but not the elimination of the system permitting tyrants. Chiang Kai-shek's misuse of power is typical of this trait. The civilian members of the Hankow Government whose careers run to the exerting of power over mild-natured militarists rather than commanding troops themselves, are no exception to this rule. Russian theories are incompatible with Chinese aspirations for individual power and gain.

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The agrarian situation in China is not believed to be favorable to the Russian experiment. The Russian economists claim that in the South a great part of the land is held by large landholders. This is not true in the North, and has formerly been held untrue generally over China. The leaders in Hankow who at the moment are denouncing their erstwhile mentors state that China is a country of small landholders and has no agrarian problem crying for solution. This view is probably correct in spite of the widespread peasant brutalities in Hunan which the Russians pictured as a natural expression of the masses against exploitation. It is believed that the excesses in Hunan were the result of a relaxation of all authority which permitted the release of animal passions of very ignorant and incited masses and the free play of some of the Chinese natural traits mentioned above. Hunan is proof of the existence of the more unwholesome traits of the Chinese, traits incidentally incompatible with Communist theories, rather than of a genuine mass demand for needed agrarian reforms. The Hunan developments have damaged the Russian cause all over China.

In spite of the continuing slogans regarding imperialistic countries, there are growing evidences that the destruction of imperialist commerce has brought only hunger and suffering to some millions of people who benefitted from foreign trade. This effect cannot long be hidden from the more practical Chinese people and ultimately the blame for their distress will be shifted to the Russians and the Communist Party in China. This is now being widely done.

Political.

As mentioned before, the Soviet system of party government is based upon the dominance of a small group and implicit obedience of all the rest. The military leaders are nothing; the civilian bosses everything.

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In China, power always has resided in the group which controls the troops. In crises the power ultimately resides in the men who command the troops. Throughout Chinese history commanders of troops have become the emperors and these in turn have been at pains to poison their too successful subordinates in recognition of the principle that the strong man rules. The Chinese soldier will only temporarily subordinate himself to the civilian thinker and soldiers are not the type to accept the unnatural Communist theories of the supremacy of the weaklings.

Assuming the Chinese are as subject to regeneration under Communist principles as other people, their inertia is tremendous. The enthusiasm in the South for radical changes was more superficial than it appeared. The great mass of population preferred to be left alone. The energy and perseverance in stirring the population and keeping it incited was a tribute more to Russian propaganda efficiency and fanaticism than an evidence of deep and widespread desire for revolution. The slightest relaxation on the part of propagandists always has been followed by a relapse of the people into apathy. Hunan was so thoroughly uprooted by the revolution that it may seem to be an exception to this statement. Russians got in their best work in Hunan.

In Russia, while the peasants hate bolshevism, they originally were won to the revolution by being given, or promised, the land to divide and the old landlords to tear to pieces. In China there is no land to divide and no royalty to be made the target of hatred. The militarists have been made the objects of attack, quite justly, but militarists offer no wealth or privileged position to be divided; they exist only by their own ability. Destroy the militarists of the North and so long as the Chinese remain as they are, militarists of the South will rise in their places. The Russians have failed to supplant military by civil authority supported by the masses.

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The Chinese, unable to compete with the material development of the West, in their conceit fall back on criticism of western materialism as unworthy of a superior people. They are over conscious of their weakness in this direction but cannot, as did the Japanese, overcome their ineptitude to develop material strength. They do suffer from an inferiority complex. When the more rational attention of the world was drawn to the magnitude of Russia's effort in the so-called Nationalist movement by the seizure of the British concessions and the succeeding violence along the Yangtze, fingers began to be pointed at the Nationalist movement. The disclosures resulting from the raid on the Soviet Embassy aroused further suspicion among Chinese and foreigners as to Russia's role. Russia, whose activities were receiving little attention and whose practices were being condoned by emotional societies all over the world, suddenly was thrown into the most unfavorable limelight. The isolation of Russia became more pronounced and many Chinese became aware they were dealing with the pariah nation of the world. Prominent Chinese are most sensitive to the opinion of the world. Here they were playing with a most unsavory nation, which nation had been "caught with the goods". These Russians too, as was proved by captured documents, had criticized the utter incompetence of the Chinese as roundly as had the die-hards of imperialist nations. Russia, even more than the erstwhile imperialist nations, demonstrated a genuine weakness in Chinese eyes for not punishing the rashness of the Fengtienites in their suppressive measures all over North China. Nobody can estimate the loss of face which Russia suffered in the spring days of 1927.

Japan had out-wested the West in her manifestations of sympathy for the Nationalist movement. The Japanese people assumed the attitude that even a critical analysis of the movement was unjust to the aspirations of the Chinese. Officials publicly declared their sympathy, and lost no opportunity to deny that the Russians were engaged in activities which

ultimately would be harmful to Japanese interests. The Russians fostered this idea in every way. Privately Japanese officials showed great suspicion and concern about Russia's part. By April of this year the Japanese ceased denying that Russian activities were a possible menace to them. The clash of interests could not be glossed over. A change of government occurred and Japan declared the strongest policy vis-a-vis China that any imperialist nation has dared. Today no Japanese influence is inactive in combatting the spread of communism in China and the continuance of Russian influence. Widespread Japanese influence throughout China will create many formidable obstacles to radicalism.

I have not mentioned any military factors which in themselves rarely are decisive in Chinese situations. The effective reactionary struggle being made by Chang Tso-lin perhaps has had only the effect of slowing up the Nationalist movement sufficiently to permit the natural Chinese forces, unfavorable to the spread of Russian ideas and the consummation of Russian policies, to operate. Chang Tso-lin still exists because he and his group are more genuinely Chinese than his enemies rather than because the Fengtien armies have effectively resisted a powerful Chinese movement. Chang Tso-lin has greatly contributed to the welfare of China and has been a most effective bar to communistic success by his bold measures in driving the powerful underground organization from cover, and exposing the whole Russian scheme.

Recent Developments.

Having gone to some length in trying to show theoretically that the huge Russian experiment promises to fail in creating its objective, namely, a socialistic revolution, when all Chinese tendencies strongly indicate reaction or, at most, a bourgeoisie revolution, very recent developments tend to prove the argument. What in brief has actually occurred is the North, while the whole undercurrent of opinion is antagonistic to suppression by militarists, remains so far as can be observed immune to the fundamental

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communistic political ideas. The practical effects of the communistic efforts in the South have created considerable mistrust even of the Nationalist movement, and the Russians seem to be popularly accused of having destroyed the revolution, which was universally desired, even if not understood. All factions of the Kuomintang have now publicly denounced communists, suppressed radicalism and have made at least a start in expelling the Russians except the group surrounding Feng Yu-hsiang. His position is ambiguous, but at present he appears to be harboring the Russian emigres, to be clinging to communistic practices and still receiving Russian money and munitions. This last may explain his whole seeming pro-Russian attitude, for Feng has never manifested loyalty to men nor to a cause when his interests were slightly imperilled. If the Russians become a real stench in Chinese nostrils Feng may be expected to deal with them more brutally and arbitrarily than have the other factions.

Chiang Kai-shek in defense of his own action charged the communists with having destroyed the revolution, and proceeded consistently to hound the communists and to denounce those Russians who were not of remaining assistance to him. The Hankow group clung to the Chinese communists and their Russian advisers until very recently. They saw the Kuomintang Party breaking up and the military invasion of the North stopped. A victim had to be found. The denouncing of Chiang Kai-shek had gained them little. In fact it would seem that Chiang Mi-shek had gained more support by attacking communists than Hankow had by denouncing Chiang as the New Militarist. Politically and economically Hankow was visibly weakening. Subordinate military commanders saw the signs of a breakup. The victim had to be found and Hankow suddenly and belatedly discovered "proofs" that the Communists had played falsely by the Kuomintang Party, that by no degree of elasticity could the San Min Principles cover the wreckage of Hunan and the destruction

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of all sources of income in the Yangtze Valley. It must have been the Communists. It was the Communists! Not only had the Communists been deceiving the Kuomintang Party and planning its destruction, but it was conveniently discovered (Northerners find documentary proofs more quickly than the Cantonese) that the Third International was actually a party to the scheme to supplant the Kuomintang by the Communists, who would be Chinese no longer but a creditable international, red organization. The Hankow leaders most suddenly found themselves in the hands of unsavory elements and declared against them. I believe Chinese opinion had already denounced communism in no uncertain terms, and Hankow could only follow popular opinion. With the exception of Eugene Chen all important Hankow leaders have taken pains to announce that the revolution has been delayed by false friends - and by innuendo by another group of foreigners.

The Russian organization, without whose directives the Communist Party of China will probably languish or undergo transformation to suit peculiar Chinese characteristics, has been recently disrupted, and the Russian personnel is either departing or finding unwelcome lodging places. The cleavage between the Kuomintang Party and the Communist Party of China today is definite. However, long after the last Russian advisor motors to the west, China will suffer from the unsound ideas which were implanted in Chinese minds with the most consummate revolutionary skill by sincere and energetic fanatics. The Chinese character has a high coefficient of absorption. It embalms moribund ideas like amber does flies and is loath to part from any functions, good or bad, however acquired. In consequence, some theories of radicalism, turned down upon first presentation by innate Chinese inertia, may on the other hand be expected to persist longer than elsewhere.

Conclusions.

Whereas I believe that all natural Chinese influences are operating to enclose the Communist nuclei as tissue surrounds foreign substance in the human body, the distribution and strength of Communist cells cannot

be fully known. Where the infection may spread or break out in violence can only be conjectured. How long Communist influence may work within the Kuomintang and among the people is highly speculative; however, the present tendency of the Chinese undoubtedly is to consider communism foreign and first to encase, then absorb it.

Meanwhile the length of time required and the degree of suffering to be borne by the Chinese people in the process of expelling Communist theories and Soviet influence WILL DEPEND MOST UPON THE UNCOMPROMISING ATTITUDE ASSUMED BY THE LARGER POWERS TOWARD THE ACTIVITIES OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS, which attitude rather than sentimentality will best assist the genuine Chinese in restoring normal conditions. Whereas the Russian onslaught is believed to have been doomed to failure, it is even now possible that a recrudescence of communist power accompanied by a reign of terror may arise before the inevitable and, historically speaking, early reaction sets in. The following facts must be considered:

(a) The Chinese leaders most under Russian influence are those who best have conducted propaganda to win American public opinion in their favor.

(b) Russian policy in the Far East depends upon the success of her establishing a revolutionary regime in China, a regime which is Communist and international. In spite of her partial defeats it is not to be expected that she will readily accept final defeat.

(c) A large and active Communist Party exists in China and the intimate relations between this Party and the 3rd International are only temporarily impaired by being forced underground.

(d) A policy of the Kuomintang Party declared by Dr. Sun of maintaining the most friendly and mutual relations with Soviet Russia

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has not been denounced by any of the Hankow leaders. On the contrary, several of the most prominent ones mentioned the advisability of maintaining close cooperation with Russia in their common revolutionary aims.

(e) Russian advisors in great numbers are still in China and their activities continue. Nobody can estimate the importance of the role being played in the Kuomintang reorganization now in progress by the hidden hand of the Chinese Communists, still under Russian direction.

John Magruder,
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WAR DEPARTMENT

Organization and means of communication in the armies of the Canton Government before creation of the National-Revolutionary Army.

The army of the Canton Government of the past consisted of several armies of individual militarest generals from other provinces of China, namely: the Yünnan army, the Kwang si army, the Hunan army, etc. All those armies existed independently of each other, were not united into a whole and each one was separately subordinated to the headquarters of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Neither the headquarters nor any of the above mentioned armies had properly organized communication service. There were in each of those armies primitive organs of communication, under the name of "Detachments of Communication", the numerical strength and the duties of which were very diverse. Sometimes such "detachment of communication" carried out duties of a military band (the Hunan army), or a "detachment of communication" did the same work as a military engineer (sapper) detachment. Sometimes the bodyguard of the commander-in-chief of an army was at the same time the detachment of communication". Even "detachments of communication" of that kind were attached only to the staffs of armies, very seldom to the staffs of army corps or divisions, and never to the staffs of brigades and regiments.

The duties of the above mentioned "detachments of communication" were very limited and never went beyond installation of telephones in the lodgings of the high officials of the army staff. Sometimes, in exceptional cases, only by permission of the commander of the army, those detachments organized the telephone communication during war time between the most important points. There was in those armies no training of specialists of communication, nor were there

any practical exercises with the actual personnel. The procurement of personnel of these detachments was carried out through engaging the necessary men from civilian life. Specialists engaged in that way served in the army as civilian employees and were given the pay of officers of various ranks. This pay however varied according to the number of trained specialists available and the armies were usually forced to pay high salaries, as good specialists in Kwangtung were very few (there were no specialist schools in Canton.)

There was no centralization in supplying the material for communication, and each detachment of communication was supplied with funds at the moment when it was necessary to install telephone communications (those detachments, except the telephone property, had no other property), and purchased the necessary material on the local market.

Owing to the fact that there were only very few "detachments of communication" and that these detachments were unable to establish proper communication on account of the scarcity of trained personnel and on account of the almost complete lack of technical equipment (each detachment had at its disposal not more than 6 or 7 telephones and 20 "li" of wire), military units were compelled to rely exclusively on communication by messengers which was done neither by soldiers nor military employees in general but by local people - peasants of the region through which the unit in question was passing. The organization of this kind of "communication" was extremely simple. A peasant was hired for 1 or 2 dollars, given a letter and sent to the point where the military unit, to which this letter was addressed, was supposed to be, and the messenger was told that if he delivered the letter the same sum would be paid him there. This was the only way of communication used by military units at the front. By means of such communication system commanders of regiments and brigades informed their divisional commanders as to their actions, in-

tentions and the state of their units, and divisional commanders sent them their combat orders.

It is quite natural that military units and especially the staffs of the armies also used the ~~civilian~~ commercial means of communications available, which in the territory of Kwangtung were: a) the telegraph; b) the radio-telegraph; c) the telephone.

A. A. There were in Kwangtung 89 telegraph stations (with "Morse" apparatus) chiefly in district towns, with Canton as the central point. Telegraph lines between district towns had only one wire, and only lines from Canton to Swatow, Shaokuan, Kangmen and Wuchow had 2 or 3 wires. All those lines were constructed before the revolution and were part of the general Chinese telegraphic system.

After the secession of Kwangtung from Central China, the Kwangtung telegraph administration was also compelled to sever relations with the central telegraphic organs and to act independently. Moreover, owing to local wars of the Canton Government with militarists and the seizure by them of some parts of Kwangtung, the telegraph system of Kwangtung was divided into three parts, namely:

a) The Eastern part which fell into Gen. Chen Chün-min's power.
b) The Southern part which was under the control of Gen. Teng Pen-yin.
c) The central part which was under control of the Canton Government.

Those three parts were separate from each other, and even individual telegraph stations very often existed quite independently without being subordinated to anybody.

Complete absence of control over the work of the telegraph stations, irresponsibility of the persons who were at the head of this business, irregularity in payment of salaries to the employees forced them to use telegraph receipts of the stations to cover arrears of their salaries and often to appropriate the re-

[illegible]. Under all those conditions, any repair of telegraph lines was naturally out of the question, and for many years telegraph lines remained without any kind of repairs. All poles became rotten, wires were falling down, insulators were broken, etc. Telegraph stations the receipts of which were not sufficient to pay for the work of their employees limited their activity and entered into engagement with some other institutions or hired themselves out for service to military units reserving the right to accept private telegrams. Everybody lived from hand to mouth and did not care a bit about improvement of the business.

B. B. There were 8 radio-stations in Kwangtung which were established at the following places:

1. The Central radiostation in Canton (one kilowatt).
2. The radiostation in Swatow, (one kilowatt).
3. The radiostation in Shaokuan, (one kilowatt).
4. The radiostation in Wuchow (Kuangsi) (one kilowatt).
5. The radiostation in the fortress of Waichow, (½ kilowatt).
6. The radiostation in Shaochen (Western river), (½ kilowatt).
7. The radiostation in the fortress of Humen (½ kilowatt).
8. The radiostation in Kungmen (½ kilowatt).

C. C. Telephones in Kwangtung were established only in large places, such as Canton, Swatow, etc. and were used only for local communications. There was no long distance telephone communication.

<u>Organization and means of communication in the National-Revolutionary Army of the South of China.</u>

From the day of creation of the National-Revolutionary Army, the Inspectorate of Communication was established in the General Staff of the Army to direct organization and work of communication in all units of the Army. In connection with that scheme, corresponding organs of communication were planned in all military units. At the present time only the organization of the Inspectorate of Communication of the General Staff is completed. As

regards army corps, divisions and regiments, the work in connection with the organization of units of communication is only in an embryonic state on account of the lack of technical equipment and trained personnel.

Training of personnel for the units of communication.

Training of personnel for the units of communication is so far being carried on only on a small scale because qualified students are lacking. The only exception is the 1st army corps (former "Whampoa" units) in which a course in communications for 200 enlisted men has been organized. These men, after completion of their studies, will be used for the organization of units of communication in the corps.

It is planned to train in the near future two categories of specialists of communication, namely: 1) officers; 2) enlisted men.

The officers personnel will be trained in the Central Military Politaical School in the class of communication, which is a part of the section for the training of technical troops. The graduates of the class of communication will be appointed commanders of companies and platoons of communication and chiefs or radio-stations.

The enlisted specialists will be trained in the training company of the battalion of communication of the General Staff. The above said Company will train telegraph and telephone-inspectors and repairmen and telegraph and telephone-operators.

Supplying military units with signal equipments.

The National-Revolutionary Army so far has no properly organized supply service for technical equipment, and supplying military units with signal equipment is only done in a haphazard manner. The chief obstacle for organization of a central supply of materials for communication is the lack of this material on the local market and the absence in Canton and in the neighborhood of factories making such equipment. Under existing condi-

tions the National-Revolutionary Army is obliged either to buy the necessary material of communication abroad which requires a big outlay of money, or to confine itself to buying articles which can be found on the local market, such as: telephones of the commercial type and bare zink wire. Financial difficulties force the army to buy whatever they can get locally and to supply military units with inferior equipment. If the wholesale purchase of signal equipment necessary for all units of the army is approved by the Military Council, that material will be bought abroad, and the military units will be supplied in the future in accordance with the plan and the tables which already have been prepared.

Work of the Inspectorate of Communication of the General Staff.

Notwithstanding the fact that the project of organization of the troops of communication has been approved by the Military Council of the National-Revolutionary Army as early as in June 1925, it has not as yet been put in practice fully. On account of the lack of signal equipment and necessary funds, it is impossible to do anything in this respect and to remove obstacles that hinder the full development of work in connection with creation of organs of communication in all military units.

Under such conditions, the Inspectorate of Communication was compelled to follow the line of least resistance and to use everything that could be obtained from the commercial means of communication and adapt it for military purposes. For instance:

1. The Inspectorate of Communication took under its control all radiostations in the territory of Kwangtung. The number of these stations has now been decreased by two, namely:

a) The equipment of the radiostation in Swatow was taken away by Gen. Chen Chün-min during the flight of his army from the Eastern region.

b) In the radiostation of the fortress of Wai-chow the generator was burned out.

The rest of the radiostations are under strict control, and now it is always possible to get into communication with military units stationed in the places where the radiostations are situated. It is true, that the stations themselves, from a technical standpoint, have almost no value at all, being of old construction and having been bought different firms (American, English, German, Japanese, etc.) and, what is most important, after many years of work having had no repairs.

2. The Inspectorate of Communication took possession of the Telephone central of the provincial government with a switch board for 100 numbers, and adapted it for the needs of the General Staff. With the aid of this central the staff maintains all its interior communications as well as communications with military units inside the town and other organizations.

3. The Inspectorate also extended its control over the commercial telegraph services. Through the commercial telegraph the General Staff is able to communicate with army corps which are sent for protection of the frontiers of the province.

4. In connection with clearing the whole territory of Kwangtung of the hostile troops, the Inspectorate of the General Staff directs, regulates the administration of commercial telegraphs, subordinating all telegraph stations to the central telegraph Administration in Canton. Under its direction a project for repairing and development of telegraph lines is being drawn up. In accordance with this project the number of wires between the more important towns will be increased by one telegraph - and one telephone wire.

5. On account of the great necessity to have communications with military units in the South of Kwangtung (the territory which has been captured from the troops of Gen. Teng Pen-yin, and the island of Hainan) it is projected to install two more radiostations. All necessary machinery for these stations is ready but not in good condition. The funds for repairing this machinery

have been appropriated and as soon as the money is received, the repair and installation work will be started immediately.

Characteristics of the Personnel of the Inspectorate of Communication.

The Inspectorate of Communication of the General Staff is headed at the present time by a Russian adviser who at the same time is Inspector of Communications in the General Staff. The personnel of the Inspectorate consists of men, the majority of whom are not military men and have no experience in establishing of military communications and who are not even specialists. There are in the personnel of the Inspectorate only two specialists - Chinese who were educated in America and call themselves - "electrician engineers", but who evidently have had no practical experience and are unable to solve even the most simple problems in communications.

The Personnel of Radio-stations.

The personnel of radio-stations consists mostly of men who have no thorough technical education being only graduates of short-termed radio-courses. Even among the chiefs of radio-stations, there are no specialists who can be depended upon and who can be put in charge of stations. Owing to such personnel, very often generators in the stations are burned out, and, on account of technical inefficiency, the stations are obliged to stop their work. All without exception, from the chiefs of stations downward, steal, embezzling the money assigned for technical needs of the stations.